Beihefte der Francia

Bd. 62

2006

ENLARGING EUROPEAN MEMORY

MIGRATION MOVEMENTS IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

deutsches historisches **institut** *historique allemand*

paris

BEIHEFTE DER FRANCIA

Herausgegeben vom Deutschen Historischen Institut Paris

Band 62

ENLARGING EUROPEAN MEMORY

MIGRATION MOVEMENTS IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

edited by
Mareike König and Rainer Ohliger

Jan Thorbecke Verlag

ENLARGING EUROPEAN MEMORY

MIGRATION MOVEMENTS IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

Mareike König and Rainer Ohliger (eds)

Jan Thorbecke Verlag

BEIHEFTE DER FRANCIA
Herausgeber: Prof. Dr. Werner Paravicini
Redaktion: Veronika Vollmer
Deutsches Historisches Institut, Hôtel Duret de Chevry, 8, rue du Parc-Royal, F-75003 Paris
Institutslogo: Heinrich Paravicini, unter Verwendung eines Motivs
am Hôtel Duret de Chevry

Bibliografische Information der Deutschen Bibliothek
Die Deutsche Bibliothek verzeichnet diese Publikation in der Deutschen Nationalbibliografie; detaillierte bibliografische Daten sind im Internet über http://dnb.ddb.de abrufbar.

Dieses Buch ist aus alterungsbeständigem Papier nach DIN-ISO 9706 hergestellt.
Gesamtherstellung: Jan Thorbecke Verlag, Ostfildern
Printed in Germany
ISBN-10: 3-7995-7458-1
ISBN-13: 978-3-7995-7458-7

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Acknowledgements

This volume originated in a workshop organised by the Network Migration in Europe (http://www.network-migration.org) and the German Historical Institute Paris (http://www.dhi-paris.fr). The Network is a framework for the co-operation of scholars, practitioners and others interested in exchanging and distributing knowledge about the importance of migration in Europe's history and present. It is working towards the acknowledgement of the plural past and present of European societies, as well as their multiple links. The German Historical Institute Paris is one of the eight research institutes which the foundation »Stiftung Deutsche Geisteswissenschaftliche Institute im Ausland (D.G.I.A.)« maintains outside Germany. These institutes provide a platform for historical research, academic exchange and international cooperation.

The publication of this book and the preceding conference (http://www.network-migration.org/workshop2004) were made possible by generous grants from the Werner Reimers Stiftung, the German Historical Institute Paris and the Heinrich Böll Foundation. We would also like to express our sincere thanks to the French NGO Génériques that contributed to organising the event and provided additional help and support in Paris. The volume presents a selected number of papers that were presented at the German Historical Institute Paris on 15/16 November 2004. Within the series of international workshops on migration history, this publication is the fourth edited volume that has resulted from workshops organised by the Network Migration in Europe since 1998.

Berlin/Paris, winter 2005

Mareike König
Rainer Ohliger

NARRATING AND THEORISING MEMORIES OF MIGRATION

MAREIKE KÖNIG AND RAINER OHLIGER

Facing Migration History in Europe Between Oblivion and Representation

I. INTRODUCTION

It has become a truism ever since the renewed debates about nationalism, nation-building and state formation from the 1980s on[1] that history and historiography played a crucial role in forging and forming *national* communities and identities and thus »constructing« or »engineering« the national fabric as the scientific terminology goes. Within post-structuralist and post-modern debates about history and historical writing it has also become a commonality that reconstructing, reading and interpreting the past in a text or as a text[2] can differ from what »actually happened« in the past. Historiography is informed by these events, it *recreates* it to a certain extent, however, it also *creates* it as a new textual reality and commemorative practice[3]. Nineteenth century objectivism and factitiousness was said to be dead with this paradigmatic shift to a new understanding of writing history. This shift generated as a lasting effect the ongoing debate about history and memory, history and oblivion, memory and commemorative practices and the intricacies of their interrelations[4]. Thus, the questions, which historical actors, events and groups are represented and how this representation takes place, became more and more important. Research about the function of (collective) memory, the means and contents of commemoration for the construction of collective identities, and the cultural forms of keeping and trading memory became central[5].

1 Benedict ANDERSON, Imagined Communities. Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism, London 1991; Ernest GELLNER, Nations and Nationalism, Ithaca, London 1983; John A. HALL (ed.), The State of the Nation: Ernest Gellner and the Theory of Nationalism, New York 1998; Eric J. HOBSBAWM, Nations and Nationalism since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality, Cambridge 1992; Anthony D. SMITH, The Ethnic Origins of Nations, Oxford 1986.

2 Geoff ELEY, Is all the World a Text? From Social History to the History of Societies Two Decades Later, Ann Arbor 1990.

3 Lucian BOIA, Istoria si mit in conştiinta românească [History and Myth in the Romanian Consciousness], Bucharest 1997, p. 9.

4 The topic generated strong interest in the last two decades, so that in the meantime the separate journal History & Memory was founded. Important books for the debate about the interrelations of history and memory were, for instance, John R. GILLIS (ed.), Commemorations: The Politics of National Identity, Princeton 1994 and more recently Paul RICOEUR, La mémoire, l'histoire, l'oubli, Paris 2000.

5 One booming branch of this research stream was the historical research on monuments, festivities or other cultural practices and their commemorative function. See for instance for France and Germany as examples: Charlotte TACKE, Denkmal im sozialen Raum. Nationale Symbole in Deutschland und

These observations open up the question of how historiography and historical representation of the twenty-first century will look like? Will it stick to its accustomed and inherited, but controversial standard of trying to be »objective« and recreating an »objective« and factual past? Or will a more subjective, and a more »constructed«, though also more fragmented, attitude towards writing history dominate? If the latter prevails, it means that categories of choice, difference, diversity, and plurality might gain a stronger influence and eventually exercise hegemony over traditional and often clearly bound national narratives. Hence, the future paradigm might shift towards a more eclectic and more controversial understanding of the past. It might even imply a more normative approach rather asking what history and historiography *should* and *can be* about, not only what it *is* and *was* about. This paradigm could be open to more ambivalent (and twisted) historical narratives emphasising in-betweenness of groups, populations, and nations, thus recognising the fact that national communities are and have been under constant transformation. In such a view, marginalised populations such as immigrants and minorities could become central. They would offer the possibility of researching history from what was for a long time the periphery, narrating it from these margins, partly against the *telos* of the centre[6]. Historical imagination would be opened up to much larger, but also more conflictual interpretations. Thus, the current debate about history, memory and practices of commemorations is inherently linked to the debates about making historical representation work under the conditions of increasingly diverse societies, namely societies shaped by immigration.

II. MODES OF IMMIGRANT REPRESENTATION

Modern Europe – Europe in the times of modernity has always been a continent on the move. Emigration and immigration, migration within the continent, as well as in its nation-states, have shaped Europe's social, political and cultural face. The same is true for European colonial expansion and decolonisation. Large-scale migration had wide-reaching repercussions in Europe. Nation-state populations as well as Europe's economic and social fabric were shaped by the dynamic of migration movements. This

Frankreich im 19. Jahrhundert, Göttingen 1995; Peter Carrier, Holocaust Monuments and National Memory Cultures in France and Germany since 1989: The Origins and Political Function of the Vél d'Hiv in Paris and the Holocaust Monument in Berlin, New York 2005.

6 This perspective of ethnocentric and nation-centred history is, however, under attack from various sides. A first step towards overcoming this perspective was comparative historical research, usually along the borderlines of comparing nation-states, often informed by social scientific approaches. See for instance the journal Comparative Studies in Society and History. More recently, the history of interrelations *(Beziehungsgeschichte)* and transnational history, are emerging as a productive field of scholarship. See Jürgen Osterhammel, Geschichtswissenschaft jenseits des Nationalstaats. Studien zu Beziehungsgeschichte und Zivilisationsvergleich, Göttingen 2001. On transnational history see for instance the forum <http://geschichte-transnational.clio-online.net> within the H-Net system (H-Soz-u-Kult) or for German history Sebastian Conrad, Doppelte Marginalisierung. Plädoyer für eine transnationale Perspektive auf die deutsche Geschichte, in: Geschichte und Gesellschaft 28 (2002) pp. 145–169.

dynamic began unfolding on a larger scale in early modern times, accelerated within the establishment of modern industrial societies, and has yet to come to an end. Thus, migration has been a continuum of European history and not only a phenomenon of the immediate modernity[7].

Within European nation-states, national cultures and national public spheres, the plurality of the past and present is often not or insufficiently represented and commemorated. The image of Europe's Self is, despite historically different experiences, still mostly determined by national paradigms and modes of interpretation that cherish linear and static national narratives. Border transcending phenomena such as migration or movements or intercultural exchanges are still often neglected. If at all considered, migrants are usually written into national memories and mnemoscapes of European nations as Others[8]. They are seldom portrayed as part of the Self. This is true for public debates and discourses. It is particularly true for national discourses about immigration and integration of immigrants. These debates are usually not dominated by broad discussions emphasising plurality and co-existence of different people and cultures, but by arguments revolving around closing societies along national lines.

Despite increasing Europeanisation, institutions shaping the European historical consciousness and memory (museums, media, schools, universities, historiography, curricula) are usually still conceptualised along national or nation-state borderlines. Border transcending and border destroying all-European (pan-European) or transnational developments and processes do not yet find adequate room in these concepts. The representation of European migration history within a national as well as a pan-European context provides an opportunity to intellectually challenge centralistic images of the past created by nation-states. Migration history and its representation can thus serve to decentralise historical memory. As it transcends politically and historiographically imagined and implemented borders of nation-state orders, it provides an opportunity to create an image of the past that breaks through national concepts and limitations.

Europe inherited a rich history of various forms of migrations. However, this history is generally not yet part of the general narrative in Europe, but still rather a domain of specialists. Thus, there is room for extending Europe's historical imagery by way of incorporating immigrants and their histories. Such a view and interpretation matches the historical and contemporary European reality, which is shaped by worlds

7 See for example Dirk HOERDER, Cultures in Contact. World Migration in the Second Millennium, Durham 2002 (Comparative and international working-class history); Klaus J. BADE, Migration in European History, Oxford 2003.

8 However, in the area of scholarship and public history this is gradually changing with growing scholarly interest in the topic and museums discovering it. Gérard NOIRIEL, État, nation et immigration. Vers une histoire du pouvoir, Paris 2001; Leo LUCASSEN, The Threat: The Integration of Old and New Migrants in Western Europe since 1850, Urbana 2004. See also the literature about the diverse national projects to open up migration museums or migration centres, for France and its »Centre d'histoire de l'immigration« see the special edition of the journal Hommes & migrations 1247 (2004); for Germany see Aytaç ERYILMAZ, Deutschland braucht ein Migrationsmuseum. Plädoyer für einen Paradigmenwechsel in der Kulturpolitik, in: Jan MOTTE, Rainer OHLIGER (eds), Geschichte und Gedächtnis in der Einwanderungsgesellschaft: Migration zwischen historischer Rekonstruktion und Erinnerung, Essen 2004, pp. 305–319.

and spaces of in-between, much more than by an interpretation and representation determined predominantly by national centres and national elites. On the other hand such a representation from the periphery serves an important goal going beyond the limited purpose of representing immigrant history. In the age of globalisation it could help to broaden and transcend a still Eurocentric picture of the past which is no longer appropriate for the present nor for the future. Historical representation of migration in and to Europe necessarily has a strong extra or trans-European element. The history of colonialism and decolonisation and the migrations caused by it are the best, though not the only example for this argument.

The question of how this rich immigrant (and ethnic) history can be written into national, as well as into transnational and nation transcending history is one key issue to be debated and decided by the historical profession and practitioners of historical commemoration. One could argue that there are basically five ideal type approaches to representing migrant (and ethnic minorities) historiographically. They could be labelled as ethnification, assimilation, »distinctive« integration, non-representation and multiculturalisation.

These five models were and are (at least partly) mirrored in current or past societies and their historical and commemorative approaches towards (migrant) minorities. Ethnification of migration history is probably best epitomised by the US American approach which developed in the aftermath of the »ethnic revival« (from the 1960s to the 1980s) and was reinforced by debates about political correctness and recognition of minorities[9]. It stands for separate histories of immigrant groups and ethnic minorities. These are seen rather as a separate part of national history (or better histories) than as an essential part of it. For each group its own history, its own museum and its own collective memory would be the motto of such an approach. The nature of this approach opens the way for fragmentation of national history as such. In the extreme form national history remains only a loosely connected patchwork of group histories or is even dissolved as an autonomous entity. Critics would even argue that it endangers the coherence of a society itself and leads to tribalisation[10].

The opposing model is the approach of *active* assimilation. It is best mirrored by (historical) France with its republican model. It sees immigrants (and minorities) as a constitutive and essential, though not separate or distinctive part of the politically defined nation and national history. Making ethnically blind nationals (Frenchmen) with an (often invented) commonly shared past out of them is the primary goal within this model[11]. This approach would neither pay any attention to ethnic, regional or historical roots and difference of migrants, nor would it give any room for special group rights, or recognition of particular interests. A group-specific historical narrative may

9 Charles Taylor, Multiculturalism: Examining the Politics of Recognition, ed. and introduced by Amy Gutmann, Princeton 1994; Arjun Appadurai, Modernity at Large. Cultural Dimensions of Globalisation, Minneapolis, London 1997.

10 Arthur Schlesinger, The Disuniting of America, New York 1992; or with a different, less polemic focus: David A. Hollinger, Postethnic America, New York 1995.

11 In the extreme and caricatured form this approach is best shown in French textbooks of colonial times teaching indigenous students in French colonies about »Nos ancêtres les Gaules« (Our ancestors the Gauls).

evolve on an independent local level, but it would not be initiated or supported by state institutions. Conforming to the republican values on which the model is based is the first rule for state educational institutions within this model.

The third alternative would be the model of »distinctive« integration and representation of privileged migrants such as co-ethnic or colonial repatriates. This approach is characterised by smooth integration of immigrants into the national narrative, without assimilating the group and its history completely but rather making it an integrative and essential part of national history, whilst still keeping it visible or distinctive. Germany and its co-ethnic migrants (post-war expellees and refugees but also ethnic German migrants who have come as *Aussiedler* from Central and Eastern Europe since 1950) could represent such a model. Dutch-Indonesians who went to the Netherlands after decolonisation or French *Pieds-Noirs* from Algeria immigrating to France could be seen as two other groups epitomising such an approach. Or one could make the same argument for Jews who migrated away from discrimination in Eastern Europe, the (former) Soviet Union, Iraq or Ethiopia to Israel. This mode of representation is often based on narratives of suffering and victim status identity prior to immigration. The real or ascribed status of victim then provides a rather easy possibility for the receiving society to fit the group history into its own national narrative. The state is usually much more inclined to tolerate and support an independent historical narrative of privileged immigrant groups (for instance by state supported research and research institutions).

The fourth model is a non-model, i.e., one of ignoring (migrant) minorities completely within national historiography and public commemoration, just seeing them as not belonging to one's own history and thus overlooking, not representing them. This approach is different from active assimilation, though the outcome of exclusion might be similar. It is probably the most widely spread approach to immigrants in most countries that do not explicitly consider themselves as being countries of immigration, though they might have a large element of immigrant population in their societies. The long-term attitude of Western European societies to labour migrants that were recruited until the early 1970s is one good example of such an attitude, though it has been slowly changing within the last one or two decades. However, one could also argue that the approach of Central and Eastern European nation-states towards the history of indigenous minorities matches this model. In these cases the structure of excluding minority history from (ethno-)national history is very similar to the exclusion of labour migrants in Western Europe.

The fifth model of immigrant representation, the multicultural one, is probably best represented by Canada[12], and in a very different, territorial way by Switzerland[13]. In contrast to the ethnification of history the multicultural option provides (at least in theory) for an overall idea of society, holding it together and providing a coherent picture of the past. Majority and minority groups play an equally important role in the construction of a national past and in commemorative practices. The national past is ac-

12 Will Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship. A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights, Oxford 1995.

13 For Switzerland this is rather true for the four nation-building ethnic groups, less so for migrant minorities.

tually seen and portrayed as the very outcome of social and ethnic diversity; the state would fairly and equally support majority population and (migrant) minorities being represented historically and historiographically. However, the danger of this model, critics would argue, is its potential for turning into an ethnification or tribalisation of societies and their past. Recognition of differences, the argument would run, has the inherent tendency of establishing and consolidating these differences at the expense of national coherence.

III. QUESTIONS AND CHALLENGES

The intersection of migration and memory, history, commemorative practices, representation and identity, culture and social hierarchy during different historical periods in its complex characteristics is rather an emerging than an established field of study. As a step in this direction, we raised the issue of representing migration and migration history in various national contexts as well as in the European public sphere in our conference held in November 2004 in Paris. Scholars met who work on various subjects in the area of migration history. Topics of interest were e.g. migrant incorporation or exclusion and historical representation in both sending and receiving countries. The focus was also on writing national and/or European history versus migration history. Social and cultural practices of immigrants as well as strategies for representation by migrant groups or museums were under consideration. Exhibitions and the role of the media in representing migrants and migration history were discussed as well as methodological and theoretical contributions.

Discussing the contributions presented at the conference several questions and spheres of problems proved to be important and sometimes controversial. First, there was the question of actors or agency on the one hand, and the question of the target group on the other. If memory is a product of battle and conflict, the question arises as to who legitimately takes part in it and gets a voice. Who is the »audience«? Or to put it more provocatively: what is the content and impact of commemoration? And do immigrants want to be commemorated? Moreover, who wants and needs it? Why and on what terms? Closely linked was the question as to which agency of immigrants unfolds in nationally structured societies and largely national public spheres.

As there are different voices and interests involved, plural memories and commemoration practices seem to be the adequate form for representing the respective past. However, if this holds true, it also raises the question of discrepancy between individual interpretation of lived experiences and official commemoration providing collective meaning. Which psychological and social processes take place when individual memory is confronted with (a different) collective memory? What is the influence of families and generations in this regard?

The question of competition among groups is closely linked to this issue. Who exercises dominance or even hegemony over the interpretation and representation of the past? How and why have previously marginalised memories entered into mainstream conceptions of the past at different moments in time? To what extent have they been

modified by or assimilated into dominant collective memories? In what ways and in what circumstances have formerly excluded or clandestine memories become the sites of rival power centres, subverting or surmounting dominant notions of the past[14]?

In this regard, however, function and impact of memory are central. Memory is generally seen as a means of constructing and maintaining a collective (national) identity[15]. Thus, memory and commemorative practices have to be seen as political statements, subject to the dialectic process of remembering and forgetting. The inherent danger of commemoration as only a *selective* representation of the past has to be taken into consideration. Commemoration can be the effect of memory but not the reflection of it. Thus, commemoration is likely to become a »staging« of discontinuous images, mixing past and present, focusing on image and representation instead of reflection and discussion[16]. As a result, the appropriation of the past rather concentrates on itself instead of writing a new narrative of the past.

