MODERNIZATION À LA MODE:
WEST GERMAN AND AMERICAN DEVELOPMENT PLANS
FOR THE THIRD WORLD

Corinna R. Unger
Research Fellow, GHI

The research presented in this paper is part of a larger project entitled “How to Make Men Modern: Western Modernization and Development Policies vis-à-vis the Third World since 1945.” This paper will introduce some of the problems central to the project: decolonization and postcolonialism, modernization theory, Cold War politics, and development aid. It will also provide a short case study of an aid project in India to give insight into the complicated relationship between the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany in the field of development politics in the late 1950s and early 1960s. At this point, I am concentrating on West German and American perspectives, but I do plan to integrate the perspectives and experiences of those who received development aid at a later stage.

I. Decolonization, the Cold War, and the Creation of the Third World

Decolonization—formally “the process whereby colonial powers transferred institutional and legal control over their territories and dependencies to indigenously based, formally sovereign, nation-states”—played an extraordinarily important role in determining the world’s political course after 1945. As old empires were dismantled in the wake of World War II, new nations and alliances established themselves in parts of the world that for centuries had been marginalized as “periphery.” In everyday practice, decolonization was “a clutch of fitful activities and events, played out in conference rooms, acted out in protests mounted in city streets, fought over in jungles and mountains.” The effects of decolonization on the former colonies were sweeping, often dramatic, even though continuities to colonial times were strong: “The whole entity that the new leaders were trying to fill with their own content was a colonial construct: its borders, its capital city, its official language.” The newly gained independence posed at least as many problems as chances, seeing that “[t]he world was, quite simply, filled up. The postcolonial responsibility was essentially to undo the clutter: crowded cities, unemployment, trade imbalance, inefficient bureaucracies, insufficient educational establishments. And yet all such needful activities were largely constrained or
twisted by a global economic system itself undergoing major change. In this situation, new dependencies to the industrialized nations were difficult to avoid.

Very differently, decolonization presented the former colonial powers with grave challenges, too. On the economic level, they feared for their privileged access to resources, export markets, and the loss of financial advantages. On the socio-cultural level, they had to come to terms with the fact that their civilizing missions were no longer welcome and that their nations were reduced to their original territories. This implied a loss of power and status as well as a challenge to national identity. On the political level, the redistribution of international power and the creation of new sovereign entities led to an overall restructuring of the Eurocentric world. What came to be called the Third World was soon posing “a fundamental challenge to Western global dominance.” But the evolution of the Third World—a political as well as a cultural construct—cannot sufficiently be explained by decolonization. The Third World was also a brainchild of the Cold War, which coincided with decolonization and intensified its inherent problems.

The Cold War world was divided into two camps, both of which were driven by the effort to enlarge their respective spheres of ideological and political influence as well as their access to markets and natural resources. Above all, Arne Odd Westad argues, it was a competition over two concepts of modernity, one socialist, one capitalist, with both claiming universal validity. Since the newly sovereign nations did not belong to either of the two blocs, their existence constituted a strategic and ideological vacuum. From the Western point of view informed by the domino theory, there was a danger that if one of the non-aligned nations became communist, the whole region would “fall” to communism. Thus, the Soviet Union would gain the upper hand in the struggle for global power. Consequently, any communist effort to draw the non-aligned nations closer to the East was to be countered, and the West had to convince the African and Asian societies that it was in their interest to join forces with the free world. Backed by the belief in a historical mission to support independence movements and to promote American civilization, intervention into Third World countries became an integral part of American foreign policy during the Cold War.

Building nations and establishing democratic, capitalist, modern structures in the developing regions gained in importance after the Conference of Bandung (1955), the largest meeting of the newly independent nations and those struggling for independence. Bandung was not only proof of Afro-Asian solidarity but also of the evolution of the non-aligned movement, whose members tried to stay independent from both East and West. In American eyes, neutrality was acceptable as long as it was
stringently anticommunist. But since communism was defined as "any resistance to Third World governments that swore allegiance to capitalism, democracy, and an alliance with the United States," the perceived need to intervene clearly increased. From the consensus-liberal perspective that dominated political thinking in the postwar era, modernization theory seemed to allow for such interventions to be nonviolent, peaceful, and constructive.

