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IMPERIAL ENTANGLEMENTS: BRITAIN, GERMAN EAST AFRICA, AND INTERNMENT DURING THE FIRST WORLD WAR

MAHON MURPHY

Introduction

The transnational nature of the First World War is receiving more and more attention in current historiography and nowhere seems more apt for a reappraisal of the war under these terms than the East African theatre. The war in East Africa was not merely a sideshow to the fighting in Europe, but from a geo-strategic viewpoint was heavily connected to the global war. In the minds of British strategists, the East African coast posed a serious threat to shipping routes from Britain to India. In the post-war period, and with the establishment of the Mandate system, the conquest of German East Africa became intertwined with the re-establishment of imperial loyalties and the conflicting process of internationalization.¹ British imperial planners hoped that the war sparked in Europe and the territorial gains from the takeover of the German colonies would ultimately strengthen the British Empire. It was also clear from the outset of the war that this takeover would mean there was to be no place in the sun for the German residents of these colonies, necessitating their removal. British internment and expulsion policies may have operated differently in the extra-European theatres, but there was an Empire-wide strategy that will form the subject of the current analysis.

In mapping the British establishment of what was a global internment network that included East Africa, four issues are of note. First, treatment of European prisoners of war in a colonial context was con-

nected to how perceptions of prisoners should be treated under international law. Standards which were applicable in Europe could not always work in East Africa because of various local factors, as Daniel Steinbach has expertly shown.  

Prisoner treatment was also a means to bring out contrasts in how each belligerent looked after its captives with the focus on the civilized European centre and the less developed periphery. Secondly, the terms of surrender in Dar es Salaam caused logistical problems and were out of step with how the Admiralty and War Office had enforced surrender on the other German colonies, leaving a civilian population at large in an enemy city.  

Thirdly, repatriation of prisoners of war to Germany was initially seen as a viable option. In the opinion of the Foreign Office, Germans would cause fewer problems for the British Empire as a whole if they were at home in Germany than if they were loitering around the Dominions and colonies. The sinking of the Lusitania and the naval blockade, however, meant that new strategies had to be brought into play. Finally, and related to the first point, the British, like the other colonial powers, were concerned with maintaining racial hierarchies in post-war East Africa, highlighted through the treatment of Paul von Lettow-Vorbeck and other German officers upon their surrender. From a British perspective, the ideas and practices of the Great War placed imperial interaction at the heart of the conflict.

This article will look at British internment of German colonial settlers in the extra-European theatres of the war with a focus on German East Africa. British imperial policy on internment outside Europe was formed around a policy of deportation and repatriation to Germany. Enacting empire-wide policies, however, was not as easy as it first seemed. The nature of warfare, racial prestige, and the various geo-political differences from region to region brought up unexpected complications. Using the East African theatre as a guide


and supported by archival sources from the British Foreign Office, War Office, and Admiralty, this article will plot British attempts at disentangling pre-war imperial entanglements.

Expulsion and its Complications

A common policy enforced throughout the former German colonies during the war was the expulsion of the resident German colonialists on takeover. This was the initial plan of the War Office, who had not only the immediate strategic aim of preventing any potential agitation among indigenous populations and securing the rear, but also the long-term objective of preventing Germany from having any foothold outside Europe in a future conflict.4 The war was an opportunity for the Allies to take over German-held territory and secure it for their own colonial ambitions. Further afield, Japan saw the war as a once in a century opportunity to establish a strong position not just geographically but also politically in China. The Australians and the New Zealanders saw the war as a chance to establish their own spheres of influence in the Pacific. Poor colonial administration had left German possessions wide open to the expansionist ambitions of Japan.5 Japan, while Australia’s and New Zealand’s ally, was viewed with suspicion—this was, after all, the period of heightened anxiety over the Yellow Peril and the fear of Japanese and Chinese immigration. Taking over Germany’s colonies would not only prevent them falling into Japanese hands but would create a buffer zone from which to protect any direct threats to the mainland from the Japanese Empire in the future. Britain was also keen, from a military and naval viewpoint, to eliminate German presence overseas. The immediate necessity of taking over the colonies to disable any ports which could be used for German shipping and the rounding up of German civilians to prevent agitation among the native populations, comple-

mented the long-term objective of confining Germany to Europe and disabling its naval threat to ensure British dominance in sea power and weaken Germany’s position in future conflicts.

However, this policy was not enacted in some areas, causing complications. The most notable area, of course, was German South-West Africa, where a combination of fear of potential revolt by the Boers in light of any evacuations and the wish of the Union of South Africa’s government to keep the colony white meant that plans to repatriate the German population were aborted once the colony was fully defeated. Similarly in Samoa and New Guinea, which put up very little resistance, Germans were initially allowed to remain in the colonies, partly to avoid having to import any more Chinese labour. This changed in the post-war years with the order of expulsion for Germans from New Guinea to make way for Australian servicemen who had served in Europe. In East Africa, wherever prisoners were taken or civilians interned, it was deemed necessary to remove them from the colony to camps in Malta, Egypt, and India, which hosted the biggest prisoner of war camp in Ahmednagar (in Maharashtra state in east India). These evacuations, however, did not apply to the residents of Dar es Salaam.

The surrender terms of Dar es Salaam had been made before a coherent colonial policy was written up and it had explicitly been mentioned that civilians would be allowed to remain in the city. The surrender taken by HMS Vengeance, on 4 September 1917, stated:

You have done remarkably well and have made a gallant defence. Surrender now or your town will be bombarded and destroyed. We guarantee the lives of all the populace provided the immediate surrender of all armed forces and material takes place. Private property will be respected, noncombatants will be permitted to remain in the town. For this purpose we request that your town police will continue to carry out their

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6 For the conflict in the Pacific see Hermann Joseph Hiery, The Neglected War: The German South Pacific and the Influence of World War I (Honolulu, 1995).
7 The National Archives (hereafter TNA), ADM 116-1543, letter from War Office to Admiralty, 13 Apr. 1917.
duties of the protection of property until our armed forces occupy the town.  

There had been complications with terms after the fall of New Guinea and Samoa and the subsequent desire to remove all the German civilians to Australia and New Zealand respectively. Initially it was suggested that German mistreatment of the French and Belgian civilian populations would be reason enough to reassess the terms of capitulation, but the Admiralty were reluctant to go ‘back on a promise which had been so definitely given’.  

They felt that German treatment of their enemy civilians was not cause enough for removal and a more likely argument in favour of removal would arise if it could be shown that it was dangerous to the peace of the country to allow these people to remain in their former colonies.

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**European Comparisons: The Expectations of Internment**

The Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907 established uniform treatment of prisoners of war which was expected to be applied no matter what the circumstances. The obvious differences in terrain, supplies, and climates were not taken into account, leaving room for exploitation of the regional differences in camps in propaganda accounts of internment. Media presentations of internment in the former German colonies fit the notion of a common western ‘colonial archive’ as conceptualized by historians where the imagined barbarity of the colonial world overshadowed its realities. This portrayal of camps could also have negative consequences in the form of reprisals against British prisoners in Europe. In 1916, in an attempt to force France to remove its German prisoners from North Africa, 30,000 French prisoners were sent to work in reprisal camps in

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8 TNA, ADM 116-1543, General Hoskins to War Office, 9 Apr. 1917.  
9 TNA, ADM 116-1543, draft despatch to the War Office, 18 May 1917.  
10 Ibid.  
The extra-European camps were not immune to the waves of reprisals that, in Isabel’s Hull’s words, ‘disfigured the Great War’ and this reprisal system linked the extra-European to the European theatres of war.13

In September 1915 Guy Stephenson, Director of Public Prosecutions Department, forwarded a letter from an acquaintance in Germany, Adolf Fuld, to the Foreign Office discussing the perceived differences between captivity in Europe and captivity elsewhere. The letter inquired about the possibility of a man-for-man exchange for a family friend, Dr Walther Sulzbach, who had been on a hunting trip in German East Africa at the outbreak of the war and consequently found himself interned in Ahmednagar. As Sulzbach was the son of a ‘wealthy banker and of a British mother’, Fuld was sure that some kind of arrangement could be made for his release.14 Fuld suggested that Stephenson’s cousin, a Mr Honeywill, could be exchanged for Sulzbach. Unfortunately for Sulzbach, the Foreign Office was not willing to entertain the idea of like-for-like exchanges.

However, the content of the letter, not its desired outcome, interests this article. Fuld drew some stark contrasts between Sulzbach and Honeywill’s detention. Sulzbach had first to be ‘imprisoned in Nairobi with Nigger criminals and afterward shipped to India, where he is interned in Achniednagar [sic Ahmednagar]. He fell sick there with malaria . . . He has only two complaints; the one is the climate of Achniednagar which he thinks he cannot endure for much longer, the other is the absolute prohibition of reading matter. His family have sent him boxes of absolutely harmless books—scientific and novels—and he is not allowed to have any of them.’ Fuld ended his letter with a request for help that echoed two aspects of complaints common to internment in the extra-European theatre, climate and lack of European culture: ‘I fear that, Dr Sulzbach who is not

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14 TNA, FO 383/77 134067, 18 Sept. 1915, Adolf Fuld’s correspondence with Guy Stephenson.
very strong would in deficiency of help, either be killed by the no-
torious climate of Achniednagar or go mad by lack of reading stuff.'

Mr Honeywill, in contrast, was faring much better in Germany. ‘Re-
grading your relation Mr Honeywill, I am enchanted to be able to
give you good news . . . he is in a sanatory where he finds every med-
ical help and comfort, that he is allowed repeated leaves of absence
to a watering place.’ According to Fuld, however, there was one
problem: ‘the German authorities do and will do anything for the
health of the interned; but they are prohibited to go further than they
do, by the fact, that the British government do not, by far, the same
for interned Germans.’ The contrast between Honeywill’s and
Sulzbach’s internment is again brought up through the climate. Fuld
claimed that Honeywill was interned in the ‘healthiest town in
Germany . . . I had to walk through long avenues of old trees and
found Mr Honeywill in a pretty, very proper house in the middle of
a pretty garden of some acres . . . having his tea with four or six nice
looking Englishmen. . . . He is allowed to be in the garden as much as
ever he likes and has free access to a well furnished library.’

Despite Fuld’s pleas, the Foreign Office was unwilling to budge
on either letting Sulzbach go or exchanging him for Honeywill. In a
telegram from the government of India it was noted that the ‘per-
sonal convenience of the prisoner appears to be the only grounds
urged for his transfer to a place of internment in England. We have
refused similar applications made to us by prisoners of war at
Ahmednagar and consider it undesirable to make [an] exception in
this case.’

15 Ibid.
16 Ibid.
17 Ibid.
18 TNA, FO 383/77 134067, 18 Sept. 1915, telegram from the Government of
India to the Foreign Office, 16 May 1915. The case of the retired German offi-
cer Baron von Tucke is an interesting example. He had refused to sign an
oath of parole and was held in solitary confinement for seven months at
Yeruada prison in Bombay. The German ministry sent a telegram that threat-
ened that an English officer of similar age (55) to von Tucke would be held
in solitary confinement until von Tucke’s case received ‘favourable consid-
eration’. Von Tucke’s case was quickly reviewed and he was given a bungalow
in the civilian section of Ahmednagar camp. TNA, FO 383/171 38062, 28 Feb.
1916.
Articles

Whether Fuld was prompted by the German government to write the letter we do not know, but it coincided with publication of a booklet on the good conditions of camps and good treatment of British prisoners in Germany, which was for sale in neutral countries. Indeed, Horace Rumbold of the Prisoners of War Department himself had attended a lecture by ‘a Swede or Norwegian’ in London who had used photographs from the booklet in a talk on the good conditions for British prisoners. The idea of a counter-booklet was raised and referred to the War Office, although Rumbold feared ‘they [the War Office] may take the view that we should be competing with the Germans in advertising our camps’. Fuld’s letter contained all the characteristics of propaganda relating to the colonial camps: the negative effect of the climate, the lack of medical attention, unreasonable camp regulations, and, most importantly, the degradation of the European, in racial terms, in this case keeping Sulzbach in the same prison as black prisoners. For Fuld, the contrast between the apparently civilized treatment afforded British prisoners in Germany serves further to highlight how Britain had abandoned the bond of European racial superiority and overlapped with German propaganda on the war in the colonies.

In more extreme cases one can see how the humiliation, real or imagined, of Germans in front of the indigenous other, such as in Cameroon or New Guinea, played a role in the German propaganda campaign and helped fuel accusations that Britain had turned its back on the civilizing mission. Complaints from Ahmednagar camp, as with complaints from other extra-European camps, were framed from the context of European racial supremacy as highlighted by the following note from the Austro-Hungarian Foreign Office to its British equivalent:

The treatment shown to the prisoners in the Indian camps especially, where they are obliged to wash their soiled linen, sweep their floors, clean latrines etc. . . . is derogatory to the European race in a country inhabited by an eastern people whose creed it is to despise and hold in contempt such work.

19 TNA, FO 383/77 134067, 18 Sept. 1915.
20 TNA, CO 323/709 1288, 8 Jan. 1916, from the KUK Ministerium des kaiserl. und königl. Hauses des Au ßeren to the Foreign Office.
From a cultural point of view these complaints are interesting. In the European narrative of prisoner treatment, the gender role reversal through the emasculation of prisoners in the camps and the role of women in the work place are often cited and analysed.21 In the extra-European context, however, it is the racial role reversal that forms the broader part of the narrative. This reversal also impacted on British policy, and in this case prisoners who had the means were allowed to hire help, either less well-off prisoners or servants sourced from the local population. The British in their reply to the Austrians were keen to point out that they were doing all they could for the prisoners and would be willing to repatriate them if the Austro-Hungarian government could persuade its ally, Germany, to cease torpedoing ships. The hardships caused by the German use of unrestricted submarine warfare were often cited as the reason for internees suffering privations.

Expulsion and its Complications Continued

One of the first repatriation proposals was to have the prisoners sent to a neutral European power where they could be interned until the end of the war. One of the few powers willing to take in German prisoners of war was Spain. Previously Spain had taken in a number of Germans from Cameroon after pressure from the British and French governments to have them transferred from Fernando Po (Bioko, Equatorial Guinea) off the coast of Cameroon to the Spanish mainland. The precedent these prisoners had set in agitating the Spanish public against the Allies deterred the Foreign Office from inviting a repeat performance. The Foreign Office bluntly rejected German proposals to send internees from East Africa to the Netherlands or some other agreeable neutral country: ‘In view of our experience in Spain it seems highly undesirable to allow Germans to make further propaganda in neutral countries.’22 The German government, in exchange

22 TNA, FO 383/436 73240, 26 Apr. 1918, minutes of a meeting on the removal to Europe of German women and children brought from East Africa
negotiations, proposed that each government would have the right to detain thirty invalid civilians who would otherwise be eligible for exchange. The Foreign Office shrewdly noted that this was ‘in fact the maximum number of civilians at Ruhleben who are believed to be entitled to repatriation on grounds of health’.  

The British had toyed with the idea after the fall of German South-West Africa and a handful of civilians were sent to live with their German brethren in the former Reich’s colony. However the idea of a full-scale transfer was abandoned because of objections from the Union of South Africa government. The blockade and the length of the war caused the issue to be revised, partly prompted by the memory jogging of German inquiries. In late 1918 the Foreign Office again investigated the possibility of taking internees, especially those who were still to be transferred to India, to German South-West Africa. The original reasoning had been financial. In German South-West Africa in 1916–17 there were willing Germans ready to accept and take in refugees, thus taking the burden off His Majesty’s Government. However the Foreign Office found in 1918 that, as a result of the privations of the war, the colony’s German population was impoverished and dispirited and no longer eager or willing to accept more mouths to feed. Thus in line with the transfer of civilians from Hong Kong, the idea of sending captives to Australia was drawn up, with the intention, as Lord Newton wrote, of passing responsibility for the decision on to ‘the Huns in S[outh]-W[est] Africa’. The war was almost coming to a close and Britain could act to India and the modification of existing invalid civilian agreements. For German propaganda in Spain see Jens Albes, Worte wie Waffen: Die deutsche Propaganda in Spanien während des Ersten Weltkrieges (Essen, 1996).

23 TNA, FO 383/436 73240, 26 Apr. 1918. Ruhleben, situated on the outskirts of Berlin, was the main civilian internment camp for British civilian internees in Germany. See Matthew Stibbe, British Civilian Internees in Germany: The Ruhleben Camp, 1914–18 (Manchester, 2008).


25 Thomas Wodehouse Leigh 2nd Baron Newton. Lord Newton was the Assistant Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and the Head of the Prisoners of War Department. He was also involved in organizing overseas propaganda.

26 Ibid.
from a position of strength. If this policy had been enacted earlier in the war, Newton commented, Germany would have been able ‘to put the screws on us’, either by enacting reprisals against British civilians held in Germany, or appealing to neutral public opinion.27 The reasons eventually given for not sending women and children to South-West Africa was the risk of infecting the internees with the Spanish flu, of which there was an outbreak in the Union of South Africa at the time.28

During the war there were extensive, if not altogether successful, talks on prisoner repatriation. We saw in the case of Sulzbach that the institution of like-for-like exchanges was not going to be the norm in the First World War. Numerous petitions and appeals were sent to the Foreign Office or directly to some of its staff, along the lines of the Sulzbach case, and time and again they were refused. In one situation Newton received a request from an old family friend, Lady Courtney, that some friends of hers, Germans who were interned in the Belgian Congo, be transferred to British internment. He noted in his reply that it was no wonder, in view of ‘German precedings [sic] that they should object to being handed over to the Belgian government’, but they were prisoners of the Belgians and would remain so.29

Belgium also controlled internment in Tabora, German East Africa and German civilians, such as Ada Schnee, the wife of the former governor of German East Africa, were interned or on parole there. The Reichs-Kolonialamt published a book on internment in the Belgian Congo in 1918 in which it accused the Belgian authorities of forcing women and children to endure periods of up to twenty-four hours without food or water while being taunted by black and European guards during their transport from Tabora to the west coast of Africa.30 Perhaps in an effort to balance out Allied propaganda on German brutality in Belgium, Germany accused Belgium of being complicit, along with Britain and France, in the racial role reversal in the African theatre. First Lieutenant von Botsch, writing

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28 Ibid. Telegram Secretary of State for the Colonies to the Administrator of German East Africa, 19 Oct. 1918.
29 London School of Economics Archives, Courtney 12/58.
30 Die Kolonialdeutschen aus Deutsch-Ostafrika in belgischer Gefangenschaft (Berlin, 1918).
about his transfer from the Belgian Congo to North Africa, noted: ‘I have had altogether the impression . . . that it was the expressed intention of the Belgians to shame and lower us before the natives as much and anyhow possible.’ Later on in the war, however, prisoners who had been captured by Belgian troops but were then sent to India, found themselves eligible for repatriation under Belgian–German agreements. The Foreign Office was keen to get any British civilians, notably those in Belgium, out of German hands and repatriated back home, but the blockade caused problems when it came to exchanges.

Belgian–British relations were also strained during the war. Jan Smuts (commander of the British Forces in East Africa until 1917), in particular, was concerned about the possibility of Belgium using the conflict to encroach on German East Africa. Early on in the war Belgium had gained control of Ruanda-Urundi (Rwanda and Burundi), and in the summer of 1916 it looked as if it might reach the southern shore of Lake Victoria, thus straddling the proposed British Cape to Cairo corridor. This led to a propaganda war between Britain and Belgium, with Belgian Askari accused by Britain of all manner of atrocities, even cannibalism, while Belgian officers were accused of brutality in their treatment of soldiers and carriers.

In the initial stages of the war in the colonies, the paramount strategic objective was to secure the military lines. Prisoners of war were to be interned but civilians were all earmarked for repatriation to Germany. In the Cameroon campaign this was roughly how events transpired, although there were some very vocal complaints about the harsh manner in which German civilians were turned out of their homes and packed on transport ships with inadequate living quarters. The transfer of German civilians from German East Africa to either India or Malta and their internment there was to be only temporary, with the view that all civilians would be sent back to

33 For the Cameroon campaign see Uwe Schulte-Varendorff, Krieg in Kamerun: Die deutsche Kolonie im Ersten Weltkrieg (Berlin, 2011).
Germany before the conflict was resolved. However, with the sinking of the *Lusitania* and the Allied blockade, this policy changed. Because of the blockade, the Admiralty was not only restrictive on allowing ships for transport; it banned all passage through the Suez Canal, especially for ships containing enemy subjects. The argument against the transportation of enemy subjects also centred on the British population who were abroad. How would it look, commented one official, if they spent enormous resources in ensuring the safe transport of German civilians from India to Holland, while at the same time banning mothers and children who were in Australia from returning to the UK while the war was on?\(^3\)\(^4\) The Admiralty noted that it was ‘not right that we should accord to our enemies facilities which we are unable to accord our own people’.\(^3\)\(^5\)

In March of the following year (1918) the debate was still unresolved, but arguments in favour of repatriation were winning out, especially once a proposed exchange had been worked out with Germany, by which British subjects in Belgium and France were to be swapped for German East Africans. Again, the movement of British citizens came into question, with the problem remaining: ‘if the arrangement is adopted the Colonial Office will be subjected to very great pressure to remove the ban which at present exists against British women and children crossing dangerous waters.’\(^3\)\(^6\) Ship space was limited and reserving room for German civilians would naturally prevent British women and children taking spaces, should they be allowed to travel. Of secondary concern was that German civilians would gain an insight into the workings of the convoy system, but such information, as the Admiralty noted, was probably obtained by Germany from crews of neutral ships.\(^3\)\(^7\)

\(^3\)\(^4\) The war effectively ended migration within the Empire. In the post-war years there was a renewed determination to reinvigorate the Empire though a ‘free passage scheme’ for ex-servicemen and women from 1919 to 1922. The newly taken German colonies were to provide an outlet for the ‘lust for adventure’ that young British men had gained from their experience in the trenches. Kent Fedorowich, *Unfit for Heroes: Reconstruction and Soldier Settlement in the Empire Between the Wars* (Manchester, 1995), 25–35.