IV. CONTENT

The articles in this book discuss different aspects of the topics mentioned above. They give an idea of ongoing research in this sector. A complete overview was not and cannot be intended in a field of research as complex and open as this. In the first part of the book, »Narrating and Theorising Memories of Migration«, *Dirk Hoerder* gives an overview about »Europe's Many Worlds and Their Global Interconnections« from late medieval Europe to the late 19th and 20th century. Among other topics, he discusses the poverty of histories of the nation state and uses the Dutch and Swedish example of reconceptualising national history into a many-cultured history as a resource to reshape societies from mono-cultural historical memory to multi-cultural everyday practise in the present.

»Commemorating Migrations since Early Modern Times« is the title of the second part of the book. *Alexander Schunka* traces the commemorative practices and historiographical traditions concerning the Bohemian Exiles in the German state of Saxony from the 17th century until today. Due to their social, cultural and linguistic heterogeneity, and contrary to the Huguenots in Brandenburg-Prussia, they failed to achieve a distinctive place in their host society's memory. However, they are a striking example of the multifaceted efforts to invent and select certain migratory traditions and to neglect others.

14 Charles ZIKA, Memory and Commemoration in Recent English-Language Historiography and Discourse, in: Paul MÜNCH (ed.), Jubiläum, Jubiläum ... Zur Geschichte öffentlicher und privater Erinnerung, Essen 2005, pp. 241–257.

15 Aleida ASSMANN, Im Zwischenraum zwischen Geschichte und Gedächtnis: Bemerkungen zu Pierre Noras »Lieux de mémoire«, in: Etienne FRANÇOIS (ed.), Lieux de mémoire, Erinnerungsorte. D'un modèle français à un projet allemand, Berlin 1996, pp. 19–27; Jacques LE GOFF, Mémoires et histoire, Paris 1996.

16 Claire GANTET, La mémoire, objet et sujet d'histoire. Enquête sur l'historicité et sur l'écriture de l'histoire, in: Francia 28/2 (2001) pp. 109–128.

Through the example of the Swiss in 18th century Strasbourg *Hanna Sonkarjävi* shows that it does not make much sense to try and define an all-embracing category of the foreigner in Old Regime France. Studying the various means of inclusion and exclusion from a micro-historical perspective and examining in a bottom-up approach who, in what context, would have been defined as a stranger, by whom and to which purpose, provides a counterbalance to the picture created by historians who have tended to take the nation state as their primary point of departure. Focusing on the social processes of defining boundaries between different individuals or groups allows a more thorough and differentiated understanding of the »foreigner« in Early Modern France.

Huguenot migration has been largely seen against a background of religious persecution. As a contrast, *Klaus Weber* in his article picks the example of 18th century Hamburg, a town with a small, but economically extremely powerful Huguenot community that chose its destination for primarily economic reasons. The paper traces the community's efforts at integration through the increasingly nationalist 19th and 20th centuries, and assesses the poor commemorative practice of this particular aspect of Huguenot history.

The contribution of *Mareike König* deals with the changes German migration to Paris underwent after the Franco-Prussian war of 1870/71. The hostile atmosphere affected not only the size and composition of the community, but also the behaviour, identity, and (self)representation of the migrants. In public, they were hiding their national identity. At the same time strong efforts occurred to unite and organise the Germans through associations or festivals like celebrating the Kaiser's birthday.

In the third part of the book, »Troubled and Contested Memories« of different migration groups are analysed. Although millions of refugees were categorised as DPs (Displaced Persons) after 1945, the experience of displacement was quickly forgotten during the Cold War era. Yet since 1989, DPs have been the focus of scholarly writing and commemorative practices. In his article, *Daniel Cohen* elucidates the reasons accounting for their post-war absence and recent reappearance.

Which image of the past is likely to insure the cohesion and the integration of the Transylvanian Saxons after their emigration to West Germany? *Pierre de Trégomain* reckons that the »celebration of 800 years«, organised in 1950, did not only intend to celebrate the Saxon history. It also shows the symbolical domination of a group of these migrants in representing the past. The commemoration of a constructed authenticity turned out to be a political act of strength.

In her contribution, *Lavinia Stan* presents and analyses media discourses on Romanian exiles as they were constructed before and after the fall of communism, emphasising the continuities and discontinuities that can be found in the competing narrative linking or dividing these two periods of Romanian history.

Dovilė Budrytė outlines changes in the uses of traumatic memory for collective identity building. Her article about remembering the Stalinist deportations and repressions in the Baltic states explores public debates and analyses struggles about memory in the realm of 20th century forced migration. Her focus is on political discourse and action instead of images of victimhood.

The fourth and last part of the book is entitled »Making Migrants Visible«. In their article, *Rainer Ohliger* and *Jan Motte* search possible *lieux de mémoire* in Germany's immigration society. They analyse the representation of post-war labour immigrants in media of historical representation and commemoration such as monuments, street names, exhibitions, museums and film.

Wladimir Fischer examines the research on migrants from Southeastern Europe to Vienna around 1900 and develops a strategy to overcome the specific problems in writing such a history. He pleads for an open approach to a history that has so far been written from the perspective of the migrant elites and by the administrators of migration.

The Ellis Island Immigration Museum and the Lower East Side Tenement Museum in the United States are the subject of *Joachim Baur's* research. These two museums are usually thought of as telling fairly different stories about migration to the United States. Without neglecting the differences, the study at hand, in reading the presentations, identifies considerable common ground. Both museums basically produce narratives of transformation, they tell immigration history in terms of »Becoming American«, not so much as »Being in America«.

An oral history approach is used by *Myriam Cherti.* In her contribution, she deals with the Moroccan migration to England from the 1960s on, a movement so far rather unexplored by scientific research. In capturing the living memory of the first generation migrants, their respective personal experiences are pointed out.

These articles bring together a wide range of scholarship on migration history and its commemoration. They should be seen as a starting point, rather than a conclusion, as the topic is only nascent.

DIRK HOERDER

Europe's Many Worlds and Their Global Interconnections

»European history« – the connotation of the conference theme implies a continent, a geographical image, or the bordered states of modern Europe, a political image[1]. The hidden mental maps and images of the World in which we live structure and define our analytical concepts. By »the World in which we live« I mean the whole of the socio-economic arrangements, the power structures and participatory options, the imprints which our socialisation left on our minds, and the discourses in which we express ourselves and decipher what we experience. »Europe« is a shorthand term with many meanings. When shorthand was still in use in offices, it went without saying that clerks without training could not decipher shorthand texts. When it comes to historical memory, in contrast, people born into a territory are assumed to be able to decipher such codes. From early infancy on, children's minds are being inscribed in the trusted world of family and kin with encoded social and historic meanings. They are not trained in schools to expand the ciphers' significations into a full text and unquestioningly pass them on to their children as »what actually happened«. Historians, too, are burdened by such socializations. Are we, as historians of migrant men and women, able to invoke 18th century or medieval maps of Europe's social spaces, overlapping and multi-layered ones?

Through manifold migrations, societies of the past incorporated peoples of different ethno-cultural, religious, craft and other belongings. Religion had been trans-European into the 16th century with borderlines drawn between Roman and Byzantine Christendom and within the Roman-European realm to local differing readings of the fundamental texts, so-called heresies. Europe's states were ruled by trans-European dynasties and political regimes were conceptualised by trans-European political thinkers. Within such »absolutist« states the multiplicity of religious groups, territorial entities of subjects, and in-migrants negotiated their particular status. With the emergence of »nation« as a constituent element of the state in the course of the 19th cen-

1 This essay is based on Dirk HOERDER, Cultures in Contact: World Migrations in the Second Millennium, Durham N.C. 2002. Further Bibliographic references: Information on the Netherlands and Sweden from: Christiane HARZIG, Einwanderung und Politik. Historische Erinnerung und Politische Kultur als Gestaltungsressourcen in den Niederlanden, Schweden und Kanada, Göttingen 2004 (Transkulturelle Perspektiven, 1). Negotiating Nations: Exclusions, Networks, Inclusions from: Christiane HARZIG, Dirk HOERDER, Adrian SHUBERT (eds), Histoire sociale – Social History 34 (2000). Dirk HOERDER, Christiane HARZIG, Adrian SHUBERT (eds), The Historical Practice of Diversity: Transcultural Interactions from the Early Modern Mediterranean to the Postcolonial World, New York 2003. Christiane HARZIG, Danielle JUTEAU, Irina SCHMITT (eds), The Social Construction of Diversity: Recasting the Master Narrative of Industrial Nations, New York 2003.

tury, national culture became the absolute sign of belonging – far less negotiable than any absolutist structures. Cultural homogenisation came to be imposed on the many-cultured residents as well as in-migrants in a territory. The trans-European intellectual elites transformed themselves into gatekeepers of particularities called »nations«. While from the Reformation, people had been defined and, perhaps, had defined themselves by a variant of the Christian Church, they now came to be defined by ethnic belonging, ethno-cultural or ethno-genetic. While the fundamentalists of religion had generated masses of refugee migrants in the past, the fundamentalists of nationhood erected cultural borders to fence in minorities and to keep out cultural »others« from neighbouring or distant cultures.

In the process, the gatekeepers provided themselves with income-generating positions and elite status. Since then, nation-state socialised historians have hardly dealt with cultural interaction and have emphasised borderlines and conflict instead. By endowing national ideology with scholarly support they legitimised-sanctified the new political elites and, at the same time, narrowed the space in which citizens of a nation and newcomers could manoeuvre. Nationalist curricula in schools severely restricted options for young people – and thus for the respective society's future. The diversity, whether distinct slots or flexible options, available in the absolutist-dynastic past, was reduced to a one-way street called »nation-state«. Many of those who did not benefit from its economy and/or were excluded from participation migrated westward across the Atlantic on the assumption, well-founded to a certain degree, that the immigration states in North America, all nationalising rhetoric notwithstanding, provided more cultural, political, and – above all – economic options for self-determined life-projects.

In this essay, I propose differentiated maps. First, I will discuss the three Europes of the Middle Ages: the tri-continental Mediterranean-centred World, the Northern World originating in Scandinavia, and the intermediate Europe north of the Alpine mountains and south of the Baltic Sea. Second, I turn to the connectedness of Europe with cultures on other continents and resulting intra-European migrations. Third, I analyse the consequences of the change from dynastic to nation-state societies for cultural interaction and migrants. I then turn to the 19th and 20th century Atlantic labour and European refugee migrations and, in conclusion, discuss the problems historiography-imposed invisibility of migration and cultural interaction mean for policy making in the present and for strategies for the future.

I. THE THREE EUROPES OF THE MIDDLE AGES

The »first Europe«, the 8th century Mediterranean World connected the cultures and religions of western Asian with north African and south European regions. Through commerce and human mobility this World was connected to imperial China, to the trade emporia of the Indian Ocean, to societies of sub-Saharan Africa, and to the marginal trans-Alpine Europe. The cipher »trade«, usually decoded as exchange of material goods, has always been regulated by social protocols and, through the ages, has involved cultural selectivity and change. Trading men, rarely women, moved across cul-

tural spaces. So did transport workers and clerks. In hostels, maids and journeymen of local cultures cared for the travellers from distant cultures. All of these exchanges demanded negotiation and accommodation. In contrast, nobles imposed their codes of honour or clerics their religious dogmatisms by strategies of power. Negotiation ensures accommodation of multiple interests and perspectives. Intercultural competence, since the recent decline of essentialised national identities a buzzword, was a self-understood requisite for all exchanges in the medieval and early modern periods. Written manuals for such human mobility were compiled around 900 B.C. by ibn Khordadbeh, an Arab postmodern in Persia, for routes from West to East Asian cultures, in the 1330s by a Florentine factor in a Genoese trading centre on the Crimean peninsula concerning the cultural specifics from Kaffa to China; and by a Jewish Catalan with Arab informants for the African trade.

In this Mediterranean World, three religions coexisted, competed, and warred in the 8th to the 15th century Iberian societies. Muslim rulers settled their many-cultured soldiers and Jewish-Christian-Islamic transcultural scholars advanced learning. The imposition of Christian dogma and ways of life has been encoded as *reconquista* as if the societies had had an earlier Christian-Frankish history. This term, still current in Western encyclopaedias, has expunged the practice of *convivencia* from collective memory. This tri-religious World mediated between Europe and Africa: Black Madonnas, African goddesses of fertility, became part of Christianity; Black slaves and their children were part of society. The Mediterranean World was one of cultural exchange, if often contested.

– Later, the south European-Mediterranean core shifted to the cities of the plains of the northern Apennine Peninsula or – as a cipher – to »Urban Italy«. The city states were a social space of exchange transactions between the Indic-Arab trade and northbound connections to the emerging Urban Netherlands. Legal protocols ensured that dynastic power and noble honour did not interfere with merchants' activities and negotiations.

– In a third period, the Ottoman rulers of the Eastern Mediterranean established structures for many-cultured and multi-religious *cohabitation* – this French term, meaning »living together«, emphasises negotiated whole ways of life. Neighbourhoods *(malhalle)* housed particular ethno-religious groups who, across larger spaces, organized themselves in socio-political units *(millet)* under religio-cultural leaders without a non-productive, tribute-demanding nobility. The non-Islamic *millets* had to pay a special but not oppressive tax. To prevent cultural hegemony and disruptive power strategies of the Turkish group over the other peoples of the realm, Turkish ethnics could neither serve in the elite troops nor in the administration. Forced migrants, both slaves from other peoples for the troops and boys levied from among the non-Islamic peoples *(devshirme)* for the administration, were educated as bound civil servants of Islamic faith. Similarly, the women of the sultan's family were recruited as bound persons from south Russian and central Asian peoples and could achieve high influence. These elites used the artificial Persian-Arabic-Turkish Osmanlica, a *lingua nullius*, to avoid hegemony of one ethno-cultural language. The Empire invited Jewish refugees expelled from the Catholicised Iberian Peninsula. When it advanced into south-eastern Europe, its armies annihilated the parasitic nobilities and liberated peasants. Then Christian intellectuals, serving their nobility, developed the image of the

»bloodthirsty« Turk, an invention that became a standard cipher of historical shorthand memory – it is still present in school texts.

The second »trans-Alpine Europe« was a tribal and, subsequently, a dynastic region with little economic productivity and few complex institutions. Some urbanised regions, the south German mercantile cities and the Baltic Hanseatic cities emerged. The centre of social life and urban outreach developed in the bourgeois Netherlands. To the east, migrations as well as missionary and military penetrations created vast cultural borderlands. Across the whole of trans-Alpine Europe, interregional migrations occurred wherever peasant families – by historic cipher rooted in the soil – raised more children than their land could support. Serfs, though bound to lords, were not always needed or decided to pursue their own interests – in either case they migrated voluntarily or involuntarily. Jews came and departed on their own or because of persecution. Pilgrims moved over large distances with more than spiritual goals and, back at home, reported about distant, strange customs and cultures. Medieval trans-Alpine Europe consisted of societies in motion.

The third »Europe«, the 9th to 12th century Scandinavian societies, was of almost hemispheric extent. Norsemen and Norsewomen recorded in their oral histories, »sagas«, the achievements of well-established farming or seafaring men and families far better than did court historiography south of the Baltic Sea. These highly skilled seafarers migrated westward to Iceland, Greenland, and Vinland in northern America (not yet named). East-southward, as »Varangians« or »Rus«, they migrated to the Moskva river, established the Rus or Russian society and state and traded southward as far as Eastern Christian Byzantium. Other Norsemen of standing moved south-westward as invaders and state-builders to north-western France (mid-10th century »Normandy«), to England and Wales after 1066, to Sicily and southern Italy in the 12th century. The migrant men intermarried with local women and by a process of ethnogenesis new peoples emerged from this cultural-carnal métissage. The newcomers accepted local languages and reformed traditional socio-political systems of taxation and rule with the intent of reducing the burdens of the peasantry. The mentally-bound – mentally-enslaved? – West and Central European chroniclers and later historians labelled the two models of state organization, providing alternatives to central Europe's feudal regimes, »Turks« and »Vikings«.

The Holy Roman Empire, later constructed as of »German Nation«, through emperor Fredrick II of Hohenstaufen (1212–1250), was ruled by a Norman-German of Sicilian education in the first half of the 13th century. He chartered a trans-European Order, which relocated from Palestine to Venice to Transylvania and, finally, to Masovia. There, the self-designated Teutonic Knights fought Baltic peoples of non-Christian beliefs, the Pruzzen-Prussians among them, labelling their adversaries the »Saracens of the North«. If there was a Europe or an Occident, borders were fuzzy and permeable; borderlands or contact zones were characterized by transcultural ways of life. Migration meant cultural interaction, trade changed material culture, intellectual contact – often through migration – resulted in Islamic-Jewish-Christian or Palestinian-Arab-European scholarship. Pilgrims and peddlers influenced the local ways of life of common people. Such interactions, however, again and again were interrupted by violence and warfare.

II. EUROPEAN EXPANSION SINCE THE 15TH CENTURY NEW WORLDVIEWS AND NEW MATERIAL CULTURE

By the mid-15th century »Portuguese« merchants and seafarers began to venture along West African coasts. They sailed into the Atlantic and reached, first, the islands and then, accidentally, the shores of Brazil. The cipher »Portuguese« meant subjects of the state's dynasty. For geographic and nautical expertise, the Portuguese-born merchants and the Crown relied on underemployed seafarers migrating from the declining Urban Italian-Mediterranean system to the Atlantic rim as well as on Anglo traders seizing the Iberian opportunities. A still enigmatic sailor, »Columbus« in shorthand, perhaps from Urban Italy, perhaps from one of the Atlantic islands, studied the rich information in the chronicles of the defunct Norse migration system to Vinland before he charted his own westward course.

The Mediterranean system of slavery, which had brought men and women in forced migrations from Africa and Central Asia to southern Europe and from Europe to North Africa, had come to an end. Their intercultural or, in another – later – reference system, inter-racial children had become part of the free societies. Thus, a new supply region of bound labourers would be useful – from a European perspective. Portugal's many-cultured seafarers, connecting European and African forms of bondage, began a slave trade to the Iberian societies. Next, Spanish (another cipher for the many Iberian realms) conquistadores established their rule over the Caribbean as well as Central and South America. Finally, they expanded with the help of Arab pilots into the Indian Ocean and to the »South Sea« islands with their spices and other products in high demand in Europe. In this process, the European traders who could offer but a limited range of goods for exchange combined the nobility's concept of armed honour with the mercantile drive for profits. This alliance became the foundation of European societies' economic dominance. It changed trade from a negotiating and accommodating strategy to one of imposition of power – perhaps the most decisive change in global relations.