II. Modernization Theory and Development Aid

Modernization theory, developed by American social scientists in the mid-1950s, believed in the existence of a linear path from tradition to modernity that every society could, and should, take. In order to become modern, one would have to discard traditions and embrace rational, objective norms and values supposedly free of ideology. Under the influence of the Cold War, the belief in the intellectual superiority of the West and the inferiority of traditional lifestyles helped to construct a picture of the Third World that strongly differed from, and seemed to threaten, everything the West believed in. The danger of societies remaining traditional and falling prey to communism appeared so great that it was deemed imperative to transform them to modernity by encouraging their economic development. According to Walt W. Rostow, the most popular proponent of modernization theory, once a country had reached a certain economic stage, it would automatically progress toward modernity—modernity meaning the democratic, capitalist nation-state embodied by the United States. To further this process, the already-modern nations had a duty to help the backward societies reach the level from which "take-off" would begin. Consequently, economic and technical aid played a central role in the modernization scheme, making foreign interventions into Third World nations' domestic politics appear as philanthropic missions. And since Rostow and others had close connections to the American administrations, many of their recommendations concerning Third World politics were put into practice. In the 1950s, the U.S. government and philanthropic foundations, "as a nonofficial extension of U.S. policy," began to invest huge amounts of money in Third World countries to encourage their economies' growth and kick off modernization.

Development aid, as it came to be called, promised to help those in need, to contain communism peacefully, and to establish Western norms of modernity in the "backward" areas of the world. In many cases, "deep cultural biases . . . conditioned U.S. attitudes toward non-Western societies and leaders—attitudes that abounded with dismissive stereotypes regarding the presumably effete, emotional, unstable, and, above all, in-
Thus, one had to win their “hearts and minds” for the cause of modernity. This became one of the central goals of American foreign policy—via cultural exchanges, films, exhibitions, and sports events. Neither the need for modernization nor the assumption that every developing nation wanted to become a Western-style nation-state was truly questioned, and modernization theory’s inherent teleology seems to have been largely ignored.

West German observers were greatly interested in American modernization schemes, and they eagerly read Rostow’s writings. They, too, believed in the need to modernize the decolonized regions by applying Western methods and standards. In fact, the Federal Republic, which was believed to “lack” a colonial past and therefore to have easier access to the decolonized nations than the other European powers, became a prominent player in this endeavor—although West Germany had just overcome its very own anti-modern, anti-Western prejudices. In this sense, the Cold War served as a catalyst that promoted Western-style modernity across national borders. Yet despite agreement that change toward modernity and, consequently, external interventions were necessary, American and West German methods of bringing about change differed. West German development aid always remained distinctly German, especially by relying on private investments and concepts like cooperative societies and the “social market economy.” Also, reservations toward American-style modernity and the United States’ pragmatic, Cold War-determined approach to development aid seem to have caused conflict within the transatlantic “alliance for modernity.”

In retrospect, we often seem to believe that the Cold War, Adenauer’s eagerness to integrate the Federal Republic into the West, and the American appreciation of West Germany’s usefulness as an ally resulted in an extraordinarily solid partnership that withstood domestic and international disputes. Yet West German-American differences concerning methods and measures of development aid, and, more broadly, the adequate type of modernity for the Third World burdened the two countries’ relationship. Hence, it does not seem to be true that “Bonn’s [development] policies merely represented faithful support for the role assigned to the Third World within the post-war framework designed by the West.” Unquestionably, the Federal Republic did subordinate itself to the Western alliance, with the Cold War transcending many national interests. But that does not mean that it gave up its political ideals or its ambition to influence the course of international politics. No matter how strong the influence of the Cold War, it did not fully neutralize nations’ beliefs in their historical and cultural individuality. Consequently, each nation projected its own expectations onto other parts of the world. Thus,
what has been called the “Americanization” of the West might have to be analyzed more closely to recognize the divergences that remained alive beneath the common rhetoric of Western modernization and integration. Development politics offer a gateway to this phenomenon.

III. West Germany and the Third World in the Context of the Cold War

In the late 1950s, West German observers were convinced that the Federal Republic’s political, economic, and cultural efforts in Africa and Asia were insufficient: They neither kept communism at bay nor strengthened the position of the West. At the same time, communist activities in the decolonized regions intensified. As soon as a former colony became independent, the U.S.S.R. initiated a multifaceted program of financial and technical aid, goodwill missions, and cultural exchanges. Its representatives approached the indigenous societies respectfully, studied local languages and cultures, took serious interest in everyday problems, offered (and actually gave) generous material aid, and distributed professionally designed information—propaganda in the Western view—about the Soviet Union and communism, Bonn’s embassies reported.24 In sharp contrast to the Soviets, most West German diplomats lived gated lives, had little contact with the general population, showed little interest in their host cultures (about which they often had strong, sometimes racist prejudices), and concentrated their public outreach—academic booklets about the Oder-Neisse line and the like—on the local elites.