\(^3\)\(^5\) TNA, ADM 116-1543, 9 Sept. 1917.

\(^3\)\(^6\) Ibid. 18 Mar. 1918, P/W Department 34091, memorandum and minutes.

\(^3\)\(^7\) Ibid.
Discussions over repatriations continued until the end of the war but hit a number of problems. Germany protested over the treatment of its U-Boot crews and, as Heather Jones has shown, the use of forced labour was a particularly thorny issue. German civilian internees from the East Africa theatre and all civilian internees outside Europe were considered by the British as a separate entity from those civilians held on the British Isles. This was easier to present once the Union of South Africa took over most of the fighting, and plans were enacted, although never completed, in July 1918 to have all civilian internees in either India, Hong Kong, or Singapore sent to Australia, where they were to remain under the supervision of the Australian government.

European Prestige

Before concluding, it will be necessary to look briefly at the treatment of prisoners of war in the context of maintaining imperial and European prestige. As the former governor of German East Africa, Heinrich Schnee, noted in his diary, on capture the German officers were shown very gracious treatment by their captors: ‘General Edwards [remarked], that it gave him great pleasure to be able to allow the brave [German] Officers and Europeans to retain their arms, and he expressed his admiration for the bravery of all the troops.’ Because there was fear that disarming and rounding up the white German officers might spark off a rebellion in the colony, the officers were allowed to retain their weapons while within German East Africa. They marched in file as if on regular manoeuvres towards the trains that took them to their ferries for Zanzibar, and it

38 Jones, Violence Against Prisoners of War, 374.
39 For South African participation and the decisions taken to enter the war see Anne Samson, Britain, South Africa and the East Africa Campaign, 1914–1918: The Union Comes of Age (London, 2006), 93–117.
41 TNA, WO 106/1460, Heinrich Schnee’s Diary, 26 Nov. 1918.
was only on board these ferries that they were requested to hand in their arms. They were, however, after some bargaining allowed to bring all their servants with them.\textsuperscript{42} Transition from Zanzibar to Germany would not be immediate, but von Lettow-Vorbeck, Schnee, and the other officers would spend their time in European-style housing under curfew.

This treatment was in distinct contrast to that of the majority of the Askari, who were kept at more makeshift camps in Tabora before being allowed to make their way back home. However, contrary to what Schnee believed, the British were not ‘doing everything in their power to ruin our [German] prestige in front of the natives’,\textsuperscript{43} but were explicitly allowing the European rank and file to retain their arms, in the words of General Jacob (Jaap) van Deventer (who succeeded Smuts as commander of British Forces in the region), ‘in order that they should not lose prestige with their Askari’.\textsuperscript{44} Van Deventer was wary of the unrest that the veteran Askari could cause, to the extent of offering to pay the wages that were owed to them by the German government. This, he argued, would in the long term be much better than the ‘very serious trouble’ the new occupying force would have ‘if we repatriate nearly 3,000 veteran Askari and carriers practically penniless’.\textsuperscript{45} It would, in his view, ‘have an excellent effect. It may save us very serious disturbances and will be an excellent investment.’\textsuperscript{46} Fearing revolt in the region, van Deventer wished to ensure decent treatment of Askari troops.\textsuperscript{47} The War Office refused this request and and African soldiers were left to find their own way in a devastated post-war political and economic environment.\textsuperscript{48} His fears, however, seem to have been exaggerated and the Askari peace-

\textsuperscript{42} Ibid. 29 Nov. 1918.
\textsuperscript{43} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{44} TNA, WO 158/907, 6 Dec. 1918, General Jacob Van Deventer to Dirmiliat.
\textsuperscript{45} Ibid. 20 Nov. 1918, General van Deventer to the General Staff.
\textsuperscript{46} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{47} There was also the fear that disturbances in German East Africa could cause political unrest in South Africa. Samson, Briti, South Africa and the East Africa Campaign, 139.
\textsuperscript{48} Michelle Moyd, Violent Intermediaries: African Soldiers, Conquest, and Everyday Colonialism in German East Africa (Athens, OH, 2014), 209.
fully disbanded after reaching the camp at Abercorn.\textsuperscript{49} Paul von Lettow-Vorbeck fought hard during the inter-war years to ensure that German Askari received pensions from the German government.\textsuperscript{50}

Conclusion

Prisoner treatment was very fluid across the British empire. Not only in East Africa, many prisoners of war taken from the German colonies and interned civilians within the British empire experienced the war on the move. Perceptions of how treatment in the colonies differed from that within Europe were based very much on pre-war ideas of colonial backwardness, and in the initial stages of the war it was quite easy for the German government to provoke official British investigations into alleged and often much exaggerated claims of mistreatment.

Civilian internees in Dar es Salaam, due to surrender terms, were spared expulsion from the colony, but it was a different story for those in other parts of East Africa. Those who were not captured in the first year of the war would not be repatriated back to Germany and spent the war either in India, Malta, Egypt, or some of the more temporary camps in East Africa itself. The Allied blockade meant that resources would not be directed to helping these internees back to Germany and thus their exclusion from any exchange agreements. However, the British were aware of colonial prestige and the negative influence internment camps could have on the surrounding populations. The solution was to send as many internees as possible to Australia, which had a more trustworthy white population that was strongly anti-German and also, unlike that of the Union of South Africa, quite willing to accept the influx of internees into the country.

Finally, the magnanimous treatment of the German officer corps, who on surrender were allowed to maintain their weapons while in the colony and to march to the train stations as a unit, may have

\textsuperscript{49} Bror Urme McDonell, \textit{Mzee Ali: The Biography of an African Slave Raider Turned Askari and Scout} (Johannesburg, 2006), 214. There are very few memoirs by Askari troops and those that exist can be quite problematic.

\textsuperscript{50} Moyd, \textit{Violent Intermediaries}, 208.
helped prevent any disturbances from the indigenous population, but no doubt contributed to the image of an army undefeated in the field. Von Lettow-Vorbeck created this myth in the aftermath of his well-documented return to Berlin, and Heinrich Schnee kept it alive through his constant pamphleteering. While this ensured public awareness of the loss of Germany’s colonies, it ignored the internment and expulsion of German colonial settlers from their former colonial homes. The image of strong, brave Europeans fighting in the African bush, as Steinbach has argued, fits much better into the traditional imperial narrative than that of humiliated Europeans behind the wire. 51 While the internment experience of German colonial settlers fell very much into the background of the inter-war colonial revisionist literature, the presence of captives in places such as Ahmednagar meant that extra-European spaces were spun into the global narrative of the Great War.


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In 1912 Wilhelm Lamszus (1881–1965), a teacher and pacifist from Hamburg, published a small, bestselling novel which immediately unleashed a political scandal in Wilhelmine Germany. While training with the military reserve, Lamszus observed a huge build-up of artillery and turned these impressions into a sinister visionary novel of the character of future wars which he entitled The Human Slaughter-House. In it he predicted the machine-like mass killing of soldiers:

How the experts have, day in, day out, been inventing and constructing new marvels of mechanism. The mechanical side of war has been raised to a high standard of genius and a fine art. Two hundred and forty bullets and more to the minute!

Trans. Angela Davies (GHIL).
What a marvel of mechanism one of those machine guns is. . . . It is as though Death had scrapped his scythe for old iron; as if nowadays he had graduated as expert mechanic. . . . I cannot get rid of this hideous thought. It is always cropping up again. We have passed on from retail to wholesale methods of business. . . . Once it was a knightly death, an honorable soldier’s death; now it is a death by machinery. That is what is sticking in my gullet. We are being hustled from life to death by experts—by mechanicians. . . . [T]hey are now turning out the crippled and the dead by by machinery.1

Nothing was more realistic than this vision. It was seen as unrealistic only by those who thought that the future war would be like the Napoleonic wars, the Franco-German war of 1870–1, or the Boer wars: a war of movement with light arms, flying cavalry, and close combat, man-to-man (see ills. 1 and 2).

In the autumn of 1914, what had been predicted many years earlier came to pass: if millions of soldiers, their equipment, guns, ammunition, supply convoys, and horses (armies were not yet motorized) were to be transported to the front by a huge effort on the part of the railways,2 (see ill. 3) then they would be stuck there. A war of movement with large mobile combat units making breakthroughs and gaining territory, or even decisive battles in the traditional sense, were no longer possible. Attackers had to dig in immediately and seek cover because modern weapons technology gave the defenders


2 In a few days, around 3 million men and around 850,000 horses went west in 11,000 transports. ‘Between 2 and 18 August alone, around 2,150 trains went west over Cologne’s Hohenzollern Bridge, newly inaugurated in 1911;
the advantage everywhere. The spade was as important as the gun. The proverbial gunpowder smoke no longer offered any protection; smokeless powder meant that targets were visible all the time, while the camouflaged artillery was almost invisible. Trench warfare as a war of attrition claimed unimaginable sacrifices.

Within a few weeks in the autumn and winter of 1914–15, this became the reality of the Western Front, from Hartmannsweilerkopf in the Vosges mountains to Ypres and Dicmuiden in Flanders and on to the English Channel. In 1916 the trench warfare around Verdun escalated to unimaginable proportions (more than 700,000 dead) with a terrible culmination on the Somme in the summer and autumn on average, one every ten minutes.’ Jörn Leonhard, *Die Büchse der Pandora: Geschichte des Ersten Weltkriegs* (Munich, 2014), 163.
Illustration 3: The Kaiser’s Thanks to the Railway Workers (22 August 1914). The mobilization and concentration of the armies on the borders has been completed. The German railways have carried out this huge transport movement with unprecedented safety and punctuality. I thankfully commemorate the men who, since the war of 1870–1, have quietly created an organization which has passed a serious test with flying colours . . .

of 1916. In the five months of battles on the Somme, 420,000 British, 204,000 French, and 465,000 German soldiers were killed, missing, wounded, or taken prisoner.

All this could have been predicted even more precisely, as Lamszus did in his visionary novel, for in 1899, a six-volume work containing analysis and forecasts in military history, weapons technology, and social policy had been published as Der zukünftige Krieg in seiner technischen, volkswirtschaftlichen und politischen Bedeutung, first in Russian in St Petersburg, and later in the same year in German in Berlin. Unlike his fellow campaigner, Bertha von Suttner, its author has largely been forgotten as a pacifist by the general public. He is, however, well known among military historians and historians of the peace movement. At present, he is commemorated by a foundation in Warsaw that bears his name: Jan Bloch, Jan Gotlib in Polish, Ivan Stanislavovich in Russian, and known in Germany, France, and Britain under his Russian noble title as Johann von Bloch or Jean de Bloch (see ill. 4).

Bloch’s message was that defenders, protected in their dugouts, in complex systems of deep trenches and barbed wire interspersed with machine guns and rapid-fire cannon, would always have the advantage. The war of the future would be decided by modern artillery techniques and sheer masses. Hostilities would come to an end when one side or the other ran out of ammunition or their supply lines collapsed. Given that there were huge numbers of troops, supplying


4 A good overview of Bloch’s biography, his work, and its relevance for the international peace movement is provided by the essays in Walter Troxler, Daniela Walker, and Markus Furrer (eds.), Jan Bloch und das internationale Kriegs- und Friedensmuseum in Luzern (Vienna, 2010).

them would be difficult. Horse-drawn vehicles and railways would be completely overstretched, medical care for the wounded was ruled out entirely (it was not even planned for), and soldiers at the front would not receive a hot meal for days on end. Supplies to the civilian population, too, could no longer be maintained; the labour force and working animals would be at the front and dying in large numbers, which meant that they would have to be constantly replaced by new recruits. Industry and the economy, converted to a war footing, could only be kept going by women’s work (home front), until food supplies, as was to be expected, collapsed completely. It was not weapons that would end this war, but hunger.6 With no prospect of peace, tormented to the utmost and demoralized, the war-weary nations, in their desire for peace, would seek to get rid of their unrepentant governments, which were incapable of making peace and therefore criminal. Bloch was right. At the end of 1917 and in November 1918, the monarchies in St Petersburg, Berlin, and Vienna were swept away, and the Austrian and Ottoman empires disintegrated.

These predictions of ‘total war’ were not the product of fantasy, but the result of many years of painstaking research by Bloch in publications about the development of the latest weapons technology in the 1880s and 1890s, and accounts and analyses of the history of war. He also talked to experienced soldiers and staff officers from several different countries, and carried out his own experiments with weapons technology on the shooting range. What was unusual was the way in which he embedded the projected course of the war and military planning in the economic, social, and political context: the huge cost of taking part in the European arms race was depleting national economies by draining them of capital and reducing productivity; a war would ruin them completely, while inflation, the consequence of escalating national debt and printing worthless money, would devalue savings and assets. Political upheaval would be the inevitable result. ‘What the Governments will all come to see more or less clearly is that if they persist in squandering the resources of their people in order to prepare for a war which has already become impossible without suicide, they will only be preparing the triumph of the socialist revolution.’ These words ended a conversation which the British journalist, social reformer, and peace activist William Thomas Stead (1849–1912), had conducted with Jean de Bloch. Stead used them to preface his selective edition of Bloch’s six-volume work, *The War of the Future in its Technical, Economic and Political Relations.*

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I. Jean de Bloch (1836–1902): Polish Entrepreneur, Banker, and Peace Activist

Who was Jean de Bloch? Born in 1836 in Radom into a Polish–Jewish family, at the age of 15 he converted to the Evangelical Reformed Church in Poland (at that time part of the Russian Empire), and five years later to the Catholic Church. (His origins explain many of his publications on the Jewish questions and on anti-Semitism in Imperial Russia.\(^9\)) Space does not permit an account here of Bloch’s biography, or of his wide-ranging work as a banker, railway entrepreneur, economic and social policy-maker, benefactor, and patriot of Poland.\(^10\) Instead, this article will concentrate on his main work, *Der Krieg* (1899), which secured his entry into the annals of the peace movement before the First World War, along with Frédéric Passy in France (who, with Henri Dunant, was the first winner of the Nobel Peace Prize in 1901, for which Bloch was also nominated by the University of Cracow),\(^11\) Norman Angell in England (who won the Nobel Peace Prize in 1933),\(^12\) and Wilhelm Lamszus, quoted above, in Germany.


\(^11\) Bloch fell ill and was not involved in the selection process. He died on 6 Jan. 1902, shortly after the first awards ceremony on 10 Dec. 1901. See Peter van den Dungen, ‘Jan Bloch and the Inaugural Nobel Peace Prize (1901)’, *Norwegian Nobel Institute Series*, 3/2 (Oslo, 2003), 4–27.

How did Bloch, a Polish–Russian banker and railway magnate, come to be interested in military problems? The first answer is that he had made his fortune in Russia by constructing military–strategic railway lines, which were part of contemporary plan for an arms race and war readiness. The second answer points to the civic responsibility of an entrepreneur who regarded armament and war as a great danger, threatening the destruction of prosperity. In military matters, too, he thought like a businessman who was used to solving problems on the basis of a cost–benefit analysis. For example, in his conversation with Stead,\textsuperscript{13} he pointed out, in relation to the American Civil War, that it would have been much more cost effective for the Northern states simply to have bought the slaves for an acceptable price from the Southern states and set them free, instead of spending many times more on a bloody military campaign. On the other hand, he also thought as a social reformer, patriot, and pacifist. Andrzej Żor wrote:

One can assume, that . . . the most famous of his works [\textit{Der Krieg}] was inspired, like the previous books, by his sense of civic duty. Bloch was never concerned with military issues, although he had to consider military aspects during railway construction. . . . As the tension caused by the preparations to [\textit{sic}] an imminent large-scale European military conflict was constantly growing, Bloch asked, on behalf of Warsaw merchants, for access to materials concerning the protection of the city of Warsaw and its citizens against possible results of military activity. To his surprise and dismay, he saw that strategic documents are dominated by purely military issues, while no attention is paid to such questions as provisions for the population, citizens evacuation in case of conflict escalation, medical care for inhabitants. The issue was not negligible.\textsuperscript{14}

Bloch was worried by the arms race between the European great powers, and its economic and mental consequences: chauvinism and

\textsuperscript{13} The War of the Future, p. liii.
\textsuperscript{14} Żor, ‘Jan Gottlieb Bloch (1826–1902): Biography Outline’, 11–12.
a growing readiness for war on the one hand, and the lack of any provision for disarmament, settling disputes, and peace on the other. One of the main internal sources of crisis in Imperial Germany was the dominant mentality that even domestic conflict could not be resolved by compromise and compensation.\(^{15}\) Given that this political culture was not limited to Germany, but was found all over Western Europe, Bloch was not taken seriously by the high-ranking generals,\(^{16}\) who still subscribed to highly conventional notions of warfare,\(^{17}\) for example, hand-to-hand fighting with bayonets (according to the Russian general Dragomirov).\(^{18}\) It was as if, Bloch remarked ironically, admirals still believed in sea battles with modern ships.\(^{19}\)

Berlin historian of war Hans Delbrück closely examined Bloch’s work as soon as it was published,\(^{20}\) because he believed that it had ‘given the modern peace movement new strength and life’.\(^{21}\) He also agreed with Bloch that war theorists lacked a coherent theory of war at the level of weapons development: ‘Even our generals admit that they have no idea what a future battle will be like. One theory of how a battle can be brought about drives out the last. At the war acade-
mies, one professor teaches the opposite of the next.' What could an outsider such as Jean de Bloch contribute here? Delbrück conceded that his descriptions were realistic. Bloch could, for example, point out that the usual manoeuvres conveyed a completely inadequate idea of the future combat situation. For, he said, it has to be admitted that no small power of imagination is required to visualize the impact of a battalion shooting 10,000 bullets per minute, each of which, without being aimed, can hit 5 people at a distance of 600 metres; or the effect of exploding artillery shells which, in 1870, using saltpetre powder, released only 37 splinters, while now the figure is between 300 and 800; or the effect of huge, 37-kilo steel bombs which, using ordinary powder, explode into 42 pieces on impact, but now, with a load of pyroxylin, disintegrate into 1,204 pieces . . . and, finally, the impact of grenades and shrapnel, which pepper an area of 6,000 square metres with hundreds of splinters and bullets, like hail.

In the war of 1870, losses accounted for 9 per cent of the armies’ strength. If we take the new weapons into account, which are 40 times more effective than the weapons of 1870, then we would have to multiply army losses by 40, and the comparison is reduced to absurdity, not because the calculations are wrong, but simply because means have been made available which are sufficient for the destruction of armies many times greater than what we can actually put into the field.


23 Bloch, Der Krieg, vi. 206; also see v. 394 ff.

24 Ibid. i. 667.
The inescapable conclusion reached by Bloch was that to carry on a war of aggression was possible only at the price of suicide. He intended to present the evidence in his book, and trusting to reason, intellect, and ethics, encourage a rethinking in line with the European peace movements.

II The Future War: Industrialized Mass Murder

Bloch began with two questions: (1) can the increasing burden of rearmament continue to be borne without provoking ‘serious internal upheavals’ in society? and (2) ‘will the further perfection of weapons make it simply impossible to wage war, at least for the countries where a high culture has considerably increased the value of each citizen’s life?’ that is, mainly in the European so-called ‘civilized nations’, but less so in the Ottoman and tsarist empires. The answers have already been suggested above; in both cases, a resounding ‘no’. He provided the first answer as an economist; the second as a weapons technician. According to his research and calculations, the effect of modern weapons, especially high-explosive artillery projectiles, was so devastating that any command to storm enemy positions would be tantamount to mass suicide. And that is how it was in the West: in Flanders, at Verdun, and on the Somme. The French Colonel Langlois and the German Artillery General Müller had long worked out, as Bloch reports, that on the basis of its

25 Ibid. i. p. xvii.
26 Detailed arguments can be found ibid. ii. 551–9. Bloch never tired of pointing out that a basic problem with regard to the ideas, course, and consequences of the ‘war of the future’ lay in the fact that the generals did not understand economics, and the economists understood nothing about the theory of war and weapons technology. Bloch discussed the catastrophic economic consequences of the war in volume 4 of his main work. In conversation with Stead (The War of the Future, p. xvii) he said: ‘it is as a political economist that I discovered the open secret which he who runs may read. The soldier by natural evolution has so perfected the mechanism of slaughter that he has practically secured his own extinction. He has made himself so costly that mankind can no longer afford to pay for his maintenance, and he has therefore transferred the sceptre of the world from those who govern its camps to those who control its markets.’
firepower and the devastating effect of explosive projectiles, modern artillery ‘can kill eight times more soldiers than can be sent to the battlefield’.  