The Christian World's view of the globe and its peoples also collapsed and changed forever. The Church could not deny that the people of the Americas lived without ever having heard of the Roman Catholic version of »God«. No longer were the Bible and the papal decrees the only authorised views of the world as regards people and as regards its physical shape. In an age of post-colonial discourse, this might be termed a pre-colonial revision of theories from Euro-Christian centrism to larger perspectives. The comparatively small number of European migrants to the conquered regions set in motion vast migrations in many societies of the other macro-regions of the world (the cipher »continents« reduced complex social spaces to their geography). By the 20th century, such migrants, first some of the colonised, then many of the decolonised would select Europe as their destination. Imports from these societies-turned-colonies vastly changed the everyday cultures of Europe's many local worlds. »Africa in Europe« meant slaves, trade, religion, mixed marriages or cohabitation. »Latin America in Europe« changed food ways from the luxury of cocoa to the staple potato. The Euro-Afro-American slave trade brought profits and demanded products for exchange

that influenced patterns of migration internal to Europe. »Asia in Europe« lastingly modified European life-ways through spices, luxury goods, and other products. The cultural change, obliterated by encoding strategies in a process that may be called »incorporation beyond recognition«, will be highlighted by three examples.

(1) Europeans, by a newly emerging ideology and science, came to construct themselves as »white« when enslaved and some free men and women from sub-Saharan Africa came to the Iberian societies, from the mid-16th century on to England, and somewhat later to other western European societies. Though racial hierarchisation was the practice, at first inter-racial unions were accepted. A mixed Iberian population emerged; manumitted Danish-Caribbean slaves served in Copenhagen and north German societies, accepted the Christian faith, and intermarried with local women. The offspring of such unions was of many shades of »white«, the »alchemy of race's« (Jacobson) rigorous colour-coded hierarchy had not yet been institutionalised. »White« over »Black« and over any other colour was still on the drawing board and not yet under construction. »White« is another cipher, again with a geographic connotation in mental maps, which needs to be deciphered as regards its many cultural inputs, its many shades, its property-connotation: »White« as a property rather than a colour with all the legal-ideological protection common in hierarchised societies.

(2) »The Turks«, contemporary ideologues said, cut off »Europe« from the rich offerings of the »India« trade. Historical evidence, however, indicates that it was the Portuguese in the Indian Ocean who by force ended the trade through Arab firms to Venice and Genoa in order to establish Lisbon as the major trading centre. They indeed turned Lisbon into a »profit centre« to use a modern term. But rather than being accused of profiteering, they appeared as saviours – saving European societies from a »Turk«-imposed dearth of spices. When, in the struggles between Habsburg and Ottoman rulers, the latter's troops reached Vienna, the »Turks« threatened the Occident and, to drive the point home among common people, the many-cultured troops of the Christian powers were financed by a »Turk tax« levied across European societies and supported by anti-Turk sermons in the churches.

(3) »Folk« customs in Europe were studied by 19th century scholars in search of the origin of national cultures. They were said to be unchanging just as peasants were said to be rooted in the soil. This paradigm of immutability emerged when the societies as a whole were in the process of industrialisation, in which artisanal and rural cultures underwent shattering changes. One region with a distinct code of folk dress was the Vierlande, a rural region supplying the port town of Hamburg with vegetables and fruit. This local culture, styled »German« in the 19th century, was deeply influenced by global trade and resulting cultural change. The South Asian economies had been incorporated into the British Empire and Hamburg's merchants had close connections to London, local people adapted the imports to everyday use. The »folk«, men and women of the Vierlande, incorporated colourful fabrics from India into their traditional and strictly coded dresses.

Mobility, migration, and material exchange with other Worlds have influenced all regions of the particular World called Occident. Demographic developments in Europe would have been different without the introduction of the potato and medical drugs from the Americas in the 16th century: sassafras, coca, aromatic balsams, the an-

ti-malarial quinine, and untold other new substances. Merchants recognised the profit potential and the South German Fuggers granted a loan to the King of Spain in return for a monopoly on the anti-syphilitic holywood *(guaiacum)*. An Iberian savant, Nicolás Bautista Monardes, who had studied the Greek-Arab medical tradition, published a first magisterial work on the healing drugs from the Americas in 1569, which was translated into English, Italian, French, German, and Latin. From the Asian world, millions of pieces of porcelain were traded. The trade circuit involved carriers, packers, wagoners, and sailors. To meet the demand, Chinese pottery owners increased imports of the fashionable »Mohammedan blue«-colouring from Turkestan and sold their wares to Batavia. Sensing an opportunity, 17th century Delft potters in the Netherlands began to imitate the Chinese blue-and-white style and found a ready market. Their cheap »chinoiserie«, in the 18th century, came to be considered as »typically Dutch«. In the process of adaptation, consumers Europeanised the distant origins of their new material culture.

In Europe, labour migrants responded to demand for their skills induced by global trade. Armourers came to London, where imperial expansion created opportunities. Gunsmiths moved to Birmingham to supply West African slave-catching regimes. Textile workers had to react to imports from India, as weavers in India later had to react to machine-produced fabrics from Britain. Swiss men served in armies across the continent, Swiss dairy experts worked on farms in many cultures. Dutch drainage experts moved to wetlands across Europe which needed to be cultivated to provide growing populations with arable land. 17th century Sweden and the Netherlands were immigration societies with a relative volume of in-migration – per 1,000 resident population – higher than in later centuries. In Hungary and the Balkans, the struggles between the Habsburg and Ottoman empires and, further east, between the Romanov and Ottoman empires resulted in vacating of lands through warfare and flight, new settlement by in-migrants, and forced and voluntary acculturation processes. The Islamic settlement in Bosnia, the South German Roman Catholic and West European Mennonite settlements in the south Russian plains emerged from the expansion and contraction of empires and religions. By the beginning of the European Era of Democratic Revolution, a Black and a White Atlantic interacted; the plantation belt influenced European demography; the younger generation of the growing rural population sought opportunities to eke out a living in nearby wetlands or difficult-to-till hills or in distant regions in Europe or in colonies of the European powers.

III. PEOPLES' CULTURES, MIGRANTS' CULTURES, CONTACT ZONES, 17th–19th CENTURIES

Migration to colonies of settlement – in contrast to those of exploitation – permitted a structuring of societies from the bottom up at least in North America. These new societies to some degree did provide democratic options. Parallel, European societies underwent a democratisation of political thought, a new valuation of people's cultures and then, in 1815, at the Congress of Vienna, a re-imposition of authoritarian rule. The

non-migrant/migrant dichotomy thus came to be reflected in a dichotomy of monarchical Europe v. dynamic »America« – a cipher meaning »United States« or, more exactly, one particular location in it, where kin or friends had settled and where jobs were known to be available.

The elevation of local and regional »folk« or »people's« cultures in juxtaposition to the trans-European culture of the nobility and in support of supra-regional – in the future: national – cultures of the middle-classes was, unexpectedly, to have severely constricting consequences for migrant men and women. Johann Gottfried Herder, of German background, was socialised in 1760s Riga in a Baltic many-cultured context with Russian influences. Shaped by the French Enlightenment, he moved to the central German principalities with their many local cultures as well as traditions of migration. From the early 1770s, he developed his theory that poetry was not »the private heritage of some educated men« but a gift held by the peoples of the world and he called on historians to include an emotional understanding not only of the distinctiveness of epochs but also of peoples. Citing the cultures of the Slavic peoples as an example, he postulated the equal value of different ethnic cultures which develop – under God's benevolence – from the common people *(Volksgeist)*. Parallel to this emphasis on cultural expressiveness, Enlightenment thought emphasised political expressiveness of citizens and their equality before the law. In the spirit of the times, but not according to logic, equality before the law (usually limited to men) was constructed as to be based on a uniform culture. Thus citizenship came to be constructed as implying one single national culture, a fixed national identity. This implied a disruptive inequality: Other peoples resident in a state's territory were labelled minorities, migrants not merely as newly arriving Others but as alien, lesser Others. In result, processes of mobilisation for emigration and of migrant acculturation changed permanently: Culturally oppressed »minorities« usually lived in economically marginal regions and, thus, many saw emigration as the only way to live self-determined and economically secure lives. In-migrants to societies newly defined as national were not equal before the law – they had been equal as subjects once they had sworn allegiance to a ruler under the previous concept of statehood. They were now expected to assimilate or, in the late 19th century, to migrate for a limited period of labour only, live in distinct quarters, and then return to their culture-of-origin – the concept of rotating labourers unwanted as citizens had emerged and was reimposed in the legal frame of the »guestworker« migrations since the 1950s.

The concept of equality of cultures could also be used to advance the interests of the colonised. The Scots, incorporated into the English dynasty's realm in 1708, were considered of lesser culture by the new rulers. In reaction, the Scottish poet James Macpherson (1736–1796) published »The Works of Ossian« (1765). Oisín was said to be a Gaelic bard of ancient times and if Scottish culture was more ancient than the English one, it should take precedence. When – well justified – doubts arose about the authenticity of the collection, scholarly annotation was added and a »Critical Dissertation« published in support. Culture became a resource in struggles for and against hegemony and power. During this period, common Scottish men continued to migrate to wherever their capabilities could be employed to earn a living. Scottish merchants moved through the Polish lands, Scottish fur traders through northern Canada. Most

consorted with or married local women – Polish in the one case, »Indian« in the other (= two more ciphers: Polish local cultures and Native cultures in North America were many). For the men these women, through their cultural and linguistic capabilities, provided access to networks and social relations. Children of such unions between migrating men and resident women, given gender roles, were usually educated in the mother's culture. White European and North American cultures might be designated *hybrid* cultures. Had culture not been constructed as immutably, inflexibly national, there would be no need for the term »hybridity«. We might simply talk about cultural change or, in the regions of interaction between cultures – contact zones – of transculturation. The concept of contact framed by power relations had been developed in 1940s Brazil by Gilberto Freyre, that of transculturation by Fernando Ortiz in 1940s Cuba. »Western« historians and theorists did not incorporate such concepts until the 1970s and 1990s respectively – the authors lived in dependent societies, were not white, and did not write in English.

Such regions of interaction were the borderlands between cultures in Europe as well as in the social spaces across the globe onto which European powers imposed their economic interests and culture-colour hierarchies. If globalisation today is perceived as a threat by people in the developed and rich world, it certainly was a threat to people facing European intruder-migrants when the European powers globalised their outreach. Contact zones were numerous. The colonised Irish were forced to migrate early and laboured in England and Scotland. (Historically – just to remind us of the mind-numbing power of ciphers – »the Irish« had a strong connection to the French Atlantic ports through military service and flight.) When the Baltic-centred Swedish economy needed a port open towards the North Sea and the Atlantic, Gothenburg was founded in 1603/19 as a colony for Dutch merchants, German traders, other immigrants, and Swedes. Adapting the earlier concepts of separate jurisdiction for immigrant mercantile and artisanal communities, Gothenburg's first charter made Dutch and Swedish official languages and apportioned the city council seats to four Swedes, three Dutch, three Germans, and two Scots. The founding of St. Petersburg in 1703, like the rural migration to South Russia, esp. after 1763, also involved formally structured as well as informal interaction of many groups. Such interactions involved cultural hierarchies but, more so, occupational definitions. Artisans were »Germans«, drainage technicians »Dutch«, pastry bakers often »Swiss«.

Occupational definitions had been characteristic of many societies, the Ottoman Empire, the trading societies of the Indian Ocean, many castes in India. With coloniser migrations and imposition of new power-based protocols of trade, contact zones in other parts of the world came to be characterised by hierarchies of Christian over »heathen« or White over »Coloured« – as if white is not a colour. Coloniser migrants, defined by the gatekeeper-ideologues of their own societies as culturally superior, came with emotions and sexuality. The majority of the migrants were men and out of voluntary unions with women of the (allegedly lesser) receiving societies as well as from sexual violence against them, new mixed »races« or cultural *métis* emerged. The cultures of the colonisers and the colonised were inextricably entwined, though gatekeepers constructed purity as birth in Europe and *créolité* as birth in the colonies (of European parents). Such entwined culture was not to remain »confined« to the

colonised regions. In the late 20th century, post-colonial theory emerged out of this hierarchised interaction and replaced the mono-cultural power-buttressed and -buttressing master narratives. The formerly colonised and their children as migrants carried their cultures to the European cores.

IV. FROM LABOUR MIGRATIONS TO REFUGEE GENERATION

In the 19th century, demand for male and female workers outlasted the abolition of the Euro-African-American slave trade, formally in 1815, de facto in the 1870s. For a century, contract workers were mobilised from several Asian cultures and, during World War One, also laboured as auxiliaries in France and Britain. But the vast majority of labour migrants came from Europe to the Americas: free migrants who departed under severe economic constraints not for states but for particular segmented and stratified labour markets with internationalised access. Within Europe, too, the industrialising core – Great Britain, France, the Netherlands, Germany, and Switzerland – needed labour and drew on the poor periphery from Ireland via Scandinavia to Slavic societies in the East and to Mediterranean Europe. In all states, urbanisation processes attracted women and men from agriculture, in particular from marginal peasant families for whom mechanization of farming was not an option. In most German cities of the 1880s, more than half of the inhabitants were first-generation in-migrants. The globalisation of grain production – from the North American Prairies via Argentina and Australia to the Russian South – lead to a collapse of grain prices on the world market. This forced small producers across Europe into migration »for bread« – the 20 million who left Europe between the mid-1880s and 1914. The skilled agriculturalists became unskilled factory workers and Taylorisation, the division of complex tasks into ever smaller units, could proceed fast because a reservoir of labour for such unskilled repetitive work was available through migration.

Transatlantic mass migrations from Mediterranean Europe were, at first, destined mainly for Latin America, where these »olive«-coloured men and women met with less racist exclusion than in »white«-coloured North America. But by the 1880s, Italian men and women moved to both Americas, the vast majority to the US, and integrated the dual Euro-Atlantic migration system. The regions of departure expanded and, from the mid-1880s on, were those regions economically marginal to the Romanov, Hohenzollern, and Habsburg empires and their hegemonic nations, Russian, German, Austrian-German. In the terms of the times, many migrants came from minorities, Jews and Poles in Russia, Slovaks and South Slavs in Austria-Hungary. Among these »minorities«, the concept of self-articulation and self-rule of peoples and their cultures still held sway. Since Herder's time, however, learned dissertations had been relegated to backstage and, instead, militarist politics of suppression of minorities and aggressive struggles for national self-determination had moved centre-stage. After several locally limited wars in the Balkans, World War One disrupted European societies and economies (but not nationalist aspirations) and for half a century, to the aftermath of

World War Two in the early 1950s, European states generated more refugees than any other part of the world. The cipher »Christian Occident« is usually not applied to this aspect of European history. Most of these involuntary migrants moved to North America or within Europe. Thereafter European societies became immigration societies and destinations for refugees from the decolonising World.

V. HISTORICAL MEMORY: INVISIBILITY AND SYMBOLIC ANNIHILATION OR MULTIPLE OPTIONS FOR THE FUTURE

National-centred or nationalist historians have acted as gatekeepers. They admitted the national to collective historical memory and excluded minorities, migrants, those of Jewish religion, as well as the cultural origins of material life-ways. They also narrowed the nation to men of middle-class or elite position – excluding the young generation, usually considered immature, the proletariat, and women. Luise Pusch has called the exclusion of women from historical memory a »symbolic annihilation« and Ralph Ellison has coined the phrase »invisible man« – which we amend to »invisible men and women« concerning the exclusion of African-origin people in the US – and the same applies to Afro-Europeans.

While the young men of the rebellious 1960s and 1970s generation reinserted the working classes into societies' historical memory, feminist women scholars had to write their own history and so had Afro-American and Chicano historians in the United States. Afro-European or Turkish-European history is just at its beginning. With the labour – or guest worker – migrations since the mid-1950s and the resulting cultural interaction, two societies – the Dutch and the Swedish ones – decided to deal with actual exclusion and their exclusionist national his-story, story, mythology. In both states, governments commissioned scholars to approach not »the immigrant problem« but the problem of incomplete memory and outdated policies. The historians among these scholars rediscovered the immigration and emigration of previous centuries and this more complete and complex historical memory became a resource to change attitudes to many-cultured immigrants in the present. Both societies succeeded in reconstructing their self-views and structures. A similar development took place in Canada, where, however, no single national paradigm had ever achieved hegemony. The British-origin gatekeepers had clung to notions of imperial Euro-British belonging and the French-origin gatekeepers to Roman-Catholic and French belonging. In France and Britain, societies and institutions also began to accept the many-cultured composition of the people.

Historians of migration have often argued – and justly so – that migrants, too, deserve to be part of collective memory. Providing the research for such memory, I suggest, is only one of two tasks of historians. For whom do historians write? For adults? They have their own memory of their lives, adults who lived in 20th century Europe of two wars and a worldwide depression and a »Cold War«. Many prefer not to have their subjective memories questioned by historians' analyses or stress that they have no memory space left on their brain's hard drive. Do historians address youths? His-

torians provide young people, as yet without their own histories, with information. They may market ciphers that serve elites or other specific interest groups, they may relegate much of history to invisibility and symbolically annihilate its actors. Or, they may provide young people with options. If different cultures coexisted in societies in the past, if newcomers added their distinct ways and emigrants subtracted their capabilities to add them elsewhere, young people learn about multiple options rather then being inculcated with a mental one-way roadmap. Their societies chose particular options from among many in the past and they, as individuals, may select particular options in the present: Awareness of historical diversity to shape societies and its projects for the future.

Two years ago, I taught students at Paris 8-Saint Denis, who (or whose parents) came from a dozen or more societies as voluntary migrants, proactive refugees, or refugees. They wanted to relate to French society and its history as much as to their society of origin and its history. They used historical memory to develop their own life-projects and to understand the cultures and injuries of their parents, a war in Vietnam, civil war in Algeria, dictatorship in Chile. Multiple narratives that include hurtful aspects of the past increase options and permit a critical attitude to gatekeepers' lobbying for particular versions of the past. Such an approach requires equality of cultures, requires inclusions instead of exclusions, requires complex texts rather than linear master narratives. The life-projects of young people from many origins are the future of societies and will be history for later generations.

COMMEMORATING MIGRATIONS SINCE EARLY MODERN TIMES

ALEXANDER SCHUNKA

Forgotten Memories – Contested Representations Early Modern Bohemian Migrants in Saxony

I. INTRODUCTION

The early modern era introduced an almost unique type of intra-European migration, strongly influenced by the confessional division of Europe. These confessionally-motivated migrants developed significant practices to shape a collective memory within their own group[1]. But also the host societies in certain Central European countries created a specific image of these migrants, which endures to this day.

One of these migrant groups was the so-called »Bohemian exiles«, who immigrated primarily to the Electorate of Saxony in the 17th century. Although the immigrants numbered in the tens of thousands, our knowledge about them is relatively scarce. Compared to better-known emigrant groups such as the Huguenots in Brandenburg-Prussia, there is little to remind us of the Bohemian migrants today. This article explores the successes and failures in the construction of a collective memory of the Bohemian migrations by looking at historical representations and commemorative practices on both the migrants' and the host society's sides.