Convinced that the U.S.S.R. was trying to expel Western European influences from Africa and to integrate the continent into the communist bloc in order to promote world revolution, members of the Foreign Service in the late 1950s demanded that the Federal Republic work harder “to win the developing peoples of Africa over for our intellectual orientation and to offer them practical advice on how to solve their economic and sociological problems.”25 Interestingly, American observers in the State Department thought that their West German colleagues were exaggerating the “communist threat” in the Third World. Marxist theory did possess some potential to explain the Third World’s inequalities, making it attractive to some, they conceded. But they were convinced that “our basic cause is so superior to that of the Soviets that our credibility should grow, whereas the contradiction between Soviet theory and practice will be more revealed with the passage of time.”26 Sooner or later, the developing countries would turn away from communism and join the West, they believed.

But even if one shared this pragmatic optimism, it did not seem advisable to allow the Soviet Union to become overly popular and pre-
vent the West from pursuing its legitimate interests in the Third World, observers on both sides of the Atlantic agreed. For the Federal Republic this meant that its public outreach should follow a less elitist, more practical approach—without ever entering into a competition with the U.S.S.R., of course. In trying to anchor Western principles in African societies, West German diplomats should make better use of the colonial legacies in the fields of language, religion, culture, law, and administration, the Foreign Office recommended.

Christian missions, which the decolonized societies regarded much less suspiciously than government institutions, could function as “bastions of the West,” “immunize the people against communism,” and “support the developing countries’ attempts to improve their intellectual and social levels.” In addition, the “materialistic attitude [of many in the Third World], especially of the Blacks” seemed to hold the possibility of winning the developing countries’ sympathies by offering them goods the Eastern bloc could not afford.

Development aid was the “natural” instrument for realizing these goals. To be sure, some bureaucrats in the West German ministries warned that aid to the Third World must not be exploited but must remain an end in itself and be used only as the first step toward self-help (Hilfe zur Selbsthilfe). They argued that it was at least as important to convince the developing societies that liberty, individualism, and capitalism were morally superior to totalitarianism, collectivism, and planned economies as it was to keep up with Soviet levels of aid. But the Soviet dual promise of rapid industrialization and social justice was hard to counter, and concepts like “freedom” and “democracy” were much too abstract to attract immediate enthusiasm from societies that at this point had much more urgent problems to solve. In this situation, development aid, as a “show and tell” approach under the umbrella of philanthropy, was seen as the best way of exporting Western values to the non-aligned countries. Goodwill campaigns like the donation of mobile hospitals to newly independent nations, the invitation of local elites to the Federal Republic, financial aid for schools and hospitals, and the delegation of agricultural, engineering, and medical experts to developing countries soon became regular elements of West German development politics.

IV. What to Give and How to Help: Concepts of Foreign Aid

Development aid was taken seriously in the Federal Republic’s ministries, and many of the bureaucrats involved tried hard to further what they thought was in the best interest of the developing nations. Aid should be given with regard to the receivers’ needs instead of being instrumentalized in the donor nations’ interests, they urged. The latter seemed to be true of U.S. aid to developing countries, as the West German
OECE representative stated in 1961. Whereas the U.S. government portrayed its aid as purely philanthropic, he was convinced that most of it was being allocated according to American military and economic interests.36 To some degree, such criticism was part of the effort to counter American demands that the FRG spend more money on foreign aid and liberalize its conditions of granting money, credits, and material to developing countries. Citing the Federal Republic’s remarkable export surplus, the U.S. government in the late 1950s and early 1960s continuously increased its pressure on West Germany to contribute a larger share to the alliance’s cause in the Third World.37 The FRG eventually fell in line, and by the early 1960s it was one of the leading donors of development aid worldwide. Already by the late 1950s, West German aid had surpassed American aid as a percentage of GDP.38

