»European history« - the connotation of the conference theme implies a continent, a geographical image, or the bordered states of modern Europe, a political image\(^1\). The hidden mental maps and images of the World in which we live structure and define our analytical concepts. By »the World in which we live« I mean the whole of the socio-economic arrangements, the power structures and participatory options, the imprints which our socialisation left on our minds, and the discourses in which we express ourselves and decipher what we experience. »Europe« is a shorthand term with many meanings. When shorthand was still in use in offices, it went without saying that clerks without training could not decipher shorthand texts. When it comes to historical memory, in contrast, people born into a territory are assumed to be able to decipher such codes. From early infancy on, children's minds are being inscribed in the trusted world of family and kin with encoded social and historic meanings. They are not trained in schools to expand the ciphers' significations into a full text and unquestioningly pass them on to their children as »what actually happened«. Historians, too, are burdened by such socializations. Are we, as historians of migrant men and women, able to invoke 18\textsuperscript{th} century or medieval maps of Europe’s social spaces, overlapping and multilayered ones?

Through manifold migrations, societies of the past incorporated peoples of different ethno-cultural, religious, craft and other belongings. Religion had been trans-European into the 16\textsuperscript{th} century with borderlines drawn between Roman and Byzantine Christendom and within the Roman-European realm to local differing readings of the fundamental texts, so-called heresies. Europe's states were ruled by trans-European dynasties and political regimes were conceptualised by trans-European political thinkers. Within such »absolutist« states the multiplicity of religious groups, territorial entities of subjects, and in-migrants negotiated their particular status. With the emergence of »nation« as a constituent element of the state in the course of the 19\textsuperscript{th} cen-

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tury, national culture became the absolute sign of belonging—far less negotiable than any absolutist structures. Cultural homogenisation came to be imposed on the many-cultured residents as well as in-migrants in a territory. The trans-European intellectual elites transformed themselves into gatekeepers of particularities called »nations«. While from the Reformation, people had been defined and, perhaps, had defined themselves by a variant of the Christian Church, they now came to be defined by ethnic belonging, ethno-cultural or ethno-genetic. While the fundamentalists of religion had generated masses of refugee migrants in the past, the fundamentalists of nationhood erected cultural borders to fence in minorities and to keep out cultural »others« from neighbouring or distant cultures.

In the process, the gatekeepers provided themselves with income-generating positions and elite status. Since then, nation-state socialised historians have hardly dealt with cultural interaction and have emphasised borderlines and conflict instead. By endowing national ideology with scholarly support they legitimised-sanctified the new political elites and, at the same time, narrowed the space in which citizens of a nation and newcomers could manoeuvre. Nationalist curricula in schools severely restricted options for young people—and thus for the respective society’s future. The diversity, whether distinct slots or flexible options, available in the absolutist-dynastic past, was reduced to a one-way street called »nation-state«. Many of those who did not benefit from its economy and/or were excluded from participation migrated westward across the Atlantic on the assumption, well-founded to a certain degree, that the immigration states in North America, all nationalising rhetoric notwithstanding, provided more cultural, political, and—above all—economic options for self-determined life-projects.

In this essay, I propose differentiated maps. First, I will discuss the three Europes of the Middle Ages: the tri-continental Mediterranean-centred World, the Northern World originating in Scandinavia, and the intermediate Europe north of the Alpine mountains and south of the Baltic Sea. Second, I turn to the connectedness of Europe with cultures on other continents and resulting intra-European migrations. Third, I analyse the consequences of the change from dynastic to nation-state societies for cultural interaction and migrants. I then turn to the 19th and 20th century Atlantic labour and European refugee migrations and, in conclusion, discuss the problems historiography-imposed invisibility of migration and cultural interaction mean for policy making in the present and for strategies for the future.