As the result of a historiography which has long failed to understand the heterogeneous structures and cultural identities of groups simply labeled as »Böhmische Exulanten« or Bohemian exiles, their memory has been limited to the image of steadfast Lutherans received by their protector, the Elector *(Kurfürst)* of Saxony. The fact that this collective memory is based on a very selective interpretation of these migrations has been widely neglected.

The following analysis aims at looking closely at the historical representations and collective memory of the Bohemian exiles in Saxony, from the actual circumstances of migration and settlement policies in 17th century Germany to the present day. Starting with the historical events leading to the Bohemian migrations and to the reception of immigrants in Saxony, their country of destination, I will examine the way different historiographical traditions were constructed on the basis of contemporary statements and a selective interpretation of historical sources. These traditions – an »exiles' history«, the view of the receiving country, and finally the traditions in the country of origin (Bohemia/Czechoslovakia) – partly derive from the self-images and the ›self-

1 Heinz SCHILLING, Die frühneuzeitliche Konfessionsmigration, in: Klaus J. BADE (ed.), Migration in der europäischen Geschichte seit dem späten Mittelalter, Osnabrück 2002 (IMIS-Beiträge, 20), pp. 67–89; Alexander SCHUNKA, Glaubensflucht als Migrationsoption. Konfessionell motivierte Migrationen in der Frühen Neuzeit, in: Geschichte in Wissenschaft und Unterricht 56 (2005) pp. 547–564.

fashioning‹ of the migrants as well as from the dominant historical and political issues of the affected countries. I suggest that the self-representation and utilisation of exile traditions must be seen as a particular search for order, deriving from the heterogeneities of the migrational process as well as of the migrant groups.

II. BOHEMIANS IN EARLY MODERN SAXONY

From the early 1620s on, the German state of Saxony became the refuge of supposedly steadfast Protestants from neighbouring countries[2]. These people sought shelter with the government of one of the most influential Lutheran rulers in Germany: the Elector of Saxony. Unlike in Brandenburg-Prussia[3], Saxony did not attempt any centrally-organised settlement policy for the arriving refugees. The government was not acting, but rather re-acting to the influx of strangers. It was mainly the municipal or local governments which had to deal with integrating the immigrants into the local community structures[4]. However, accepting, welcoming, and hosting the immigrants has been primarily attributed to the reign of Elector Johann Georg I (1611–1656). The migrations continued throughout the 17th century, but are usually associated with the Thirty Years War.

Many immigrants from the neighbouring states south and east of Saxony, which were then part of the lands of the Habsburg Monarchy (Bohemia, Moravia, Silesia, and in the later 17th century, Upper Hungary/today Slovakia), fled either the cruelties of the Thirty Years War, or the ongoing, more or less forcefully applied efforts of the Habsburg administration to re-catholicise their Protestant populations[5]. They came to Saxony hoping to stay for just a few years, but a significant number of them settled permanently.

In many cases, people stayed together in groups consisting of former neighbourhoods in their cities of origin[6]. Still, perhaps the most striking feature of the Bohemian

2 I have dealt with the immigration into Saxony more extensively in my doctoral dissertation: Alexander Schunka, Gäste, die bleiben. Zuwanderer in Kursachsen und der Oberlausitz im 17. und frühen 18. Jahrhundert, University of Munich 2004 [in print: Münster et al. 2006]. On the socio-historical background see Georg Loesche, Die böhmischen Exulanten in Sachsen, Vienna, Leipzig 1923; Eduard Winter, Die tschechische und slowakische Emigration in Deutschland im 17. und 18. Jahrhundert, Berlin (East) 1955.

3 On the Huguenot migration see, among others, Myriam Yardeni, Le Refuge huguenot. Assimilation et culture, Paris 2002; Heinz Duchhardt (ed.), Der Exodus der Hugenotten. Die Aufhebung des Edikts von Nantes 1685 als europäisches Ereignis, Cologne, Vienna 1985 (Beihefte zum Archiv für Kulturgeschichte, 24).

4 Wulf Wäntig, Kursächsische Exulantenaufnahme im 17. Jahrhundert. Zwischen zentraler Dresdner Politik und lebensweltlicher Bindung lokaler Machtträger an der sächsisch-böhmischen Grenze, in: Neues Archiv für sächsische Geschichte 74/75 (2003/2004) pp. 133–174.

5 There is a wide range of literature on the Habsburg counter-reformation. See, for example, Thomas Winkelbauer, Ständefreiheit und Fürstenmacht. Länder und Untertanen des Hauses Habsburg im konfessionellen Zeitalter, Vienna 2003, vol. 2, pp. 112–147.

6 Lenka Bobková (ed.), Exulanti z Prahy a severozápadních Čech v Pirně v letech 1621–1639 [Exiles from Prague and North Western Bohemia in Pirna 1621–1639], Prague 1999, p. 96.

migrants in Saxony was their social, religious and even linguistic heterogeneity. The emigrations affected clerics as well as the nobility, traders, craftsmen, and urban as well as rural populations. Due to reasons of infrastructure and communication networks, they settled in the big cities as well as in the countryside of Saxony and the Saxon-administrated Upper Lusatia, with a particularly high proportion in communities along the river Elbe such as Pirna or Dresden, in border areas (Zittau) or in the cities and villages in the Saxon Erzgebirge[7]. During the 17th century, their numbers reached probably much more than 100,000 people, although any exact figures are very difficult to find because of the scarcity and inaccuracy of contemporary sources and of the difficulties in counting the average migration patterns between Saxony and the neighbouring countries[8]. Lutheran migrants mixed with followers of the Czech reformer Jan Hus, with Calvinists or Bohemian Brethren, sometimes even with Catholics. Depending on the area of origin, there were German-speaking as well as Czech-speaking people. Among them were people born in the Bohemian countries as well as others who had recently emigrated to Bohemia and were now returning to Saxony. Unlike the Huguenot case elsewhere, the varieties within the Bohemians made any homogenisation difficult and quite unpredictable.

However, the image as constructed by the migrants themselves – in sermons, historical works, and treatises as well as in petition letters – was one of persecution, victimhood, and faith. The authors made clear that they were forced to leave their beloved homeland for the sake of their Lutheran faith and against Catholic oppression. With the help of biblical examples, they considered emigration as a test of their faith and found consolation in the words of God. This image coincided with the high popularity of the neo-stoical notion of *constantia* (constancy), as developed in the writing of the Dutch politician and convert (and exile) Justus Lipsius[9]. The notion of *constantia*, with the meaning of steadfastness in the vicissitudes of life, was easily adapted by Protestant emigrants such as Johann Amos Comenius[10]. It became a means of coherence for the migrants and at the same time was very popular in baroque theatre plays, as shown at European courts such as the one of the Saxon Elector in Dresden.

But this was not the only intellectual building block for the shaping of a religious exile tradition. The migrants' journey to Saxony was in retrospect converted into a pilgrimage, based on Augustine's concept of *peregrinatio*, the life-long period of wandering in search of Christ[11]. This is part of the ideological foundation for the fact that

7 See the map in Karlheinz Blaschke, Bevölkerungsgeschichte von Sachsen bis zur Industriellen Revolution, Weimar 1967, pp. 120–121.

8 The number of 36,000 families as found in the older literature and ascribed to a statement of the 17th century Bohemian politician William Slavata therefore bears a good deal of myth rather than being an accurate figure. This has been the basis for later guesses of around 150,000 emigrants. I have attempted another hypothesis on the migrant figures in Schunka, Gäste (see note 2), chap. 3.

9 Justus Lipsius, De Constantia. Von der Standhaftigkeit, übersetzt, kommentiert und mit einem Nachwort von Florian Neumann, Mainz 1998.

10 Johann Amos Comenius, Trawren über Trawren/ und Trost über trost/ Sehr dienlich auf alle zeiten/ Sonderlich bei ietziger noht der gantzen Christenheit, Preßburg 1626.

11 Cornelius Mayer, »Peregrinatio« bei Augustinus, in: Xenia von Ertzdorff, Dieter Neukirch (eds), Reisen und Reiseliteratur im Mittelalter und in der Frühen Neuzeit. Vorträge eines interdisziplinären Symposiums vom 3.–8. Juni 1991 an der Justus-Liebig-Universität Gießen, Amsterdam, Atlanta 1992

many migrants primarily expected to return to Bohemia soon, their exile status being only temporary. Even some decades after it had become apparent that these people were not going back to Bohemia, some of them, similar to members of other diasporic communities in history, still called themselves »religious exiles« (*Exulanten*)[12]. We find this description in their epitaphs as well as in wills, sermons, and signatures. Even their Saxon-born children sometimes called themselves exiles. The notion, however, owes more to the self-image and the theological foundations of their presence in Saxony – whether only a few years, a whole life, or some generations – than to historical reality, as has long been supposed.

To a very large extent, this argument became legitimised by the circumstances, namely the fact that these people had to stress their status as religious exiles in order to be allowed to stay in Saxony[13]. On the contrary, there are many examples of people who migrated voluntarily: some were Catholics and thus not affected by any religious persecution; others converted from Catholicism to the Lutheran faith and back; some migrated back and forth between Saxony and Bohemia before as well as after re-Catholicisation and war; and some Protestants remained more or less illegally in Catholic Bohemia. Still, the image of the persecuted Lutherans was one of the strongest foundations for a collective identity of the Bohemian exiles.

The migrants dominating the discourse on »exile« were mostly clerics and intellectuals. Looking at their own itineraries, it is quite surprising to see that although they bitterly mourned the loss of their Bohemian fatherland, they had usually entered it only a few years before the migration started. Thus, most of them were not native Bohemians, but native Germans, even Saxons, who now only re-entered their original homeland after leaving Bohemia. Their choice for the country of exile was therefore obvious[14].

After some years, the exile community managed to receive permission from the Lutheran consistory to conduct religious services in the Czech language. These services started in the city of Pirna in 1628, in Dresden in 1650, in Zittau even later. All these church communities went through considerable trouble to foster a sense of coherence among the Bohemian migrants. At the same time, they were the prime institutions for keeping emigrant traditions alive. Although it is most likely that the vast majority of the migrants were German-speaking or at least understood enough German to get along in their new surroundings, the church communities claimed the right to be the keepers of Bohemian/Czech traditions and the Bohemian/Lutheran faith, for Czechs as well as for Germans, who in other respects soon vanished into the local population.

Whereas the Pirna community almost crumbled due to interior conflicts, the Dresden community quickly grew in importance. Its parochial organisation was exempt from the municipal church administration and thus stood directly under the authority of the Supreme Consistory. Their strategy for integrating Bohemian immigrants into their church and social structures was twofold. It was based on the Czech language

(Chloe, 13), pp. 67–80; Juergen HAHN, The Origins of the Baroque Concept of Peregrinatio, Chapel Hill 1973, pp. 114–173.

12 On this notion see Franz EPPERT, Exulant und Emigrant bis etwa 1750, in: Zeitschrift für deutsche Sprache 26 (1970) pp. 188–192.

13 See, for instance, Staatsfilialarchiv Bautzen, Oberamt 4278, fol. 35v (1650).

14 SCHUNKA, Gäste (see note 2), chap. 4.

and on the traditions of German-based Lutheranism in Bohemia. The services were held in Czech, but the preacher had to be fluent in both Czech and German. All church registers up to the end of the 18th century were written in Czech and in German, and the officials usually descended from important Protestant migrant clerical families, for instance the long-time Dresden priest Benjamin Martini, a second generation immigrant[15]. Even in the 18th century, when it became extremely difficult to find a preacher with both sufficient knowledge of the Czech language and a Protestant education, the community undertook a long, exhausting search rather than accept a German preacher[16]. These Czech traditions were kept until the 19th century. The community existed until 1945 and was reinstated in the wake of the German reunification, though under different administrative conditions.

The second feature was the legitimisation of the community not on Czech, but on German, though Bohemian-Lutheran traditions. Most importantly, the community established a connection to the Church of the Saviour (St. Salvator) in Prague. This particular church had been erected in the decade just before the outbreak of the Thirty Years War and the beginning of re-catholicisation, due almost solely to the massive publicity and financial efforts of Lutherans in Germany[17]. It had been used by the German-speaking Lutherans in Prague until the start of the war and the expulsion of their preachers. The expulsion of the priests from Prague, which took place in 1621/22, was again accompanied by lots of printed matters such as sermons and broadsheets. It served as one major example of the cruelties of the Catholic Habsburg government. In the 1660s, the Dresden Bohemian church community managed to obtain the sacred items and some church property and, from then onwards, considered their own church the legal successor to St. Salvator[18]. Furthermore, the date of foundation of the Dresden community, the Maundy Thursday before Easter 1650, acquired the status of an informal immigrant holiday for the Bohemians[19]. In Christian tradition, Maundy Thursday is the day when the sinner is readmitted to the Christian community i.e. the church. This fitted extremely well with the situation of the Bohemian exiles, now back in their own church, whose roots went back to Bohemia.

In daily life, the Bohemians in Saxon cities segregated from the host society in some respects, but in most others they integrated after some decades. Sometimes the Bohemians lived more densely together in certain areas than in others, or were over-represented in certain occupations such as selling wine or trading goods between Saxony and the Bohemian countries. At the same time, the practical issues of being an »exile« or a »foreigner« decreased in importance after only one or two generations. Still, it was not just the church communities that were responsible for keeping Bohemian tradi-

15 Archiv der Erlöser-Andreasgemeinde Dresden (Exulantengemeinde), Rechnungsbücher; Stadtarchiv Dresden, Ratsarchiv, D XXIII 2 (1680).

16 The efforts to find a Czech-speaking priest are documented in: Stadtarchiv Dresden, Ratsarchiv, D XXII 9 (1746).

17 Rudolf Schreiber, Anton Ernstberger et al., Das Spenderbuch für den Bau der protestantischen Salvatorkirche in Prag, Freilassing 1956.

18 Hauptstaatsarchiv Dresden, Geheimer Rat, Loc. 7431/13 (1665).

19 I owe this observation to Frank Metasch's paper »Religiöse Festkultur und kirchliches Personal der böhmischen Exulanten in Dresden während des 17. und 18. Jahrhunderts«, presented at the conference »Migration und kirchliche Praxis«, Jauernick, Germany, 26–29 July, 2004.

tions alive. From the time of the early migrations, the whole phenomenon was accompanied by extensive writing.

III. MEMORIES AT STAKE THE HISTORIOGRAPHICAL TRADITIONS

The publications on the so-called Bohemian exiles were not restricted to published sermons or treatises of consolation. The meaning and importance of printed works for the shaping or neglect of migrant traditions became manifest in other respects as well.

The historiography of the migrations written by emigrants or their descendants usually derived from reflections on the exiles' present situation. Just as for other early modern migrant groups such as the Huguenots[20], there was usually at least one historical volume that contributed to the manifestation of a religious-based migrant tradition. This type of immigrants' historiography was influenced by contemporary stories of persecution and faith, of comfort in times of exile. Yet, there was another basis for this type of historiography: the »martyrologies«, manuals consisting of martyrs' biographies. Important exiles like Comenius and his circle were influenced by the example of martyrs' biographies, and worked on the first historical study on the Bohemian migrations: the anonymous »Historia persecutionum«[21]. The original Latin text was soon translated into Czech. It was re-published in German in 18th century Berlin, interestingly at the height of Huguenot historiography[22]. Subsequently, German-language works on the migrants of the 17th and 18th centuries usually consisted of biographical collections of migrants; mainly of clerics or intellectuals, because, in the eyes of the historians, they were the most pious avantgarde of the exiles and deserved the most attention. Furthermore, the source material was best for members of these social groups. The biographical works were mainly written by clerics, who were usually themselves descendants of Bohemian migrants and served as examples of piety and martyrdom[23]. In the 19th century, together with the rise of historical studies in Germany, these works were followed by historical books which either explicitly or implicitly supported the traditions of the Lutheran-Bohemian exiles. Again, authors like Christian Adolph Pescheck or Karl Gottlob Morawek were descendants of Bohemian migrants[24]. Now, they used archival

20 Viviane Rosen-Prest, L'historiographie des Huguenots en Prusse au temps des Lumières. Entre mémoire, histoire et légende: Jean Pierre Erman et Pierre Chrétien Frédéric Reclam, Mémoires pour servir à l'histoire des Réfugiés françois dans les États du Roi (1782–1799), Paris 2002.

21 Historia persecutionum Ecclesiae Bohemicae [...] [1632], [Amsterdam] 1648.

22 Johann Theophilus Elsner, Martyrologium Bohemicum oder die Böhmische Verfolgungs-Geschichte vom Jahr 894 bis 1632 [...], Berlin 1766.

23 For example Georg Heinrich Götze, Diptycha Exulum, Oder Exulanten-Register. Darinnen die Nahmen derer Beständigen Lutheraner angeschrieben stehen, Welche Um der Lehre des Evangelii willen, zwar verfolget, und ins Elend vertrieben worden, doch gleichwohl aber Göttl. Beschirmung und Seegen mit denen Ihrigen wieder gefunden haben, Altenburg 1714.

24 Christian Adolph Pescheck, Die böhmischen Exulanten in Sachsen. Zur Beantwortung der von der Fürstlich Jablonowskischen Gesellschaft gestellten historischen Preisfrage, Leipzig 1857; Karl Gottlob Morawek, Geschichte der böhmisch-evangelischen Exulantengemeinde in Zittau [...], Zittau 1847.

sources such as charters or even petitions. The documents served as proof of the martyrdom and the hardships of their antecedents. The German Gustav-Adolf-Verein, an organisation dedicated to the support of diasporic Lutheran communities, took part in this exiles-renaissance in the middle of the 19th century, publishing small booklets. It was then that the »Historia persecutionum« was re-issued in a new German edition[25]. Later, even the more thorough works of the early 20th century, such as Georg Loesche's »Die böhmischen Exulanten in Sachsen« (The Bohemian Exiles in Saxony), were based on these preliminary Protestant works, and propagated the image of persecuted Lutherans[26]. Besides, non-professional historians such as people with genealogical interests and Bohemian ancestors researched their own roots or just collected archival sources, like the teacher Alwin Bergmann of Dresden, who left a huge collection of biographical information on some 60,000 immigrants[27].

Whereas the Huguenots already had a solid place in the German collective memory since the 18th century, and were a hundred years later lauded by the Prussian chancellor Bismarck as the »best Prussians«[28], the Bohemians did not receive such attention. Their image did not comprise any successes for Saxony, but was reduced by Protestant historiography to martyrdom and hardship. From the 18th century onwards, with the decline of Saxony's political importance and the rise of Prussia, the Bohemians drew even less attention outside Saxony; their small settlement in Prussian Berlin was overshadowed by the city's Huguenot culture[29].