Finally the ammunition is depleted, millions of cartridges, many thousands of bullets and bombs cover the earth . . . But the firing continues and goes on for as long as a new box of ammunition arrives to replace each spent one. . . . There comes a moment when half [of the soldiers] are giving the death rattle; wounded and dead are lying in dense parallel mounds, which are, however, separated on both sides by the distance of 1,000 paces, which the bullets [of both sides] whistle through, the grapeshot transforming it into a sea of dust that no one can pass through alive. The bitter battle continues, but those 1,000 paces invariably separate the two armies. Who has won here? Nobody.  

Bloch quite rightly assumed that armies comprising millions could not be transported and led in a conventional war of movement, so that, given the number of French fortresses already built, trench warfare would become inevitable: ‘A future war will therefore . . . be a struggle for fortified positions.’ Behind their entrenchments, these positions could be made impregnable, all the more so as defenders could exploit the advantages of the land for themselves while attackers had to show themselves openly in order to take shots. ‘Everyone will dig themselves in during the next war. It will be a huge trench war. The spade will be as important to the soldier as his rifle.’ ‘Those on the defensive, when they have been forced out of their positions, will retreat on a prepared path, on which they will either find new trenches, which they had dug earlier, or dig new ones in suitable places, while constantly resisting attack and inflicting new losses on the enemy.’ There could not be a more precise description...
of trench warfare in all its ‘terrible design’, its futility, its criminal conception of ‘attrition’ and ‘bleeding out’, as the German High Command described it in 1916 in relation to Verdun. Here Bloch found himself outdone by a degree of cynicism unimaginable for Germany as a ‘civilized nation’, something that he had not thought possible: millions of fathers, brothers, and sons were regarded as nothing but ‘cannon fodder’. This is precisely what the ‘battle’ planners had anticipated and expressed in numbers: ‘the attacker [will] suffer losses of 500 per cent of his original strength.’ Lord Kitchener exclaimed: ‘I don’t know what is to be done—this isn’t war.’ (See ills. 5 and 6.)

The following text about the war of the future secured Bloch’s entry into the military historiography of the First World War:

At first there will be increased slaughter—increased slaughter on so terrible a scale as to render it impossible to get troops to push the battle to a decisive issue. They will try to, thinking that they are fighting under the old conditions, and they will learn such a lesson that they will abandon the attempt forever. Then, instead of a war fought out to the bitter end in a series of decisive battles, we shall have as a substitute a long period of continually increasing strain upon the resources of the combatants. The war, instead of being a hand-to-hand contest in which the combatants measure their physical and moral superiority, will become a kind of stalemate, in which neither army being able to get at the other, both armies will be maintained in opposition to each other, threatening each other, but never being able to deliver a final and decisive attack. It will be simply the natural evolution of the armed peace, on an aggravated scale. . . . accompanied by entire dislocation of all industry and severing of all the sources of supply by which alone the community is enabled to bear the crushing burden of that armed peace. It will be a multiplication of expenditure simultaneously accompanied by a diminution of the sources by which that expenditure can be met. That is the future of war—not fighting, but famine, not the slaying of men, but the bankruptcy of nations and the break-up of the whole social organization.

32 Ibid. v. 423.
33 Fuller, Conduct of War, 160.
34 The War of the Future, pp. xvi–xvii.
Illustration 5: The Battlefield I (1914)

Source: Der Wandervogel: Monatsschrift für deutsches Jugendwandern, 9/11–12 (1914), 290.

Illustration 6: The Battlefield II (1916)

Source: Der Wandervogel: Monatsschrift für deutsches Jugendwandern, 11/11 (1916), 228.
Hans Delbrück, the military historian from Berlin cited above, discussed Bloch’s findings at length in the context of his own research on the history of war. He considered Bloch’s conclusions about supply problems during a war and his assessment of the economic consequences as, on the whole, unfounded or misguided. Above all, he argued, if an opponent disarmed, this would increase his readiness for war rather than lessen it.

Delbrück’s judgment on the work as a whole was damning: ‘From a scientific standpoint the work does not have much to recommend it. It is a rather uncritical and poorly arranged collection of material; and although it is embellished with illustrations, the treatment is amateurish with vast amounts of detail that have nothing to do with the actual problem.’

Delbrück also regarded the demand for international arbitration on questions of power, which Bloch advocated, as illusory. He finished by justifying Germany’s continued rearmament on land and at sea by pointing out that as a continental great power, Germany would fall behind if it could not take part in dividing up the world, along with the colonial powers Britain, France, and Russia.

For Germany, which has practically no valuable possessions in other parts of the world . . . gaining possessions of equal value to those of the established colonial nations is a matter of life and death . . . if we want to remain a great nation. . . . Only to those who have power, power accrues. A profoundly moral law lies behind this precept. A people that has the self-control to limit its daily pleasures in favour of increasing its national power, that, to put it crudely, prefers to drink less beer and smoke fewer cigars and to buy cannons and ships instead, thereby acquires a claim to assert its individuality, and to leave as a lasting bequest to itself and humanity what it has achieved intellectually over centuries. . . . Without war if possible, but this is something of such value that any amount of blood is not too much to pay for it.


Bloch and his work were powerless against so much cultural chauvinism, imperialism, and ignorance of weapons technology. Delbrück, who died in 1929, experienced the dreadful toll of blood claimed by the suicidal war, which had been unleashed and continued against better judgement. For him, it was worth it:

The generals will certainly wait and see whether the natural law of war, the violent destruction of the enemy fighting force, is really no longer valid today. The final decision on such questions is never made in theory, but always by experience. But even if we assume that Bloch really is right and has demonstrated that large battles are impossible or futile, the same has not been proven for war. We would first be pushed back to the level of strategy in the sixteenth to eighteenth centuries, to the time of Gustavus Adolphus, Eugene, Marlborough, Friedrich, and wage a war of small means. Only when the situation was especially favourable, or tensions were highest, would we attempt a defeat; at other times we would try to get by simply by gradually exhausting the opponent. 37

In fact, the German generals did wait and see about ending the war in autumn 1914 after the advance in Flanders stalled, without recognizable war aims and against the advice of General von Falkenhayn. The suicidal war became a mass grave, as had been calculated by an alleged utopian and non-expert: Jean de Bloch. ‘Under present day conditions of war and life . . . it would be wantonly frivolous, almost a crime, to embark upon a war without being clear about the consequences of an international war in one’s own country and in foreign ones.’ 38 ‘International war’ is the key word. It was not just armies that took up positions against each other, but whole peoples and their economic and social structures: this was ‘total’ war. And this is why, if a victory could not be achieved, it became a ‘struggle for existence’. 39

37 Ibid. 215. In his multi-volume Geschichte der Kriegskunst im Rahmen der politischen Geschichte (Berlin, 1900 ff.), Delbrück differentiated between a strategy of complete defeat (Niederwerfungsstrategie) and a strategy of attrition (Ermattungsstrategie).

38 Bloch, Der Krieg, i. p. xviii.

39 According to the ‘inventor’ of the war of attrition at Verdun, General von Falkenhayn. See Leonhard, Büchse der Pandora, 551.
III. Unsuccessful Peace Attempts: Jean de Bloch Falls into Oblivion

Unlike Delbrück and the German high-ranking generals, Tsar Nicholas II, it seems, took Bloch’s conclusions seriously. Nicholas’s manifesto of August 1898 against rearmament and war, combined with his call to convene a peace conference, adopted the spirit of Bloch’s basic idea. The tsar elevated Bloch to the nobility, appointed him State Councillor, and initiated the first international peace conference, which was held from May to July 1899 in The Hague and was hosted by the queen of the Netherlands. Bloch took an active part in the conference, which passed a number of accords (including a ban on using poison gas in war, and concerning the peaceful settlement of international disputes), but failed to agree on the question of an international arbitration court in The Hague, largely because of Imperial Germany. An impression of the atmosphere inside the German delegation is provided by Count Münster, Germany’s First Delegate, in a letter to Imperial Chancellor von Bülow:

The conference has attracted the worst political rabble from the whole world, journalists of the worst sort like Stead, baptized Jews like Bloch, women of peace like Frau von Suttner . . . Frau Salenko [sic], etc. . . . This whole rabble (Young Turks and Armenians, and Socialists are also involved) openly operates under Russian protection. Stead, who I knew more than twenty

42 This was disregarded on both sides of the front. See Rolf-Dieter Müller, ‘Gaskrieg’, in Hirschfeld, Krumeich, and Renz (eds.), *Enzyklopädie Erster Weltkrieg*, 519–22.
43 He is referring to Margarethe Lenore Selenka, German women’s rights and peace activist.
years ago as a well-known, paid Russian agent, leads the whole press campaign here, in Belgium, and especially in Britain.\textsuperscript{44}

An accord on disarmament was out of the question in any case. Nationalism, imperialism, the arms race on the Continent and especially in Germany and France, accompanied by a strongly stoked will for war produced a political narcotic that immunized even against a sober analysis like that by Jean de Bloch. But the actors were certainly not ‘sleepwalkers’ (Christopher Clark). In the early autumn of 1914 Kaiser Wilhelm II declared pathetically that he had not \textit{wanted} this war. But this statement totally ignored the realities of his power and guilt. It was within his power not to have allowed the war to start, or to have put an end to the fighting after the first battle of Ypres in November 1914. He determinedly did not do this, and that is why the Allies wanted him put before an International Court as a war criminal, under the provisions of the Versailles Treaty.

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‘Who has won here? Nobody.’ Bloch had clear-sightedly predicted this. There was no victory, just a truce. But he had thought even further, pursuing his approach of combining military matters with economic ones: even without a war, constant armament would, in the long term, overburden the states and lead to social and political disturbances.

Thus side by side with the growth of military burdens rise waves of popular discontent threatening a social revolution. Such are the consequences of the so-called armed peace of Europe—slow destruction in consequence of expenditure on preparations for war, or swift destruction in the event of war—in both events convulsions in the social order.\textsuperscript{45}

The only alternatives were to disarm or to find a way of guaranteeing peace. Shortly before his death, Bloch was able to give this, his

\textsuperscript{44} Dieter Riesenberger, \textit{Geschichte der Friedensbewegung in Deutschland: Von den Anfängen bis 1933} (Göttingen, 1985), 70.

\textsuperscript{45} \textit{The War of the Future}, 356.
major concern, expression by founding and financing the first International Museum of War and Peace in Lucerne, in neutral Switzerland. But it had to close as early as 1912. Did Jean de Bloch want to create a memorial for himself? He almost won the first Nobel Peace Prize. His message, which is still relevant today, is that in every case, and for everyone involved, modern war is a political, military, economic, social, and human catastrophe.

Autumn 1918: no defeat—no victory. A number of Allies wanted to turn ceasefire into victory in the Versailles Treaty, with fateful and far-reaching consequences. In view of the provisions concerning Germany, General Foch commented, coolly and prophetically: ‘This is not a peace, but a truce for twenty years.’ He was right, to the very year.


It is ironic that the first modern monograph-length study of the English Exchequer, that medieval English institution par excellence, should be published by a German scholar as a version of her doctoral dissertation. In British medieval historiography the Exchequer is nothing if not studied—many of the best medieval historians have cut their teeth on it. Its records are the pipe rolls, those financial accounts of allowances and debts paid and unpaid to the crown arising from its twice-yearly audits. These are are nothing if not well used—a scholarly society exists for editing and publishing them. The Exchequer’s principle ‘manual’, Richard of Ely’s so-called Dialogue of the Exchequer, is nothing if not edited—it is the beneficiary of no fewer than four modern editions or revisions (1902, 1950, 1983, 2007). Yet extraordinarily, despite this, the last dedicated monograph-length study of the Exchequer is Reginald Lane Poole’s of 1912. It could not be said that British medievalists have taken this massive continuous run of records for granted precisely (there is a continuous run from 1156 to 1832). But it might be said they have not stepped back to focus on them en bloc as they could have done. Today the pipe rolls and Bishop Stubbs’s Select Charters from the Beginning to 1307 do not dominate twenty-first century university teaching of British (English?) medieval history as much as in the twentieth, but it is true that for advanced students of English government, those older reference points and their successors remain basic givens in the historiography. The Exchequer and its records are part of the landscape. They are ‘rather like Vesuvius . . . a grand object, never quite inactive, always plumed with smoke . . . but seldom in full-scale eruption’, as R. W. Southern said of Magna Carta.¹ This can make it hard to see the

phenomenon in question afresh. Die Autonomie der Routine steps back to take a fresh look at this historiographical Vesuvius.

If, however, it is ironic that the first study since Poole’s should be German, it is not at all unprecedented; indeed it is very fitting. One of the most distinguished dedicated studies of the Exchequer was the great Felix Liebermann’s still valuable 1875 *Einleitung*.

So if it is striking that Kypta’s is the most modern dedicated study of the Exchequer it is instructive for the following reasons. Much methodological water has flowed under the historiographical bridge since Poole, let alone Liebermann, wrote. While it would be quite unfair to suggest that approaches to the pipe rolls remain stuck in the 1920s, it would be fair to say that approaches drawn from socio-evolutionary theory, modern historical semantics, and systems theory have not been applied to them before (though Kypta is not alone in approaching the Exchequer from other instructive modern perspectives). As this implies, Kypta brings to her analysis a historiographical *Gestalt* quite distinct from most ‘indigenous’ Anglophone specialists in medieval English government. Her geographical and methodological detachment from the established British historiography on medieval government accordingly make her an interesting guide to it. For this British reader, partly if not formatively brought up within the indigenous historiography, Kypta’s study is valuable and thought-provoking. Even—especially—where I would not agree with some of her stronger conclusions or methodological prescriptions, her account is a very useful one when thinking more widely about medieval institutionalization. It would be interesting to apply it to other record series, though difficult, as she points out, given the *Sonderfall* of English material.

Her argument in essence is as follows. It is fundamentally mistaken to think of kings and high-level administrators as the guiding hands and minds behind the innovative administrative developments of the Exchequer as a government department. (Kypta is brutally dismissive of those who would argue this.) They played no such role. Their presence correlates with no discernible patterns or changes in record-keeping practices. Rather, agency belongs anonymously to the humble clerks who, through their many, small, repeated actions and modifications, created the Exchequer-as-department,

the unintended longer-term consequence of those same actions and their development of the technical language needed to articulate it to one another. Similar but autonomous patterns can be seen in record-keeping elsewhere, suggesting wider social systems at work. This is the autonomy of Kypta’s routine, which develops its own agency à la genetic mutations which are at once random and preserved as a function of their fit within their environmental context. The pipe roll clerk cannot see the pattern that his individual choices will retrospectively develop into. His retention or amendment of particular scribal or oral practices is rational in a limited way, but has no wider intentional game. Because these practices are fluid, multiple, and composite, the rules for playing the Exchequer’s game as one of its clerks cannot be learnt from a rulebook. (The 1170s Dialogue of the Exchequer would be inadequate for this purpose Kypta argues.) Rather, you could only learn the game by playing it. Institutionalization starts here with the development of a routinized technical language, which leads to social differentiation between those who have and do not have that language, which finally hardens into a process of institutionalization-as-organization around those, by now, long-established practices.

As this implies, the book interestingly applies practices of historical semantics as being developed by historians such as Bernhard Jussen (her supervisor) and which themselves build on the Begriffsgeschichte of Reinhart Koselleck (and others). It also draws on organizational theory and ideas of socio-evolutionary thinking, a field of growing activity, partly through such theorists as Niklas Luhmann, who have used it to explain the complexity of social systems, partly through historians such as W. G. Runciman, who are exploring ways of doing history meaningfully with evolutionary models of causal agency. Kypta’s argument is neatly aided by these theories. Agency is taken away from ‘big men’ and given to little ones. Intention with a small ‘i’ is permitted (the accretion of fluid clerical Exchequer practice over time) but teleology is thwarted because there is no master plan. (‘Let’s create a government department called the Exchequer!’—Kypta is sharply critical of those who assume an intentionally developing administrative process.) Complexity is maintained precisely because of the absence of intrusive executive interventions: the system maintains itself. She is careful not to fall into the trap of arguing that all evolutionary changes improve the system’s efficiency, rather than (by definition) con-
tributing to its *reliability*. She is interestingly sceptical about how much technical semantic analysis can contribute to unearthing the origins of Exchequer procedure. She is good on the social divisiveness of specialized knowledge—an unintended consequence, she suggests—and good, too, on the self-legitimizing nature of a technical practice once established. Finally, Kypta elegantly ends by angling her account of a depersonalized, routinized administrative function which has decoupled itself from the king’s person alongside narratives of the ‘emergence of the modern state’, narratives which are ultimately circular and teleological.

It is perhaps where analysis is pushed to wider forceful conclusions that one might raise some questions, mainly because Kypta appears to stress binary alternatives where I am not persuaded they are necessary. I will pick out two. In both cases an effect of the analysis is to produce a somewhat unpolitical picture, it seems to me, and a somewhat idealized account of administration, even if that idealization is to do with the processes not purposes of administration.

One is in relation to the respective agency of routines and people. One can see the attractiveness of socio-evolutionary theory in explaining the non-linear but rational (small ‘r’) logic underpinning the many changes in record-keeping across numerous fields. It means one does not have to explain every single change every time with reference to an individual’s purposeful intervention. It means one can explain parallel but autonomous processes. More widely, it indeed makes a great deal of sense to stress the importance of aggregated routine-as-legitimacy in distinction to individuals’ assertion of their own fiat. But I do not see that a wider individual intentionality *needed* to be excluded as a consequence of asserting the importance of routine-as-legitimacy. One does not have to go back to an old model of kings or chancellors ‘running’ government to think that the self-conscious, reflexive capacities of twelfth-century clerics, scribes (and, why not, kings) reached beyond the very limited intentionality Kypta is willing to concede. An awful lot of energy, effort (and money) was being allocated by these regimes to functions that, on this account, they were strikingly uncurious about. In this period any autonomous routine is always executed by people. It seems more likely that a perfectly ‘automatic government’ devoid of reflexivity will be as hard for humans to carry out as automatic writing is for writers trying to escape their own self-consciousness. Richard of Ely includes some
interesting comments in precisely this respect about Richard of Ilchester’s meddling and unhelpful innovations. Part of the attraction of approaches such as Luhmann’s is that they seek to defuse the need to stress ‘big bangs’ at the supposed origins of practices, and hence reduce the need to attribute significant agency to individuals. Notwithstanding the sophisticated ways we can attempt this defusion, the question persists for me about the role of humans in deciding that accounting action ‘X’ should take place, and then deciding to repeat it, and to repeat it, and to repeat it, and to repeat it—or not. Perhaps this is the incorrigible, irreducible, deluded humanist in me. (I think Kypka would say so and it is part of my point that ultimately some historians may disagree with her on philosophical grounds.)

In the second case one might wonder whether Kypka is warranted to see accounting as pure routine, devoid of ritual, ceremony, meaning—and politics—beyond the functional division of labour and formal process that is played out in the accounting process. Is ritual as polarized from routine as Kypka argues? Is the king’s general absence from accounting practices also a sharp distancing of government from monarchy? On the one hand one would need to square this with the very ambiguous nature of what someone like Walter Map has to say about the anything but routinized, anything but depersonalized Angevin court more widely. One could argue that Map ostensibly exempts the Exchequer from the court’s murkiness, yet Map only goes on to stress Henry II’s watchful presence there, an irony which actually only deepens the murk. Likewise, if being an Exchequer clerk was as straightforwardly pragmatic as Kypka suggests, would such a clerk either need or be persuaded by Richard of Ely’s elaborate intellectualized dialogue instructing them on the habitus necessary to carry it off, as she suggests? On the other hand, one might contrast Kypka’s description of accounting as purely accounting with the ‘play’, ritual, and politics that a historian like Olivier Matteoni has found in later medieval French accounting where one might have expected such procedures to be more ‘bureaucratic’.3

An interesting comparison to think with here is the papal curia. It fits with some but perhaps not all of Kypka’s analysis. Take Thomas

of Marlborough’s account of bringing a case at Innocent III’s curia. It conforms to a description of the on-going volatility of practice-based knowledge (Thomas has to keep up with a changing legal environment and an unclear set of protocols). But this need to engage with that mutability does not preclude ‘static’ booklearning (Thomas goes to Bologna for a crash-course in Roman and canon law to prepare himself for his case). Nor does the need to know the Roman rules of the game, at every level, result in a depersonalized environment (here are bribes, fainting fits, misjudging an audience, acerbic papal put-downs).

The importance of these questions and the chewiness of Kypta’s answers is an indication of the usefulness of her enterprise, even where one does not necessarily agree. The British Middle Ages are too interesting and weird to be left to British historians, much as the German Middle Ages are too interesting and weird to be left to German historians. There is a very great value to be brought to a particular, technical, and sometimes introverted historiography by a skilled ‘outsider’s’ reading of its material. It makes the *Heimisch unheimlich* and for historians this is always instructive, even if not always comfortable. Literate in but not a simple product of a historiographical tradition, such historians are able to bring questions and perspectives to bear that are harder to form within the tradition itself. A great virtue of Kypta’s work is that she does not take the field’s indigenous historiographical assumptions for granted and asks sharp questions that have not been asked often enough in British historiography. Precisely because such historiography is not comparative enough, often those questions have not been asked. It is very instructive to have them asked here.