I. THE THREE EUROPESES OF THE MIDDLE AGES

The »first Europe«, the 8th century Mediterranean World connected the cultures and religions of western Asian with north African and south European regions. Through commerce and human mobility this World was connected to imperial China, to the trade emporia of the Indian Ocean, to societies of sub-Saharan Africa, and to the marginal trans-Alpine Europe. The cipher »trade«, usually decoded as exchange of material goods, has always been regulated by social protocols and, through the ages, has involved cultural selectivity and change. Trading men, rarely women, moved across cul-
cultural spaces. So did transport workers and clerks. In hostels, maids and journeymen of local cultures cared for the travellers from distant cultures. All of these exchanges demanded negotiation and accommodation. In contrast, nobles imposed their codes of honour or clergies their religious dogmatisms by strategies of power. Negotiation ensures accommodation of multiple interests and perspectives. Intercultural competence, since the recent decline of essentialised national identities a buzzword, was a self-understood requisite for all exchanges in the medieval and early modern periods. Written manuals for such human mobility were compiled around 900 B.C. by ibn Khordadbeh, an Arab postmodern in Persia, for routes from West to East Asian cultures, in the 1330s by a Florentine factor in a Genoese trading centre on the Crimean peninsula concerning the cultural specifics from Kaffa to China; and by a Jewish Catalan with Arab informants for the African trade.

In this Mediterranean World, three religions coexisted, competed, and warred in the 8th to the 15th century Iberian societies. Muslim rulers settled their many-cultured soldiers and Jewish-Christian-Islamic transcultural scholars advanced learning. The imposition of Christian dogma and ways of life has been encoded as reconquista as if the societies had had an earlier Christian-Frankish history. This term, still current in Western encyclopaedias, has expunged the practice of convivencia from collective memory. This tri-religious World mediated between Europe and Africa: Black Madonnas, African goddesses of fertility, became part of Christianity; Black slaves and their children were part of society. The Mediterranean World was one of cultural exchange, if often contested.

- Later, the south European-Mediterranean core shifted to the cities of the plains of the northern Apennine Peninsula or— as a cipher— to »Urban Italy«. The city states were a social space of exchange transactions between the Indic-Arab trade and northbound connections to the emerging Urban Netherlands. Legal protocols ensured that dynastic power and noble honour did not interfere with merchants’ activities and negotiations.

- In a third period, the Ottoman rulers of the Eastern Mediterranean established structures for many-cultured and multi-religious cohabitation — this French term, meaning »living together«, emphasises negotiated whole ways of life. Neighbourhoods (malhalle) housed particular ethno-religious groups who, across larger spaces, organized themselves in socio-political units (millet) under religio-cultural leaders without a non-productive, tribute-demanding nobility. The non-Islamic millets had to pay a special but not oppressive tax. To prevent cultural hegemony and disruptive power strategies of the Turkish group over the other peoples of the realm, Turkish ethnics could neither serve in the elite troops nor in the administration. Forced migrants, both slaves from other peoples for the troops and boys levied from among the non-Islamic peoples (devshirme) for the administration, were educated as bound civil servants of Islamic faith. Similarly, the women of the sultan’s family were recruited as bound persons from south Russian and central Asian peoples and could achieve high influence. These elites used the artificial Persian-Arabic-Turkish Osmanlica, a lingua nullius, to avoid hegemony of one ethno-cultural language. The Empire invited Jewish refugees expelled from the Catholicised Iberian Peninsula. When it advanced into south-eastern Europe, its armies annihilated the parasitic nobilities and liberated peasants. Then Christian intellectuals, serving their nobility, developed the image of the
»bloodthirsty« Turk, an invention that became a standard cipher of historical shorthand memory – it is still present in school texts.

The second »trans-Alpine Europe« was a tribal and, subsequently, a dynastic region with little economic productivity and few complex institutions. Some urbanised regions, the south German mercantile cities and the Baltic Hanseatic cities emerged. The centre of social life and urban outreach developed in the bourgeois Netherlands. To the east, migrations as well as missionary and military penetrations created vast cultural borderlands. Across the whole of trans-Alpine Europe, interregional migrations occurred wherever peasant families – by historic cipher rooted in the soil – raised more children than their land could support. Serfs, though bound to lords, were not always needed or decided to pursue their own interests – in either case they migrated voluntarily or involuntarily. Jews came and departed on their own or because of persecution. Pilgrims moved over large distances with more than spiritual goals and, back at home, reported about distant, strange customs and cultures. Medieval trans-Alpine Europe consisted of societies in motion.