It is interesting to see how the Bohemian migrants were presented within the local historical tradition of the Saxon communities, from their own time to the present. In the 17th century, chroniclers of cities and villages noticed the increase of immigration even before the beginning of the Thirty Years War. What was most striking to the authors was not the quality of migration, but the different quantity. Yet there are some exceptions. Whenever anything occurred which at first seemed unusual or disturbing, the chroniclers wrote these events down to preserve them. This can be shown in one striking example. When Bohemian nobles arrived in the Saxon Erzgebirge in the first decade of the Thirty Years War, it was an extraordinary event to the locals as well as to their cities' chroniclers. As a matter of fact, the nobility was usually the least mobile group within early modern society, not at all prone to migration. Furthermore, noblemen usually did not live in cities, but in their country courts. Thus, the chroniclers put considerable effort into describing their immigration into Saxon cities in order to deal with the extraordinary[30].

25 Georg Buchwald, Böhmische Exulanten im sächsischen Erzgebirge zur Zeit des Dreißigjährigen Krieges, Barmen s. a. [1888] (Für die Feste und Freunde des Gustav-Adolf-Vereins, 58); Anon., Das Persekutionsbüchlein. Geschichte der Verfolgungen des Evangeliums in Böhmen seit Einführung des Christenthums bis auf die Regierung Kaiser Ferdinand II. (894–1632), Gütersloh 1869.

26 Loesche, Exulanten (see note 2).

27 Alexander Schunka, Digitalisierung der »Bergmann'schen Exulantensammlung«. Eine Kooperation zwischen der Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München und dem Sächsischen Hauptstaatsarchiv Dresden, in: Familie und Geschichte 12 (2003) pp. 426–428.

28 Etienne François, Vom preußischen Patrioten zum besten Deutschen, in: Rudolf von Thadden, Michelle Magdelaine (eds), Die Hugenotten 1685–1985, Munich 1985, pp. 198–212, 205.

29 On Rixdorf see Werner Korthaase (ed.), Das böhmische Dorf in Berlin Neukölln (1737–1987). Dem Kelch zuliebe Exulant, Berlin 1987.

The main goal of early modern local historiography was the display of a stable social order. Whenever extraordinary events occurred – such as disasters, monstrosities, diseases or wars – it was most important to write about them in order to adapt these events to the world view of the writers and the society they lived in[31]. Thus, the underrepresentation of the Bohemian migrants in the long run shows that they did not disturb the authors' views considerably.

The end of the early modern era, together with the institutionalisation of the so-called »Landesgeschichte« (local history) in the 19th century, saw the emergence of historical clubs, historical undertakings sponsored by the ruling dynasties in Saxony and elsewhere, and the opening of the Saxon State Archives in 1834[32]. The historians then focused on Saxon rulers and diplomacy. If the Bohemian exiles were of any interest, it was only their politically significant figures. Still, with the rise of population history and historical demography at the end of the 19th century, Saxony, particularly the University of Leipzig, became the centre of cooperation between geographers such as Friedrich Ratzel, and historians like Karl Lamprecht. What came out of this cooperation was the geographically and demographically-based historical research on Saxony. The development of the »historische Landeskunde« (historical regional sciences) was not limited to Saxony, and gained some importance from the political situation in Germany after 1918, particularly with the growing popularity of »völkische« ideas preceding the rise of the National Socialist party. Like most other German university institutions, the Leipzig Institute of »Siedlungskunde« (sciences of settlement) was not at all free of these issues, as we can easily see from works published by the leading Saxon historians of the time, like Rudolf Kötzschke or Walter Schlesinger[33]. This historical-geographical approach, together with the »völkische« ideology, was the basis for the resurgent popularity of the Bohemian migrants. Now historians like Franz Pohl referred to 17th century demographic sources like immigrants' lists, which had been of little interest before. Pohl showed the historical connections between Germany/Saxony and the German-speaking territories in Czechoslovakia, and thus indirectly justified NS German imperialism[34]. At the same time, the Saxon historical associations focused their interest on the German-speaking parts of Czechoslovakia, i.e. Bohemia. Just after the invasion of the »Sudetenland« by Hitler's army, historical congresses were held by Saxon historians on former Czech territory, like the Annual meeting of the

30 See, for instance, Georg Arnold, Chronicon Annaebergense continuatum [...], Annaberg 1812 [1658], Repr. Stuttgart 1992, p. 289; Schunka, Gäste (see note 2), chap. 1.

31 See, among others, Peter Johanek (ed.), Städtische Geschichtsschreibung im Spätmittelalter und in der frühen Neuzeit, Cologne, Vienna 2000 (Städteforschung A, 47).

32 Georg Kunz, Verortete Geschichte. Regionales Geschichtsbewußtsein in den deutschen Historischen Vereinen des 19. Jahrhunderts, Göttingen 2000; Werner Buchholz, Vergleichende Landesgeschichte und Konzepte der Regionalgeschichte von Karl Lamprecht bis zur Wiedervereinigung 1990, in: Id. (ed.), Landesgeschichte in Deutschland. Bestandsaufnahme, Analyse, Perspektiven, Paderborn 1998, pp. 11–60.

33 Esther Ludwig, Rudolf Kötzschke – Das schwere Bemühen um die Bewahrung der »unantastbaren Reinheit des geschichtlichen Sinnes«, in: Wieland Held, Uwe Schirmer (eds), Rudolf Kötzschke und das Seminar für Landesgeschichte und Siedlungskunde an der Universität Leipzig. Heimstatt sächsischer Landeskunde, Beucha 1999, pp. 21–70.

34 Franz Pohl (ed.), Die Exulanten aus der Herrschaft Friedland im Sudetenland, Görlitz 1939.

Upper Lusatian Academy of Sciences, in Friedland/Frýdlant in 1939[35]. Saxon historians stressed the historical connections between Germany and (German-speaking) parts of Bohemia: first in order to reverse such post-World War I developments as the founding of Czechoslovakia, then in order to support the invasion of the Sudetenland[36]. When in 1940 the famous NS historian Günther Franz first published his book on the re-population of Germany after the Thirty Years War, he attributed to the exiles an important role in the rebuilding of Germany in the 17th century[37]. He hardly bothered with the fact that many of these people had not been ethnically German according to NS ideology.

After 1945, and particularly after the dissolution of the historical German states by the GDR government in 1952, the development of Saxon »Landesgeschichte« almost came to a halt[38]. The Bohemian exiles did not fit into a Marxist-materialist image of history. Still, one of the most important books on the topic was published in East Berlin in 1955. Its author was the historian and philologist Eduard Winter, a native Austrian who had taught at the University of Prague even under the Nazi regime, and eventually had emigrated to the GDR. His book refers to the notion of a Slavonic internationalism as based on and derived from the Bohemian migrations. Being a philologist of Slavonic languages he mainly looked at the Czech-speaking migrants[39]. In this respect, he produced a somewhat artificial gap between the German-speaking and the Czech immigrants. In his opinion, the migrants carried important parts of a Bohemian-Czech cultural heritage with them on their journeys through Saxony and other places in Europe. This Czech heritage, according to Winter, could only be preserved by the migrants outside of Bohemia, not by those who had remained.

In this respect, Winter constructed a close and completely new tie between the two socialist countries, the GDR and the Socialist Republic of Czechoslovakia, with the help of the Bohemian migrants. Winter's position is important, for his book can only be understood by looking at the way the migrants and their place in Bohemian collective memory were treated by Czech historians.

35 Nachrichten aus der Gesellschaft, in: Neues Lausitzisches Magazin 115 (1939) p. 217; on National Socialist tendencies found in Saxon/Upper Lusatian Historical Journals as well as on very subtle criticism, e.g. in book reviews, see the issues around 1940 of the Neues Lausitzisches Magazin esp. the regularly printed protocols of the annual meetings; for the Neues Archiv für Sächsische Geschichte see the protocols of the meetings of the Historical Commission of Saxony, ibid.

36 See, for instance, Walter Schlesinger, Entstehung und Bedeutung der sächsisch-böhmischen Grenze, in: Neues Archiv für Sächsische Geschichte 59 (1938) pp. 6–38.

37 Günther Franz, Der Dreißigjährige Krieg und das deutsche Volk. Untersuchungen zur Bevölkerungs- und Agrargeschichte, Jena 1940; Wolfgang Behringer, Bauern-Franz und Rassen-Günther. Die politische Geschichte des Agrarhistorikers Günther Franz (1902–1992), in: Winfried Schulze, Otto Gerhard Oexle (eds), Deutsche Historiker im Nationalsozialismus, Frankfurt a. M. 1999, pp. 114–141.

38 On the changes in Saxon Landesgeschichte see Wieland Held, Die Bemühungen um die Weiterführung der wissenschaftlichen Traditionen des Leipziger Seminars für Landesgeschichte und Siedlungskunde nach 1935, in: Id., Uwe Schirmer (eds), Rudolf Kötzschke und das Seminar für Landesgeschichte und Siedlungskunde an der Universität Leipzig – Heimstatt sächsischer Landeskunde, Beucha 1999, pp. 71–90; Karlheinz Blaschke, Die sächsische Landesgeschichte zwischen Tradition und neuem Anfang, in: Neues Archiv für Sächsische Geschichte 64 (1993) pp. 7–28.

39 Winter, Emigration (see note 2).

Even among the migrants and their Czech contemporaries in the 17th century, the issue of how a Bohemian or Czech nation could be defined was highly debated. Intellectuals like Comenius and Pavel Stránský saw the common bonds of a people *(natio/národ)* in descent and origin, but mainly in a common language[40]. It would appear that the migrations, either forced or voluntary, were the starting point for reflections on Czech history and politics and on the purity of Czech culture, and for a boom in writings on the Czech nation[41]. People either interfered with the political circumstances, or they wrote the first descriptions of the country of Bohemia, as Stránský did from his exile in the Netherlands. Throughout his life, the writings of Comenius touched upon the issue of a re-unification of the exile communities in the lands of the Bohemian crown and thus the re-establishment of the devastated Bohemian nation. Later on, the exiles around Comenius and his followers who had migrated to Poland, gained continuous prominence in Czech historiography, while the Bohemians in Saxony largely remained forgotten[42].

The most common view in Czech historiography after the time of war, re-catholicisation and migration was the notion of »temno« (darkness), as promulgated by the author Alois Jirásek in the 19th century[43]. Historians associated the emigrations with the loss of the most important features of Czech culture, Bohemian religion, and intellectual variety, and with a forced Germanization of Bohemia under the auspices of the Catholicism of the Habsburg Empire. However, much of this view originates from 19th century Czech historiography.

The interpretation derives from the time of national rebirth in the 19th century. The idea of a common bilingual Austrian-Bohemian patriotism, as promoted by the Prague intellectual Bernhard Bolzano at the beginning of the 19th century, did not prove decisive in the long run. The notion of »temno«, on the other hand, seems to be a constructed national trauma which proved useful to stress the Czech national movement connected to intellectuals like František Palacký[44]. It is the current task of Czech historians to re-evaluate the key dates of the 17th century. The more research is done, the clearer it becomes that the dividing line of the period before and after the Battle of the White Mountain (1620), when Catholic Habsburg troops forced the Calvinist Bohemian »Winter King« into exile, was never as sharp as has long been supposed by Czech and even German historiographers.

Czech historians dealing with the questions of 17th century emigration were thus either concerned with the national losses, or, like the early 20th century researcher

40 On 17th century Czech historiography see František Kutnar, Přehledné dějiny Českého a Slovenského dějepisectví [Concise History of Czech and Slovak Historiography], vol. 1, Prague 1973, pp. 64–76; a short outline is: Vladimír Urbánek, Patriotismus pobělohorského exilu [Patriotism in the Exile after the Battle of the White Mountain], in: Historické Listy 4 (1995) pp. 3–6.

41 Norbert Kersken currently prepares an article on this matter.

42 Recently Lenka Bobková, Die Gemeinde der böhmischen Exulanten in der Stadt Pirna 1621–1639, in: Herbergen der Christenheit 27 (2003) pp. 37–56, here p. 53.

43 On the time of temno see Ivana Čornejová, Das »Temno« im mitteleuropäischen Kontext. Zur Kirchen- und Bildungspolitik im Böhmen der Barockzeit, in: Bohemia 34 (1993) pp. 342–358.

44 Roland Gehrke, Bernard Bolzano 1781–1848, in: Ostdeutsche Gedenktage 1998, pp. 283–290; on Palacký and the reception of his thoughts in 19th century Europe see Ernst Birke, Frankreich und Ostmitteleuropa im 19. Jahrhundert, Cologne, Graz 1960, pp. 235–264.

Otakar Odložilík, were themselves migrants[45]. In the course of the 20th century, the most prominent emigrant, Comenius, continued to be a Czech national hero. The minister of culture under Klement Gottwald, Zdeněk Nejedlý, who was an admirer of Jirásek's notion of »temno« under the auspices of socialist historiography, went as far as comparing the Peace Treaty of Westphalia and subsequent German dominance to the 1938 Munich Agreement[46]. Apart from these statements, the historical treatment of the Bohemian migrants in Czechoslovak historiography was rather scarce.

In short, due to the historical borders and political circumstances, historical representations of the Bohemian migrations were dispersed for centuries. The views on this matter seemed quite different, sometimes even incongruent, depending on the positions of the members of the group of migrants, the historiography of either host country or home country.

IV. BETWEEN REMEMBERING AND FORGETTING MIGRATIONS IN PUBLIC MEMORY

It is sometimes hardly predictable how historiographical traditions are handed down to the people dealing with public statements and collective memory. Still, it can be illuminating to see how the immigrant traditions were kept and transformed over a very long period of time. A particularly good indicator in this respect are public celebrations such as anniversaries. For any community or group, anniversaries serve as self-assuring rituals by selectively reproducing history and thus producing memory as well as forgetting. The centennial founding anniversaries of the city of Johanngeorgenstadt in Saxony, one of only two urban communities in Saxony founded by Bohemian emigrants, therefore reveal the self-image of a migrants' community which kept its cultural heritage as a city of exiles[47].

Although the interior development of the city after its foundation in 1654 was for a long time based on massive economic and social difficulties, the inhabitants showed to the outside world their exceptional status as true believers and their astonishing successes. The regular celebrations of the city's anniversary strongly contributed to this tradition. Whereas celebrations of city anniversaries elsewhere in Saxony and the rest of Germany tended to become secularised during the 18th and 19th centuries, the people of Johanngeorgenstadt preserved their religiously-founded traditions even

45 Ivo Barteček, Exil jako předmět vyzkumu a životní zkušenost – Otakar Odložilík [Exile as a Matter of Research and Life Experience – Otakar Odložilík], in: Michaela Hrubá (ed.), Víra nebo vlast? Exil v Českých dějinách raného novověku [Faith or Fatherland? Exile in Early Modern Czech History], Ústí nad Labem 2001, pp. 44–50.

46 Zdeněk Nejedlý, Odkaz našich dějin [Our Historical Heritage], Prague 1948, p. 11; quoted in: Bedřich Šindelář, Comenius und der Westfälische Friedenskongreß, in: Historica 5 (1963) pp. 71–107.

47 I have treated this issue more extensively elsewhere. Alexander Schunka, »St. Johanngeorgenstadt zu kurfürstlicher Durchlaucht unsterblichem Nachruhm«. Stadtgründung und städtische Traditionsbildung in der Frühen Neuzeit, in: Neues Archiv für Sächsische Geschichte 75/76 (2003/2004) pp. 175–205.

until the 20th century. The stories of the persecution of the Bohemians and the city's foundation with the help of God and the Elector were crucial for the city memory. Sermons, addresses as well as processions referred to the exiles' myth regularly. Due to a fire in the 19th century and primarily to the destruction of the old city in the 1950s by the GDR government to make way for a mine, there are almost no architectural remnants of the exiles' history. Still, the 350th anniversary in 2004 kept the traditions of the exile's heritage, now visible only in a statue of the founding elector Johann Georg I, and some street names like »Exulantenstraße« (exiles' street).

The case of Johanngeorgenstadt proves that the traditions of persecution and exile in public memory are closely linked with the historiographical tendencies shown above. This seems to be reversely true for historical forgetting. Political and social circumstances during the last decades have not put the topic of the Bohemian exiles high on the agenda, neither in the academic nor in the public sphere. Thus, it is not surprising that apart from Johanngeorgenstadt, there is not much to be found of the Bohemians in Saxony in public memory. The Dresden exiles' community lost their church building after the bombings of World War II, the exiles' cemetery in the city of Zittau lay in ruins, and Johanngeorgenstadt no longer visibly resembled the exiles' community it always claimed to be. The distinctive borders of national states and, after 1945, the Iron Curtain have eroded the relationships and accentuated the differences between the Bohemian and Saxon neighbours. Only after 1989 did the situation begin to change. Since the end of the Cold War, the scientific exchange between the Czech Republic and Germany has increased, which is visible in international cooperation such as conferences and research projects, or within the framework of the so-called »Euroregion Neisse« and its scientific and cultural enterprises. The Czech immigrants' books housed in the Christian Weise Library in Zittau are now being catalogued and researched. At the same time, the Dresden exiles' community has re-established its traditions, and celebrated its 350th anniversary in the year 2000[48]. Events like the big Zittau exhibition in 2002 on Habsburg and Upper Lusatia, now usually treat the history of the Bohemians as well, and in due course the »Heffterbau« in Zittau, which hosted the exiles' church community and their cemetery, was renovated[49].

For centuries, the distinctive and distinguishable feature for coherence among the so-called Bohemian migrants in Saxony was neither language nor, strictly speaking, region or even religion, but their common, sometimes exaggerated or even invented fate as persecuted exiles. Only now, in recent years, is one of the largest migrant groups in early modern Europe slowly regaining their importance as well as their historical plurality. This is just as true for their historiographical representations as it is for their public memory. The unification of Europe as well as the current discussions on contemporary migration issues are helping to shape this awareness. Thus, we might assume that the historical changes of our own time significantly affect the past as well, inasmuch as they affect our treatment of its remnants.

48 Marie-Luise Lange et al., Um Gottes Wort vertrieben. 350 Jahre Evangelisch-Lutherische Gemeinde Böhmischer Exulanten in Dresden, Dresden 2000.

49 Joachim Bahlcke, Volker Dudeck (eds), Welt – Macht – Geist. Das Haus Habsburg und die Oberlausitz 1526–1635 [exhibition catalogue], Görlitz, Zittau 2002.

