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In the panel on women and education, the panelists outlined some of the reasons why it is so difficult to establish "women's studies" in the Federal Republic, and why there are so few female professors in West Germany. Hanna Beate Schöpp-Schilling, who had the latest figures, pointed out that there are at present only eighteen professorships in women's studies in West Germany—a deplorable number compared to the United States, where women's studies not only is well established but has also been much more successful in changing the paradigms of academic research.

By far the most moving contribution was made by the GDR novelist, Helga Schütz, in her talk on "Memories of Daily Life and Literature". Her description of everyday experiences of women gave a poignant impression of what it means not to have access to the goods and the information that women in Western countries take for granted.

Its stress upon the interdisciplinary approach, and its incorporation of history, political science, and literature made the conference a success. Erika Fairchild and Anthony LaVopa delivered concluding remarks. Christiane Lemke pointed out that comparing the impact of the women's movement on politics in the United States and in West Germany would make for a valuable (or worthwhile), interesting follow-up conference.

Hanna Schissler

## E. American Policy Toward Germany, 1949–1955

Marburg, September 26–28, 1989

On September 26–28,1989, the German Historical Institute held its first conference in Germany. Convened by Hermann-Josef Rupieper (University of Marburg) and Jeffry M. Diefendorf (University of New Hampshire), more than thirty German and American historians met at the University of Marburg to discuss problems of American policy toward Germany from the late 1940s to the mid-1950s. Attention focused upon the first period of the history of the Federal Republic, after Konrad Adenauer had been elected Federal Chancellor but while there was still another government residing on the *Petersberg*, a hill overlooking the newly and provisionally-established capital, Bonn: the Allied High Commission for Germany.

The conference met at a time of fundamental change in international relations. The customary frontiers of the Cold War are dissolving and so is the conceptual framework for the interpretation of post-World War II history. Arguing that the presumed end of the ideological struggle between capitalism and socialism might indicate a resolution of Hegel's dialectic contradictions in human history, Francis Fukuyama, deputy director of the State Department's policy planning staff, predicted in an article in the summer 1989 issue of *The National Interest* "not just the end of the Cold War, or the passing of a particular period of postwar history, but the end of history as such: that is the end of mankind's ideological evolution and the universalization of Western liberal democracy as the final form of human government."

Historians at Marburg did not speculate about the future of humankind or history but presented the results of their current research into American policy toward Germany in an era in which the Cold War certainly did shape international relations. In six compact sessions, the participants discussed basic political issues including Germany's democratization, economic problems, defense matters, questions of industry and technology, and archival sources.

Erich J. Hahn (University of Western Ontario) analyzed U.S. policy toward a West German constitution from the London conference of the Council of Foreign Ministers in 1948 to the Washington meeting of the foreign ministers in 1949, and in particular General Clay's role in the process of the formulation and passage of the Basic Law. Michael Wala (University of Erlangen) described the Council on Foreign Relations both as a forum to test ideas and to discuss and build consensus on foreign policy issues and its recommendations for Germany's denazification, the revival of the German economy, and its strong support for Germany's inclusion in the European Recovery Program. Hermann-Josef Rupieper concluded the first session with an evaluation of the policies of the Truman and Eisenhower administrations toward the reunification of Germany. While in American eyes the integration of a reunified Germany (including the Federal Republic, the GDR, and Berlin, and excluding the Eastern territories under Soviet and Polish administration) with the West was deemed a maximum aim, U.S. policy from 1949 to 1952 gave priority to West Germany's stabilization and European integration. In a second phase from 1952 to 1955, after the Federal Republic's western orientation had been established, emphasis shifted from Germany's reunification to European security, and after the failure of the Geneva conference of foreign ministers, the issue receded to the background of U.S. policy.

The following session was devoted to economic problems. In his presentation, Gunther Mai (University of Marburg) summarized the effects of American policy toward Germany upon the process of European integration, 1945–1955, in four points: 1) the influence of the U.S. on the development of the institutional aspects of European integration tended to be negligible; 2) the preponderance of the German question determined American policy toward Europe in the beginning but proved to be a liability in the course of events; 3) American policy of European integration aimed at a possible disengagement in Europe without prejudicing U.S. leadership in the Atlantic Alliance; 4) European collective attempts to repudiate American hegemony contributed more to the long-term success of the integration movement than the collective defense against the Soviet menace. As to American support for the Schuman Plan, Mai and John Gillingham (University of Missouri) agreed that it was rather reluctant because the establishment of a single common authority to administer the heavy industries of France and Germany, as well as any other nation that might choose to join it, threatened to create a European super-cartel. In his assessment of French policy, Gillingham stressed that the Schuman/ Monnet Plan was considerably more important for European integration than the Marshall Plan, and that Schuman's proposal did not constitute an about-face but a development of French policy toward Germany which had already changed at the beginning of 1948.