Histories of institutional, organizational, and constitutional practices were once enthroned at the top of our historiographical hierarchies. Pushed from that pedestal they have dwelt in rather reduced circumstances within some increasingly shabby rooms of Clio’s mansion for decades now. The critical interdisciplinary approaches that dominated European historiography after the Second World War could not see their way clear to give new and better accounts of these once canonical subjects. One can now see, however, particularly in British, French, and German historiographies, new, stimulating, and important accounts of these phenomena being offered by a range of young historians. Kypta’s is one of these and historians of adminis-
tration—English or otherwise, medieval or otherwise—will profit from it. It will make them think.

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The work under review is an expanded and posthumously published version of June L. Mecham’s Ph.D. thesis (University of Kansas, 2004). The author was able to work on the manuscript herself until the beginning of 2009, and the editors handled the final publication.

The subject of the resulting monograph—in contrast to the impression given by the very general title—is the piety of the nuns of the so-called Heath Convents of Lower Saxony (Lüne, Medingen, Ebstorf, Walsrode, Isenhagen, and Wienhausen), with a focus on the Cistercian monastery of Wienhausen alongside the Benedictine house at Ebstorf. For comparative purposes Mecham draws on individual objects and texts from the monasteries of the Holy Cross in Rostock and Brunswick, from the house of the Poor Clares in Villingen-Schwenningen (the ‘Bickenkloster’), and from St Agnes in Maaseik, a convent of Augustinian canonesses.

In a similar manner to Jeffrey Hamburger, Mecham seeks to use topography alongside visual and textual sources to reconstruct the performance of piety (in particular, the case of the Easter liturgy in ch. 2). She engages with the multimedia outfitting of the convents, and recognizes wall paintings, sculptures, tapestries, manuscripts and liturgy, devotional images, ‘paradise garden’ reliquaries, Christ-child dolls in cribs, and embroideries as equally significant works of art and sources (ch. 3). She attributes the vast wealth of the Heath Convents, especially in the period of reform during the last decades of the late fifteenth century, to the social status of the noble nuns on the one hand, and to the nuns’ wealth on the other (ch. 4).

A focal point of the study (ch. 5) are the building activities and the private piety of Katharina von Hoya, abbess of Wienhausen (1422–37 and 1440–69), who made many architectural alterations and contributed furnishings to the benefit of both the convent and her private devotional practice. In a separate essay, published under her own

* Trans. Ben Pope.
auspices in 2007, Mecham had already discussed the chapel of St Anna founded by Katharina as a witness to her private devotion.¹

Mecham devotes chapter 6 to religious visual media in the fifteenth-century reform era, which began at Wienhausen under Susanna Potstock (1470–1501), following the ousting of Katharina von Hoya. Mecham is chiefly concerned here with the reconstruction of reforming networks which crossed regions and orders, and which can be deduced from the spread and reception of certain texts, such as the ‘Dornenkron’ and the ‘Ars moriendi’, from the exchange of manuscripts and movement of individuals, whether abbesses, nuns, or reformers such as Johannes Busch, and from the Devotio moderna and the Windesheim Congregation. I would doubt whether there really was a direct exchange between north and south German convents, as the reference to an indulgence from the Bickenkloster in Villingen suggests. But the close connections which Mecham observes within the north German and Netherlandish space have been repeatedly confirmed by studies produced during recent years in connection with the Herzog August Library at Wolfenbüttel.² Obviously none of these works could be considered.

Mecham offers an original study of the ‘Crown of Thorns’ (Dornenkron) (pp. 218–28), a meditative prayer by Dietrich Kolde (a cleric associated with the Windesheim Congregation), which survives both at Ebstorf (KE MS. IV) and in multiple manuscripts at Wienhausen (Mss 31, 60, 69). Mecham interprets this work as an expression of Passion-centred piety in late medieval female monasteries, and also of other typically female forms of piety, such as spiritual pilgrimages in the form of prayers for indulgence (pp. 228–39).

The author finds a pronounced Eucharistic piety in the Heath Convents during the reform period, which she associates with medi-

² On this see my survey: Hedwig Röckelein, Schriftlandschaften, Bildungslandschaften und religiöse Landschaften des Mittelalters in Norddeutschland (Wiesbaden, 2015).
tation on the *Dornenkron*, with the performative rites of the Depositio
and Elevatio crucis, with the re-enactment of the *Via crucis*, with the
Visitatio sepulchri, and the ubiquitous motifs of the Resurrectio
Christi. The nuns, according to Mecham, identified themselves in
these ‘dramas’ with the Virgin Mary, with Mary Magdalene, and
with Veronica, and thereby created a greater nearness to Christ (p.
261). Through the manipulation of religious works of art and materi-
al objects alongside the sacral space, the nuns of the Heath
Convents—according to Mecham’s central thesis—dramatized them-
selves as brides of Christ and inhabitants of the Heavenly Jerusalem,
generating a particular spirituality which was seen in a negative light
by their (male) confessors. In the convents of the Windesheim Con-
gregation, on the other hand, Mecham observes a leaning towards
Marian devotion (p. 258).

Mecham makes frequent use of detailed studies by others, for
instance, Tanja Kohwagner-Nikolai’s investigation of the Wienhau-
sen embroideries. It is greatly to her credit that she has extensively
absorbed German-language research, given the widespread igno-
rance of this material in the anglophone research today. She also
understands the relevant historical vernaculars—Middle High Ger-
man, Low German, and Dutch—which enables her to study the orig-
inal sources beyond the universal language of Latin.

The editors have inserted references to literature which has
appeared since 2009, for example, the Niedersächsische Klosterbuch
(2012) and Charlotte Klack-Eitzen, Wiebke Haase, and Tanja Weiß-
graf’s work on Wienhausen’s robe for a statue of the Virgin Mary
(2013). Unfortunately there is no consideration of Katharina U.
Mersch’s dissertation (2012), which tackles similar issues to Mecham’s
work. The index is very patchy and shows little understanding of the
subject. In contrast to Mecham’s very substantial monograph, the
index is best not relied upon.

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In this book Stefano Saracino investigates the importance of utopias in the political discourse of the Commonwealth, when England was ruled without a monarch. He also includes the preceding Civil War period and the beginning of the Restoration which followed it in his study. Saracino’s analysis is based on the following works: *Macaria* (1641) by the circle around Samuel Hartlib; Gerrard Winstanley’s *The Law of Freedom* (1652); James Harrington’s *The Commonwealth of Oceana* (1656); the works and newspapers of Marchamont Nedham dating from Oliver Cromwell’s rule; John Streater’s *Government described* (1659); William Sprigge’s *A Modest Plea for an Equal Commonwealth against Monarchy* (1659); and four works from the Restoration period under Charles II, *New Atlantis continued* (1660), Antoine Legrand’s *Scytomedria* (1669), Margaret Cavendish’s *Blazing World* (1666), and Henry Neville’s *The Isle of Pines* (1668).

Saracino searches these works for rhetorical traces of republicanism and/or contemporary utopian ideas. Following in the tradition of research by John Pocock and Quentin Skinner, Saracino defines republicanism as a political language based mainly on references to political writings from Antiquity, their central terms, values, and world views. If authors during the Civil War and Commonwealth used these terms, values, and world views, they could be counted as belonging to the tradition of republicanism. In the case of contemporary utopianism, it is more difficult to establish this sort of textual commonality. Yet Saracino makes an attempt to describe utopianism as a political language by analogy with republicanism. Here, too, he identifies a canonical textual corpus. In the works he investigates, he looks for explicit or implicit references to utopian concepts in the writings of Plato, Thomas More, and Francis Bacon. What united these three classical authors was that they used comparable rhetorical devices in their utopian writings to develop political visions that contrasted sharply with prevailing social conditions. Whether there was also agreement among them relating to terms, values, and world views.

Trans. Angela Davies (GHIL).
views is discussed by Saracino. But what he really sets out to show in his study is that these two political languages—republicanism and utopianism—did not have to be mutually exclusive, as John Pocock explicitly pointed out in the case of James Harrington’s *Oceana*. Rather, Saracino argues, they could enter into a symbiotic relationship, as he demonstrates using the example of Harrington himself.

In most cases Saracino plausibly shows that the texts under investigation can be read as political speech acts in which the authors addressed specific concerns and ideas for reform to political decision-making authorities with the aim of bringing about political change. During the Civil War and just before the return of Charles II, these were the English Parliament; under the Protectorate, Oliver Cromwell. Only the examples from the Restoration period do not fit into this picture. These are either panegyrics praising monarchy as the best form of state, or criticisms of the system of rule, to the extent that this issue figured prominently in them at all, which is doubtful, at least with regard to Cavendish’s *Blazing World*. In any case, the analysis of Charles II’s reign tails off by comparison with that of the years of Cromwell’s rule and the Republic.

Less convincing, however, is Saracino’s claim that utopianism was an independent political language. Sometimes he introduces other terms, for example, when he defines utopia as an ‘independent space of political communication’ (p. 65) without making clear how exactly this term differs from ‘political language’. Chapter IV is entitled ‘Functions of Utopias in Republicanism’. Here utopianism appears to be a rhetorical device for making republicanism possible, for example, by evading censorship or defusing potentially explosive political statements. In subchapter IV.1, however, ‘The Semantics of Republicanism in Utopias’, the relationship between the two seems to have been reversed. What makes me wary is that towards the end of his investigation, Saracino attributes modernizing qualities to utopianism without showing in detail how this worked. His examples are intended to demonstrate that ‘the theory of the state was far ahead of practice’ (p. 292), but they would make it difficult to provide any specific evidence, as none of the models of political reform was ever put into practice in England. In order to demonstrate that the English utopias ‘anticipated the development of the state’, Saracino devotes several pages to punishment practices. In addition to Foucault, he looks at a number of ritual punishments in seventeenth-
century England, and compares these with statements in the utopias he discusses. In these, however, the public humiliations of forced labour and slavery, following Thomas More’s example, often played a greater part than the death sentence. How the thesis of a ‘theoretical and semantic proto-modernity’ (p. 316) can be derived from this finding remains a mystery to the reader.

Saracino’s work provides plenty of evidence that he is much more familiar with the world of texts in England than with the political and social practices of the time. This starts with his rather casual use of terms that are increasingly considered, by historians, as requiring definition, such as, for example, ‘Puritans’. Saracino uses this term frequently without attempting to clarify it, or even referring to what has, by now, become an almost endless literature on the subject. Important writers on the Civil War period are missing; as a representative sample I mention here only Nicholas Tyacke, John Morrill, Kevin Sharpe, Alexandra Walsham, Peter Lake, and David Colclough, all of whom have published significant work on themes that Saracino treats in his work. And the reader is also surprised to find several references to the Common Book of Prayer (pp. 20, 66) instead of the Book of Common Prayer. Not least, the author’s lack of familiarity with England is revealed in his uncertainty about the dating of his sources. Thus he states that the publication date of 1644 given on the title page of the pamphlet The Great Assises holden in Parnassus by Apollo is wrong (p. 273), referring to Joad Raymond’s important study of newsbooks in England, in which 10 February 1645 is given as the date of publication. He could have known that until the middle of the eighteenth century, the mos Anglicanus was followed in England, and that the new year only began with the Annunciation, on 25 March. Thus the date on the pamphlet’s title page is not wrong; Raymond merely gives the date in today’s terms, as is common scholarly practice.

On the whole, therefore, the work conveys a somewhat mixed impression. While Saracino’s interpretation of the individual texts he investigates is convincing, the generalizing conclusions he draws from them are largely unsubstantiated and logically unpersuasive.

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**Book Reviews**

_Ehre: Der höfische Adel am Kaiserhof Karls VI._ (2003); _Macht der Schrift: Politischer Biblizismus in Schottland und England zwischen Reformation und Bürgerkrieg_ (2011); and, as co-editor, _Repräsentation und Selbst-inszenierung Friedrichs des Großen_ (2014).

Religion and piety as topics long eked out a shadowy existence in research on nineteenth-century German history. Whether as political history in the narrow sense or social history more widely, the history of religion did not fit into the central paradigms of national historiography. In the meantime, the tide has turned, and the study of religion is currently experiencing a boom. One of the first among Germany’s leading historians to recognize the significance of religion and its transformation in the second half of the nineteenth century was Thomas Nipperdey. In his masterly Deutsche Geschichte 1866–1918 (1990–2), he considered the topic of religion and the church to be so important that he published the relevant chapter in advance as a paperback. In it, Nipperdey not only looked at the two major Christian confessions, but also pointed to the increasing significance of non-ecclesiastical religiosity (art as religion, theosophy, völkische mythology, and so on), for which he coined the term ‘vagierende Religiosität’ (peripatetic religiosity). In the meantime, much has been published on the individual groupings and overarching trends within the free religious movement, which flourished at the beginning of the twentieth century. It may, therefore, be justified to call the various forms of this non-ecclesiastical religion beyond Catholicism, Protestantism, and Judaism a ‘fourth confession’, as Todd H. Weir does.

In this book, Weir discusses the early history of peripatetic religiosity in the nineteenth century, and shows how it emerged out of a secularism that saw itself as essentially anti-church. Weir adopts the term ‘secularism’ from the English freethinker and social reformer George Holyoake as he finds it more suitable than contemporary German terms such as ‘freireligiös’ and ‘freigeistig’ to sum up the two essential elements that link the various groupings in this non-ecclesiastical and anti-church religiosity, namely, clear anti-clericalism and the claim to be replacing the traditional forms of religion with a new belief, for example, in a materialistic worldview or a universal ethical system. ‘Secularism’ thus denotes both a movement to

Trans. Angela Davies (GHIL).
dismantle the social and political privileges of the traditional confessions and a belief in the inherent progress of salvation.

Weir begins his account by looking at religious dissidents within Catholicism and Protestantism in the 1840s. Here it was the Protestant Lichtfreunde and the Deutschkatholiken in particular who radicalized the heritage of Enlightened, rational theology and, during the 1848 revolution, grew into independent, political and social opposition movements. The Prussian king reacted to the growing numbers of radical political and religious dissidents within the ranks of the two main confessions by granting the Religious Patent of 1847, which allowed his subjects to leave the church without joining another confession. According to Weir, Friedrich Wilhelm IV’s intention was not to encourage religious freedom, but to open the floodgates so that religious dissidents would lose their place in Prussia’s political and denominational system. In any case, the Religious Patent did nothing to undermine the idea of the ‘Christian state’, and, given the steep exit fees, many freethinkers chose to remain nominal members of their churches.

After the 1848 revolution, the free religious communities which had emerged from the Deutschkatholiken and the Lichtfreunde suffered serious repression by the state. None the less, church dissenters managed to reorganize themselves at local level. One of the most important free religious groups on German soil was the Christkatholische Congregation in Berlin, which in 1862 renamed itself the Free Religious Congregation (FRC). The following chapters of Weir’s book are devoted to the history of this congregation, which grew out of the tradition of the Deutschkatholiken and the Lichtfreunde, but also drew on the new worldviews of materialism and monism. Weir does not write a chronological history of the FRC as such. Rather, concentrating on particular moments of its turbulent history, he investigates its place in the ‘religious field’ (Bourdieu), or, as Weir puts it more precisely, the ‘confessional field’ of the time. Drawing on police reports and publications from the FRC’s milieu, Weir identifies the social position of the congregation’s members. He also presents the dominant positions within the FRC regarding religious worldviews (materialism v. idealism), demarcation from other free religious groups (Monistenbund, Gesellschaft für ethische Kultur, and so on), and the ‘Jewish question’, which was highly topical at least from the time of Berlin’s anti-Semitism dispute.
According to Weir, the FRC long retained the radical democratic heritage of its origins, but from the second half of the 1880s, it increasingly came under the influence of rising Social Democracy and highly materialistic Freethinking. One of its best known members, Adolph Hoffmann, later a co-founder of the USPD, became co-minister for science, art, and education in Prussia during the November revolution of 1918, and in this role abolished the supervision of schools by the church. During the Weimar Republic, the anti-church secularist movement became a mass phenomenon, especially when the Communist Party discovered the political potential of anticlericalism for itself. At the height of the proletarian Freethinkers’ movement—in 1930 it is said to have had more than half a million organized members—Helmut Schreiner, professor of Protestant theology, wondered whether, given these numbers alone, it was appropriate to speak of a ‘fourth confession’.

It can be debated how appropriate it is to use this term for free religious and freethinking groups. Weir himself concedes that many members and sympathizers of these congregations and organizations remained nominal members of the main Christian churches. Added to this, there were internal disagreements and differences of opinion that make it difficult to speak of a common ‘belief’ among these groups: those who interpreted the world in a metaphysical and idealistic way could be found next to staunch materialists, defenders of the concept of a God of whatever nature co-existed with convinced atheists. Yet however heterogeneous this group may have been, to exclude it, as a quantité négligeable, from the religious history of the nineteenth century with its three major religious communities (Catholics, Protestants, and Jews) would not be doing justice to the dynamic of the religious field in Germany over the last two hundred years, as we know at least since Nipperdey. To this extent, therefore, it is appropriate in future to speak, as Weir does, of a quadriconfessional approach.

Weir’s attempt to replace the structural-historical term ‘secularization’ with the actor-centred concept of ‘secularism’ is also worth noting. After all, the secularization of state and society was not just an anonymous, macro-structural process, but also had active advocates who, like Adolph Hoffmann, for example, did not hesitate to translate their secularist worldview into political decisions. Weir convincingly distinguishes his use of the term ‘secularism’ from Talal
Asad’s use of the same term. In the dichotomous view of global history put forward by Asad and other post-colonial thinkers, ‘secularism’ essentially stands for the subjugation of subaltern religious and political arrangements by Western liberals. Weir, by contrast, rightly shows how deeply ‘secularism’ was contested in the West itself, and that it was anything but a hegemonic concept. In its conceptual structure, therefore, the book goes far beyond the history of ‘peripatetic religiosity’ in nineteenth-century Germany.

Theories of the firm, in particular those relating to the significance of information and transaction costs, have been used effectively to sustain the view that merchant enterprises can successfully draw on their role as intermediaries to achieve continuing success and to manage the transition to global concerns. It is only recently, however, that attention has been focused on the operation and development of merchant enterprises in India during the nineteenth century and the emphasis, perhaps inevitably, has largely been on the role of British merchant houses. Within this context, Dejung’s rigorous study of Gebrüder Volkart, based in Winterthur, is to be doubly welcomed. The merchant house of Volkart Bros. was founded in both Winterthur and Bombay by the brothers Salomon and Johann Georg Volkart in 1851. By the end of the nineteenth century it had already become one of the largest companies in South Asia and it remained a family owned concern which continued to be controlled by partners who were drawn from the Volkart and Reinhart merchant families of Winterthur. Dejung’s study is important for two reasons. First, it extends our collective understanding of the key mechanisms that underpinned the success of individual merchant enterprises in India and the Far East in the period from the mid nineteenth century until the end of the twentieth century at a time of increased globalization and the rise of multinational firms. Secondly, by focusing on the history of a Swiss-owned firm which operated on a continent which was very much an integral part of the British Empire until the India Independence Act of 1947, the wider significance of socio-cultural factors in determining the success or failure of merchant houses can be analysed in a more nuanced and effective manner than would otherwise have been the case.

Three main themes inform the author’s overall approach to the history of Volkart Bros. as a paradigmatic case study: the significance of personal interaction and networks for the expansion of world trade; the dependency of European merchant houses operating in India on efficient local networks based on production and trade; and the central importance of trust and social capital in structuring long-
term social relations within the firm. In the pre-colonial era, India and Southern Asia constituted one of the most developed economic areas in the world and cooperation between European trading houses and non-European merchants was only possible on the basis of a similar understanding of the underlying principles of business operations where honesty and reliability were essential prerequisites, while trust was easier to establish and consolidate in a family firm, irrespective of the nationality of its owners, where decision-making was based on shared economic interests and culturally structured attitudes.

The two founders of Volkart Bros. already had considerable experience and knowledge of the Indian market and its importance as a supplier of cotton and other raw materials. If the expansion of the railway network in the 1860s was followed by the establishment of a number of hinterland agencies, the company remained dependent to a large degree on Indian merchants and ‘guarantee brokers’ (shroffs). Mutual confidence and trust underpinned these business relationships and encouraged the Swiss merchant house to rely on individual Indian firms for decades. At the same time, the firm had to operate within the framework of British law and achieve a significant degree of integration within an Imperial culture structured around clubs, parties, social gatherings, and tiger hunts. The firm’s ability to achieve these twin objectives, according to De Jung, rested on its hybrid mix as a family firm and managerial enterprise. It never faced any direct succession problems which might have jeopardized the retention of its traditional family model; it developed and retained a patriarchal structure until the 1960s; and placed considerable emphasis on the creation of a sense of solidarity and a spirit of service as the firm’s ‘guiding ideal’. Moreover, it is argued that this was not just rhetoric as there was a real commitment to maintain close contact with all employees within the framework of what was regarded by its owners as a ‘company family’.