Still, the administration continued to argue that it was irrational to spend money too freely or on a multinational level, and that it made much more sense to give aid to individual nations for specific projects that could be controlled and evaluated. Bonn’s development experts were also critical of American measures that aimed to enable Third World nations to stabilize their export rates. In practice, this meant buying large quantities of raw materials or agricultural produce from developing countries at fixed prices. While such measures brought short-term relief to the producers, they carried the danger of creating structural disadvantages and requiring long-term commitments from the donor nations, West German officials argued.39 Similarly, they did not believe in the American policy of stockpiling natural resources for fear that it would damage local producers in the long run.40 In general, the FRG’s economic and financial aid guidelines can be characterized as conservative in the sense that they emphasized the need to promote sustainable development. They were progressive in acknowledging the interdependencies between economic, financial, political, and social conditions of underdevelopment. Overall, West German development experts regarded aid not primarily as a means of change but as a catalyst to initialize change.41

This positive assessment of West German development aid and the high degree of theoretical thinking it was based on should not suggest, though, that the Federal Republic’s development policy was solely dedicated to improving the living standard of the Third World nations.42 The large bureaucratic apparatus—a result of continuous inter-ministerial power-struggles—and the complicated process of granting aid prevented the West German programs from being truly efficient.43 The founding of the Ministry for Economic Cooperation in 1961 was, in part, a reaction to this situation. But the new ministry’s establishment and its attempt to centralize development policies did not bring about significant change.
because, for a long time, it did not succeed in coming up with a coherent development policy.\textsuperscript{44}

This lack of coherence was largely due to the Foreign Office’s argument that foreign aid was a diplomatic instrument that must be employed with utmost flexibility.\textsuperscript{45} Accusing the Ministry for Economic Cooperation of an “addiction to general planning \textit{[Generalplanungssucht]},” the Foreign Office argued that committing the Federal Republic to a specific concept of aid or to certain regions as focal points of aid would undermine the political usefulness of development aid. Those countries that supported the FRG’s position on the “German Question” should be rewarded with increased aid, while those that questioned or counteracted it risked being sanctioned. Obviously, the Foreign Office supported foreign aid not for philanthropic reasons but as a measure “useful to foreign policy.”\textsuperscript{46} While this utility was greatest vis-à-vis the developing countries, it also held the chance to improve the Federal Republic’s standing in the world and within the Western alliance, especially with the United States. West German development activities in India may serve as a case in point.

V. Competing for Influence: American and West German Aid to India

Having become independent in 1947, India, though one of the poorest countries in Southeast Asia, held great strategic importance in the Cold War world due to its location, size, and economic potential, especially vis-à-vis communist China.\textsuperscript{47} Jawaharlal Nehru, India’s charismatic leader who became the spokesperson of the non-aligned movement, was anxious to maintain the country’s autonomy while creating a “modern India.” Consequently, both the United States and the Soviet Union tried to persuade Nehru of the superiority of their respective courses toward modernity. The West faced the difficult task of countering the Soviet promise of “turning an agricultural nation into an industrial powerhouse . . . in less than a generation.”\textsuperscript{48} This challenged the United States to come up with a competitive development policy that also projected Indian industrialization within a short period of time while preventing its turn away from capitalism. When the Indian economy began to struggle in 1957–58, the risk of “losing” India to communism seemed greater than ever. Consequently, the U.S. government offered India an aid package of $225 million and organized a World Bank consortium to support the country. Parallel to this effort, the Ford Foundation gave a large grant to MIT’s Center for International Studies, calling on its economic experts, including Walt W. Rostow, to design a development plan that would surpass the Soviet model.\textsuperscript{49}
The Ford Foundation had dealt with India before: In the early 1950s it had invested several million dollars into integrated rural development projects that promoted social reform while increasing agricultural production. Its goal was to break “the cycle of rural poverty marked by increasing population, inequitable distribution of land, and low-yielding agricultural practices.” But by the late 1950s, new social-scientific concepts like modernization theory, which took into account technological and scientific advancements and drew on the latest sociological and economic findings, made such approaches look rather old-fashioned. From the perspective of many of the young, ambitious experts involved, promoting structural change in rural areas could hardly compete with the highflying plan to fully industrialize India within a few decades with the help of modern technology.