Returning to the Marshall Plan, Christoph Buchheim (*Institut für Zeitgeschichte*, Munich) explained what he called the "double relationship" between the European Recovery Program (ERP) and the West German currency reform. The ERP was a prerequisite for the success of the currency reform of June 1948, which again provided for an increase in German exports of capital goods to Western Europe. Insofar as these goods substituted for American products, Buchheim argued, they reduced the European dollar gap, and thus the currency reform contributed to the success of the Marshall Plan.

Germany's economic recovery not only required American credits but also the collaboration of Germany's industrialists. After blaming the Ruhr magnates during the early postwar years for helping to bring Hitler to power and for supporting the Nazi regime's expansionist policy and atrocities, the attitude changed with the political climate of the upcoming Cold War. The predominant pragmatic view was perhaps best expressed by the British control officer Sir Percy Mills. "They were not Nazis," he claimed, "they are businessmen." How this change affected the case of Alfried Krupp, one of the most prominent German industrialists, was set out by Werner Bührer (*Institut für Zeitgeschichte*, Munich). The case of

Alfried Krupp, who had been convicted of the abuse of slave labor and plundering occupied countries, came up again in a somewhat different context. On January 31, 1951, the U.S. High Commissioner for Germany announced his final decision regarding executive clemency for eighty-nine German war criminals held in Landsberg prison. For the most part, McCloy found grounds for clemency. The sentences of seventy-nine of those imprisoned were reduced, and thirty-two of the inmates were immediately released, among them Alfried Krupp. In his presentation on "John J. McCloy and the Landsberg Cases", Thomas Schwartz (Harvard University) addressed questions such as: Why did the U.S. High Commissioner initiate a new and comprehensive review of the Nuremberg sentences? Why did McCloy make the final decisions which he did? And what significance did the decisions have in the long run?

In the session on industry and technology, John Gimbel (Humboldt State University) and Raymond Stokes (Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute) discussed the topic of technology transfer. Gimbel focused upon the commercial-industrial exploitation program of the Commerce Department's Office of Technical Services (OTS) and the Field Information Agency, Technical (FIAT) in the early postwar years. Popular beliefs that the Americans took no reparations from Germany after the Second World War notwithstanding, he pointed out that the amount and value of American reparations removals from Germany in the form of scientific and technical know-how were by no means insignificant. In his paper on "Technology Transfer and the Emergence of the West German Petrochemical Industry, 1945–1955", Stokes too stressed the fact that immediately after the war the flow of (enforced) transfer was away from Germany and toward Allied and neutral countries, but that by the late 1940s unilateral transfer of technology stopped. During the final four years of Allied control, German chemical firms established more equal relationships with companies abroad. They offered their experience, research results, know-how, and patents to the highest bidder on the international market and used the proceeds to obtain technologies and feedstock supply agreements. On the positive side, both Gimbel and Stokes concluded, postwar investigations served as a conveyor-belt for future German-American industrial cooperation and business connections.

Another aspect of U.S. industrial policy was treated by Albert Diegmann (University of Aachen), who described the changes in American deconcentration policy toward the Ruhr coal mining industry: from the

concept of harsh punishment during the early occupation period (1945–1947), to a relaxation under the auspices of the Marshall Plan (1947–1949), ending up again in determined action against cartels and combines (1950–1951).

The fourth session was devoted to military questions and defense matters. James M. Diehl (Indiana University) examined U.S. policy toward German veterans from their designation as "Disarmed Enemy Forces" or "Surrendered Enemy Personnel" during the final stages of the war and in the early postwar years (in order to circumvent the formalized rules of treatment for "Prisoners of War" laid down in the Geneva convention of 1929) until the relaxation of Allied control measures following the creation of the Federal Republic. In contrast to the politics of the Weimar Republic, after the *Wehrmacht's* surrender in 1945 German veterans were denied political activity as veterans and forced by their difficult economic circumstances (abolition of war pensions) to form new economic and social ties - ties that worked to reintegrate them into society as individuals. Social reintegration therefore preceded activity in veterans' organizations, and this helped to foster policies that were pragmatic in nature when the latter were again permitted to operate.