The third »Europe«, the 9th to 12th century Scandinavian societies, was of almost hemispheric extent. Norsemen and Norsewomen recorded in their oral histories, »sagas«, the achievements of well-established farming or seafaring men and families far better than did court historiography south of the Baltic Sea. These highly skilled seafarers migrated westward to Iceland, Greenland, and Vinland in northern America (not yet named). East-southward, as »Varangians« or »Rus«, they migrated to the Moskva river, established the Rus or Russian society and state and traded southward as far as Eastern Christian Byzantium. Other Norsemen of standing moved south-westward as invaders and state-builders to north-western France (mid-10th century »Normandy«), to England and Wales after 1066, to Sicily and southern Italy in the 12th century. The migrant men intermarried with local women and by a process of ethnogenesis new peoples emerged from this cultural-carnal métissage. The newcomers accepted local languages and reformed traditional socio-political systems of taxation and rule with the intent of reducing the burdens of the peasantry. The mentally-bound – mentally-enslaved? – West and Central European chroniclers and later historians labelled the two models of state organization, providing alternatives to central Europe's feudal regimes, »Turks« and »Vikings«.

The Holy Roman Empire, later constructed as of »German Nation«, through emperor Fredrick II of Hohenstaufen (1212–1250), was ruled by a Norman-German of Sicilian education in the first half of the 13th century. He chartered a trans-European Order, which relocated from Palestine to Venice to Transylvania and, finally, to Masovia. There, the self-designated Teutonic Knights fought Baltic peoples of non-Christian beliefs, the Pruizen-Prussians among them, labelling their adversaries the »Saracens of the North«. If there was a Europe or an Occident, borders were fuzzy and permeable; borderlands or contact zones were characterized by transcultural ways of life. Migration meant cultural interaction, trade changed material culture, intellectual contact – often through migration – resulted in Islamic-Jewish-Christian or Palestinian-Arab-European scholarship. Pilgrims and peddlers influenced the local ways of life of common people. Such interactions, however, again and again were interrupted by violence and warfare.
II. EUROPEAN EXPANSION SINCE THE 15TH CENTURY
NEW WORLDVIEWS AND NEW MATERIAL CULTURE

By the mid-15th century »Portuguese« merchants and seafarers began to venture along West African coasts. They sailed into the Atlantic and reached, first, the islands and then, accidentally, the shores of Brazil. The cipher »Portuguese« meant subjects of the state’s dynasty. For geographic and nautical expertise, the Portuguese-born merchants and the Crown relied on underemployed seafarers migrating from the declining Urban Italian-Mediterranean system to the Atlantic rim as well as on Anglo traders seizing the Iberian opportunities. A still enigmatic sailor, »Columbus« in shorthand, perhaps from Urban Italy, perhaps from one of the Atlantic islands, studied the rich information in the chronicles of the defunct Norse migration system to Vinland before he charted his own westward course.

The Mediterranean system of slavery, which had brought men and women in forced migrations from Africa and Central Asia to southern Europe and from Europe to North Africa, had come to an end. Their intercultural or, in another – later – reference system, inter-racial children had become part of the free societies. Thus, a new supply region of bound labourers would be useful – from a European perspective. Portugal’s many-cultured seafarers, connecting European and African forms of bondage, began a slave trade to the Iberian societies. Next, Spanish (another cipher for the many Iberian realms) conquistadores established their rule over the Caribbean as well as Central and South America. Finally, they expanded with the help of Arab pilots into the Indian Ocean and to the »South Sea« islands with their spices and other products in high demand in Europe. In this process, the European traders who could offer but a limited range of goods for exchange combined the nobility’s concept of armed honour with the mercantile drive for profits. This alliance became the foundation of European societies’ economic dominance. It changed trade from a negotiating and accommodating strategy to one of imposition of power – perhaps the most decisive change in global relations.

The Christian World’s view of the globe and its peoples also collapsed and changed forever. The Church could not deny that the people of the Americas lived without ever having heard of the Roman Catholic version of »God«. No longer were the Bible and the papal decrees the only authorised views of the world as regards people and as regards its physical shape. In an age of post-colonial discourse, this might be termed a pre-colonial revision of theories from Euro-Christian centrum to larger perspectives. The comparatively small number of European migrants to the conquered regions set in motion vast migrations in many societies of the other macro-regions of the world (the cipher »continents« reduced complex social spaces to their geography). By the 20th century, such migrants, first some of the colonised, then many of the decolonised would select Europe as their destination. Imports from these societies-turned-colonies vastly changed the everyday cultures of Europe’s many local worlds. »Africa in Europe« meant slaves, trade, religion, mixed marriages or cohabitation. »Latin America in Europe« changed food ways from the luxury of cocoa to the staple potato. The Euro-Afro-American slave trade brought profits and demanded products for exchange.
that influenced patterns of migration internal to Europe. »Asia in Europe« lastingly modified European life-ways through spices, luxury goods, and other products. The cultural change, obliterated by encoding strategies in a process that may be called »incorporation beyond recognition«, will be highlighted by three examples.