In the meantime, the Federal Republic had turned its attention to India, too. West German economic interests in India had been strong ever since the FRG’s postwar economic boom had set in. Offering India credits and industrial loans was regarded as the best way of helping the West German economy to gain a foothold on the continent in order to “open up” its markets to exports “made in Germany.” This was one of the motives for the Federal Republic to grant India $1.5 million of its $12.5 million development fund in 1959–60. The grant’s official aim was to further India’s industrialization, but the West German embassy in India neatly captured the larger idea behind it by stating: “In adapting the thesis ‘The trade follows the flag,’ one could now say ‘Trade follows technical help.’” What made India even more interesting was the prospect that it might be an oil-rich country. Accordingly, in 1957–58 the Foreign Office paid a team of seismic experts to search for oil in India, hoping not only for an economic payoff but also for a boost to the Federal Republic’s international prestige if its team found oil before the Soviets did. Clearly, Cold War and economic interests went hand in hand in shaping West Germany’s policy toward India.

This is not to say that economic considerations always determined West German development aid policy. In the case of the Federal Republic’s sponsoring the establishment of model villages in India in the early 1960s, political and ideological motives clearly dominated. The village project’s goal was to increase agricultural productivity, raise the general level of income, level social discrepancies, and solve the perceived problem of “overpopulation.” These efforts responded to the problem of rural populations leaving their villages for the cities, where observers feared they were likely to become “proletarianized.” In order to prevent revolts rooted in the unjust distribution of property and inspired by socialist propaganda, a new socio-economic order was believed necessary. Cooperative societies seemed to hold a solution:
ments, they allowed for more efficient agricultural production and greater, more equal wealth while fully embracing the principles of private property and individual achievement.55

Otto Schiller became one of the most prominent advocates of cooperative societies for the decolonized regions in the postwar era. Prior to 1945, he had concentrated on Russia, arguing that the Bolshevik Revolution could have been prevented if the czarist regime had initiated property reforms in time and thereby alleviated conflict within Russian society. After World War II, Schiller transferred his models onto Southeast Asia, whose conditions he found to be similar to Russia’s.56 Working for the United Nations’ Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO), he built model villages in Pakistan in the 1950s, finally realizing the plans originally produced for Russia. The Foreign Office supported his work because his efforts to “support systematically the agricultural progress of small farms through corporative measures” perfectly complemented the FAO’s village aid project, which promoted “general progress on the social, hygienic, communal and educational levels.” In the eyes of the ministry, this double effort was the best way of countering the communist model’s attraction because it helped the decolonized countries develop the “intellectual and moral [sittlichen] capacities necessary for a constructive and progressive solution to their difficult agricultural problems.”57

In 1961, Schiller became advisor to a five-year agricultural development project in India that the Federal Republic funded with nearly $2 million.58 The project’s goal was to increase agricultural productivity and improve living standards in order to keep the population in the rural areas. It was informed by the community development concept, which argued that modernizing agricultural and economic techniques without modernizing the people involved would ultimately fail.59 The search for an adequate region in which to set up the model village proved difficult, not least because American development experts were involved with similar projects in India. In 1960, the Ford Foundation had started its Intensive Agricultural District and Community Development Programs, very similar in design to the West German project.60 While the West Germans were looking for a model district, their American colleagues had already chosen districts in which the preconditions for agricultural modernization seemed encouraging. This meant that the Federal Republic had to pick from the “left-over” areas that were not as well suited for a successful experiment. Another advantage on the American side was that the Ford Foundation paid for artificial fertilizer, which improved the chances that agricultural output would be increased at a significant rate within a short time.61

Finally, the West Germans decided on the district Mandi in the northwestern part of Himachal Pradesh, which they believed to hold the high-
est chances for success compared to the American projects.\textsuperscript{62} Due to this competitive notion, they were greatly interested in the Ford Foundation’s program. The FRG’s embassy in New Delhi sent a copy of the agreement between the foundation and the Indian government to Bonn, along with a detailed analysis of the American program. This information was supposed to help the Federal Republic come up with “its very specific,” characteristically German project for India.\textsuperscript{63} Whereas the Ford Foundation’s expert traveled from site to site, the West Germans were to work directly in the village for longer periods of time, which it was hoped would give them greater influence on its development. Structurally, they planned to transfer the traditional German agricultural model—the mixed-economy family farm, with intensive tillage and gardening in addition to dairy and livestock farming—to India and adapt it to the local conditions. Seeing that, over a period of eight years, the Ford Foundation had spent $40 million in India on fertilizer, pesticides, laboratory equipment, and vehicles, the Federal Republic would have to be truly generous, the embassy emphasized. But it was clear that the FRG could not match the foundation’s practice of paying for half of the salaries for the Indian personnel, which resulted in “a certain financial dependence” of the Indian key personnel on the foundation. To make up for West Germany’s lack of direct control over the Indian personnel, the embassy recommended that Bonn’s program include a bonus system that would encourage the Indians to work hard. This would increase the chances that the project would succeed, thereby improving the FRG’s prestige.\textsuperscript{64}