Turning to the "European Defense Community" (EDC), David C. Large (Montana State University) characterized the EDC as a "grand illusion" for those who had chosen to believe in it. He examined the expectations for the EDC entertained by the two nations that became, after initial severe misgivings, its most ardent champions: the United States and the Federal Republic. In investigating these countries' official "conversion" to the project, he discussed the lingering doubts about the plan harbored by some of the converts as well as the continuing hostility toward it expressed by its opponents. Finally he tried to assess the significance of the EDC's failure within the broader context of West German rearmament.

Bruno Thoß (*Militärgeschichtliches Forschungsamt*, Freiburg) directed attention to the presence of U.S. troops in Europe and to the effect of plans to reduce their number upon German-American relations in the early and mid-1950s. Although President Eisenhower in early 1953 had stressed that American forces in Europe, which had been increased from one to five divisions in the wake of the Korean war, were a real physical deterrent to the Soviet Union and not merely a psychological one, he soon had to face the necessity of making American defense "more effective" and "less costly." His "New Look" concept therefore called for a reduction of troops and emphasized the importance of nuclear weapons. This

caused serious problems for the rearmament of the Federal Republic and anxieties on the part of the West German government about American isolationism and the continuing interest of the United States in Europe. After the foreign ministers failed even to touch upon disengagement plans at the Geneva conference in 1955, the stationing of U.S. troops in Europe gained the character of a "provisional institution in permanence." The consequences of the "New Look" and the strategy of massive retaliation with its heavy reliance on nuclear weapons for the Federal Republic were analyzed by Klaus A. Maier (*Militärgeschichtliches Forschungsamt*, Freiburg). Not only were West Germany's conventional forces diminished to secondary importance at a time when they had not even come into existence, but also the Federal Republic's territory had to be viewed as one of the main battlefields in a nuclear war.

In the session on American democratization policies in Germany, Rebecca Boehling (University of Maryland) evolved the thesis that the restraints placed upon grassroots political activity by both the U.S. Military Government and its appointed German officials in 1945 and 1946 inhibited not only the development of new and renewed political parties but also the potential for the democratic transformation of German society and the economic order. As examples she named the suppression of the *Antifa* movement by the military government's ban on political activities in the spring of 1945 and the collapse of the multi-party structure of the *Frankfurter Rundschau* in 1946. In her opinion, many Germans were all too willing to sacrifice the ideals of structural political and socio-economic democratization in return for U.S.-style capitalism—which most Americans equated with democracy—as long as it meant an end to the chaos, disorder, and shortages of the postwar period. Another "lost opportunity" was identified by Diethelm Prowe (Carleton College). Americans, he argued, reinforced a democratization in West Germany based upon a largely conservative restabilization with a considerable increase in power sharing. But they modified the form of this democratization by effectively blocking a second democratic system of corporatist-democratic institutions (e.g., chambers of industry and commerce) in the economy. West Germans ultimately adapted to a system, he continued, that has mixed much-weakened corporatist elements with the American concept of political democracy and unconstrained market economy.

Michael Fichter (Free University of Berlin) explained how the U.S. High Commissioner for Germany (HICOG) sought to insure that organized labor in Germany would fulfill what Americans regarded to be the role of trade unions in a democratic society. It was during the tenure

of John J. McCloy as High Commissioner (1949–1952) that basic (but not necessarily final) decisions were made on issues involving organized labor which were crucial to the future of the Federal Republic: codetermination, the Schuman Plan, decartelization, and rearmament. In the end, "selling the American way of life" to German labor was an element of policy but not an end in itself. Rather it was more of an ideal and a means to a more politically and strategically defined end. Of greater import to HICOG's concern for labor affairs and its attempts to influence the policy of the German trade unions was the goal of insuring that organized labor would contribute to the political stability and economic growth of the Federal Republic as well as to its integration into the Western Alliance.

Manfred Heinemann (University of Hannover) examined U.S. policies of "re-education" and "re-orientation" " as part of the re-emergence of cultural policies in West Germany, and Norbert Frei (*Institut für Zeitgeschichte*, Munich) discussed American concerns after the debate on nationalism in the Federal Republic in 1949, which the East Coast press feared might be a prelude to a "re-nazification" of Germany.

Turning back to an event that could be considered an example of a grassroots democratic development, James F. Tent (University of Alabama) described the unusual circumstances and intentions of the founding of the Free University of Berlin. It came into existence largely as a result of student initiative. When matters came to a head between Soviet-SED authorities who had assumed exclusive control over the old *Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität* in Berlin (later to be called *Humboldt-Universität*) and dissident students in April 1948, these students set in motion carefully prepared plans for the creation of a new university in the western sectors, "free" of ideological control, i.e., SED domination. The new university with its student representation at all levels was supposed to serve as a model of reform for other German universities, and with the help of returning émigré scholars, the Free University became a center for the social sciences. By admitting thousands of students who had been unable to begin studies at home, the Free University served—unofficially—as a kind of "State University" for the GDR. Despite its many reform features, the Free University ultimately failed in several of its purposes. After four years of chaos, the 1948 constitution was replaced by the 1969 University Law, which created a different institution of higher learning and effectively ended the experiment that had begun twenty years earlier.