(1) Europeans, by a newly emerging ideology and science, came to construct themselves as »white« when enslaved and some free men and women from sub-Saharan Africa came to the Iberian societies, from the mid-16th century on to England, and somewhat later to other western European societies. Though racial hierarchisation was the practice, at first inter-racial unions were accepted. A mixed Iberian population emerged; manumitted Danish-Caribbean slaves served in Copenhagen and north German societies, accepted the Christian faith, and intermarried with local women. The offspring of such unions was of many shades of »white«, the »alchemy of race's« (Jacobson) rigorous colour-coded hierarchy had not yet been institutionalised. »White« over »Black« and over any other colour was still on the drawing board and not yet under construction. »White« is another cipher, again with a geographic connotation in mental maps, which needs to be deciphered as regards its many cultural inputs, its many shades, its property-connotation: »White« as a property rather than a colour with all the legal-ideological protection common in hierarchised societies.

(2) »The Turks«, contemporary ideologues said, cut off »Europe« from the rich offerings of the »India« trade. Historical evidence, however, indicates that it was the Portuguese in the Indian Ocean who by force ended the trade through Arab firms to Venice and Genoa in order to establish Lisbon as the major trading centre. They indeed turned Lisbon into a »profit centre« to use a modern term. But rather than being accused of profiteering, they appeared as saviours – saving European societies from a »Turk«-imposed dearth of spices. When, in the struggles between Habsburg and Ottoman rulers, the latter's troops reached Vienna, the »Turks« threatened the Occident and, to drive the point home among common people, the many-cultured troops of the Christian powers were financed by a »Turk tax« levied across European societies and supported by anti-Turk sermons in the churches.

(3) »Folk« customs in Europe were studied by 19th century scholars in search of the origin of national cultures. They were said to be unchanging just as peasants were said to be rooted in the soil. This paradigm of immutability emerged when the societies as a whole were in the process of industrialisation, in which artisanal and rural cultures underwent shattering changes. One region with a distinct code of folk dress was the Vierlande, a rural region supplying the port town of Hamburg with vegetables and fruit. This local culture, styled »German« in the 19th century, was deeply influenced by global trade and resulting cultural change. The South Asian economies had been incorporated into the British Empire and Hamburg's merchants had close connections to London, local people adapted the imports to everyday use. The »folk«, men and women of the Vierlande, incorporated colourful fabrics from India into their traditional and strictly coded dresses.

Mobility, migration, and material exchange with other Worlds have influenced all regions of the particular World called Occident. Demographic developments in Europe would have been different without the introduction of the potato and medical drugs from the Americas in the 16th century: sassafras, coca, aromatic balsams, the an-
ti-malarial quinine, and untold other new substances. Merchants recognised the profit potential and the South German Fuggers granted a loan to the King of Spain in return for a monopoly on the anti-syphilitic holywood (guaiacum). An Iberian savant, Nicolás Bautista Monardes, who had studied the Greek-Arab medical tradition, published a first magisterial work on the healing drugs from the Americas in 1569, which was translated into English, Italian, French, German, and Latin. From the Asian world, millions of pieces of porcelain were traded. The trade circuit involved carriers, packers, wagoners, and sailors. To meet the demand, Chinese pottery owners increased imports of the fashionable »Mohammedan blue«-colouring from Turkestan and sold their wares to Batavia. Sensing an opportunity, 17th century Delft potters in the Netherlands began to imitate the Chinese blue-and-white style and found a ready market. Their cheap »chinoiserie«, in the 18th century, came to be considered as »typically Dutch«. In the process of adaptation, consumers Europeanised the distant origins of their new material culture.

In Europe, labour migrants responded to demand for their skills induced by global trade. Armourers came to London, where imperial expansion created opportunities. Gunsmiths moved to Birmingham to supply West African slave-catching regimes. Textile workers had to react to imports from India, as weavers in India later had to react to machine-produced fabrics from Britain. Swiss men served in armies across the continent, Swiss dairy experts worked on farms in many cultures. Dutch drainage experts moved to wetlands across Europe which needed to be cultivated to provide growing populations with arable land. 17th century Sweden and the Netherlands were immigration societies with a relative volume of in-migration – per 1,000 resident population – higher than in later centuries. In Hungary and the Balkans, the struggles between the Habsburg and Ottoman empires and, further east, between the Romanov and Ottoman empires resulted in vacating of lands through warfare and flight, new settlement by in-migrants, and forced and voluntary acculturation processes. The Islamic settlement in Bosnia, the South German Roman Catholic and West European Mennonite settlements in the south Russian plains emerged from the expansion and contraction of empires and religions. By the beginning of the European Era of Democratic Revolution, a Black and a White Atlantic interacted; the plantation belt influenced European demography; the younger generation of the growing rural population sought opportunities to eke out a living in nearby wetlands or difficult-to-till hills or in distant regions in Europe or in colonies of the European powers.