In covering the history of Volkart Bros. from its foundation in 1851 to the end of the twentieth century the author is required to cover a great deal of ground, primarily as a result of the extension of its business operations to other Asian countries, in particular, to China and Japan in the 1920s, and its strategy of product diversification, which led to its entry into the Brazilian coffee trade in 1942. However, the business model which had proved to be effective with-
in an Indian context, particularly at a time when political stability and legal security were provided by the British colonial government, proved to be far less successful elsewhere. The difficulties which the firm encountered in entering the Chinese market, the losses which it suffered for a long time in Japan with the Nichizui Trading Company, and the short-lived success of its Brazilian operation raises wider issues about the relevance of the ‘company family’ model with its specific value system and network embeddedness to different trading environments beyond the borders of India. Indeed, the portrayal of a merchant house whose success was predicated on a sense of solidarity within its workforce, irrespective of their ethnic origins or status, might well merit a more critical appraisal. Within the company there was an extended hierarchy of posts; Indian employees were prevented from acting as purchasers of raw materials or salesmen; and a ‘conservative’ remuneration policy meant that purchasing agents were still poorly paid in the period after the First World War. The company generated a very extensive archive, but the real views of the firm’s employees were seldom, if ever, recorded and there is an implicit danger in relying too much on the stated expectations of its owners.

However, these points should not detract from an excellent study. It offers a detailed analysis of a specialized trading firm which came to occupy a central position in the international trade in raw materials. Apart from the two world wars, the nationality of its owners was less important than its capital strength and its long-term success can be attributed, at least in part, to the extent to which it was both culturally and socially embedded. Its extensive networks in India with agents, brokers, and shroffs continued to provide an effective operational framework which reflected a wider commitment to ‘honourable merchant values’. To this extent Dejung has produced a major study of a Swiss-owned merchant house which complements recent research in this field and enhances our understanding of a range of key issues which influenced the relative success or failure of companies operating on an international stage.

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BOOK REVIEWS


‘All governments still believe in military preparedness as an essential of national life’, the American journalists H. C. Engelbrecht and F. C. Hanighen concluded in resignation, ‘hence they foster and aid the arms makers and cooperate very closely with them. Armament makers, on their part, woo the government and its officials, so that their particular company may be favored when government contracts are given out.’¹ As we learn from Naci Yorulmaz’s new book, this statement dating from 1934 also applies to relations between the late Ottoman Empire and German armament makers before the First World War.

Based on a Ph.D. thesis completed at the University of Birmingham in 2011, Naci Yorulmaz’s study asks how German arms producers became the dominant suppliers of the Ottoman arsenals in the second half of the nineteenth century, and how they succeeded in maintaining this position until the First World War. Drawing on a broad empirical basis, the author shows that this did not depend primarily on the quality or price of matériel. It was achieved by rigorous personal diplomacy, clever marketing, and manipulative methods.

Contextualizing chapters (1 and 4) illuminate the background to what the author calls the first two waves of German arms sales in the Ottoman Empire. According to Yorulmaz, Bismarck, initiating the German policy of commercial expansion towards the Ottoman Empire, understood that ‘international arms sales could be used as a significant symbol of support and a declaration of friendly relations’ (p. 37). The Chancellor intervened personally in the negotiations leading to a huge contract by which the Mauser company was to supply the Ottoman Empire with 500,000 rifles and 100 million cartridges. Moreover, Bismarck recommended the powder producer Duttenhofer with whom he had a personal relationship. Wilhelm II also strengthened the close relations with the Ottoman Empire under the reign of Sultan Abdülhamid II, and it was in the context of the Kaiser’s Orientreise of 1898 that we can observe the second wave of

German arms sales. At that time, *matériel* (mainly rifles, artillery, and ships) made up more than one half of German–Ottoman trade. Like Bismarck before him, Wilhelm II intervened personally in the negotiations and promoted Krupp’s quick-fire gun.

Chapter 2 looks at the role of Germany’s military advisers. The first group of four was dispatched in 1882, and became highly paid military officers in the Ottoman army. Yorulmaz considers these Germans in Ottoman service as the ‘key instruments working for the sake of Germany’s peaceful penetration strategy in general and for the profit of the GAFs [German Armament Firms] in particular’ (p. 7). He takes a closer look at the most important figure among these actors, Colmar Freiherr von der Goltz (Goltz Pasha). Goltz succeeded in building up a network including high-ranking bureaucrats in the Yıldız Palace as well as young military cadets. He rigorously promoted German products, and, according to Yorulmaz, his lobbying work for the German armaments industry proved particularly effective in obtaining contracts with Krupp (for the fortification of the Turkish Straits with Krupp artillery) and the contract with Mauser mentioned above. Some doubts remain, however, about the author calling the military advisers ‘businessmen in uniform’. From this reviewer’s perspective, this might apply to some members of this group. The study itself reveals that a significant part of the first group of German military advisers proved to be rather ineffective for both the German and the Ottoman side. For example, one of them was said to have spent much of his time in the Janni Bier Halle in Pera.

The author also takes a closer look at the armaments orders (ch. 3). Focusing on the extensive armaments contract with Mauser, he traces the drawing up of the contract in detail. This reveals the preparatory measures taken by the German side to avoid competition and demonstrates the personal factor in the outcome of this contract that was so crucial for the growth of the Mauser company and had such a lasting impact on the community of Oberndorf am Neckar.

In chapter 5 the author focuses on Sultan Abdülhamid and his bureaucrats; this change of perspective is particularly illuminating. The armaments contracts were not just part of a defensive military policy. For the Sultan, who was in urgent need of loans, they were also a way of tapping a new finance market and making his empire attractive to investors in countries that claimed no colonial interests in the Ottoman Empire. The main reason why Abdülhamid II decid-
ed in favour of Germany as his partner for military reforms and as his source of weapons was the Prussian military’s good reputation and Germany’s victory over France in the Franco-Prussian War of 1870–1. Nonetheless, Ottoman bureaucrats also analysed European literature, newspapers, and their envoys’ reports in order to form their own, independent opinions of European military affairs. Although bribery certainly played a part in gaining access to the Sultan’s bureaucrats and obtaining their favour, the author argues that its importance has been exaggerated in the literature. To maintain good customer relations with the Ottoman Empire, Paul Mauser developed more subtle strategies, such as providing lavish dinners for the Ottoman Inspection and Control Commission, constructing a special building for them close to his factory in Oberndorf, and organizing a charity collection among his company workers for the victims of the 1894 Istanbul earthquake.

A forward-looking final chapter traces how the preference for German suppliers of matériel survived the Young Turk Revolution and triggered a third wave of German armament sales. Price was more important now, however, and companies from other countries regained ground in the Ottoman Empire’s arms market.

German–Ottoman relations before the First World War are well researched in the historiography, and the immense German–Ottoman arms trade has also attracted scholarly attention in the past. Yorulmaz’s study, however, offers new insights into the mechanics of this trade. By interpreting the German–Ottoman arms contracts as above all political acts, his study provides an excellent illustration of the potential importance of the arms trade for rapprochement and maintaining bilateral relations. The author emphasizes a ‘German style of war business’ that relied on a combination of state support, personal diplomacy, networking, and manipulative methods. This proves to be accurate in this case, but without a comparative approach it remains an open question to what extent this was a particular style within an imperialist context in which the merging of

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political and economic interests and the application of vigorous means to promote the nation’s advantage were carried to extremes.

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In the half century after 1945, the Weimar Republic was frequently depicted as an unloved, if culturally progressive, experiment in democracy, and one that was unlikely to survive in the long run. Since the turn of the millennium, however, historians have tried to escape this ‘glitter and doom’ paradigm to present Weimar as something other than a mere prelude to the horrors of the Third Reich. They have placed a heavier emphasis on the role of contingency in the Republic’s demise,¹ pointed to its achievements in building an authentically democratic civic culture,² and questioned the notion that 1920s Germany was pervaded by a sense of impending disaster.³

Locating Anthony McElligott’s book in this ‘new orthodoxy’ is no easy task. On the one hand, there is much here about the Republic’s success in establishing and legitimizing itself among the broad mass of the German population. But on the other hand, McElligott continuously brings attention to those authoritarian continuities that linked Weimar with the Third Reich, and he maintains throughout that the Republic was bedevilled by a fundamental and dangerous crisis of legitimacy. Indeed, this crisis is the focal point of the entire book—each chapter is organized around the central question of ‘authority’ and where it truly lay in Weimar Germany, a question which ‘remained unresolved throughout the 1920s’ and was the basic problem at the heart of the Republican project (p. 7).

The focus on contested authority is reflected in the timespan that the book covers. Rather than beginning with the war’s end in 1918

and finishing with Hitler’s accession to the chancellorship in 1933, as
do most conventional accounts, McElligott maintains that we must
begin in 1916 and end in 1936, because it was during this twenty-year
period that the question of who really held power in Germany re-
mained unanswered and, at times, was violently contested. McElligott convincingly argues that this dynamic of uncertain and
splintered authority was unleashed in 1916 by two developments
which first compromised the Kaiser’s pre-eminence: Hindenburg
and Ludendorff’s assumption of dictatorial powers; and growing
social unrest and calls for constitutional reform within the Reichstag.
However, the reason for choosing 1936 as the year in which this
dynamic of contested authority was finally resolved is less clear and
is, in fact, rather briefly addressed. McElligott suggests that only with
the 1936 plebiscite in the wake of the remilitarization of the Rhine-
land was Hitler’s ‘unbounded authority’ unambiguously recognized
by the population of the entire Reich, but this (highly debatable)
argument is not developed much beyond a few fleeting paragraphs.
The book treats the central theme of ‘contested authority’ in seven
chapters, the first and last of which are chronological and deal with
the Republic’s beginning and end respectively, with the remaining
five organized thematically. They focus in turn on foreign policy, the
economy, the judiciary, culture, and the civil service. In each chapter,
McElligott uses a consistent formula, first presenting the reader with
the ‘standard narrative’ on whatever issue is about to be dealt with—
that the judiciary, for example, was implacably opposed to the
Republic—before challenging it, or at least drawing out some of its
underlying complexities.

For the most part, this approach works well, especially where
some of the striking continuities that linked the Republic with the
Third Reich are identified. In chapter 3, which examines Weimar for-
eign policy, McElligott convincingly argues that German domination
of central and eastern Europe was on the agenda long before the
Nazis came to power. But whereas Stresemann had pursued this goal
cautiously and peacefully, his successors (including, but not only,
Hitler) ‘threw caution to the wind’ (p. 66), becoming increasingly
aggressive and impatient in their striving for hegemony in the east.
Chapter 6, which deals with Weimar’s ‘cultural authority’, calls into
question the classic portrayal of the Republic as a progressive staging
ground for avant-garde artistic experimentation that was brought to

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an abrupt end in 1933. Instead, McElligott emphasizes how stringent some of the censorship laws passed by Republican governments were, as well as the illiberal character of much of the Weimar state’s pedagogical self-presentation. Focusing on competing visions of politics during the Weimar period, the author shows in chapter 8 that the seeds of Hitler’s untrammeled authority after 1933 had already been built into the Weimar Constitution, which tried to marry elements of parliamentary democracy with more authoritarian ideas of plebiscitary, presidential rule.

But perhaps the most successful example of ‘rethinking’ in this book is chapter 7, which deals with the provincial councils and bureaucracies that effectively ran much of Germany. These institutions have frequently been depicted as, at best, lukewarm in their support for the Republic and, at worst, as conservative and reactionary outfits that did all they could to sabotage democracy from within. But McElligott shows that the pro-Republican political parties were remarkably successful at packing the German bureaucracy with their own supporters, despite some colourful examples of obstructionism from redoubtable monarchist civil servants such as Herbert von Bismarck (whose office continued to send out letters bearing the Imperial stamp throughout the 1920s).

There are other chapters where the attempt to ‘rethink’ historiographical orthodoxy is a little far-fetched, however. In chapter 5, which focuses on the ‘authority of law’, McElligott initially resolves to challenge the traditional thesis that the legal profession remained a bastion of authoritarian, conservative nationalism and bitterly opposed to the Republic throughout its lifespan. But much of what follows tends to confirm precisely this conventional narrative, though McElligott does succeed in laying bare some of the fluctuations in the severity of sentencing throughout the 1920s. In fact, the most interesting aspect of this chapter is yet again McElligott’s unearthing of a striking historical continuity: ‘special courts’, set up during the First World War to try dissenters for undermining German morale, continued to be used extensively in the first years of the

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Republic, when revolutionary unrest was widespread, and were introduced again in order to quell political radicalism in Weimar’s twilight phase after 1929. Remarkable, too, is that some of these ‘special courts’ remained operational and were used, to devastating effect, in the early years of Hitler’s dictatorship. This singular organ of juridical authoritarianism thus connected the legal culture of the Kaiserreich with that of the Third Reich.

There are other instances where the opportunity to ‘rethink’ the Weimar Republic is surprisingly passed up. Chapter 4, which deals with ‘the authority of money’, includes a short section on the crucial question of who voted for Hitler, which largely amounts to a restatement of the traditional and long discredited thesis that the Nazi party was a movement of the disgruntled middle classes. But the last few decades of scholarship have shown how successful Hitler was at winning support from a remarkable cross section of German society, including among workers and even defectors from the Social Democrats. There is little mention of this, despite the works of Jürgen Falter and Conan Fischer appearing in the bibliography. Nor does McElligott adequately engage with the thesis, advanced by Peter Fritzsche and others, that Nazi successes after 1929 were less a short-term result of the Depression than the manifestation of a long-term process of mobilization within a largely Protestant, rural, and small town nationalist subculture that was visible by the mid 1920s at the latest.

None of this is to detract from the exceptionally thought-provoking nature of McElligott’s contribution. All of the chapters are packed with provocative insights, for example, that the sudden explosion of the Nazi vote after 1929 was at least partly caused by a wave of nationalist euphoria triggered by the final withdrawal of French troops from the Rhineland. The central idea at the heart of the book—that the Weimar Republic’s instability was ultimately the result of its imperfect and contested claim to ‘authority’ over the German body politic—is also useful and illuminating. Finally, McElligott’s incisive unpacking of many of the authoritarian continuities that linked the Weimar period with Nazi Germany, especially those inherent in the

constitutions and legal systems, is a significant service to scholars of the period. Undergraduates and specialists alike will profit from reading this book.

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‘Europe’ is a continent with unclear borders, a space of trade links and human exchanges, and now, in the form of the European Union, also a highly institutionalized political entity. This Europe has been imagined in multiple ways and used and abused for contradictory political objectives. Its different economic, political, and cultural aspects and connotations have been reported and commented on in public discourses including in the media. The two books by Florian Greiner and Ariane Brill focus on this latter dimension: interpretations (‘Deutungen’) of an ‘imagined continent’ in the press in (Western) Germany, the United Kingdom, and the United States in two periods of the twentieth century, from the start of the First World War to the end of the Second World War in the case of Greiner’s book, and from 1945 to 1980 in the case of Brill’s.

The two books are Ph.D. theses prepared within the research programme ‘Lost in Translation: Europabilder und ihre Übersetzungen’, which was funded by the German Federal Ministry of Education and Research from 2009 to 2012. Both authors contributed to part project C of the larger research programme, on press reporting, mutual perceptions, and possible resulting transformations of discourses about Europe. This project was headed by Frank Bösch, a leading contemporary historian of media and communication, who, since 2011, has been co-director of the Zentrum für Zeithistorische Forschung in Potsdam.

For his quantitative and qualitative discourse analysis Florian Greiner chose a combination of three times two newspapers covering the period from 1914 to 1945. For Britain he analysed reporting of European themes in the more conservative *Times* and the left-liberal *Manchester Guardian*. For the USA he used the *New York Times* and the pro-Republican *Chicago Tribune*, which was also highly isolationist. While choosing two newspapers with different political orientations
is a standard approach in media history research, Hitler’s usurpation of power in 1933 clearly complicates the story for Germany. Here, the author used the Kölnische Zeitung, which continued to exist until April 1945, but adjusted its reporting entirely to the ‘principles of National Socialist ideology’ (p. 29) after 1933. In addition he chose the liberal Vossische Zeitung until its closure in 1934, and for the period after 1934 the Frankfurter Zeitung, which enjoyed some independence because of its international status, but lacked a ‘European orientation’ until it was taken over by the National Socialist Eber-Verlag in 1939. The progressive Gleichschaltung of the press in Germany nonetheless does not seem to constitute a methodological problem for the author in ascertaining ‘German’ imaginations of ‘Europe’.

In his introduction to the book, Greiner competently covers the major developments in German comparative social (and cultural) history since the 1960s, from the Bielefeld School to the new cultural history and new political history, which has fostered research on the cultural history of politics, or the history of political culture in Germany in the last fifteen years or so. Somewhat surprisingly, in light of the project’s overall focus on cultural translations, Greiner effectively asserts the primacy of the comparative over the transnational perspective, which, according to him, lacks conceptual and methodological sophistication. He develops a general notion of the ‘constructed’ character of images of ‘Europe’ and highlights the importance of ‘alterity’, and the perception of others, for identity constructions. However, the apparently central question of perceptions and interaction among the analysed newspapers and any resulting transformations in their reporting of European themes is already marginal to the introduction, and largely gets lost in the translation from the analysis to the writing-up of the thesis. It mainly features in chapter 3 with a focus on transatlantic dimensions of images of Europe, which follows chapter 2 on Europe as a continent of the ‘second thirty years war’. The third substantial chapter (ch. 4) addresses Europe as a ‘space of progress’ and moves from economic and political themes to infrastructure connections and communication across borders as well as sport and tourism.

Relating to recent research on transnational social and cultural aspects of the history of technology, Greiner in this last chapter brings out clearly the often optimistic reporting of such forms of integration. This is true, for example, of increasing railway integration
and plans for a European motorway system launched before Nazi Germany embarked on its national programme after 1933. Air transport was another new sector which was integrated and facilitated fast transnational travel. Similarly, Europe as a communicative space, according to Greiner, also became denser in the way in which newspapers reported developments in other countries. In addition, radio and telephony created new means of communicating content with a European scope.

In conclusion, Greiner makes the point that the analysis of newspaper reporting does not corroborate what he sees as the prevalent view in the historiography of European ideas, namely, that the interwar period was characterized by a perception of European crisis, as in Oswald Spengler’s demise of the Abendland narrative. Instead, it also served as an economic and political ‘Hoffnungsträger’ (p. 457). Images of Europe did not develop in linear ways, but depended on changing historical context. Reporting even of some national events regularly took place within a broader European horizon. Transnational themes became more prevalent in newspaper reporting than they had been in the nineteenth century, and included more aspects of ‘lived Europe’ (p. 463), such as tourism, sport, epidemics, or the weather, for example, than before. The ‘Europeanization’ of forms of perception, spatial images, and everyday experiences, Greiner argues, did not begin with the end of the Second World War.

In her project sequel to Greiner’s book, Ariane Brill covers the period from the end of the Second World War to 1980. Why 1980? Brill claims (without substantiating this odd claim) that this was a Wendejahr in Europe’s political development, between the first direct elections for the European Parliament in 1979 and Greece’s accession to the European Communities in 1981. As this choice indicates, Brill’s approach is connected somewhat more closely to material developments in European integration after 1945 than Greiner’s could be. Her four main chapters focus on questions of ‘security and threats’, ‘Europe as a political and economic project’, ‘cultural Europe’, and ‘the continent from the perspective of travelling journalists’. This last chapter is quite different from the others, and from those in Greiner’s book. Here, journalists who actually write newspaper articles feature more prominently as agents in the history of imaginations of Europe.

At 293 pages, Brill’s book is not only substantially shorter than Greiner’s at 520 pages; it is also conceptually and methodologically
more reductionist and appears to be pragmatically geared towards obtaining a Ph.D. rather than contributing substantial new knowledge to the historiography. Bizarrely, in view of the project’s constructivist approach, she claims not to be very interested in ‘political evaluations’ of Europe and European developments, when one might expect the world views of editors and journalists to be one major factor influencing how they define editorial policy and write about Europe, or any other theme for that matter. Not being interested in such political worldviews entails the major practical advantage, however, that Brill can reduce her discourse analysis to just one newspaper per country. She studies the *Times* and the *New York Times* and, for Germany, the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* except for the period up to its foundation in November 1949, for which she uses the more liberal *Süddeutsche Zeitung*. Why she does not use the latter for the entire period remains a mystery, but is probably a result of the *FAZ*’s digitization, which makes it, like the English-language newspapers, more easily searchable.

For obvious reasons, Brill has to discuss European integration. Her newspaper analysis confirms that ‘federation’ was a widely used term in the first few years after the war in reporting on plans for integration, and often advocated as a panacea against the recurrence of national strife, ideological confrontation, and war. However, the newspapers were not very sophisticated or detailed (p. 108) in reporting on the various groups and plans for European integration. They did not pick up any fundamental differences between ‘federalists’ and ‘unionists’ with more intergovernmental preferences for integration, for example. Apart from that, Brill admits that newspaper reporting was ‘quite disparate’ and probably shallow, too. She refers to only two articles in the *Times* and the *New York Times* from different years—1950 and 1956—to argue that both newspapers shared the view that European integration was not comparable to US federalism. ‘The German press’ is even less comparable with British and American perceptions and reporting, first because the *Süddeutsche Zeitung* was so thin and had little space to report anything and later because the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* showed limited interest in the European movement. From the failure of the European Defence Community in 1954 onwards, Brill explains, reporting shifted very strongly to economic issues of integration including, in the early 1960s, the fragmentation of Western Europe into the Sixes and
Sevens, or the newly created European Economic Community and the European Free Trade Association, an issue that naturally concerned British and German newspapers because of its economic and political implications for both countries (p. 121).