This episode gives an idea of the degree to which the urge to help India’s rural population improve its living standard was overshadowed by the Federal Republic’s competition with the United States (despite, or parallel to, a rather close coordination of general foreign aid issues).\textsuperscript{65} Since the FRG could not afford “magic” help like artificial fertilizers to speed modernization, its development experts had to come up with cheaper alternatives that relied more heavily on structural, long-term changes. And while there can be no doubt that the U.S. experts genuinely wanted to do good in India, it seems clear that they also saw a chance to achieve spectacular successes that would persuade the global public that the United States was the most progressive society and would win the competition with the East within due time.

VI. Conclusion

As this overview has shown, Western development aid to the Third World during the Cold War has to be understood in terms of a bundle of extremely divergent motives. These included the First World’s honest wish to help the poor increase their living standards and achieve greater indi-
vidual and political freedom; the attempt to secure one’s access to raw materials and markets; the attraction of trying out social scientific models in the Third World “laboratory”; the effort to contain communism, strengthen the West, and stabilize democracy; the wish to increase one’s international prestige; and the belief in one’s responsibility to share with the world one’s real or imagined national achievements and to ease the new nations’ way to (the right kind of) modernity. Semantically and methodologically, these efforts often bore a striking resemblance to the “civilizing missions” of colonial times.

The case study of Western aid to India suggests that one cannot blame the Cold War and economic instrumentalization of development aid alone for the overall failure of Western development policy in the Third World. Internal competition within the Western alliance, too, kept development aid from being truly effective. Looking at the Federal Republic’s struggle to keep up with American development politics and its desperate efforts to improve its international reputation, one could argue that West Germany’s engagement in the Third World served as a means to reinvent a national identity that, after World War II, was so laden with negative associations that a new, constructive relationship to international politics was indispensable. Many West Germans seemed to believe that their country, despite its recent “lapse” into genocide, was entitled to embark on a “civilizing mission” in the Third World. Thus, participating in international development politics might also have served as a means of re-establishing the country’s reputation as a trustworthy, respectable power. Simultaneously, turning one’s attention to Africa and Asia and fantasizing about a new sphere of influence abroad might have eased the discarding of German imperial dreams. Finally, the Federal Republic’s attempts to improve its standing vis-à-vis the United States—its most dependable, yet most demanding ally—are proof of the difficulties it encountered in accepting American seniority and in coming to terms with its ultimately belonging to the West.

Notes

1 On the relevance of the Cold War to the Third World and vice versa, see Odd Arne Westad, The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Times (Cambridge, 2005).


3 The literature on decolonization is as vast as the range of approaches. An overview is provided by Dietmar Rothermund, Delhi, 15. August 1947: Das Ende kolonialer Herrschaft, 2d edition (Munich, 1999). Duara, Decolonization presents contemporary writings by African and Asian leaders of decolonization as well as historical interpretations of decolonization from the last fifty years. Duara’s introduction deals with the experience of decolonization by the decolonized; Duara, ed., Decolonization, 1–18. Also see the overview by Mike Mason, Development and Disorder: A History of the Third World since 1945 (Hanover, NH, 1997).


Betts, *Decolonization*, 66.

In his book *The Decolonization of Africa* (Athens, OH, 1995), David Birmingham stresses the colonial powers’ national economic interests. See Birmingham, *Decolonization*, 89. On the economic aspects of India’s decolonization, see Rothermund, *Delhi*, 34–37. Betts pays less attention to political parties and international accords than “to environment and atmosphere, to the sense of place, space, and perspective.” Betts, *Decolonization*, 3.


Robert J. McMahon, “Introduction: The Challenge of the Third World,” in *Empire and Revolution: The United States and the Third World since 1945*, ed. Peter L. Hahn and Mary Ann Heiss (Columbus, OH, 2001), 1–14. 1. Without ignoring the multiple ideological overtones of terms like “Third World,” “backward countries,” “developing countries,” “development,” “modernity,” and “modernization,” they are used in this paper without specifically labeling them.