HANNA SONKAJÄRVI

Multiple Attributions: The Foreigner as a Circumstantial Category in 18th Century Strasbourg

In 1777, having worked in the Palatinate city of Mannheim, a Parisian master haberdasher named Retaillon set his mind on returning to France to establish a silk manufacture in the city of Strasbourg, which had been annexed by France in 1681[1]. To his great surprise, the merchants' guild would not allow him to become a member without the agreement of the master haberdashers' guild. The guild, however, refused to admit him, arguing that accepting Frenchmen would break the guild's long established relations with German and Scandinavian guilds. Retaillon chose to plead his case before the Strasbourg magistracy, but its members would only speak German to him, thus obstructing communication. He was accorded permission only to manufacture products that the local haberdashers would not produce, and the nature of these products was to be determined by the guild in question. Retaillon regarded this concession as depriving him of any chance of subsistence. As a consequence, he accused the magistracy of treating subjects of the French king less favourably than foreigners:

Si les strasbourgeois, et même tous les alsaciens sont comme il est vray libre de se faire recevoir dans tous les corps et communautés d'arts et métiers non seulement à Paris ou il y en beaucoup mais encore dans toutes les villes jurandes de royaume, pourquoi donc les parisiens seraient ils dans la seule ville de Strasbourg exclus du droit de représailles et de réciprocité ainsi que tous les autres sujets de Roy ce qui leur est naturellement du à tout égard, pourquoy les strasbourgeois reçoivent ils et accordent ils ce droit aux étrangers, allemans [sic] *et autres sans la moindre difficulté; ce qui arrive journellement dans tous le corps de communauté par préférence aux sujets du Roy et à leur exclusion*[2].

1 Archives municipales de Strasbourg (AMS), AA 2064, fol. 152, Demande dudit Retaillon d'être reçu passementier à Strasbourg. Observations sur les difficultés de cet établissement, 1777; AMS, XI 279, fol. 174–175, Der Zunft zum Spiegel, Gerichtsprotocoll (1778–1784), 21 July 1777. The great majority of the magistracy's proceedings preceding the French Revolution are written in German.

2 »If the inhabitants of Strasbourg and even all Alsatians are free to make themselves admitted in all trade and craft guilds, not only in Paris, but in every town of the kingdom where guilds exist, why then should the Parisians, along with all other subjects of the king, in the sole city of Strasbourg, be excluded from the right of retaliation and of reciprocity to which they are totally entitled to, why do the Strasbourgeois welcome and give this right to foreigners, Germans and others without difficulty; this is what takes place daily in all the corporations in relation to the subjects of the king and their exclusion«, AMS, AA 2064, fol. 152 (see note 1).

Yet, this was by no means the only way in which the notions of citizenship or foreignness could be employed in early modern France. In different situations, different individuals and different groups could advance the idea of either themselves or someone else being subjects of the king, or being foreigners, depending on the interests at stake. The Jewish merchant, Cerf Berr, tried in 1776 to introduce himself into the city with the argument of having obtained naturalisation letters from the King. The magistracy denied his claims by stating that even if he were to be treated like any other subject of the King, his quality as a Jew would prevent him from becoming an inhabitant since the city traditionally did not accept any Jews[3]. Conversely, some Strasbourg citizens argued that even if they renounced their *droits de bourgeoisie*, the citizenship rights of the town, they still would have the right to live in the city since they were subjects of the French King[4]. In 1781, some Strasbourg citizens of Italian origin even requested to be classified as foreigners in order to be able to export their products under more favourable tariffs[5].

I. THE FOREIGNER IN THE CONTEMPORARY HISTORIOGRAPHY OF EARLY MODERN FRANCE

The examples above illustrate the difficulty of assessing the importance of *naturalité* as a category of analysis for the history of early modern migration processes and state formation. In French historiography, however, being a foreigner under the Old Regime has been regarded simply as a question of not being a subject of the French king. In legal terms, who would have been defined as a foreigner during the Old Regime? What naturalisation practices were established? How were foreigners seen by political and legal decision makers? How were they controlled by the state[6]? These are the ques-

3 AMS, AA 2380, Copie de la lettre de M. le préteur royal de Strasbourg à M. le sieur Saint Germain, 13 April 1776.

4 AMS, AA 2106, no. 11, Mémoire du sieur Salzmann, par lequel il demande à être exempté du serment – exigé de ceux qui veulent renoncer à leur droit de Bourgeoisie – y joint les avis des trois avocats généraux, 16 January 1783.

5 AMS, AA 2203, no. 1, Requête des marchands italiens en soierie, pour faire régler les droits qu'ils ont à payer de leurs marchandises de foire. Rapport de la Chambre des XV à ce sujet, 22 December 1781. One of the demanders, François Moris from Turin, had become member of the Strasbourg merchant guild already in 1751; AMS, XI 277, fol. 87, Der Zunft zum Spiegel, Gerichtsprotocoll (1749–1756), 3 August 1751.

6 On the legal status of foreigners during the 18th and 19th centuries, see notably Rogers BRUBAKER, Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany, Cambridge 1992; Patrick WEIL, Qu'est-ce qu'un Français ? Histoire de la nationalité française depuis la Révolution, Paris 2002; Charlotte C. WELLS, Law and Citizenship in Early Modern France, Baltimore, London 1995. On the surveillance and control of foreigners by the state Gérard NOIRIEL, La Tyrannie du national. Le droit d'asile en Europe 1793–1993, Paris 1991; John TORPEY, The Invention of the Passport. Surveillance, Citizenship and the State, Cambridge 2000. Some studies have focused on the techniques of identification and surveillance of *étrangers* and *forains* from a local perspective, but tend to forget that the state was not the only instance doing the identifying, see Marie-Claude BLANC-CHALÉARD, Caroline DOUKI, Nicole DYONET, Vincent MILLIOT (eds), Police et migrants. France, 1667–1939, Rennes 2001; Daniel ROCHE (ed.), La Ville promise. Mobilité et accueil à Paris (fin XVIème–début XIXème siècle), Paris 2000.

tions that have dominated the contemporary historiography on foreigners in early modern France. In fact, little has changed since the work of Albert Mathiez and Jules Mathorez whose studies, published in 1913 and 1918, treated the »foreigner« as an all encompassing, nationality based category[7].

Even recent studies, such as the ones by Jean-François Dubost and Peter Sahlins, have centred on the opposition between foreigners *(étrangers)*[8] and subjects of the French king born on French territory *(régnicoles)*[9], thus ignoring the importance of local practice. These two historians have studied the naturalisation letters granted by the French king and explored the continuities and discontinuities in the definition of the foreigner during the Ancien Régime. The problem – and the advantage – of such an approach lies in the restricted number of persons who would have profited from such letters[10]. Naturalisation was sought by people interested in offices or benefices and by wealthy foreigners who had an interest in securing their legacies against the *droit d'aubaine*, the king's right to confiscate the property of foreigners who had died on French soil. Peter Sahlins suggests that already during the Old Regime, although a French nationality did not yet exist, a certain practice of French citizenship (Sahlins employs the notion »absolute citizen«) was being expressed by lawyers dealing with the naturalisation of foreigners[11]. This leads to the question as to whether the difference between foreigners and subjects of the French king can really be regarded as having been the decisive factor in the everyday lives of individuals. The formal institutionalisation and codification of national categories does not say anything about the depth, resonance or power of such categories in the everyday experience of the persons so categorised[12].

In contrast to studies which take legal definitions of the foreigner as their point of departure, in her work on Castile and Latin America, Tamar Herzog attempts to combine the study of juridical categories with the study of social networks. She argues that it was not the juridical categories which influenced social classifications, but rather, social classifications which moulded juridical implications. Through a study focused on the process of defining local belonging in Castile and Latin America, the author explores the ways in which local citizenship rights *(vecindad)* were defined according to the circumstances and the interests of the individuals and groups involved, rather than

7 Albert Mathiez, La Révolution et les étrangers. Cosmopolitisme et défense nationale, Paris 1918; Jules Mathorez, Les Étrangers en France sous l'Ancien Régime: histoire de la formation de la population française, 2 vol., Paris 1919–1921.

8 See Jean-François Dubost, Étrangers en France, in: Lucien Bély (ed.), Dictionnaire de l'Ancien Régime, Royaume de France, XVI^{e}–XVIII^{e} siècle, Paris 1996, pp. 518–522.

9 See Jean-François Dubost, Peter Sahlins, Et si on faisait payer les étrangers? Louis XIV, les immigrés et quelques autres, Paris 1999; Peter Sahlins, La nationalité avant la lettre. Les pratiques de naturalisation en France sous l'Ancien Régime, in: Annales: Histoire, Sciences Sociales 55 (2000) pp. 1081–1108; Id., Unnaturally French: foreign citizens in the Old Regime and after, Ithaca (N.Y.) 2004.

10 According to estimations, about sixty thousand foreigners arrived in Old Regime France every year. But, the average number of naturalisations was only forty to fifty per year between 1660 and 1789, Yves Lequin, La Mosaïque France, Histoire des étrangers et de l'immigration en France, Paris 1988, p. 204.

11 Sahlins, Unnaturally French (see note 9).

12 Rogers Brubaker, Frederick Cooper, Beyond »Identity«, in: Theory and Society 29 (2000) pp. 26–27.

any juridical rule. The granting of *vecindad* thus appears to be a result of ongoing negotiation within the community[13].

A diametrical opposition between the categories of *étranger* and *régnicole* has led to a situation where historians working on the Old Regime have not recognised that in this society other, more powerful means of differentiation existed than the mere question as to whether someone was a king's subject or not. The state and the local authorities had different interpretations of the definition of a foreigner. The state defined the foreigner by birth outside its borders, whereas for cities, the possibility of defining who was foreign offered an important means of differentiation within the community. Old Regime society thus did not divide itself simply into foreigners *(étrangers)* or strangers to the community *(forains)*[14], but into a multiplicity of different groups with different status.

In this society, characterised by a diversity of status and privileges, jurisdiction served rather as a means of confirming exceptions than as a coherent framework of regulation. Recognising this implies that instead of asking whether there was already a concept of French citizenship, we should ask how, when and why people would have interpreted social experience in terms of foreignness and who were the agents doing the identifying in any given situation. The difference between foreigners and king's subjects was not necessarily a decisive factor in the everyday life of an individual. Other categories such as social status, family ties, gender, systems of patronage, religion or confession, wealth, or the citizenship rights of a town, could be much more important in a given context and must therefore be taken into account. A society based on status the Old Regime linked rights to concrete social situations, whereas modern society has divorced political rights from social status and thus integrated diverse social groups into the state on an equal basis[15].

13 Tamar Herzog, Defining nations. Immigrants and citizens in early modern Spain and Spanish America, New Haven, London 2003. Communal practices relating to the definition of strangers and citizens have also received attention in countries like Austria and Germany, where the introduction of national citizenship came late. See Waltraud Heindl, Edith Saurer (eds), Grenze und Staat: Passwesen, Staatsbürgerschaft, Heimatrecht und Fremdengesetzgebung in der österreichischen Monarchie 1750–1867, Vienna, Cologne, Weimar 2000; Dieter Gosewinkel, »Einbürgern und ausschließen«. Die Nationalisierung der Staatsangehörigkeit vom Deutschen Bund bis zur Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Göttingen 2001 (Kritische Studien zur Geschichtswissenschaft, 150); Andreas Fahrmeir, Citizens and Aliens: Foreigners and the Law in Britain and the German States 1789–1870, New York, Oxford 2000.

14 On the importance of local definitions of strangers, see Jean-Pierre Jessenne, L'étranger au-delà du terroir, in: Id. (ed.), L'Image de l'Autre dans l'Europe du Nord-Ouest à travers l'histoire. Actes du colloque de Villeneuve d'Ascq 24, 25, 26 novembre 1994, Lille 1996, pp. 163–177; Anne Zink, L'indifférence à la différence: les forains dans la France du Sud-Ouest, in: Annales: Economies, Sociétés, Civilisations 43 (1988) pp. 149–172.

15 Gail Bossenga, Rights and citizens in the Old Regime, in: French Historical Studies 20 (1997) pp. 217–243, here p. 242.

II. MULTIPLE BELONGING THE ›ÉTRANGER‹ AS A CIRCUMSTANTIAL CATEGORY

If we refuse to reduce the problem of defining the foreigner within the Old Regime to the simple question of being a subject of the king (be it *régnicole* or *naturalisé*) or not, any study of foreigners of course becomes more complex, making an exhaustive or statistical study of all varieties of foreigners a vast and ill-defined task. The distinctions between *régnicoles* and *étrangers*, or *étrangers* and *forains*, thus were not developed in a vacuum, but rather were motivated by certain policies at certain times and in certain situations. Being designated a foreigner had consequences both for the foreigner and for those who labelled him as such. The consequences were not necessarily negative for the alien. In certain situations being regarded and treated as a foreigner could be of advantage.

We cannot consider the early modern stranger as a permanent and all-embracing category or condition, but rather should see foreign status as a circumstantial category. Consequently, the different possibilities and practices of defining strangers are best studied through concrete cases at the local level. Accordingly, we understand by the term »stranger« both foreigners in the modern sense *(étrangers)* as well as persons coming from outside the community *(forains)*. The question of who should be defined as a stranger was subject to ongoing negotiations between different individuals and groups whose interests could vary according to the situation, moment and place.

Similarly, the processes of inclusion and exclusion could take different forms according to the particular context. These were relational and multidimensional, they did not necessarily reinforce one another: It was possible to be included or excluded from different sectors, such as access to political office, access to different economic options, access to social networks, or access to a certain geographical location[16]. Being excluded from one sector of life did not automatically lead to other exclusions[17]. Of interest here are the processes and modes of drawing boundaries.

Following the Norwegian anthropologist Frederik Barth, the construction and the maintenance of these boundaries can be seen to rest in the identifications and self-identifications of certain (ethnic) categories by the participants in any given situation. However, this does not mean that we should consider groups of strangers to be defined in ethnic terms. More significant is the idea of dynamism linked to processes of social interaction and (re-)determination of boundaries between different groups. In everyday life, people identify and categorise themselves and others, and according to Barth ethnic identity, like all collective identity, is constructed and transformed through social interactions which in turn structure later interactions. Ethnic groups thus serve as forms of organisation establishing a dichotomy between members and non-members[18]. Barth's approach is accordingly more centred on the study of bound-

16 Floya ANTHIAS, The Concept of »Social Division« and Theorising Social Stratification: Looking at Ethnicity and Class, in: Sociology 35 (2001) pp. 835–854, here p. 837.

17 Cornelia BOHN, Alois HAHN, Patterns of Inclusion and Exclusion: Property, Nation and Religion, in: Soziale Systeme 8 (2002) pp. 8–26, here p. 24.

18 Fredrik BARTH, Ethnic Groups and Boundaries [1969], in: ID., Process and form in social life. Selected essays of Fredrik Barth, vol. 1, London, Boston, Henley 1981, pp. 198–227.

aries than on the cultural content they enclose: »the ethnic boundary canalises social life – it entails a frequently quite complex organisation of behaviour and social relations«[19].

In such dynamic processes, the features taken into account are not the sum of ›objective‹ differences, but only those which the actors themselves consider significant[20]. Difference is socially constructed. The primary concern is therefore how the distinction between *us* and *them* is established and justified in a specific context. People can also try to stage or create various appearances which they consider advantageous[21]. However, this does not mean that the power of authoritative institutions to develop formalised, codified and objectified systems of categorisation should not be taken into account[22]. The maintenance of boundaries takes different forms according to the time frame, social, political, cultural or economic constellations these interaction processes are conditioned by. Accordingly, »nations« can be considered »imagined communities«[23], formed through processes of inclusion and exclusion.

III. THE ›MULTIPLE SWISS‹ OR ON THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF FIXING A UNIFORM CATEGORY FOR THE SWISS

The difficulties of treating the Old Regime foreigner as a simple state-centred and nationality-based category can be illustrated by exploring different ways of being, or claiming to be, Swiss in 18th century Strasbourg. Thanks to their privileges, some foreigners could expect to be treated more favourably than the majority of the French subjects. Such is the case of the Swiss, who enjoyed considerable privileges in Old Regime France. The alliance treaties which provided the French king with Swiss mercenaries granted to the Swiss the right to move freely and trade within the kingdom. Swiss products enjoyed generous tax exemptions. Swiss troops in France had their own commanders, jurisdiction and the right to exercise their religion freely[24]. Looking at chosen examples will reveal other factors, which would have been just as important, if not more so, than national origin in defining the place of different Swiss individuals in the local community.

In 1681, the city of Strasbourg passed from being an imperial city *(Reichsstadt)* to being a free city under the sovereignty of the French king. A German speaking, Lutheran city, it was an important migratory centre, both before and after the French

19 Ibid. p. 204.

20 Ibid. p. 203.

21 Christian Windler, Plurale Identitäten: Französische Staatsangehörigkeit in mediterranen Diasporasituationen, in: Saeculum 55 (2004) pp. 97–131.

22 See discussion of Barth's work in Richard Jenkins, Rethinking Ethnicity. Arguments and Explorations, London, Thousand Oaks, New Delhi 1997.

23 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities. Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism, London 1983.

24 See Philippe Gern, Aspects des relations franco-suisses au temps de Louis XVI. Diplomatie – économie – finances, Neuchâtel 1970, pp. 211–243; Alain-Jacques Tornare, Vaudois et Confédérés au service de France 1789–1798, Yens sur Morgens 1998.

annexation. The city's population grew from about 22,000 in 1681 to some 49,000 in 1789[25]. In addition, there were some seven to nine thousand soldiers stationed in barracks, as well as billeted with the locals, who made up an important group among the growing number of foreigners in the city[26].

The annexation of Strasbourg did not lead to the immediate loss of local political autonomy. On the contrary, Louis XIV guaranteed the maintenance of local political institutions and territorial integrity. Up until the French Revolution, the population remained divided into three groups: 1) those who had citizenship rights, the *Bürgerrechte* or *droits de bourgeoisie*, 2) the so called *Schirmbürger* or *manants*, who enjoyed the protection of the city, but had no political rights, and, 3) the *simple domiciliés*, simple inhabitants, who were merely tolerated. This system provided the magistracy with the possibility of detaching domicile rights from political, economic or juridical rights. Both Frenchmen moving to Strasbourg after the French annexation and Alsatians from the neighbouring areas were regarded as foreigners to the city *(Stadtfremde or étrangers à la ville)*. As such, they were perceived as a potential threat to public order and to the city's finances.

During the 18th century, Strasbourg's political autonomy came to be increasingly contested by privileged subjects of the French king, royal administrators and noblemen, who refused to acknowledge the political and juridical supremacy of the Strasbourg magistracy. Thus, the differing powers of the local magistracy and the crown became objects of permanent negotiation. In this context, the existence of competing authorities, regulations, and interests gave rise to numerous conflicts between the municipal authorities and different groups of strangers, and the immigrant population, in daily interaction with the local inhabitants and authorities took part in this process of continuous redefinition of local norms and practices.

In 1716, and again in 1752, the magistracy and the *préteur royal*[27] of Strasbourg wrote to the Intendant of Alsace and to the war minister pleading that Swiss troops not be stationed in Strasbourg[28]. Before 1716 no Swiss soldiers had been stationed in the city. The royal government had preferred troops from Piedmont, Lyon, Normandy and Ireland, who appeared less likely to sympathise with the local German-speaking population. The cities of Strasbourg and Landau were opposed to the arrival of the Swiss and refused to acknowledge the privileges they had been accorded by the French crown, since it was feared that to do so would incur a considerable loss to the cities' tax incomes[29]. From the viewpoint of the magistracy, these privileges consisted notably of a right to sell wine without paying the *Umgeld*, a consumption tax levied by the city

25 Suzanne Dreyer-Roos, La population strasbourgeoise sous l'Ancien Régime, Strasbourg 1969, pp. 103–109.

26 Simone Herry, Une ville en mutation. Strasbourg au tournant du Grand siècle, Société militaire et société civile de langue française dans la ville libre et royale de Strasbourg d'après les registres paroissiaux, les registres de bourgeoisie et les actes notariés (1681–1802), Strasbourg 1996, p. 58.