In conclusion, Brill argues that newspaper reporting was ‘largely synchronic’ in its focus on major events. The British Times, however, increased its reporting of European themes after the United Kingdom’s accession to the European Communities in 1973 (p. 265). Taking up a major theme from the project and Greiner’s thesis, she claims that perceptions of the ‘other’ were important for self-perceptions of Europe and Europeans as reflected in the analysed newspapers. In the Cold War the Soviet Union and communism constituted the most significant ‘other’, of course. For the German and British newspapers, the USA was a largely positively perceived ‘other’ that had brought democracy and political stability to Western Europe. ‘The European people’ (p. 268) featured much more in reports about culture, sport, and tourism, but these topics nevertheless remained underreported compared with security, and economic and political issues of cooperation and integration in Western Europe.

The two books combined add a lot of detailed knowledge about press reporting of European themes beyond political ideas of ‘Europe’ or actual institutional integration. However, despite their apparent conceptual sophistication (especially in Greiner’s introduction) they suffer from significant weaknesses. The first of these concerns the choice of countries and, in the case of Brill’s book, newspapers. The combination of countries purports to integrate one external perspective (USA), one peripheral (UK), and one from ‘core Europe’. In fact, Brill describes the Federal Republic of Germany as from the ‘centre of Europe’, which seems more informed by the present-day experience than the situation in 1949, except if the term is used merely as a geographical descriptor. But why integrate Germany into a study which extends across the regime change of 1933, when the choice of one conservative and one liberal newspaper makes no sense any more, even if the Gleichschaltung of the press was not completely systematic from the start? Why not compare press reporting in pluralistic democracies like France, for example; or, for that matter, in dictatorships? If the actual choice was the result of the language skills, or lack thereof, of the researchers, then this should be admitted as a limitation of the research design. The same is true for the com-
parison within each country, between newspapers with different worldviews, which largely disappears in Greiner’s narrative when his favoured adjective becomes *facettenreich*; in other words, newspaper reporting is fragmented, covers all sorts of topics, and cannot easily be subsumed under particular headings or types of interpretation.

Both studies also engage in bland generalizations. Brill, in particular, constantly speaks of ‘the German press’, when all she has ever looked at for any one year between 1945 and 1980 is one, admittedly important, quality newspaper. Her design does not even allow for the importance of worldviews of editors or journalists for perceptions of Europe. For example, one might expect the *Frankfurter Rundschau* to have had a different view of the USA as the ‘other’ in the 1960s and 1970s. Similarly, the British tabloid press may well have conveyed different images of Europe, or other Europeans (especially the Germans), than the *Times*. Several of the larger findings of both studies are equally superficial. One wonders, for example, why we need to know that newspapers report about major events at about the same time, as Brill concludes (p. 265). Why should they, one might ask, report the signing of the Treaties of Rome in March 1959 instead of March 1957? In the end, both studies largely replicate the methodological problems of older research in the style of ‘in the light of the British press’, which basically ends up reporting what newspapers reported about what happened in the world. Conceptual ideas that different forms of reporting result from ‘alterity’, for example, look superimposed on the actual discourse analysis. Platitudes abound, including Brill’s conclusion that Europe ‘always remained an unfinished project’ (p. 267).

Some of the deficiencies of both books actually derive from the traditional comparative conceptual approach. It would, of course, have been extremely interesting to learn more about how imaginations of Europe in one national press might have been perceived, transformed, and reproduced in a different context elsewhere. Both books have very little to say on this because they are largely restricted to a discourse analysis of the printed newspapers. They are not very sensitive to, and have almost nothing to say about, those who actually perceive, imagine, and write for newspapers. We learn next to nothing about the newspapers’ owners, editorial policies and, most importantly, the home-based journalists or foreign correspondents who actually wrote the articles. Did they read the local press
regularly; did they move in transnational circles of friends including other journalists, which might have facilitated the exchange of ideas and notions of Europe; how did they ‘translate’ imaginations of Europe from one cultural context into another? In short, it would have been wonderful if the authors had discovered the role of actual people in producing and disseminating news—something that would have resulted in a different and arguably far more productive research design.

In part, the deficiencies of both books also reflect those of the German ‘system’ for producing Ph.Ds. For one, it is clearly crucial for both authors to relate to national German discourses in German about conceptual approaches to history which help them locate their work in a particular ‘school’, although this school may now be far more fragmented than it was twenty years ago. The authors’ knowledge of the international historiography is far more limited. For example, the claim in Greiner’s book that historians of European ideas have always conceived of inter-war Europe as a continent caught in a permanent mental depression is based on the reading of only one book (by Carl H. Pegg) published in 1983. Similarly, Brill displays very little knowledge of the more recent historiography of postwar European integration, and largely cites German textbooks for it.

Both books are also written in less than elegant German. Thus, to give but one example, Greiner defines ‘mass public’ as ‘eine sich durch einen dynamischen Austausch prozessual ausbildende, nach innen medial durchaus plurale und heterogene Sphäre gewachsener kommunikativer Strukturen und Prozesse’ (p. 391). Brill’s narrative, in contrast, is characterized more by the use of simplistic categories such as ‘the European people’, whoever this may be (p. 268). In both books, too much detail obscures the findings, even if the results are not terribly surprising or exciting. In short, both books would have benefited from a clearer focus on the main findings, less detail, and a more accessible narrative.

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Press Reporting and Discourses on Europe


Twenty-five years of research on the history of the GDR have shown that communist rule in East Germany was not based on coercion and obedience alone. A number of recent studies have focused on the GDR’s ideological dimensions, both exploring its meanings and paying specific attention to the ways in which socialism and antifascism were conveyed and adopted. These studies understand communist rule not as a one-dimensional top-down phenomenon, but as a multifaceted process involving various actors with differing intentions and options.

This holds true for Catherine Plum’s recent book *Antifascism After Hitler: East German Youth and Socialist Memory*, ‘the first comprehensive study of youth antifascism in the GDR’ (p. 1). Antifascism was not only the ‘foundation myth of the GDR’, in Herfried Münkler’s words, but was also one of the most effective rallying points for the regime. However, only a few GDR citizens had any personal experience with the antifascist struggles throughout Europe during the 1930s and 1940s. Thus the ruling elites constructed a selective, highly stylized narrative of the antifascist struggle, directed to younger generations, that supported communist claims to political leadership. Drawing on a variety of sources such as oral histories, student letters, essays, yearbooks, youth magazines, and literature Plum traces the pedagogical and political challenges of this narrative-building effort, and the changes in youth antifascism over time. Instead of considering antifascist education as a mere tool of totalitarian oppression, she assumes ‘a degree of compromise and negotiation between state representatives and average citizens’ (p. 3) and highlights an approach that is ‘sensitive to issues of age and generational cohort and includes the story of everyday life’ (p. 7). Consequently, her research covers both the content of the official narrative as well as commemorative practices and does not focus on GDR children alone. She also takes into account parents, teachers, and so-called ‘memory intermediaries’, often but not always antifascist veterans themselves, who were ‘youth group leaders, museum staff members and volunteers responsible for conveying stories and com-
memorative practices to generations who grew up after the defeat of fascism’ (p. 3).

Plum regards antifascist education in the GDR essentially as a communicative process that involved various actors with different experiences and intentions. The dictatorial character of both the regime and the antifascist narrative it generated compelled every GDR citizen to individually master language nuances depending on context. In analysing these contexts—schools, youth groups, memorial grounds, and homes—and the actors involved, Plum takes a measured, systematic, and in-depth approach. She incisively observes that the demand to master different languages led to a form of ‘Socialist double speak’, although this raises the question of whether this demand affected only children and was only the result of this selective antifascist narrative. Studies by Alf Lüdtke and others have stressed that the demand for a ‘Socialist double speak’ not only resulted from a public sphere that was thoroughly dominated by SED politics, thus pointing to the dictatorial character of the regime, but also proved highly influential to the regime’s eventual implosion in a historical perspective, an assessment that is somewhat at odds with Plum’s statement that ‘toward the end of the dictatorship, the amount of double speak necessary may have lessened to some extent’ (p. 207).

In line with her comprehensive account, Plum’s first chapter looks at the various components that constituted the GDR’s antifascist ‘Youth Memory Landscape’. It introduces antifascist museums, monuments, and memorial grounds, antifascist literature and extracurricular activities (most notably the Jugendweihe), and examines youth antifascism in ritual and practice. The antifascist narrative promoted by the SED consisted of two components: it emphasized the efforts of German resistance fighters, which was important to represent the GDR as the ‘better Germany’, but it simultaneously depicted Soviet efforts as decisive to the defeat of fascist forces in Germany and all of Europe, thereby promoting ‘a historical context and rationale for contemporary German–Soviet friendship’ (p. 149). Consequently, chapters 2 and 3 are dedicated to ‘Stories of [German] Resistance Fighters’

and ‘Tales of Soviet Heroes and Liberators’ respectively. Plum, aware that the antifascist narrative promoted by the East German regime was highly intentional and selective, pays special attention to the ‘Portrait of Non-Communist Resistance and Opposition’ (in ch. 2) and ‘German Nationalism’ (in ch. 3). In chapter 4, ‘Memory Intermediaries’, she makes use of personal contacts and communication with antifascist veterans to explore the conflicts and difficulties these veterans faced when presenting their personal experiences in line with the official narrative. And although this narrative presented nationalism and socialist patriotism as mutually complementary ideologies, Plum demonstrates that portraits of and contacts with German antifascists received more attention than their Soviet counterparts. This preference did have pragmatic reasons, but it also points to private memories made in the wake of the 1945 ‘soviet liberation’, which were strongly at odds with the official narrative and could not be voiced publicly. The impact of dissonant voices again plays a part in the fifth chapter, ‘Parents and Pupils’. Here, Plum pays specific attention to stories told at home that did not fit into the official narrative, for example, when grandfathers retained a certain pride in their military service in the Wehrmacht. This seems to have happened quite frequently, as Plum stresses ‘that children were essentially required to master two different languages: one language for use at home and one for school or work purposes’ (p. 205).

Plum argues that despite a somewhat twisted adoption of the antifascist narrative, the ‘campaigns . . . never degenerated into a completely “participation-less” movement’ (p. 238). An epilogue on Namensverleihung practices, a public ritual in which schools received the name of an antifascist hero, after the Wende emphasizes ‘a continued interest in historical antifascist resistance efforts’ after 1990 and shows that ‘many GDR commemorative traditions have been transformed and continued in altered form’ (p. 271). Plum argues that in propagating an antifascist narrative that sought legitimacy for the government and their newly formed state in competition with West Germany, the East German regime primarily ‘recognized the power of authenticity’ (p. 256). Instilling socialist heritage and loyalty seems to have been most effective when connected with specific individuals, whether dead or alive. Meetings with those who had actively fought against National Socialism (or their relatives) were an integral part of antifascist education in the GDR. Antifascist veterans
spoke in rather ‘intimate settings’ (p. 180), reconstructed their stories ‘in a realistic, authentic manner’ (p. 181), and ‘sought to give their listeners a sense of the challenges involved in opposition and resistance work’ (p. 180), while presenting themselves as ‘representatives of the working class’ and showing a ‘strong sense of collective identity’ (p. 178). Drawing on the historical eyewitnesses’ authenticity, based on experience and personal impressions, the regime thus promoted a strategy that provided youth with vivid recollections of the antifascist struggle and simultaneously promoted present socialist values.

While the regime’s emphasis on ‘authenticity’ seems to have been successful in addressing the younger generations, however, it could never completely dictate how the ‘memory intermediaries’, often antifascist veterans, would recount their own stories. Furthermore, factors such as ‘geographical location, the type of school, and, very importantly, the political climate at individual schools’ (p. 255) influenced what narratives would be passed down to young people. Understanding antifascist education as a communicative process, Plum not only demonstrates the limitations of regime control but also reconstructs five categories of students’ reactions to the antifascist narrative promoted in the GDR: ‘antifascist enthusiasts, reserved antifascists, apathetic students, nonconformists and the . . . fascist enthusiast or devotee’ (p. 219). Unsurprisingly, given the significance of a ‘Socialist double-speak’, Plum finds that the numbers of both antifascist and fascist enthusiasts were relatively small, but she is rather vague about the size and significance of the remaining three categories. Emphasizing the ‘role of compromise and conformity among memory intermediaries and state administrators’ (p. 256), she states that ‘the history of communist resistance and the legacy of GDR antifascism live on’ (p. 259) and concludes that the official education proved somewhat successful. While this conclusion seems justified with regard to the five categories made up by Plum it tells us little about the interplay between stability and crisis in the history of the GDR. If antifascist education had a share in legitimizing communist rule for almost forty years, how are we to explain the regimes’ sudden implosion in 1989?

Drawing on generational analysis, as Plum does, seems promising in attempting to answer this question. She refers to the fact that the worldviews of those born before the foundation of the GDR in 1949 and those born afterwards were ‘distinct and quite distant’ (p. 197),
and stresses that the efforts of memory intermediaries were not sufficient to bridge this inherent divide. While these observations certainly hold true, it would have been interesting to see how what Lutz Niethammer and others have called a ‘generational blocking’, affect ed the status of memory intermediaries. During the late 1940s and early 1950s, antifascist conviction enabled members of the younger generations to reach the highest echelons of GDR society, thereby associating antifascism with social advancement and success. But because these generations stubbornly insisted on their influence and power well into the 1980s, this was impossible for those belonging to the younger generations. Consequently, antifascism was no longer associated with success and social advancement, but with stagnation and the denial of power.

Nevertheless, Plum’s comprehensive approach is a valuable study of youth antifascism in the GDR, extending scholarship beyond the level of the state by assessing the everyday contributions of different actors in conveying stories and commemorative practices to those born after the defeat of fascism. Her study not only gets to the bottom of its social and political relevance, but addresses crucial questions regarding the legitimization and institutionalization of communist rule after 1945 that depended on the mobilization of those generations that were too young to have participated in the antifascist struggle themselves. While Plum touches on some of the most important and still highly debated questions regarding the assessment of the GDR, for example, the role of history, and the nature of social relationships within state socialism, she is nonetheless less concerned with uncovering why the regime’s emphasis on ‘authenticity’ proved so successful in conveying its antifascist narrative. One is tempted to ask how much this points to what scholars like Wolfgang Engler and others have called the intimate character of social relations in the GDR, that is, the strong desire for and special significance of personal and heartfelt relations among GDR citizens.3


How successful the SED was with its project of a ‘different’ Germany, and to what extent it created a society that was not apathetic but vivid and committed (to a certain degree) are the ‘big’ questions still highly debated among contemporary historians. Without explicitly positioning itself within these debates, Plum’s study is nevertheless a valuable contribution that addresses crucial issues of legitimacy and participation, thus offering further insight on these big questions.

CONFEREN C E REPORTS


This one-day workshop focused on the contribution of women to international political thought in the long twentieth century. Bringing together scholars working across a range of disciplines, including international relations, feminist theory, imperial and global history, international history, modern British social and political history, and the history of science, it drew on strengths in the history of internationalism and international thought and beyond.

Valeska Huber (GHIL), Katharina Rietzler (Sussex), and Tamson Pietsch (Brunel/Sydney) presented an introductory session on the current state of the field and the methodological challenges to writing a history of women and ‘thinking the global’. While some fields, not least diplomatic and international history, have in recent years become much more receptive to addressing questions of gender in international politics broadly defined, others seem less committed to systematically writing women into their narratives. This is the case with historical international relations, which has poured tremendous energy into re-writing the history of IR as a discipline. Scholars have analysed the discipline’s deep roots in race theory and Eurocentrism and rediscovered forgotten non-white theorists of international relations, but they have not done the same for women and gender. Therefore, a systematic analysis of the international political thought of women seems long overdue, especially as there is a substantial body of work to build on in feminist international relations theory, the history of women’s activist networks, and intellectual history. Future work might be oriented along three questions: where did women gather to argue about ‘the international’? What will we find

The full programme can be found under ‘Events and Conferences’ on the GHIL’s website <www.ghil.ac.uk>.

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Languages of the Global

Beyond institutional history? What is international political thought and how does it have to be redefined to include women?

The second part of the workshop further explored how to build on existing approaches through a discussion of a classic essay in intellectual history by Linda Kerber, ‘“Why should Girls be Learn’d and Wise?”: The Unfinished Work of Alice Mary Baldwin’,¹ and an ensuing discussion of theoretical and methodological approaches. Helen McCarthy (QMUL) and Jessica Reinisch (Birkbeck) debated the tensions between writing a history of women’s intellectual life and a history of their intellectual contributions, while Christine von Oertzen (MPI Berlin) reflected on whether the ‘activist turn’ in women’s history with its focus on women’s agency and the building and functioning of activist networks may not have sidetracked a systematic exploration of the ideas that mattered to women internationalists. In the ensuing discussion, Patricia Owens (Sussex) cautioned against defining ‘the international’ and ‘the global’ too loosely and argued that new approaches needed to focus on building a useable history for critical IR scholars.

The next two sessions focused on women thinkers and the concepts that they used to theorize international relations. Workshop participants presented short case studies from their own research, including, for instance, female UNRRA workers (Jessica Reinisch), women humanitarians (Francesca Piana, Birkbeck / Swiss National Science Foundation), international civil servants (Helen McCarthy and Valeska Huber), foundation officers (Katharina Rietzler), but also artists committed to a ‘pax cultura’ (Tamson Pietsch). The final session on ‘languages of the global’ analysed and problematized concepts that mattered to internationalist women, for example, maternalism, friendship, cultural relativism, and global citizenship. Natalia Cecire (Sussex) argued that fictive scenarios and counterfactuals were also a powerful tool for women intellectuals and should be included in an exploration of women’s international thought. The workshop concluded with a discussion on how to expand the network, funding, and future events, ideally, a follow-up conference in 2016.

KATHARINA RIETZLER (Sussex)


In July 2015 the German Historical Institute London once again hosted the annual Summer School in British history, organized jointly with the Ludwig Maximilian University Munich. Twenty students from various German universities attended this year’s event, which, for the first time, looked at the history of science. The focus was on Charles Darwin, probably the most famous scientist of the Victorian Age, and the wider impact that his ideas had during the nineteenth century. Particular attention was paid to five aspects: (1) Letters, Books, and the Sciences in Victorian England, (2) Charles Darwin, (3) The Development and Implications of Darwinism, (4) Science and Religion in the Victorian Age, and (5) Global Darwin: Evolution, Race, and Empire. The invited experts, Professor Jim Secord (Cambridge) and Professor Peter Bowler (Belfast), provided a unique experience and in-depth discussions of all aspects, which the participants thoroughly enjoyed.

Proceedings began with a lecture by Jim Secord. He provided a general overview of letters, books, and the sciences in the Victorian Age, which gave us important background information for the whole week. The nineteenth century was an age of change, full of questions open to debate, not least about the sciences. Secord remarked that science was conceived of as having the potential to change people’s lives in terms both of ideas and practical circumstances. The British were scared of the French Revolution and its effects but also fascinated by developments in France, as Secord pointed out, because Paris was accepted as the centre of European science. New institutions for science were established; at the same time, the reform of printing resulted in a wealth of easily accessible literature on scientific topics. Scholars of nature eventually looked for a new designation, because they did not want to be referred to as ‘some teaching engineers’. In 1832 the word ‘scientist’ was invented; in Britain, however, it was not accepted until the early twentieth century.

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The fruitful first day of the seminar extended our knowledge considerably. After the seminar, Michael Schaich showed us around the GHIL. Especially the beautiful ceilings in the Conference Room and Common Room and the building’s two similar staircases delighted not only the students studying history of art as a minor. The GHIL Library seemed to be the perfect place for a historian doing research. There are long wooden ladders and huge bookshelves and we enjoyed looking around this beautiful place. The guided tour through the institute was followed by dinner in the Library. For almost every one of us, dining in a library was an impressive, once-in-a-lifetime experience. The dinner was also a great chance for participants to get to know each other better and to find out how different their research projects were.

The second day covered ‘the man’ himself, Charles Darwin. It started with an introductory lecture on his life and work by Jim Secord. Darwin was born as the second son of a distinguished family that, as Secord put it, tried to develop new ideas and push society forward. The young Charles Darwin started studying in Edinburgh, and, when he left, came out with three main things: 1) a very broad knowledge for someone of his age, 2) a passion for natural history and 3) a deep hatred of medicine. He went on to Cambridge to become a clergyman, but came into contact with extraordinary scholars of nature who changed his view of natural history and the world, and when he left Cambridge, he followed his inner drive to become a naturalist. His five-year-long voyage on *HMS Beagle*, starting in 1831, provided the opportunity to do this. On this voyage, Darwin began to think about the human race and evolution in terms of how organisms develop, grow, or spread etc. He took his first notes on *Zoonomia* (laws of life), a term that had been coined by his grandfather, Erasmus Darwin, in an eponymous work dating from 1794. But his evolutionary theory was not published until 1859, bolstered with rich evidence, in his book *On the Origin of Species*. The impact was enormous. By 1870 evolution, understood as the change and development of life on earth, was broadly accepted.