III. PEOPLES’ CULTURES, MIGRANTS’ CULTURES, CONTACT ZONES, 17TH–19TH CENTURIES

Migration to colonies of settlement – in contrast to those of exploitation – permitted a structuring of societies from the bottom up at least in North America. These new societies to some degree did provide democratic options. Parallel, European societies underwent a democratisation of political thought, a new valuation of people’s cultures and then, in 1815, at the Congress of Vienna, a re-imposition of authoritarian rule. The
non-migrant/migrant dichotomy thus came to be reflected in a dichotomy of monarchical Europe v. dynamic »America« – a cipher meaning »United States« or, more exactly, one particular location in it, where kin or friends had settled and where jobs were known to be available.

The elevation of local and regional »folk« or »people's« cultures in juxtaposition to the trans-European culture of the nobility and in support of supra-regional – in the future: national – cultures of the middle-classes was, unexpectedly, to have severely constricting consequences for migrant men and women. Johann Gottfried Herder, of German background, was socialised in 1760s Riga in a Baltic many-cultured context with Russian influences. Shaped by the French Enlightenment, he moved to the central German principalities with their many local cultures as well as traditions of migration. From the early 1770s, he developed his theory that poetry was not »the private heritage of some educated men« but a gift held by the peoples of the world and he called on historians to include an emotional understanding not only of the distinctiveness of epochs but also of peoples. Citing the cultures of the Slavic peoples as an example, he postulated the equal value of different ethnic cultures which develop – under God's benevolence – from the common people (Volksgesellschaft). Parallel to this emphasis on cultural expressiveness, Enlightenment thought emphasised political expressiveness of citizens and their equality before the law. In the spirit of the times, but not according to logic, equality before the law (usually limited to men) was constructed as to be based on a uniform culture. Thus citizenship came to be constructed as implying one single national culture, a fixed national identity. This implied a disruptive inequality: Other peoples resident in a state's territory were labelled minorities, migrants not merely as newly arriving Others but as alien, lesser Others. In result, processes of mobilisation for emigration and of migrant acculturation changed permanently: Culturally oppressed »minorities« usually lived in economically marginal regions and, thus, many saw emigration as the only way to live self-determined and economically secure lives. In-migrants to societies newly defined as national were not equal before the law – they had been equal as subjects once they had sworn allegiance to a ruler under the previous concept of statehood. They were now expected to assimilate or, in the late 19th century, to migrate for a limited period of labour only, live in distinct quarters, and then return to their culture-of-origin – the concept of rotating labourers unwanted as citizens had emerged and was reimposed in the legal frame of the »guestworker« migrations since the 1950s.

The concept of equality of cultures could also be used to advance the interests of the colonised. The Scots, incorporated into the English dynasty's realm in 1708, were considered of lesser culture by the new rulers. In reaction, the Scottish poet James Macpherson (1736–1796) published »The Works of Ossian« (1765). Oisin was said to be a Gaelic bard of ancient times and if Scottish culture was more ancient than the English one, it should take precedence. When – well justified – doubts arose about the authenticity of the collection, scholarly annotation was added and a »Critical Dissertation« published in support. Culture became a resource in struggles for and against hegemony and power. During this period, common Scottish men continued to migrate to wherever their capabilities could be employed to earn a living. Scottish merchants moved through the Polish lands, Scottish fur traders through northern Canada. Most
consorted with or married local women - Polish in the one case, »Indian« in the other (= two more ciphers: Polish local cultures and Native cultures in North America were many). For the men these women, through their cultural and linguistic capabilities, provided access to networks and social relations. Children of such unions between migrating men and resident women, given gender roles, were usually educated in the mother’s culture. White European and North American cultures might be designated hybrid cultures. Had culture not been constructed as immutably, inflexibly national, there would be no need for the term »hybridity«. We might simply talk about cultural change or, in the regions of interaction between cultures – contact zones – of transculturation. The concept of contact framed by power relations had been developed in 1940s Brazil by Gilberto Freyre, that of transculturation by Fernando Ortiz in 1940s Cuba. »Western« historians and theorists did not incorporate such concepts until the 1970s and 1990s respectively – the authors lived in dependent societies, were not white, and did not write in English.