Westad, *Global Cold War*, 46: “Locked in conflict over the very concept of European modernity—to which both states regarded themselves as successors—Washington and Moscow needed to change the world in order to prove the universal applicability of their ideologies, and the elites of the newly independent states proved fertile ground for their competition. By helping to expand the domains of freedom or of social justice, both powers saw themselves as assisting natural trends in world history and as defending their own security at the same time. Both saw a specific mission in and for the Third World that only their own state could carry out and which without their involvement would flounder in local hands.”


H. W. Brands argues that the Truman and Eisenhower administrations’ politics vis-à-vis neutralist countries were driven by geopolitical pragmatism, not by ideology: “If the neutralist actions of a particular country worked to the advantage of the United States, that country deserved, and usually received, American support. If a neutralist country challenged American interests, opposition was the rule.” H. W. Brands, *The Specter of Neutralism: The United States and the Emergence of the Third World, 1947–1960* (New York, 1989), 308.

Westad, *Global Cold War*, 119.


22 See the essays in David C. Engerman et al., eds., Staging Growth, and Frey, “Indoctrination, Entwicklungspolitik und ‘Stale Building.’”

23 Agrarian and development expert Otto Schiller called for a “modern economic order . . . which is better than the Eastern economic system but also better than what we have inherited from the 19th century under the token of capitalism.” Letter from Schiller to George F. Kennan, August 6, 1954, Archiv des Instituts für Osteuropäische Geschichte und Landeskunde Tübingen, Ordner “J-K von 1954.”


26 702-86.00–749/59 (Hoffmann), Memorandum “Politisch-strategische Konzeption der Sowjetpolitik gegenüber den sog. unabhängigen und unterentwickelten Ländern,” October 1, 1959, PA, B 12/340. See also the memorandum by the West German embassy in Conakry, “Zusammenfassende Berichterstattung über die politische, wirtschaftliche und kulturelle Aktivität des Ostblocks,” December 11, 1959, PA, B 12/357.


30 Abteilung 7 (Duckwitz), Memorandum “Die Lage der Bundesrepublik angesichts der weltweiten Aktivität des Ostblocks,” March 10, 1960, PA, B 12/356.

31 Referat 702, “Zusammenfassung der Ergebnisse der Konferenz der Missionschefs der BRD in Afrika (Addis Ababa, 12. bis 18. Oktober 1959) durch den Herrn Staatssekretär,” October 22, 1959, PA, B 12/340. The author continued by saying that he did not believe that it was true that this materialism made “the negro more susceptible to communism than to capitalism.”

32 See Abteilung 7 (Duckwitz), Memorandum “Die Lage der Bundesrepublik angesichts der weltweiten Aktivität des Ostblocks,” March 10, 1960, PA, B 12/356.
For example, Cameroon, Togo, Nigeria, and Somalia, all of which became independent in 1960, received a “Clinomobil” each from the Federal Republic. Clinomobil cost about $32,500 each, which the Foreign Office paid for out of its development fund. See 307-82.50-90-669/59, Memorandum “Entwicklungshilfe für die im Jahre 1960 unabhängig werdenden Staaten Afrikas,” September 2, 1959, PA, B 34/123.

For example, in 1958 the Federal Republic was hosting five interns from Liberia, two from Sudan, two from Ghana, one from British West Africa, and ten from Ethiopia, and there were offers for thirty-seven more internships, all paid for by the Federal Ministry of Economics and the Foreign Office. See letter from Referat 407 to Referat 307, “Praktikanten südlich der Sahara,” September 20, 1958, PA, B 34/123.

In 1959/60, technical aid for the newly independent states included $250,000 for a cocoa-planters’ school in Cameroon, $275,000 for sending three medical doctors to Togo and for supporting a vocational training center there, $200,000 for hospital equipment and the delegation of three medical doctors to Nigeria, and $200,000 for the delegation of expert teams to Somaliland. See 307-82.50-90-669/59, Memorandum “Entwicklungshilfe für die im Jahre 1960 unabhängig werdenden Staaten Afrikas,” September 2, 1959, PA, B 34/123.