On the third day we had the honour of meeting and working with Peter Bowler, who introduced us to ‘The Development and Implications of Darwinism’. Bowler focused on Darwin’s originality and on the question of whether there was a Darwinian revolution. Bowler identified two of Darwin’s original sub-theories: first, ‘the tree of life’,
which implied a common ancestry of all organisms and a divergent, open-ended, and undirected path of evolution. There was no main line of development and no general goal or purpose. In contrast to Darwin’s Tree of Life, Bowler introduced Ernst Haeckel’s Tree, which has a trunk and a main line of evolution, and the Tree of Mammals by H. F. Osborne, which illustrated parallel lines of preordained development. For a long time both were far more popular than Darwin’s version.

Darwin’s second original contribution was ‘natural selection’ as the main mechanism of evolution. It involved undirected variation and differential reproduction and survival of organisms in specific, unstable environments. The reactions to Darwin’s On the Origin of Species were diverse, as Bowler showed. There was hardly a ‘Darwinian Revolution’. Evolution was rapidly accepted by religious thinkers and agnostics alike, and Darwin acted as a catalyst for further thought. However, hardly anybody endorsed natural selection. There was strong opposition to a view of evolution as undirected and driven by ‘natural accidents’; but there were also sound scientific arguments, which Darwin had to take seriously, whether or not they came from religious thinkers. The latter point was elaborated and discussed further on the second day with Bowler.

After this rich theoretical input we visited Down House, Charles Darwin’s family home. This trip ‘introduced’ us to Darwin authentically. The Museum is informative, covering all necessary aspects. The garden with the glasshouse was especially impressive: we could almost see Darwin working there. There were highly interesting manuscripts on Darwin’s investigation of his own family and its possibly low ‘fitness’. Apart from this line of study, which is a little sad, Down House seemed the perfect place for doing research. It is idyllic and one can understand why it provided a retreat for Darwin and his family after his travels on HMS Beagle.

On the last day we looked at the impact of Darwin’s work on a global scale. Every student had to present a particular perspective, based on the many published reviews of Darwin’s work. Preparation was made more attractive by the atmosphere in the GHIL Library, which we were able to use for this purpose. In class, we then empathized with the person of our choice and defended his or her position in subsequent debates. A wide range of opinions was represented, from the feminist Elizabeth Cady Stanton to the conservative
liberal Herbert Spencer. These presentations worked well to involve everyone in the discussion.

To sum up, this year’s summer school was a great experience and opportunity. We had the chance to meet two excellent professors, not only in class but also in the more informal settings of coffee breaks, and to network with other students. All participants enjoyed the perfectly organized, highly informative seminar in the friendly atmosphere of the GHIL.

SÜKTRAN KARADAS (Frankfurt am Main)
JULIA MÜLLER-SEEWALD (Munich)

During the recent economic recession, a new interest in nostalgia—a sentimental yearning for the past—spiked among academics and ‘amateurs’ alike. At first glance, it seems that when people are confronted with difficulties in the present, they tend to yearn for a seemingly better or simpler life in the past. An increased engagement in recreational activities related to the past supports this hypothesis. In Britain, for instance, we find a flourishing community around historical re-enactments, a growing interest in family history, and a large number of people volunteering for the British National Trust. Since the twentieth century at least, the term nostalgia has commonly been used to describe consumerist practices and media phenomena in addition to recreational activities.

The term ‘nostalgia’ was coined by the Swiss physician Johannes Hofer, who introduced it as a pathological term for homesickness in his dissertation of 1688. Caused by the absence of the apparently superior air and unique landscape of Switzerland, the disease, it was claimed, affected Swiss people when living and working abroad. According to Hofer, external stimuli such as objects or songs triggered a longing for one’s home country. The focus on place is reflected in synonymous words such as ‘homesickness’, the German Heimweh, and the French maladie du pays. Only in the twentieth century was the spatial longing transformed into a temporal one.

Until recently, historians (apart from rare exceptions) used the term pejoratively to describe the sentimental interest of non-historians for the past. Over recent decades, psychology, sociology, literature, media, film, cultural studies, and fashion have produced a body of literature on nostalgia. Picking up on the recent interest in the subject, Tobias Becker, Research Fellow at the German Historical Institute London, organized an interdisciplinary conference including not only historians but also representatives of the research areas named above. The conference set out to explore whether and how nostalgia can be historicized. Can nostalgia be described as an anthropological

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constant? Since when have we felt nostalgic? Who feels nostalgic for what? In short: does nostalgia have a history? And if so, how can we write it?

The conference began with a stimulating keynote lecture delivered by Constantine Sedikides (Southampton), an experimental psychologist who works on nostalgia. He stated that nostalgia had negative connotations and is linked to depression. According to Sedikides’s psychological experiments, nostalgia functions as a coping mechanism in negative situations where people experience feelings of loneliness, fear, and depression. Nostalgia provides a meaning for life by reminding people that they are part of a group—a family, a circle of friends—which makes them feel socially connected. Although nostalgia is primarily a backwards-looking emotion, it also has a positive forwards-looking element.

Following Sedikides, the first panel discussed theoretical approaches to nostalgia. Achim Saupe (Potsdam) asked how ideas of nostalgia and authenticity are interconnected. Saupe suggested that ‘authenticity’ is a value that is attached to objects (for example, in museums) or places (for example, memorial sites), and makes them more credible or truthful ‘as apparently direct embodiments of history’ (Saupe). The past is completed and unchangeable by comparison with an ongoing, uncertain present (and future). This makes the past more desirable and ‘authentic’, that is, closer to an assumed original or truth, than the present. In the last third of the twentieth century, self-confirmation of individuality, originality, belonging, and the notion of making sense of things by buying goods became increasingly common. Since the 1980s and 1990s, companies have used the desire for authenticity and trust as a selling point for the credibility of their brands. They cater for people feeling nostalgic by selling new goods that look as if they come from another era, such as retro bicycles.

Romanticizing a ‘painful’ past seems counter-intuitive. Yet as Ishay Landa (Ra’anana) showed in his paper, a number of critics of modernity expressed a longing for pain to counter a life lived in a state of ‘mild satisfaction’ at the end of the ‘civilizing process’ (Norbert Elias). Friedrich Nietzsche described the ‘last man’ as a squeamish person—lacking the experience and ability to endure pain—who would live a long but meaningless life. Struggle, strife, and heroism, on the other hand, he argued, made life worthwhile.
Fascism used the same rhetoric and put pain back at the centre of things, claiming that living a life in peace is not as valuable as proving oneself in war.

Rogério Miguel Puga (Lisbon) presented a variant concept of nostalgia as expressed by the Portuguese word *saudade*, the longing for an absent person, thing, or period. The term dates back to the thirteenth century and was revived by the early twentieth-century literary movement ‘Saudosismo’. The inability to describe what *saudade* means is shared with other languages, such as the Russian *toska*, the Czech *litnost*, and the Welsh *hiraeuth*. According to Puga, all these terms claim to be untranslatable, and thus express a desire for uniqueness. In this presentation, *saudade* or nostalgia was described as an element of a nascent nationalism that worked not only as a political project but also in cultural terms.

The second keynote lecture was delivered by Achim Landwehr (Düsseldorf) who put the ‘invention of nostalgia’ in 1688 into the context of changing perceptions of time. In his eyes, the Renaissance had no concept of nostalgia because it saw the past as still ongoing. Only the ‘birth of the present’ in the seventeenth century, that is, the widespread understanding of time as linear and irreversible, turned nostalgia into a collective cultural phenomenon. In the last part of his talk, Landwehr fast-forwarded to the 1970s, which once again saw a rupture in the understanding of time accompanied by a widespread sense of nostalgia. Landwehr conceptualized nostalgia as a temporal contact zone in which present versions of selected pasts are used to shape selected futures, a process Landwehr called ‘chronoferencing’.

The second panel focused on ‘Political Nostalgia’. Patricia Lorcín (Minneapolis) distinguished between imperial and colonial nostalgia in post-colonial societies in France and Britain. While the former referred to the loss of Empire and hegemonic influence in international power politics, the latter referred to the loss of a colonial lifestyle and socio-economic standing by former settlers. Lorcín highlighted the influence of politics, media, and gender on individual and collective nostalgia. A recent upsurge of nostalgia for the Habsburg Empire was the subject of Manca G. Renko’s (Koper) paper. She discussed examples of nostalgia for the dual monarchy, such as *The Kraus Project* (2014) by Jonathan Franzen and Wes Anderson’s *Grand Budapest Hotel* (2014), in which a hotel becomes a nostalgic non-place and safe home that belongs to everyone and no one, enabling its
inhabitants to escape the void of the present. The recent phenomenon of ‘Westalgie’, in contrast to the better-known ‘Ostalgie’, was discussed by Owen Malloy (Norwich). Drawing on a recent exhibition in the Stadtmuseum Berlin and referring to tours through West Berlin in VW Beetles, as opposed to Trabis in East Berlin, advertised by travel agencies, Malloy made a case that the old, stable Federal Republic has supplanted the GDR as an object of nostalgia.

Turning from a longing for a specific place in time to a longing for a certain mode of life and work, the third panel looked at ‘Industrial Nostalgia’. In focusing on the losses rather than gains of deindustrialization, industrial nostalgia bemoans the loss of the value of manual work and self-definition by ‘making things’. A significant shift in post-war Britain was the miners’ strike of 1984–5, commonly portrayed as King Coal’s heroic but futile resistance to the Thatcher government. Jörg Arnold (Nottingham) argued that the stimulus for action was disappointment that an anticipated economically stable future never arrived, rather than the loss of an industrial past per se. Following a similar train of thought, Tim Strangleman (Canterbury) analysed instances of ‘smokestack nostalgia’, drawing mainly on coffee table books about unused car plants and former industrial complexes. Often purchased by former workers, they are a way of making sense of the decline of an industrial sector they were once part of. Peter Hörz (Göttingen) presented an ethnographic study of ‘rail hikers’ who explore shut-down railway lines by walking along them. Hörz understood this practice as play, performance, and pilgrimage through which participants make the past present.

The fourth panel analysed how nostalgia is invoked and produced by the media. As Saupe had already noted, the media sell products by using nostalgic narratives and styles in advertisements. At the same time, the media can simulate past times. Katharina Niemayer (Paris) analysed instances of nostalgia in social media such as Instagram and YouTube, where the immediate present is nostalgically reproduced, prompting her to speak of ‘instant nostalgia’. Gintare Malinauskaite (Berlin) focused on Mira Jedwabnik van Doren’s documentary *The World Was Ours* (2006), a project largely based on collections of old photographs about the life of Jews in Vilne (the Jewish name for Vilnius, Lithuania). Although Vilnius as a place still exists, returning there is futile. Its Jewish community can only be remembered through photo albums and documentaries. In this logic,
nostalgic feelings for the ‘good times’ in Vilne serve as a moral reminder that the horrors of the Shoa should never be repeated.

The fifth panel, ‘Object Nostalgia’, dealt with the material side of nostalgia. Eva C. Heesen (Hanover) addressed the two-sided significance of nostalgia in museums, where nostalgia provides both education and escapism from present realities. The past becomes a canvas on which to project a selective and idealized longing. In practice, when the irreversibility of time creates a safe distance to the past on display, then the objects create an emotional resonance and thus become nostalgia-worthy.

Reinhild Kreis (Mannheim/Vienna) compared two waves of do-it-yourself (DIY). Around 1900, manual work was favoured in opposition to mass-production, while also referring to older notions of gender and generation identity. In the 1970s and 1980s, DIY was discovered by the alternative milieu with the idea of creating a better, more sustainable future because it provided independence from mass production and kept craftsmanship alive. Though drawing on the past, nostalgia acted as a source for reform to create a better future.

The conflict between preserving and destroying historical buildings after the Second World War was examined by Kerstin Stamm (Bonn/Berlin) in her paper on the European Architectural Heritage Year 1975. By then, new modern and mono-functional outskirts had been built while the bombed city centres had been neglected by architects and urban planner. Under the headline ‘A Future for Our Past’, the conservation movement tried to promote the renovation and preservation of older buildings and districts. Stamm noted that the people who were fighting against modernization and the destruction of old buildings were rarely those who lived in the buildings that they wanted to protect. As they were not affected by change, it was easier for them to feel nostalgic for a particular architectural past.

Karl B. Murr (Augsburg/Munich) reassessed Jean Baudrillard’s remarks on nostalgia in his *System of Objects*. According to Baudrillard, modern Western societies define themselves more through consumerism than industrial production. In this context, objects are ‘consumed’ not only because of their functionality, but because of their secondary meanings, their ‘sign value’. Consequently, Baudrillard criticizes the authenticity of the object and the discourse of historical reality.
Nostalgia

David Lowenthal (London), author of The Past Is A Foreign Country, concluded the conference by making some general comments. He attributed the spread of a nostalgic yearning for the past since the 1970s to the fact that the past is over and unchangeable and therefore emits a sense of stability, authenticity, and familiarity that the present for many people seems to lack. The following plenary discussion highlighted that nostalgia remains an elusive phenomenon. This makes it difficult to apply the term analytically. But as the conference showed, nostalgia can (and needs to) be studied historically. Historians can learn from other disciplines and must overcome their prejudices regarding nostalgia. After all, more people encounter the past through nostalgic phenomena and practices than through historiographical studies.

ELISA HEUSER (Berlin)
The word 'theatre' often conjures up the image of a building. For most people this image probably harks back to the nineteenth century, the era of monumental opera houses and lush bourgeois theatres with well-lit stages, circles of plush red chairs, painted plaster, ceiling-carrying caryatids, and colourful curtains. And no wonder, the nineteenth century was the century of theatre-building. No other period saw the construction of more playhouses, many of which are still in use around the world. Yet this is only half the story, as the nineteenth century was also the century of itinerant theatres. Individual actors as well as touring troupes of all sizes, origins, and qualities took theatrical entertainment from metropolitan centres to the provinces and the edges of colonial empires. Some of these troupes played in large, purpose-built theatres on the European model; others made do with any public building or space available to them.

In the history of theatre, however, these theatre companies are rarely more than a footnote. Some reasons for this are obvious: without headquarters of their own, touring theatres left few sources. Articles in local newspapers, requiring theatre historians to follow the tracks of their subjects, are often the only material available. Methodologically, theatre history is still dominated by the metropolis and the nation-state. As long as scholars work on English, French, and German theatre and drama, a theatre that transcends the borders of nation, language, and culture easily escapes their view. However, this is exactly what makes the travelling theatre so interesting—not only for theatre history, but for global history as well.

This idea, theatre history as global history, provided the starting point for the workshop ‘Emotional Journeys: Itinerant Theatres, Audiences, and Adaptation in the Long Nineteenth Century’, which was held at the German Historical Institute in October 2015. The

The full programme can be found under ‘Events and Conferences’ on the GHIL’s website <www.ghil.ac.uk>.
workshop asked what kinds of theatres—troupes, actors, genres, plays, and so on—travelled, why and where they travelled, and how travelling affected their repertoire, their performances, and their outlook on the world. It explored questions of production (management, transport), reception (audiences), and representation (text and performance). The workshop was particularly interested in issues of translation and adaptation, and the role of emotions in this context. Like any art, theatre entertains by appealing to emotions. Yet did humour, suspense, melodrama translate? How did touring companies adapt their repertoires? And if they did not, did they expect their audiences to comprehend their plots, idioms, and genres?

The relationship between mobility, performance, and emotions was the subject of the first paper, ‘Idle Tears, Hollow Laughter, and Cultural Containment: English-Speaking Performers in India and Australia in the Late Nineteenth Century’ by Jim Davis (Coventry). After sketching out general social and technological changes in the nineteenth century which led to an increase in mobility, Davis concentrated on two actor-managers, Daniel Bandmann and J. L. Toole, both of whom worked in India, though their experiences were different. While Bandmann saw the Hindu community as an ideal audience for Shakespeare (simultaneously infantilizing it), Toole, lauded as the foremost British comedian of his time, did not get a single giggle when performing to Indian schoolchildren, because they were taught not to laugh at their imperial overlords.

Like Bandmann and Toole, many actors were used to travelling, but did so in a bubble. Carrying with them preconceived national and racial stereotypes, most of them did not engage with audiences in the places they visited. This was apparent from Ute Sonnleitner’s (Graz) paper on ‘National Art and Transnational Artists: Actors’ Perceptions of Mobility, Art, and Audiences’. Like Davis, Sonnleitner looked at two actors with thoroughly cosmopolitan careers: Franziska Ellmenreich and Ludwig Barnay. Both travelled widely, yet complained in their memoirs of the lack of patriotism among German migrant communities abroad. Similarly, Berenika Szymanski-Düll’s (Munich) paper, ‘Touring Theatre and the Difficulty of Language in the Nineteenth Century’, looked at two Polish actors who performed in the United States, Bogumil Dawison and Helena Modrzejewska.

One group of travelling actors truly unconstrained by national borders were the Jewish troupes, the subject of Debra Caplan’s (New
York) paper, ‘Jewish Theatre, Global Theater: Yiddish Theatre’s Aesthetics of Itinerancy in the Long Nineteenth Century’. The paper concentrated on one specific group, the Hirschbein troupe, whose plays were inspired by the European art theatre. The Hirschbein troupe aimed to create a ‘high’ and respectable Yiddish theatre. Yet despite starting out in a promising manner, it never achieved the critical success Hirschbein had hoped for. Rasha Nicholson’s (Munich) paper, ‘Eastward Success and Westward Failure: The Professionalization, Democratization, and Expansion of the Parsi Theatre’, similarly dealt with issues of success and failure. Travelling Parsi theatre companies achieved popularity all over India and South-East Asia, but found little favour in London.

How an audience received a touring company often had less to do with the touring actors and their performances than with local conditions and conflicts. This became particularly clear in Marlis Schweitzer’s (Toronto) paper, “Too much tragedy in real life”: Jean Margaret Davenport in the West Indies, 1840–1841’. Schweitzer understood the travelling theatre as a bridge between the colony and the homeland. However, not everyone was ready to cross this bridge. When the child performer Jean Margaret Davenport performed in the West Indies, her visit, far from building bridges, revealed local frictions.

Sometimes theatre acted as a bridge even after a colony had gained independence, as was shown by Kristen McCleary’s (Harrisonburg) paper on ‘Anger, Amusement, and Adaptation: The Spanish Zarzuela in Argentina, 1890–1900’. Zarzuelas, the Spanish equivalent of operetta, had been performed in Argentina by Spanish actors since the middle of the nineteenth century on a regular basis and were as popular abroad as at home. To catch on with Argentine audiences the Spanish Zarzuelas had to undergo a degree of adaptation. This aspect was further explored by Kedar Kulkarni in his paper on ‘Adapting Sentimentality and Pathos on the Marathi Stage’. His paper scrutinized translations of Shakespearean dramas and the sentimental play *Isabella, or The Fatal Marriage*, into Indian vernacular languages, and the specific metaphors used to translate melodrama for Indian audiences.

Though the papers drew on very different examples from different regions of the world, a number of common threads became apparent. The final discussion attempted to find common themes
emerging from the individual case studies. It revolved around the questions of what types and genres of theatre travelled, when they were successful and when not, and why plays, actors, and troupes travelled at all. To some degree the theatre had travelled widely before the nineteenth century. However, new technologies of communication and transport, such as the telegraph and the steamship, led to an increase in mobility and the quantity of exchange. It was less the chance to move around that tempted actors and companies to travel than commercial deliberations—new audiences promised financial gain—and the prestige that went along with having succeeded elsewhere. Travelling as such did not result in a cosmopolitan outlook, nor did it create ‘international’ supra-regional publics. Often, it reinforced existing identities—whether local, regional, national, or imperial—and brought existing affinities and frictions to the surface. While some troupes sought out migrant audiences from their native lands, others played to much more diverse and heterogeneous audiences. This makes the travelling theatre so interesting, not only for the history of the theatre but also for the history of cross-cultural contacts and conflicts in the long nineteenth century. Cultural globalization, so much is clear, did not begin with twentieth-century mass media like radio and cinema but goes much further back. But it is equally clear that globalization did not necessarily engender cosmopolitanism.

TOBIAS BECKER (GHIL)
A conference held at the German Historical Institute London brought together scholars from various disciplinary backgrounds to explore a topic of political urgency. While digital media have simplified global communication in an unprecedented manner, at present we are witnessing political fragmentation, warmongering, and atrocities in many parts of the world. This paradox makes it all the more important to enquire into the power and limits of a global public in terms of its ability to reach different regions and audiences and its political potency. For this purpose the conference took a broad conceptual approach. Rather than focusing on different world regions, it centred on definitions and conceptions, infrastructural and linguistic preconditions, markets and audiences, and the politics of the global public.

The conference looked at the ‘long twentieth century’ from the 1870s to the present, when new technologies, above all, telegraphy, mass print, radio, and later film provided new ways of exchanging information. Consequently, one of the key questions was to what extent conceptions of a global public and relevant practices depended on these technologies. How and when did a global public sphere become a market for news or entertainment, and what were its limits? How did actors such as social reformers, revolutionaries, and religious leaders envision a global public, and how did they try to reach a worldwide audience and mobilize and manipulate global public opinion? And to what extent did a global public opinion actually affect political action, for instance, when it became an object of national rivalry or competition for prestige?