27 The *préteur royal* was the highest royal official responsible for Strasbourg and he presided over all sessions of the magistracy in the king's interest.

28 AMS, AA 2616, Lettre de M. le préteur à M. le comte d'Argenson, pour demander que le régiment de Jenner ne vienne point à Strasbourg, juin 1752.

29 Ibid.

magistracy. The magistracy complained of feeling threatened by the addition of two Swiss battalions to the garrison, and pointed to the city's capitulation treaty which had confirmed its old privileges, rights and institutions[30]. According to the magistracy, during the 35 years that the city had belonged to France, various Swiss troops had passed through the city without ever having pretended to enjoy any tax privileges[31]. Despite the protests, Swiss troops were stationed in Strasbourg from 1719. The secretary of war, d'Angervilliers, ruled out arguments based on the capitulation treaty. He considered that the Emperor had ceded the city to the French king in the Treaty of Ryswick (1697), and that the Swiss should enjoy the privileges accorded to them on French territory, so that the city had no right to demand alcohol taxes from them. It could only try to limit the trade, arranging that the Swiss be allowed to sell wine and other tax free foodstuffs only to members of their own regiments[32].

Instead, the Intendant made a clear distinction between the Swiss troops and other Swiss who had established themselves in the city as *Schirmbürger* or citizens. Thus, inhabitants of Swiss origin should not enjoy any privileges accorded to the Swiss nation, since they had voluntarily submitted themselves to the local jurisdiction by acquiring rights to live in the city[33]. In practise, this distinction proved to be hard to make and was a permanent matter of contestation.

Like any foreigners to the city, the Swiss were obliged to apply for local citizenship, if they wanted to reside or do business in the city. This was also demanded of Johann Stähelin, a *Schirmbürger* in Strasbourg and citizen of Basle, acting as a merchant without being a citizen or member of a guild in 1691. The guild of merchants pressured him to join the guild and to become a citizen[34]. According to the alliance treaty between the French crown and the Swiss cantons, any Swiss person should have had the right to freely establish himself in France and to trade[35]. After having first tried to persuade the magistracy to accept his wife as a member of the merchants' guild in his place[36], Stähelin finally obtained an exception from the magistracy because he explained that he would have to pay a ten percent tax on the inheritance from his father if he gave up his citizenship rights in Basle[37]. *Schirmbürger* Stähelin thus concretely profited from

30 AMS, AA 2118, Capitulation accordée à la ville de Strasbourg par Louis XIV, 30 September 1681.

31 AMS, AA 2616, Mémoire du Magistrat pour protester contre l'exemption prétendue par les suisses avec pièces à l'appui. Représentations adressées au ministre, 1716.

32 Louis Spach (ed.), Lettres écrites à la Cour par d'Angervilliers, intendant d'Alsace (1716–1724), in: Bulletin de la société pour la conservation des monuments historiques d'Alsace (1878) pp. 19–23: d'Angervilliers à M. de Puységur, lieutenant général et conseiller au Conseil de la guerre, 2 July 1716.

33 Ibid.

34 AMS, AA 2163, Pièces relatives à la question si un Suisse peut, en vertu des privilèges accordés à sa nation, exercer le commerce dans Strasbourg sans s'y faire recevoir bourgeois: Extrait des registres de la Tribu appelée au Miroir qui est celle du corps des marchands de Strasbourg du juillet 1691.

35 See Bündnis der eidgenössischen Orte und ihrer Zugewandten mit der Krone Frankreich, Solothurn, 24 September 1663, in: Die Eidgenössischen Abschiede aus dem Zeitraume von 1649 bis 1680: Herrschafts- und Schirmortsangelegenheiten, Beilagen, Anhang und Register (1867), vol. 6-1,2, Lucerne, pp. 1641–1658.

36 AMS, XI 276, fol. 492, Der Zunft zum Spiegel, Gerichtsprotocoll (1673–1693), 28 April 1692.

37 AMS, XI 276, fol. 478, Der Zunft zum Spiegel, Gerichtsprotocoll (1673–1693), 4 March 1692 and AMS, 2163 (see note 34).

his status as a citizen of Basle, since he was liberated from the capitation[38], and accumulated the benefits of his double belonging, combining privileges as a Swiss merchant with the right to trade in Strasbourg as if he were a citizen[39].

There are no definite numbers available for the Swiss presence in Strasbourg, but some indicative figures have been established, suggesting that the Swiss accounted for ten percent of new citizens admitted in 1700–1701 and for three percent in 1785–1786[40]. However, the number of Swiss seeking Strasbourg citizenship was low because high payments were demanded from Calvinists. Between 1698 and 1718 their access to the *Schirmbürgerschaft* was completely barred by royal order[41]. In fact, there was a convergence between the crown's and the city's interest in minimising the number of Calvinists, so that the city demanded, both before and after the annexation, that the Calvinists prove wealth three times superior to that required of Lutherans in order to become citizens. Whereas citizenship rights were opened up to Catholics through a royal decision of 1685, circumstances did not change for Calvinists, who had to raise a sum of 2000 *livres* as opposed to the 600 *livres* required of Lutherans and Catholics. Even when Calvinists managed to become citizens, the rights they enjoyed were limited. They were not allowed to hold office in the guilds[42], Calvinist services were not allowed in the city[43], and Lutherans and Catholics engaged in long-lasting struggles as to in which hospital chamber, the Lutheran or the Catholic, Calvinist patients were to be placed.

Yet, some rich Calvinists such as Stähelin, enjoyed a certain respect from both the crown and the magistracy. In 1712, when Anabaptists were to be expelled from Alsace, the Intendant of Alsace, de la Houssaye, expressed concern about the fact that there was no mention made in the edict about tolerance for Calvinists, whose presence, according to the Intendant, was vital for commerce[44].

38 Peter HERTNER, Stadtwirtschaft zwischen Reich und Frankreich. Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft Straßburgs 1650–1714, Cologne, Vienna 1973 (Neue Wirtschaftsgeschichte, 8), p. 34.

39 In 1724 Stähelin's name appears on a list of Swiss merchants who were allowed to export cash out of France, Archives Nationales, Paris, G7 83, no. 102, État du montant des certificats remis a l'intendance par plusieurs marchands suisses, pour avoir la permission de Monsieur de Harlay pour sortir de la province, les espèces qu'ils ont reçues, provenant des marchandises qu'ils ont vendues a la foire de St. Jean de la présent année à Strasbourg; G7 83, no. 100, Lettre de M. de Harlay, conseiller d'État intendant en Alsace, à M. Dodun, 12 July 1724.

40 Bernard VOGLER, La pénétration française en Alsace au XVIII[e] siècle à travers les testaments, in: Provinces et États dans la France de l'Est. Le rattachement de la Franche-Comté à la France, espaces régionaux et espaces nationaux. Actes du colloque de Besançon, 3 et 4 octobre 1977, Paris 1979 (Annales littéraires de l'Université de Besançon, 216), pp. 197–203; DREYER-ROOS, La population (see note 25), pp. 117–138.

41 AMS, AA 2573, Requête présentée par le consistoire de l'église réformé à l'effet d'obtenir l'admission des calvinistes à la manance. Correspondance échangée, à ce sujet, entre le préteur royal et le maréchal d'Huxelles qui se prononce favorablement, 1718.

42 AMS, AA 2573, Conditions posées par la chambre des XIII à l'administration des calvinistes au droit de bourgeoisie à Strasbourg, 1663.

43 Note that Alsace was not concerned by the revocation of the Edict of Nantes in 1685 since the Edict had never been introduced there in the first place.

44 Rodolphe REUSS, Documents relatifs à la situation légale des protestants d'Alsace au dix-huitième siècle, recueillis à la Bibliothèque municipale et aux archives de la ville de Strasbourg, Paris 1888, pp. 7–11: Lettre écrite par M. de Voisin, Ministre et secrétaire d'État à Mr. de la Houssaye, intendant d'Alsace, 13

Peter Hertner has pointed out the fact that some Calvinist merchants, who were among the leading manufacturers in Alsace, even enjoyed certain privileged exceptions from the rules concerning the citizenship rights[45]. In 1629, a merchant named Hoser, an emigrant from Augsburg, was given trading rights as if he were a citizen[46]. His son, Jacob Hoser, traded in the city at least from 1660 onwards. It was only in 1678 that the family acquired citizenship rights under pressure from the merchants' guild. When Jacob Hoser died in 1701, the royal tax collectors tried to seize his fortune by claiming that he was a Calvinist and had been born in Geneva. He lived separated from his wife and had no children, so that his business associate Johann Niklaus Herff, a Calvinist citizen of Strasbourg living in Basle, was to inherit his fortune. The Intendant of Alsace, de la Houssaye, judged that Hoser's possessions could not fall under the *droit d'aubaine* because both Hoser and Herff had become citizens of Strasbourg before the French conquest, and under the city's capitulation treaty its citizens could not be subjected to the *droit d'aubaine*[47].

The presence of the Swiss soldiers, whose introduction the magistracy had vainly tried to prevent, was a continuous source of conflict involving the magistracy, different local commanders and the war minister. The magistracy complained about officers who married citizens and thus were able to access real estate, which could otherwise only be acquired by citizens. However, instead of becoming citizens, the soldiers claimed to be free from municipal taxes, since they enjoyed Swiss privileges[48]. The magistracy was ordered by the crown to demand neither the *vingtième* nor *capitation* from the Swiss, so long as they did not enjoy other income than their salaries. Instead, a line was drawn between persons born on Swiss soil and those who had merely taken up residence in a Swiss canton. The order explicitly stated that Alsatians who had become members of a Swiss canton could not claim privileges[49].

It seems that even though all regiments had their own jurisdictions, only the Swiss succeeded in escaping the city's jurisdiction in cases where soldiers had committed crimes against citizens. Matters became more complicated when non-Swiss members of Swiss regiments were suspected of crimes. In such cases the magistracy insisted on its right to judge the accused. When a soldier from the Salis regiment, a native of Nassau-Usingen, injured a female inhabitant of Strasbourg with a sabre in 1777, the com-

August 1712; Réponse de Mr. de La Houssaye, 21 August 1712; Réponse de Mr. de Voisin à Mr. de La Houssaye, 31 August 1712.

45 HERTNER, Stadtwirtschaft (see note 38), pp. 32–34.

46 AMS, AA 2163, Auszug aus dem Memoriale gnädiger Herren Rats und XXI der Statt Straßburg, 5 September 1629.

47 Archives du ministère de la guerre, Vincennes, A1 1501, no. 335, Lettre du maréchal d'Huxelles au sécretaire d'État de la guerre, Chamillart, 6 June 1701 and no. 336, Mémoire, s.d.; A1 1503, no. 125, Lettre de M. de la Houssaye à M. Chamillart, secrétaire de l'État de la guerre, 6 June 1701 and no. 126, Copie de la lettre écrite à Monsieur de Chamillart par les Mrs. fermiers du domaine d'Alsace, 25 May 1701.

48 AMS, AA 2616, Mémoire sur la prétention des officiers suisses à des exemptions de charges et d'impôts, 1765; AMS, AA 2528, États indicatifs des personnes qui, par suite de leur anoblissement, d'acquisition de charges ou des mariages avec des privilégiés, se sont soustraites aux charges et impôts, 1781. Similar marriage strategies were followed by the Swiss in Lyon, where they were exempted from the taille, see Herbert LÜTHY, Die Tätigkeit der Schweizer Kaufleute und Gewerbetreibenden in Frankreich unter Ludwig XIV. und der Regentschaft, Aarau, 1943, pp. 194–195.

49 AMS, AA 2616. Extrait d'une lettre du contrôleur général, M. Bertin, à M. de Lucé, 4 May 1761.

mander of the regiment refused to deliver him to the magistracy, arguing that Swiss privileges applied to all his troops, regardless of their origin:

Ce grenadier quelque puisse être son délit n'est point dans le cas d'être réclamé par le Magistrat de Strasbourg, n'étant pas sujet du Roy, et encore s'il l'était, faudrait-il que sa majesté jugeât à propos de le réclamer pour le faire juger par un tribunal du royaume. Non seulement les Suisses nationaux, mais les étrangers qui composent nos régiments sont nos justiciables et indépendants de tout autre tribunal[50].

The most peculiar category of Swiss were the so called *Suisses portiers d'hôtels*, servants of different noble households. In 1756, a conflict arose about illegal wine sales by Swiss porters. They pretended that, since they were Swiss, they need not pay the local alcohol tax called *Umgeld*[51]. Regardless of numerous prohibitions by the magistracy, the local population went to drink in »Swiss« houses, which were sheltered from the magistracy's control by their owners' noble status. Despite appeals to these noblemen and to the state council, this abuse persisted at least until the abolition of Swiss privileges in 1782. Thus, although the exemption from consumption taxes was only a privilege of Swiss troops and not a general privilege of all Swiss, in practice it was not being Swiss which protected these resourceful Swiss or pretended Swiss. The magistracy was unable to halt the trade because the porters were protected by the noble masters, such as the prince of Lorraine, the archbishop of Reims and the commandant of Alsace, de Contades.

These examples illustrate different ways of being Swiss in 18th century France. They point to the circumstantial character of such definitions. In 18th century Strasbourg we can find Swiss soldiers and merchants enjoying Swiss privileges. We can also find *Bürger* and *Schirmbüger* of Swiss origin. Some of these were treated according to their status as inhabitants. Others could combine the status of *Schirmbürger* with that of Swiss merchant, although according to the city's constitution they should have become citizens. Religion was at least as important as »nationality« or geographic origin in determining an individual's place in society. A Swiss Catholic could acquire the citizenship rights for a price equal to that paid by Lutherans, whereas Calvinists had to pay sums three times higher. Finally, in the case of the Swiss porters it was not their Swiss »nationality«, but their position as members of noble households which hindered the magistracy from pursuing them.

50 »This grenadier, whatever his offence, can not be claimed by the magistracy of Strasbourg since he is not a subject of the king, and even if he was, his majesty would need to consider it necessary to claim him in order to have him judged before a royal court. Not only the Swiss nationals, but also all foreigners who compose our regiments underlie our jurisdiction and are independent of any other tribunal«, AMS, VI 644 no. 7. Pièces concernant le sollicite de juridiction criminelle qui s'est élevée entre le régiment suisse de Salis et le Magistrat, au sujet d'un soldat du dit régiment au garnison à Strasbourg, natif de Biberic Principauté de Nassau Usingue, qui a blessé d'un coup de sabre la belle fille d'une bourgeoisie de cette ville, 1777.

51 Georges Livet, »Maspfenning et Umgeld«. Contribution à l'étude de la fiscalité du vin en Alsace sous l'Ancien Régime, in: Annales de la Société d'ethnographie française 1 (1950) pp. 81–94. The capitulation treaty had guaranteed the city of Strasbourg the right to raise this proportional tax. The revenues from the *Umgeld* constituted a considerable part of the municipal finances. In 1685, the city collected some 170,000 on the *Umgeld* on wine, beer and wheat, the total yearly income being 606,350 livres, Hertner, Stadtwirtschaft (see note 38), p. 387.

IV. CONCLUSION

If we consider the dynamics of the inclusion and exclusion of foreigners from a local society, we come to the conclusion that the boundary, which was drawn by the crown between *naturels* and *étrangers* was only one factor among others defining the place of an individual in the early modern society. Competing, local definitions of the foreigner coexisted and in the case of Strasbourg, even prevailed over the definitions by the state. Furthermore, individuals would take advantage and exploit different kinds of definitions according to the interests at stake. Through the example of the Swiss in 18th century Strasbourg, we have shown that it does not make much sense to try to define the »foreigner« as an all encompassing category. Instead, studying the various means of inclusion and exclusion from a micro-historical perspective and examining in a bottom-up approach who, in what context, would have been defined a stranger, by whom and to which purpose, permits us to counterbalance the picture created by historians who have tended to take the nation state as their primary point of departure. However, this approach does not intend and is not able to grasp all varieties of foreignness. Rather, it centres on the use and the exploitation of the notion of foreigner in a given context. The advantage of this perspective is that it safeguards us from any description of society on the basis of only one category, be it nationality, ethnicity, religion or something other. The conflicts and negotiation processes different individuals, groups and institutions engaged tell us much about the power relations between these actors and the relationship of the »absolutist state« to local governments. Above all, they tell us not only about how people perceived the »other«, but how they perceived themselves and the society in which they lived. Hence we come to the conclusion that, in order to understand what was a foreigner in early modern France, it might be worthwhile focusing on the social processes of defining boundaries between different (groups of) individuals instead of departing from a fixed, state centred definition of the »foreigner«.

KLAUS WEBER

French Migrants into Loyal Germans Huguenots in Hamburg (1685–1985)

No textbook on early modern German history is complete without mentioning the considerable immigration of Huguenots, who started leaving France in their many thousands from 1685, when Louis XIV revoked the tolerance granted to them by Henry IV through the Edict of Nantes, almost ninety years earlier, in 1598. The revocation is commonly referred to as the Edict of Fontainebleau. Every German high school student will learn about the Edict of Potsdam, issued by the Prussian prince elector Frederick William I in the same year of 1685, granting the French refugees extensive privileges if they came to settle in his lands[1]. Throughout Europe and beyond, the prevailing image of Huguenot migration is that of a religious minority which, being persecuted in its French homelands since the revocation, found refuge in tolerant Protestant states. This emphatic picture was enhanced by the liberal values of 19th century historiography, which drew attention to the fact that, in spite of their persecution, Huguenots achieved considerable economic success, whatever host society their migration might have brought them into. Through their achievements, they provided the archetypal role model that is explicitly referred to even today – for example by official United Nations papers – when it comes to demonstrate that persecuted minorities are not necessarily a burden to those who offer shelter[2]. Little consideration has been given to the question of economic rationales that might have encouraged Huguenots to migrate.

This article focuses on such factors by offering a survey of the French Calvinist presence in Hamburg. Today, the common image of the Hanseatic city of Hamburg is of a traditionally liberal city, liberal in terms of both economy and social and political life. The French minority was very much respected throughout the 19th and 20th centuries,

For their suggestions and help during the preparation of this article, I am indebted to Caroline Shaw, Astrid Windus, Daniel Cohen and Rainer Hering.

1 Two examples selected at random: Spiegel der Zeit. Vom Absolutismus bis zum Imperialismus, Frankfurt a. M., Berlin, Munich 1977, p. 39; Zeiten und Menschen. Von der Griechisch-Römischen Antike bis zum Zeitalter des Imperialismus, Paderborn 1990, p. 210. Also see the widely used dtv-Atlas zur Weltgeschichte, vol. 1, Munich 1992 (1st edition 1964), p. 263.