A specialist for cattle breeding was sent to Guinea in 1958 in order to help the economically weak state and to counter East German engagement there. Concerns about possible conflicts with Guinea’s former colonial power, France, were regarded as less important than the strengthening of the Federal Republic’s position on the “German question.” See Leiter Namens des Representativen der Christlich-Demokratischen Politik der konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung (ACDP), Nachlaß Karl Friedrich Vialon (I-475), 015/11. West German public aid had increased from DM 1,321 million between 1950 and 1955 to DM 4,845 million between 1956 and 1959; in 1960, expenditures reached DM 938.9 million, DM 1,464.2 million in 1961, and DM 1,627.5 million in 1962. Manfred Glagow and Andreas Stucke, “Die Etablierung des Bundesministeriums für wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit (BMZ) und die Rolle seiner Gründungsmitglieder 1961–1963: Personelle Gestaltungsräume bei der Herausbildung administrativer Strukturen,” in Das Bundesministerium für wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit (BMZ): Entstehungszusammenhang, Personallpolitik, Steuerungsfähigkeit, ed. Manfred Glagow, Wilfried Gotsch, and Andreas Stucke (Pfaffenweiler–Gerzaberg, 1989), 1–90, 25.


See Unterabteilung I A, I A 3—2090/58, Memorandum “Förderung und Stabilisierung der Rohstoffimporte im Interesse der Entwicklungsländer,” copy, October 1, 1958, BAK, B 102/55804. On international efforts to stabilize prices for raw materials and to liberalize the terms of trade in favor of the Third World, see Bernecker, Port Harcourt, 34–60.
41 Schmidt, “Pushed to the Front,” 475–478.
43 See, for example, the critique in the letter from V A 4a to Herrn Unterabteilungsleiter V, “Hilfe an Entwicklungsländern—Aufsplittung der Zuständigkeiten bei der technischen Hilfe auf die einzelnen Ressorts,” draft, June 19, 1959, BAK, B 102/7110. Due to the complex nature of development policy, it continues to be a field in which a large number of institutions are involved. See Franz Nuscheler, Entwicklungspolitik, Lizenzausgabe der Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung (Bonn, 2005), 433ff and 455. On the multiple levels and complicated mechanisms of public aid granting, see Bastian Hein, Die Westdeutschen und die Dritte Welt: Entwicklungspolitik und Entwicklungsdienste zwischen Reform und Revolte 1953–1974, Quellen und Darstellungen zur Zeitgeschichte 65 (Munich, 2005), 40–60.
44 On the founding and organization of the BMZ, see Glasgow, Gotsch and Stucke, Das Bundesministerium für wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit (BMZ).
45 See, for example, 801–80.00, Aide-Mémoire “Aufgaben des Auswärtigen Amtes auf dem Gebiet der Entwicklungshilfe,” January 25, 1962, ACDP, Nachlaß Vialon (I-475), 015/10. The author of this memorandum stressed the importance of foreign aid as a means of realizing the FRG’s foreign policy goals and of improving the country’s standing within the Western alliance.
50 Hess, “Waging the Cold War in the Third World,” 319. The pilot project, the Etawah Project, was initiated and conceptualized by Albert Mayer, an American architect and urban planner who had worked on housing reforms during the New Deal and turned his attention to India and rural development after the war. See his account of the Etawah Project: Albert Mayer et al., Pilot Project, India: The Story of Rural Development at Etawah, Uttar Pradesh (Berkeley, 1956). His papers, which I plan to work with, are located at the University of Chicago.
53 See Referat 400 (v. Podewils), Memorandum “Bericht der aus Indien zurückgekehrten Erdlosexperten des Amtes für Bodenforschung,” June 14, 1957, PA, B 58–407/5. Also see the correspondence between the Foreign Office and the West German embassy in New Delhi on that matter; Referat 400 (v. Podewils), Memorandum, ibid.
54 For an analysis of West German-Indian relations until the mid-1960s, see Amit Das Gupta, Handel, Hilfe, Hallstein-Doktrin: Die bundesdeutsche Südasienpolitik unter Adenauer und Erhard 1949 bis 1966 (Husum, 2004).


See the memorandum of March 25, 1960, PA, B 61-411/272.


On such colonial fantasies, see Birthe Kundrus, ed., *Phantasiereiche: Zur Kulturgeschichte des deutschen Kolonialismus* (Frankfurt am Main, 2003).