When it came to rebuilding bombed cities, Berlin was a unique case too. Jeffry M. Diefendorf stated that from the time of the occupation

through active American involvement in programs sponsored by the Marshall Plan, the Americans pursued a relatively modest but consistent policy of encouraging modernism in town planning and housing construction. It was modest insofar as the American contribution to urban reconstruction was in fact much less (less than two percent of the investment in housing) than is commonly thought. American aid is part of the founding myth of West Germany, but most of that aid did not go to rebuilding destroyed cities—with the exception of West Berlin. Influenced by the ideas of Bauhaus-founder Walter Gropius and former Berlin town planner Martin Wagner, both by then professors at Harvard University, the Americans consistently urged the Germans to build modern, mass-produced, inexpensive housing units. American policy toward Germany's cities, he concluded, thus was a return of German thinking to Germany.

The final session of the conference focused on archives and sources. The presentations by Robert Wolfe (National Archives, Washington) and Josef Henke (*Bundesarchiv*, Koblenz) led to a productive exchange between archivists and historians. Among the vast amount of material reflecting American policy toward Germany (after 1949/51) in German archives, Henke mentioned the records of the Federal Chancellery and the *Auswärtiges Amt*, the records of the Berlin Senate and of Berlin *Bezirksverwaltungen* in the U.S. sector, the papers of Konrad Adenauer, Theodor Heuß, *Staatssekretäre* Hallstein, Globke, Lenz, and von Eckardt, and the Ministers President of the *Länder*, which are deposited in the *Bundesarchiv*, the *Staatsarchive*, and in the archives of political parties.

Robert Wolfe underscored that the records of the U.S. Federal Government deposited in the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA) are a major source for the study of the history of the Federal Republic between 1949 and 1955. The largest pertinent series of these records (2,425 cubic feet), the Records of the U.S. High Commissioner for Germany (HICOG), is not easily accessible to research. Substantial portions of that record group still await declassification or will remain security-classified indefinitely. Many HICOG records, particularly those of the *Land* level, were retained for use by U.S. diplomatic or consular missions which inherited remaining HICOG functions in Germany. Such records were retired to the U.S. with the Bonn, Frankfurt, Berlin, Munich, or Stuttgart post records at varying intervals, and some have not yet been received from the Department of State. Similarly, a large portion of the HICOG record group consists of Office of Military Government, U.S. (OMGUS) records retained in the files of HICOG agencies when they assumed responsibility for American diplomatic and

economic operations in Germany. While this assured continuity of actions then in progress, Wolfe pointed out, it now presents archival problems for both archivists and researchers.

The Marburg conference gave an impressive survey of research in progress into American policy toward Germany after World War II. It showed the degree to which historical interest has shifted to the early 1950s and gave an idea of how much research still has to be done. A vast quantity of material on the early history of the Federal Republic is available, but most outstanding is the series of HICOG records deposited in the National Archives. It will attract a growing number of researchers in the years to come.

Axel Frohn

## F. 1949-1989: The Federal Republic as History

Cambridge, Massachusetts, October 27–29, 1989

A colloquium entitled "1949–1989: The Federal Republic as History", met in Cambridge, Massachusetts, from October 27–29, 1989, under the joint sponsorship of the German Historical Institute in Washington and the Minda de Gunzberg Center for European Studies of Harvard University. In the midst of momentous change in German affairs, and on the eve of even more profound change, scholars took time, as Guido Goldman (Center for European Studies) stated in his opening remarks, to look to the past to understand the present and evaluate the experience of forty remarkable years. Hartmut Lehmann (German Historical Institute), in his greetings to those in attendance, noted that forty years, while an unusual number for commemorative celebration, was a period longer than that called the Reformation and almost as long as the life of the second German Empire, and thus the forty-year life of the Federal Republic is ripe for review and analysis. Finally, Charles Maier (Harvard University) enjoined all the participants to move beyond the trope of "order versus disorder" to the trope of *"Lernprozeß"*, following Matthew Arnold's charge to "tell me what makes you interesting." Discussions began early in the mornings and lasted late into the evenings. The facilities of the new Center for European Studies provided an ideal meeting-place for the more than one-hundred participants from all over the United States and from Europe.