In his opening remarks, Jürgen Osterhammel (Konstanz) positioned the conference in the field of global history, which he considered a particular perspective on framing questions rather than as a special kind of knowledge. Yet globalizing publics is about the globalization of *something*, namely ‘flows of knowledge, of norms and symbols, of cultural practices and political models, of debates that

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used to be limited to more narrowly circumscribed arenas’. Osterhammel suggested testing ‘communication’, loosely defined, in order to conceptualize what might be called ‘globality’. He also underlined that the conveners of the conference do not understand the public or the public sphere as a neutral arena, but, with reference to Habermas, as a space of conflicting normative claims that reflect power relations or attempts to challenge these. But what happens to a public when it turns ‘global’? What does this mean for its normative and critical potential? Does a global public have the potential to overcome provincialism?

These questions were addressed in a first conceptual panel which asked whether we should speak of one global public in the singular, or rather, of several competing global sub-publics. Tobias Werron (Bonn) presented a model for understanding global publics as imagined, and only existent for as long as they are addressed. He probed his argument by examining the constitution and role of global publics in the case of international rankings. Ralph Schroeder (Oxford) also questioned the singular by demonstrating that digital technologies do not create a unique global public. He reported from ongoing research on the World Wide Web indicating that not only is access to the internet uneven, but that usage and behaviour also differ both geographically and socially. He underlined that social media (and Wikipedia) are not fully global, not least since in China mainly separate, often state-controlled platforms are used.

A second panel inquired into the ‘idioms’ of the global public, and took three examples of languages that have the potential to be understood worldwide, namely, numbers, images, and English as a global lingua franca. Martin Bemmann (Freiburg) looked at attempts to create a universal language of statistics in the course of the first World Economic Conference held in Geneva in 1927. Problems on the way to a ‘world economic statistics’ arose primarily as a result of different national practices of data-collection and the lack of a willingness to implement international agreements nationally. Valeska Huber (London) interrogated the history of English as the ‘vehicle of a global public’. Focusing on the inter-war era she traced debates on universal language versus vernaculars, and examined both scientific projects and the practices of simplified languages like Basic English and alternatives such as the picture language Isotype. Photographs, Annette Vowinckel (Potsdam) made clear, need no translation to be
read (notwithstanding different interpretations), a factor that has facilitated their global circulation. She outlined the development of the first photo agencies, tracing their expansion in connection with transmission techniques, particularly Wirephoto. She also scrutinized the agencies’ conception of their material as news and their imagination of a ‘global visual public’.

Simone Müller (Freiburg) pursued another approach to news agencies. She examined the newspaper empire run by the media mogul James Gordon Bennett, analysing the central role he played in its success, and emphasizing his sense for stories and sensation. But here, too, the company’s success relied on the application of the latest transmission technologies and a huge staff of correspondents. Applying new technology on the side of the researcher, Heidi Tworek (Vancouver) demonstrated the opportunities that digital media provide for historical research on global news dissemination. Interrogating the assumption that the USA received almost all of its news from the British during the First World War, she found more than 12,000 articles in US newspapers based on German news up to 1917. This demonstrated the success of the German Transocean Agency’s (Deutscher Überseedienst) use of wireless technology.

A further panel on the dissemination of news stressed the limits, political control, and monopolies structuring the flows of information. Looking more specifically at the communicative infrastructures and the role of news within the British Empire, Simon Potter (Bristol) interrogated the self-conceptions and structures of the BBC World Service and its forerunner, the Empire Service. Its lofty, self-proclaimed mission to uphold peace and democracy in the world contrasted with a strong commitment to British national interests and a British geopolitical agenda that also reflected its close entanglement with other state and media institutions. Bastian Herbst (Freiburg) looked at Egypt as a nodal point in Britain’s imperial telecommunications network. While the British government managed to keep control of the communication system after Egypt became formally independent in 1922, telecommunications occasionally changed from a ‘tool of empire’ into a tool turned against the British and French empires, when Egypt’s new government used the communication system to spread the ‘anti-colonial message’ far beyond its borders.

The conference then turned from infrastructures controlling the flow of news and information to specific stages and arenas, such as
world exhibitions and the League of Nations. Sophie-Jung Kim (Cambridge) looked at the Parliament of the World’s Religions, assembling for the first time at the World Columbian Exhibition in Chicago in 1893. She argued that the concept of ‘world religions’ underlying this project stressed a universal brotherhood, and was seen as contrasting imperial with materialistic world visions. However, focusing on one of its representatives, Swami Vivekananda, she demonstrated that his projection of Hinduism turned into a political project to revitalize the Indian nation. Vanessa Ogle (Philadelphia) discussed reform initiatives to create a universal calendar as a global instrument, promoted by chambers of commerce, the League of Nations, individual reformers, and governmental agencies. Analysing the failure of such reforms, she demonstrated that different religious groups successfully created a global public sphere to disseminate their criticism.

In a panel that focused on markets and audiences for theatre and film, Christopher Balme (Munich) discussed the global expansion of the entertainment industry between 1890 and 1930 as reflected in theatre-building. With itinerant theatre groups moving around the world, however, theatre managers such as Maurice E. Bandmann, even if they concentrated their tours on destinations within the British Empire, had to cope with highly diverse publics by constantly adapting their repertoire and productions to local requirements. Antje Dietze (Montreal) looked at emerging modern entertainment industries beyond the world metropolises. Focusing on cultural entrepreneurs in the case of Leipzig, she outlined the role of these mediators between global and local cultural economies, stressing their important role for cultural transfer, the creation of new spaces for entertainment, and the development of marketing strategies. Gordon Winder (Munich) took the example of Alfred Hitchcock’s thriller The 39 Steps, released in 1935, to demonstrate global distribution patterns in the movie industry. Although film was a transnational phenomenon and the producers indeed addressed a global public, he argued that their vision of a global audience contradicted the realities of film distribution in an era of de-globalization, hampered by restricted market access, limited audience numbers, and an emerging global ‘film divide’.

The last day of the conference returned to more explicitly political uses of the global public, analysing institutions that sometimes saw
themselves as its representatives. This applied to the International Studies Conference examined by Katharina Rietzler (Sussex). This League of Nations-based Conference promoted international intellectual cooperation to connect national publics and construct a world public opinion in order to influence government policies. While this initiative came to an end in the 1950s, the UNESCO World Heritage Programme gained international recognition during the Nubian Campaign. The World Heritage Programme, Andrea Rehling (Mainz) pointed out, promoted the idea of a ‘common heritage of mankind’, developed new practices in addressing an envisioned global public, and saw itself as representing a global public. Robert Brier (London) discussed human rights as a new source of symbolic capital in the 1970s and early 1980s. Examining the cases of human rights violations in Chile and Poland discussed in the UN Commission for Human Rights, he showed that nation-states adopted the moral and political language of human rights to gain authority. At the same time, the language of human rights did, indeed, empower NGOs, and even enabled victims of repression to increase their symbolic capital and gain international attention.

With a regional focus on Asia, Steffen Rimner (New York) discussed the reaction of the Japanese Imperial government facing the revelation of the countries’ drug trafficking interests. Concerned about East Asian public opinion and the nation’s global reputation, the Japanese government ordered the immediate abolition of the empire’s ‘opium system’. Su Lin Lewis (Bristol) investigated how the idea of a global modernity, visible in fashion and film, was adapted to shape the identities of ‘modern girls’ and make political claims for women’s rights in various Asian countries in the twentieth century, stressing major differences between post-colonial and non-colonial societies.

The concluding discussion proposed several sets of binaries that could be useful to explore the theme further. Willibald Steinmetz (Bielefeld/Oxford) returned to the question of definitions and conceptualizations. Taking up Tobias Werron’s idea of an imagined global public, he distinguished between fragmented and unified appeals to the global public. Stressing the interaction between global, national, and local levels, Steinmetz asked whether the public should be conceptualized as a defined group of actors or as a communicative space. He suggested looking in more detail at the role of
law in shaping a global public, and thinking further about counter-concepts such as the private but also the secret, contrasting transparency with opaqueness and concealment. Other binaries that were discussed included simplification and complexity, particularly in relation to the idioms and languages used to communicate, inclusion and exclusion, expansion and limiting factors, and standardization and differentiation. Going back to different stages and arenas of the global public, some participants stressed its fragility and ephemeral nature, as manifested in instances such as the Parliament of the World’s Religions, in opposition to an institutionalized and sustained ideal. A further debate centred on the activity or passivity of its ‘members’ as agents or mere consumers of entertainment or news. Other questions concerned the political agendas of potentially impartial versus manipulated and monopolized versions of the global public.

The conference demonstrated that the existence of a global public is far from self-evident. It particularly shed light on the important role that single actors, international initiatives, and technical preconditions played in its formation; stressed the role of ‘gatekeepers’; and identified its limitations resulting from power asymmetries, cartelization, or national separation. Its regional focus lay on the Atlantic world, the British Empire, and Asia, but through a range of case studies, the conference also showed that there is an urgent need to look beyond these areas in order to better understand how a global public was envisioned, conceptualized, staged, and addressed in different parts of the world.

FELIX BRAHM (GHIL)
Scholarships Awarded by the GHIL

Each year the GHIL awards a number of research scholarships to German postgraduate and postdoctoral students to enable them to carry out research in Britain, and to British postgraduates for research visits to Germany. The scholarships are generally awarded for a period of up to six months, depending on the requirements of the research project. British applicants will normally be expected to have completed one year’s postgraduate research, and be studying German history or Anglo-German relations. Scholarships are advertised on H-Soz-u-Kult and the GHIL’s website. Applications, which should include a CV, educational background, list of publications (where appropriate), and an outline of the project, along with a supervisor’s reference confirming the relevance of the proposed archival research, should be addressed to the Administrative Director, German Historical Institute London, 17 Bloomsbury Square, London WC1A 2NJ. During their stay in Britain, German scholars present their projects and the initial results of their research at the GHIL Colloquium. In the first allocation for 2016 the following scholarships have been awarded for research on British history, German history, and Anglo-German relations.

Oliver Bock (Jena), The Contributions of German Scholars to the Work of the Sixth Record Commission (1831–1837)

Jasmin Daam (Kassel), Tourismusräume: Der ‘Orient’ als Reiseziel europäischer Touristen in der Zwischenkriegszeit

Anna Gielas (Edinburgh), Editorial Practices and Policies of Early Scientific/Scholarly Journal Editors, c.1770–1830, in Britain and Germany

Juliane Hornung (Munich), Margaret und Lawrence Thaw: Vom Honeymoon zur Expedition—ein High Society-Paar auf Reisen

Johannes Jansen (Cologne), ‘Der Große Krieg’: Eine international-vergleichende Untersuchung historischer Narrationen zum Ersten Weltkrieg in Lehrplänen und Schulbüchern
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Lukas Keller (Berlin), Das Kaiserreich im Ausnahmezustand: Deutschland und seine ‘inneren Feinde’, 1914–1918
Jonas Kreienbaum (Rostock), Das Öl und der Kampf um eine neue Weltwirtschaftsordnung
Martin Stier (Heidelberg), Barons, Lords, Peers: Rang in der englischen Baronage im 14. Jahrhundert
Wiebke Wiede (Trier), Das arbeitslose Subjekt: Gouvernamentalitäten von Arbeitslosigkeit in Großbritannien und der Bundesrepublik Deutschland 1964–1990

Postgraduate Students Conference

The German Historical Institute London held its twentieth postgraduate students conference on 7–8 January 2016. Its intention was to give postgraduate research students in the UK and Ireland working on German history an opportunity to present their work-in-progress, and to discuss it with other students working in the same field. The Institute also introduced the participants to its role as a research centre for German history in London and to the facilities it offers (conference and lecture programme, library, etc.) as well as to the Institute’s Research Fellows.

In selecting students to give a presentation, preference was given to those in their second or third year who had already spent a period of research in Germany. Fifteen projects in all were introduced in plenary sessions chaired by the GHIL’s Research Fellows. Papers were devoted to the Thirty Years War, the late eighteenth century, Imperial Germany, the Weimar Republic, the Third Reich, and the history of the GDR. The majority of papers concentrated on the twentieth century, but a substantial number of presentations were given on earlier periods as well. Participants gave a short summary of their work containing general ideas, leading questions, sources, and initial findings, and this was followed by a discussion.

As well as discussing their subjects and methodologies, the participants exchanged information about practical difficulties, such as how to locate sources and finding one’s way around German archives. On the morning of the first day, Dr Dorothea McEwan, former archivist of the Warburg Institute, gave a course on German
handwriting. Attended by most participants, the palaeography course was welcomed as a very valuable introduction to the study of old manuscripts and records. The German Historical Institute can also offer support by facilitating contact with German archives and providing letters of introduction which may be necessary for students to gain access to archives or specific source collections.

The coffee and lunch breaks offered ample opportunity for informal contact and networking. On Thursday evening all participants were invited to a reception to celebrate the twentieth anniversary of this event, which has become the Institute’s traditional academic start to the new year. The GHIL is planning to hold the next postgraduate students conference from Thursday 12 to Friday 13 January 2017. For further information, including how to apply, please contact the Secretary, Anita Bellamy, German Historical Institute London, 17 Bloomsbury Square, London WC1A 2NJ; email: abellamy@ghil.ac.uk

Ryan Crimmmins (Oxford), The Role of Religious Identity and Doctrine in the Armies of the Thirty Years War
Eirik Rosvik (Cambridge), Kaiser Wilhelm II and the Norwegians, 1889–1914
Sabine Schneider (Cambridge), German Monetary Integration and the French War of Indemnity of 1871
Henning Kuhlmann (Cardiff), The Cultural and Economic Development of Northern Germany’s Main Overseas Ports, from the Foundation of the German Empire until its End
Alex Burkhardt (St Andrews), Democrats into Nazis: The Radicalization of the Hofer Bürgertum, 1918–1923
Ryan Tafilowski (Edinburgh), Between Complicity and Resistance: Protestant Ambivalence Toward the ‘Jewish Question’ and the Limits of Rigid Interpretive Models
Thomas Clausen (Cambridge), Roland Freisler (1893–1945): A Biography
Charles Dick (London), Hitler’s Slave Drivers: The Role of the Organisation Todt as Overseers of Forced Labour under Nazism
Bastiaan Willems (Edinburgh), ‘Wenn die Provinz fällt, kann ich auch fallen’: The Civilian Experience During the Defence of East Prussia, 1944–1945
**Noticeboard**


*Tiia Sahrakorpi* (London), Memory of the Third Reich in Hitler Youth Life Narratives

*Marcus Colla* (Cambridge), Prussian Architecture under the GDR, 1949–1961

*Marlene Schrijnders* (Birmingham), From London to Leipzig and Back: Goth Scenes in the GDR between *Endzeit, Weltschmerz*, and Revolution


### Prize of the German Historical Institute London

The Prize of the German Historical Institute London is awarded annually for an outstanding Ph.D. thesis on German history (submitted to a British or Irish university), British history or the history of the British Empire (submitted to a German university), Anglo-German relations, or an Anglo-German comparative topic. The Prize is 1,000 Euros. Former Prize winners include Mahon Murphy, Chris Knowles, Helen Whatmore, and David Motadel. To be eligible a thesis must have been submitted to a British, Irish, or German university after 30 June 2015. To apply, send one copy of the thesis with

- a one-page abstract
- examiners’ reports on the thesis
- a brief CV
- a declaration that the author will allow it to be considered for publication in the Institute’s German-language series, and that the work will not be published before the judges have reached a final decision, and
- a supervisor’s reference

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Noticeboard

Prize will be presented on the occasion of the Institute’s Annual Lecture on 4 November 2016.

For further information visit: www.ghil.ac.uk
Email: ghil@ghil.ac.uk Tel: 020 7309 2050

Forthcoming Workshops and Conferences

Thirteenth Workshop on Early Modern German History. Workshop to be held at the GHIL, 6 May 2016, in collaboration with the German Historical Institute Washington and the German History Society. Conveners: Bridget Heal (University of St Andrews), David Lederer (NUI Maynooth), Michael Schaich (German Historical Institute London), and Jenny Spinks (University of Manchester).

The first workshop ran in 2002 and the series has now established itself as the principal forum for cross-disciplinary discussion of new research on early modern German-speaking Central Europe. The workshop gives the opportunity to discuss work-in-progress as well as theoretical and methodological approaches. Previous themes have included artistic and literary representations, medicine and musicology, as well as political, social, economic, and religious history. Contributions are also welcome from those wishing to range outside the period generally considered as ‘early modern’ and those engaged in comparative research on other parts of early modern Europe.


This conference looks at practices of leisure, recreation, and sociability in pre-modern societies and how these were reflected in and shaped by spatial practices. The aim is to take stock of the current state of research, to bridge the gap between histories of recreation, leisure, and sociability in the eighteenth century and earlier periods, and to facilitate conversations between historians working on differ-
ent case studies in Europe and beyond in order to develop comparative perspectives.

*The Contemporary History of Historiography: International Perspectives on the Making of Professional History.* Conference to be held at the GHIL, 16–18 June 2016, co-organized by the Leibniz Research Group on Historiography, University of Trier, and the GHIL.

The worldwide expansion of higher and secondary education, the rise of new media and communications systems, and the creation of new nation-states have deeply changed the institutional settings of historical scholarship. At the same time the different ‘turns’ have transformed the epistemic foundations of an international discipline that is still strongly anchored in different national, ‘cultural’, and ide- ological/religious contexts. The rise of various ethnocentric, ‘culture’-centric, inward-looking, or allegedly ‘indigenous’ ideologies concurrently with the apparent triumph of ‘globalization’ and the need for global histories needs to be fully grasped. The international history of historiography has been a dynamic field of research in recent decades but contemporary developments have yet to be studied. In particular, political conflicts that operate at intra-state, state, and inter-state levels draw upon, and are reflected in, historiographical practices; and researchers, despite claims to self-reflexivity, have not sufficiently accounted for this. This conference hopes to draw attention to a number of trends in contemporary historical scholarship.

*The Scientific Revolution.* Fourteenth Summer School in British History, to be held at the Historisches Seminar, Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich, 18–22 July 2016.

For the last few years the German Historical Institute London, in cooperation with the History Department of the Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich, has organized an annual, week-long summer school on British history. The summer schools are aimed at advanced BA and MA students from German universities and are intended to encourage and foster the study of British history in Germany. The
topic of this year’s summer school is ‘The Scientific Revolution’. It will be taught by two specialists in the field, Professor Sachiko Kusukawa (Trinity College, Cambridge) und Dr Adam Mosley (Dibner Research Fellow in the History of Science and Technology at the Huntington Library in San Marino, California).

*The Protestant Reformation and Its Radical Critiques.* Conference to be held at the GHIL, 15–17 Sept. 2016, in cooperation with the Volkswagen Foundation, the University of St Andrews, and the GHIL.

This conference will focus on the radical currents within the evangelical movement. These currents have long been the focus of scholarly attention, but their study has been productively reconceptualized in recent decades under the impetus of gender history, global history, and an interest in issues of identification and belonging. Moreover, radicalism provides a forum in which Anglophone, Dutch, and German historiographies can be brought together in fruitful dialogue. The period we focus on extends from the radical early Reformation of the 1520s in Germany and Switzerland to Puritanism and later Anabaptism and the Pietist movement of the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries. A public lecture on 16 September will address the construction of radicalism from the early modern period to the twentieth and twenty-first centuries.

The conference will be structured thematically around issues that cut across geographical and chronological boundaries, such as group formation, radicalism in politics, gender and family relations, missionary activity, radicalism across borders, and history writing. The global outreach of the Reformation (mainly to North America) will also receive special attention, as it is to a large extent connected to radical ideas within Protestantism.
The Allied Occupation of Germany Revisited: New Research on the Western Zones of Occupation, 1945–1949. Conference to be held at the GHIL, 29–30 Sept. 2016, organized in cooperation with the Institute of Contemporary British History at Kings College London, and supported by the German History Society and the Society for the Study of French History. Conveners: Christopher Knowles (Kings College London) and Camilo Erlichman (Edinburgh/Cologne).

The Allied occupation of Western Germany after the Second World War has long constituted a classic component in academic histories of post-war Germany. After having been the subject of sustained scholarly attention in the 1970s and 1980s, the subject has subsequently faced a decline in academic interest. While previous work often focused on the implementation of ‘high politics’ and big reform projects in Germany (such as the Potsdam four ‘D’s), much less attention has been paid to the equally important quotidian policies and ruling practices of the occupiers on the ground in Germany. There has also been a significant lack of comparisons between the different zones of occupation. This two-day conference will showcase new research and provide a forum for the presentation of innovative approaches to the history of the three western zones of occupation. It also aims to stimulate dialogue between historians of the different zones of occupation and so bring together hitherto almost entirely segregated historiographies.

The programme will comprise more than twenty papers by established academics and emerging junior scholars based across the globe, all of whom have either recently completed their research or are now actively working on the occupation period, plus a keynote address by Professor Rebecca Boehling (Maryland). All three zones will be represented by several papers. Topics covered include ruling strategies, cooperation and conflict, handling crime, punishment and restitution, experiencing occupation in daily life, the role of social intermediaries, and the legacy of occupation.

https://alliedoccupation.wordpress.com
LIBRARY NEWS

Recent Acquisitions

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