Such regions of interaction were the borderlands between cultures in Europe as well as in the social spaces across the globe onto which European powers imposed their economic interests and culture-colour hierarchies. If globalisation today is perceived as a threat by people in the developed and rich world, it certainly was a threat to people facing European intruder-migrants when the European powers globalised their outreach. Contact zones were numerous. The colonised Irish were forced to migrate early and laboured in England and Scotland. (Historically – just to remind us of the mind-numbing power of ciphers – »the Irish« had a strong connection to the French Atlantic ports through military service and flight.) When the Baltic-centred Swedish economy needed a port open towards the North Sea and the Atlantic, Gothenburg was founded in 1603/19 as a colony for Dutch merchants, German traders, other immigrants, and Swedes. Adapting the earlier concepts of separate jurisdiction for immigrant mercantile and artisanal communities, Gothenburg’s first charter made Dutch and Swedish official languages and apportioned the city council seats to four Swedes, three Dutch, three Germans, and two Scots. The founding of St. Petersburg in 1703, like the rural migration to South Russia, esp. after 1763, also involved formally structured as well as informal interaction of many groups. Such interactions involved cultural hierarchies but, more so, occupational definitions. Artisans were »Germans«, drainage technicians »Dutch«, pastry bakers often »Swiss«.

Occupational definitions had been characteristic of many societies, the Ottoman Empire, the trading societies of the Indian Ocean, many castes in India. With coloniser migrations and imposition of new power-based protocols of trade, contact zones in other parts of the world came to be characterised by hierarchies of Christian over »heathen« or White over »Coloured« – as if white is not a colour. Coloniser migrants, defined by the gatekeeper-ideologues of their own societies as culturally superior, came with emotions and sexuality. The majority of the migrants were men and out of voluntary unions with women of the (allegedly lesser) receiving societies as well as from sexual violence against them, new mixed »races« or cultural métis emerged. The cultures of the colonisers and the colonised were inextricably entwined, though gatekeepers constructed purity as birth in Europe and créolité as birth in the colonies (of European parents). Such entwined culture was not to remain »confined« to the
colonised regions. In the late 20th century, post-colonial theory emerged out of this hierarchised interaction and replaced the mono-cultural power-buttressed and -buttressing master narratives. The formerly colonised and their children as migrants carried their cultures to the European cores.

IV. FROM LABOUR MIGRATIONS TO REFUGEE GENERATION

In the 19th century, demand for male and female workers outlasted the abolition of the Euro-African-American slave trade, formally in 1815, de facto in the 1870s. For a century, contract workers were mobilised from several Asian cultures and, during World War One, also laboured as auxiliaries in France and Britain. But the vast majority of labour migrants came from Europe to the Americas: free migrants who departed under severe economic constraints not for states but for particular segmented and stratified labour markets with internationalised access. Within Europe, too, the industrialising core – Great Britain, France, the Netherlands, Germany, and Switzerland – needed labour and drew on the poor periphery from Ireland via Scandinavia to Slavic societies in the East and to Mediterranean Europe. In all states, urbanisation processes attracted women and men from agriculture, in particular from marginal peasant families for whom mechanization of farming was not an option. In most German cities of the 1880s, more than half of the inhabitants were first-generation in-migrants. The globalisation of grain production – from the North American Prairies via Argentina and Australia to the Russian South – lead to a collapse of grain prices on the world market. This forced small producers across Europe into migration «for bread» – the 20 million who left Europe between the mid-1880s and 1914. The skilled agriculturalists became unskilled factory workers and Taylorisation, the division of complex tasks into ever smaller units, could proceed fast because a reservoir of labour for such unskilled repetitive work was available through migration.

Transatlantic mass migrations from Mediterranean Europe were, at first, destined mainly for Latin America, where these «olive»-coloured men and women met with less racist exclusion than in «white»-coloured North America. But by the 1880s, Italian men and women moved to both Americas, the vast majority to the US, and integrated the dual Euro-Atlantic migration system. The regions of departure expanded and, from the mid-1880s on, were those regions economically marginal to the Romanov, Hohenzollern, and Habsburg empires and their hegemonic nations, Russian, German, Austrian-German. In the terms of the times, many migrants came from minorities, Jews and Poles in Russia, Slovaks and South Slavs in Austria-Hungary. Among these «minorities», the concept of self-articulation and self-rule of peoples and their cultures still held sway. Since Herder’s time, however, learned dissertations had been relegated to backstage and, instead, militarist politics of suppression of minorities and aggressive struggles for national self-determination had moved centre-stage. After several locally limited wars in the Balkans, World War One disrupted European societies and economies (but not nationalist aspirations) and for half a century, to the aftermath of
World War Two in the early 1950s, European states generated more refugees than any other part of the world. The cipher »Christian Occident« is usually not applied to this aspect of European history. Most of these involuntary migrants moved to North America or within Europe. Thereafter European societies became immigration societies and destinations for refugees from the decolonising World.

V. HISTORICAL MEMORY: INVISIBILITY AND SYMBOLIC ANNHIILATION OR MULTIPLE OPTIONS FOR THE FUTURE

National-centred or nationalist historians have acted as gatekeepers. They admitted the national to collective historical memory and excluded minorities, migrants, those of Jewish religion, as well as the cultural origins of material life-ways. They also narrowed the nation to men of middle-class or elite position – excluding the young generation, usually considered immature, the proletariat, and women. Luise Pusch has called the exclusion of women from historical memory a »symbolic annihilation« and Ralph Ellison has coined the phrase »invisible man« – which we amend to »invisible men and women« concerning the exclusion of African-origin people in the US – and the same applies to Afro-Europeans.

While the young men of the rebellious 1960s and 1970s generation reinserted the working classes into societies' historical memory, feminist women scholars had to write their own history and so had Afro-American and Chicano historians in the United States. Afro-European or Turkish-European history is just at its beginning. With the labour – or guest worker – migrations since the mid-1950s and the resulting cultural interaction, two societies – the Dutch and the Swedish ones – decided to deal with actual exclusion and their exclusionist national his-story, story, mythology. In both states, governments commissioned scholars to approach not »the immigrant problem« but the problem of incomplete memory and outdated policies. The historians among these scholars rediscovered the immigration and emigration of previous centuries and this more complete and complex historical memory became a resource to change attitudes to many-cultured immigrants in the present. Both societies succeeded in reconstructing their self-views and structures. A similar development took place in Canada, where, however, no single national paradigm had ever achieved hegemony. The British-origin gatekeepers had clung to notions of imperial Euro-British belonging and the French-origin gatekeepers to Roman-Catholic and French belonging. In France and Britain, societies and institutions also began to accept the many-cultured composition of the people.

Historians of migration have often argued – and justly so – that migrants, too, deserve to be part of collective memory. Providing the research for such memory, I suggest, is only one of two tasks of historians. For whom do historians write? For adults? They have their own memory of their lives, adults who lived in 20th century Europe of two wars and a worldwide depression and a »Cold War«. Many prefer not to have their subjective memories questioned by historians' analyses or stress that they have no memory space left on their brain's hard drive. Do historians address youths? His-
Historians provide young people, as yet without their own histories, with information. They may market ciphers that serve elites or other specific interest groups, they may relegate much of history to invisibility and symbolically annihilate its actors. Or, they may provide young people with options. If different cultures coexisted in societies in the past, if newcomers added their distinct ways and emigrants subtracted their capabilities to add them elsewhere, young people learn about multiple options rather than being inculcated with a mental one-way roadmap. Their societies chose particular options from among many in the past and they, as individuals, may select particular options in the present: Awareness of historical diversity to shape societies and its projects for the future.

Two years ago, I taught students at Paris 8-Saint Denis, who (or whose parents) came from a dozen or more societies as voluntary migrants, proactive refugees, or refugees. They wanted to relate to French society and its history as much as to their society of origin and its history. They used historical memory to develop their own life-projects and to understand the cultures and injuries of their parents, a war in Vietnam, civil war in Algeria, dictatorship in Chile. Multiple narratives that include hurtful aspects of the past increase options and permit a critical attitude to gatekeepers' lobbying for particular versions of the past. Such an approach requires equality of cultures, requires inclusions instead of exclusions, requires complex texts rather than linear master narratives. The life-projects of young people from many origins are the future of societies and will be history for later generations.