2 So did United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan in his address to the European Parliament in Brussels, on 29 January 2004, underlining that »the longer perspective is almost always far more positive« for both migrants and host societies. Also see World Economic and Social Survey 2004: International Migration, a United Nations Report by Virginia Sherry, pointing out that such migrations are a »mixed blessing« to the host societies. Both quotations from the Archive of the UN Chronicle, Online Edition, March 2005.

in particular as an example testifying to this ›liberal tradition‹ – not only in Hamburg, but all over Germany. A closer look, tracing its history further back, will demonstrate how the specific conditions of a city-state made immigration and integration a very special task. It will further demonstrate how such conditions led to commemorative practices being abandoned rather than stimulated.

Throughout the late 17th century and into the early 19th century, this major German port city had hosted a small but economically very powerful group of Huguenot maritime merchants that contributed considerably to the wealth of the city. In the course of the 19th century, after the decisive British victory over France and the loss of the French colonial empire in the Atlantic, Hamburg's Huguenot community shrank considerably. It was subject to even more radical changes when the autonomous city of Hamburg was merged into the modern German nation state, created in 1871. Some of the impact that the subsequent development of a German national identity had on this small group can be traced far into the 20th century.

Within the overall Huguenot emigration from France, German lands where not a primary destination. Out of a total of 200,000 refugees, some 70,000 found a new homeland in Britain, about 60,000 in the Netherlands. Half of the 40,000 refugees who chose German territories went to Prussia-Brandenburg. Other territories like Hesse or Lower Saxony attracted groups that ranged from about 3,000 to 4,000 migrants. They were favoured by privileges similar to those granted in Prussia. Only 1,500, probably even less, went to the Hanseatic cities of Hamburg, Bremen and Lübeck[3]. Hence, the case of Hamburg concerns a minority which was small in number, but very powerful in terms of industry and trade.

Large foreign merchant colonies were a typical feature of early modern port cities. During the 18th century, cities like Amsterdam, London and Bordeaux attracted thousands of traders from abroad. Usually, these foreigners proved to be more successful economically than the average autochthonous trader. Hamburg, being one of these major ports, could not do without its own cosmopolitan colony[4]. Some of these foreigners had been driven by religious persecution, others by economic interest only. Dutch Protestants had fled from the Spanish Netherlands; Sephardic Jews had arrived in Hamburg after their expulsion from the Iberian Peninsula. English merchant adventurers enjoyed special privileges and even maintained their own church and jurisdiction. Nevertheless, many influential members of the Lutheran clergy were strongly opposed to the presence of non-Lutheran migrants. This pattern pre-figured an enduring conflict among Hamburg policy makers.

Just as shown in Hanna Sonkajärvi's example of Strasbourg in this book (cf. pp. 47–58), Hamburg's policy towards strangers was much impregnated by its Lutheran tradition. At the same time, it lent on its status as a largely autonomous Imperial City, and its foreign policy aimed at maintaining neutrality in any conflict that might arise

3 Eckart Birnstiel, Die Aufnahme der hugenottischen Glaubensflüchtlinge in Preußen: ein Akt der Toleranz?, in: Andreas Flick, Albert de Lange (eds), Von Berlin bis Konstantinopel. Eine Aufsatzsammlung zur Geschichte der Hugenotten und Waldenser, Bad Karlshafen 2001, pp. 9–33, here p. 22. According to other estimates, the total figure of Huguenots fleeing France by far exceeded 300,000.

4 Franklin Kopitzsch, Minderheiten und Fremde in nordwestdeutschen Städten in der frühen Neuzeit, in: Niedersächsisches Jahrbuch für Landesgeschichte 69 (1997) pp. 45–59.

among its surrounding neighbours. Through the city's constitution, which had been a product of the Lutheran reform carried out in 1517/18, representation and administration of the city's districts were inseparately linked with the church parishes. Membership of the Lutheran Church, of course, was the essential precondition of citizenship.

Throughout the 16th to 18th centuries, the Senate in general defended the ethnic and religious minorities. The Senators were from the ranks of the very elite of maritime traders and ship-owners, and they easily acknowledged the positive effects that the prospering migrant communities had on Hamburg's economy. Among the clergy and the middle and lower classes however, orthodox religious ideas and, probably, economic envy fuelled a xenophobic discourse and political practice that could become hateful at times. In the 1690s, the guilds and the clergy finally succeeded in pushing the Senate to sharply raise taxation on the Portuguese Jews, which led to their exodus[5]. After 1700, the Catholic minority was targeted. In September 1719, the Imperial embassy and the chapel that was run there were completely demolished by a mob that had been stirred up by the pastors' aggressive sermons. Although, in the aftermath, the city was heavily fined by the Imperial Court for not having defended religious peace, the senior preacher Erdmann Neumeister continued his instigations and caused the mob to disturb the Calvinist church services that were held in the Dutch embassy. Neumeister had repeatedly declaimed phrases like: »Yet again, I say that Carthage, both of the popes and of the Calvinists, must be destroyed«[6]. These activities of course preoccupied the Dutch government, being the protector of the French Reformed minority. In January 1722, it sent letters of concern to the Senate, demanding the punishment of Neumeister, whom they considered a »sworn enemy of concord and peace«[7]. During the following decades, this conflict was much less pronounced. But still, in 1785, when the city finally granted freedom of religious worship, this privilege was first conceded to the Catholics, and only in the second place to the Calvinists[8].

So, why did Calvinist refugees chose this place, if it was not to fall out of the frying pan into the fire? When arriving in Hamburg, Huguenots were not allowed to have their own chapel, they had no cemetery, no political rights whatsoever, and in trade they did not enjoy the customs exemptions that favoured the Lutheran merchants established there. They could not apply for citizenship without giving up their Calvinist faith, and therefore could only hold the minor status of tolerated foreigners, as outlined by the city's *Fremdencontract*. In sermons and pamphlets, they were menaced

5 For a detailed account and analysis of the economic, social and political implications of these debates see Jutta BRADEN, Hamburger Judenpolitik im Zeitalter der lutherischen Orthodoxie 1590–1710, Hamburg 2001 (Hamburger Beiträge zur Geschichte der deutschen Juden, 23).

6 Joachim WHALEY, Religious Toleration and Social Change in Hamburg 1529–1819, Cambridge 1985 (Cambridge Studies in Early Modern History), pp. 58–63, 137–138, quotation from p. 59.

7 Staatsarchiv Hamburg (StAH), Bestand 521-4 (Deutsche evangelisch-reformierte Gemeinde), Sign. IC: »Schreiben Derer Herren General=Staaten der Vereinigten Niederlande, An den Rath zu Hamburg, Der Geistlichkeit daselbst, Straffbares Unternehmen wider die Reformirten, und sonderlich die von Herrn Erdmann Neumeister ... in Druck gegebene Ärgerliche Schriften ... ... d. d. Haag den 3 Januarii 1722.«

8 WHALEY, Religious Toleration (see note 6), pp. 168–169; Franklin KOPITZSCH, Franzosen in den Hansestädten und in Altona zwischen 1685 und 1789, in: Jean MONDOT, Jean-Marie VALENTIN, Jürgen VOSS (eds), Deutsche in Frankreich, Franzosen in Deutschland 1715–1789, Sigmaringen 1992 (Beihefte der Francia, 25), pp. 283–295, here p. 287.

with physical violence. In order to maintain some kind of religious community they had to travel to the nearby Danish city of Altona, where generous religious tolerance was in practice[9]. In Hamburg, they had to suffer the same conditions that they had left behind in France, and to do so, many of them had left their home country even illegally. In their homeland, very great pressure was put on the Calvinists in order to make them convert to Catholicism, but at the same time, French policy-makers regarded them as extremely useful to the economy and tried to keep them in the country. Furthermore, an increasing number of French merchants were settling in Altona even in the years immediately before 1694[10]. To find a sound explanation for Huguenot migration to Hamburg, economic reasons and incentives have to be considered.

Therefore, it is necessary to look at some macro-economic conditions. After recovery from the Thirty Years War, ever increasing amounts of German manufactures, textiles in particular, were exported into the Atlantic basin. The main factor favouring their trade was the comparatively cheaper labour in Central Europe. Lower production costs made German products highly competitive in Western Europe, Africa and the New World. Next to the religious oppression at home and the tolerance offered by German rulers, these factors must be taken into account when assessing what attracted French migrants to settle in German territories. At this point, it must be mentioned that those textile workers settling in German hinterlands were the less fortunate of the refugees. They had to accept low wages, but at the same time could expect to find markets. Linen manufacturing in Silesia, Brandenburg and Hesse received important incentives by their technical know-how. Those Huguenots who went to Hamburg were part of an economic elite. By transferring energy-intensive sugar refining from French Atlantic seaports to the estuary of the Elbe River, they took advantage of the lower costs for labour and fuel. Central and Eastern Europe were indeed the primary markets for sugar from the French Caribbean Islands. In 18th century French Atlantic seaports, complaints were common about the low wages and cheapness of coal in places like Hamburg. These cost advantages were regarded as the main factors for their competiveness. Thus, Huguenots heavily dominated the most expansive and lucrative sector of Hamburg's economy: the import and processing of colonial goods, such as sugar, cotton, and dyestuffs used in textile dyeing – primarily indigo, cochineal and tropical dyewoods[11]. This can be exemplified by examining Hamburg's sugar market.

9 Kopitzsch, Franzosen (see note 8), p. 287; Id., Minderheiten (see note 4), pp. 48–69.

10 Commerzbibliothek Hamburg (Archives of Hamburg's Chamber of Commerce), Protokolle der Commerzdeputation, Sign. S/599, Bd. D (1691–1696), pp. 164–165, 167, 219, 341.

11 Archives departementales de la Gironde (Bordeaux), sign. C4265, fol. 82 (28 March 1778) and fol. 169 (3 April 1781); sign. C4473 n° 46 (10 April 1764). Also see Whaley, Religious Toleration (see note 6), p. 144.

Table 1: Customs records of sugar imported by seven major Hamburg merchants, 1755[12]

	Huguenot merchants	value (Mk bco)	value (Mk bco)	German merchants
1.	P. His	1,017,710		
2.	P. Boué	777,350		
3.			435,400	Klug
4.			263,200	G. Clamer
5.	Boyer	128,600		
6.	Loreilhe & Diodati	125,800		
7.	Bosanquet	96,400		
total:		(39%)* 2,145,860	689,600 (12%)*	

* Share of the total sugar import recorded by customs in 1755, which totalled 5,541,860 Marks banco

Five of the seven major importers shown here were Huguenots, and they alone controlled almost 40 percent of the imports registered by the customs authorities. It is true that the customs records omit most of the imports made by Lutheran citizens, for they were exempt. Yet, the total of Hamburg's annual imports from France at that period has been estimated at some 14 million Marks banco (probably half of this was made up of sugar), and the total of Hamburg's maritime imports at 77 million Marks banco, with France being the city's major trading partner. Given this background, the imports made by Pierre His – making more than 1 million by sugar only – do constitute an overwhelming share of Hamburg commerce. His' total imports (including wine, coffee, dyestuffs, brandy etc.) in that year totalled two million Marks[13]. Even if he was only acting as a commissioner, commission fees of usually 2 or 2,5 percent would have made this a most lucrative (and low risk) business.

French merchants not only were committed to the import of colonial goods, but also to the export of Central European manufactures. The success of Westphalian, Hessian and Silesian linen on the markets of the Atlantic basin has not yet been acknowledged to the extent it merits[14]. Through generations, Huguenot merchants in Ham-

12 StAH, Bestand 371-2 (Admiralitätskollegium), Sign. F6, vol. 20 (1755). This table has first been published in Klaus Weber, Les livres douaniers de l'Amirauté de Hambourg au XVIII[e] siècle, une source de grande valeur encore inexploitée, in: Bulletin du Centre d'Histoire des espaces atlantiques, nouvelle série 9 (1999) pp. 93–126.

13 Ibid. On the His merchant family, see also Eduard His, Chronik der Familie Ochs, genannt His, Basel 1943.

14 Yet, a few studies indicate enormous shares of German-made goods, e.g. Karin Newman, Anglo-Hamburg Trade in the Late Seventeenth and Early Eighteenth Centuries, London (unpublished Ph.D. thesis) 1979. Also see Jacob M. Price, Perry of London. A Family and a Firm on the Seaborn Frontier, 1615–1753, Cambridge, London 1992 (Harvard Historical Studies, 111), pp. 28–51, quote from p. 44; on the maritime textile trade: »... for physical volume we cannot but be impressed by the over 30,000 yards of ozenbrigs [linen from Osnabrück, Westphalia] and other German linens« that were figuring in

burg maintained close family links with their brethren living in French Atlantic port cities, and thus disposed of excellent commercial relations with the Atlantic world. Through such ties, »Pierre Boué & fils« were commissioned to send entire shiploads of linen from Hamburg to Spain, on behalf of the »Royal Caracas Company«. For this company, Boué also sent Baltic ships loaded with hemp, tar and timber – crucial supplies to Spanish shipyards. Involved in all these transactions were other Huguenots, among them Bernard Texier, Pierre His, Jean Boyer and Alexandre Bruguier, and Zimbert Amsinck, of Dutch Calvinist origin[15].

The important share of German manufacture in Atlantic trade is further underlined by cargo samples of slave ships leaving French ports for Africa. When the ship »Amiral« left Bordeaux in 1743, more than half of its 5,295 bales of textiles came from Hamburg:

Table 2: Freight of the French slave ship »Amiral«, 1743[16]

Original port of product	Quantity	Product
Hamburg	2,720 bales	cotton and linen
Nantes	1,440 bales	cotton and linen
Rouen	675 bales	cotton and linen
Amsterdam	260 bales	cotton and linen
Amsterdam		rifles, ammunition
Amsterdam		iron, copper
France		spirits

It may be suggested that a considerable share of this flow of goods was handled through Huguenot commercial networks. When Johann Georg Büsch, himself a successful Hamburg merchant, in his »Essay on the History of Hamburg Trade« (1797) mentioned the success of Silesian linen on export markets, he attributed this to the replication of quality linen that had originally been produced in French Brittany. He underlined this in providing the example of a French ship leaving the port of Lorient (Brittany) for the Guinea Coast, in 1720, with a cargo made up primarily of Silesian linen[17]. The transfer of textile know-how from France to Silesia has always been attributed to Huguenot weavers and Hamburg merchants.

the company's books. See further Klaus Weber, The Atlantic Coast of German Trade: German Rural Industry and Trade in the Atlantic, 1680–1840, in: Itinerario, European Journal of Overseas History 26 (2/2002) pp. 99–119.

15 Archives départementales de la Gironde (Bordeaux), sign. 7B 1784, letters by Boué to Jean Pellet (Bordeaux), dated 26 September 1729, 23 November 1731, 7 December 1731, 28 March 1735, 27 May 1735, and numerous letters June to November 1735.

16 Eric Saugera, Bordeaux port négrier. Chronologie, économie, idéologie, XVII^{e}–XIX^{e} siècles, Biarritz, Paris 1995, pp. 246, 352.

17 Johann Georg Büsch, Versuch einer Geschichte der Hamburgischen Handlung, nebst zwei kleineren Schriften verwandten Inhalts, Hamburg 1797, pp. 88–89.

It is said that Pierre Boué, the second merchant on the table given above, had escaped from Bordeaux hidden in an empty sugar barrel[18]. This might well be true, as French authorities preferred highly performing entrepreneurs to stay within the country – even if they were heretics. Yet, in Hamburg, Boué served his King probably better than he could have in France. In 1719, with his brother Jacques, he founded a shipyard in Altona and started building warships and merchantmen for the French East India Company. In 1723, the Hamburg Senate managed to attract this business to its own port, where throughout the century it was considered to be the major shipyard of the city. By 1732, it had delivered at least 22 ships to the Company, among them battleships of 500 tons, carrying 50 guns each[19]. In this sector too, French investors were taking advantage of labour and raw material that were cheaper than in France. Jean Meyer concluded that Boué is just one example from an important group of emigrant Huguenots – who, he added, are rarely mentioned – who contributed considerably to the rise of French naval power in the times of Louis XIV, thus contributing to the power of the suppressor of their own religion[20].

The essential role of economic factors in the choice of Hamburg as a Huguenot refuge is further backed by the unwelcoming conditions of social life that the French experienced at this place. According to Frank Schrader's thorough survey of the social integration of German merchants in Bordeaux versus the integration of Huguenot traders in Hamburg, it was much easier for the Germans to melt into the urban society of Bordeaux than it was for the French to integrate into Hamburg's bourgeois community[21]. Franz Peter His and Peter Boué (Hamburg-born sons of the above mentioned His and Boué) were actively engaged in the foundation of a »Patriotic Association« (*Patriotische Gesellschaft*, founded 1765) and involved with the – abortive – experiment of a »German National Theatre« (*Deutsches Nationaltheater*, 1767). The maritime merchants Jean Pierre Vidal, Guilleaumont His, Pierre Texier and Guilleaume Courtrier were important protagonists of early Hamburg masonry, with the lodges being active in cultural exchange among the numerous ethnic and religious groups within the city's economic elite[22]. But in spite of considerable efforts on the side of the immigrants, the Lutheran oligarchy remained firmly closed towards them. An examination of the marriages of the Boué family members confirms Schrader's views.

18 Hamburgisches Geschlechterbuch, vol. 13, Limburg 1996, pp. 43–132, here pp. 52–53.

19 Jean MEYER, Marchands et negociants allemands dans la France de l'ouest aux XVII[e] et XVIII[e] siècles, in: Etudes Germaniques 37-2 (1982) pp. 187–210, here pp. 201–202. I am indebted to Dr Pierrick Pourchasse (Université de Brest) for kindly providing further details to Meyer's list.

20 Ibid. p. 200.

21 Fred E. SCHRADER, Handel und Aufklärungssoziabilität in Hamburg und Bordeaux, 1750–1820, in: Jean MONDOT, Catherine LARRÈRE (eds), Lumières et commerce. L'exemple bordelais, Frankfurt a. M., Bern, New York 2000, pp. 67–87.

22 KOPITZSCH, Franzosen (see note 8), p. 290. A first »Patriotic Association« had already been created in 1724, but, according to its own 1726 manifesto »Der Patriot«, it was rigidly Lutheran and claimed to »ensure that only one faith is predominant without prejudice«. The second, in which the Huguenots were involved, was rather intended to transcend »the worship of tradition without rejecting it; they thought in terms of useful projects, of the manipulation of an environment which their predecessors had thought of as God-given and immutable.« These quotes from WHALEY, Religious Toleration (see note 6), pp. 201–202.

Out of the 36 Boué marriages listed by a genealogical handbook for the period 1700–1800 (covering both male and female family members), 28 alliances were concluded with partners of French origin. Most of these partners were from Hamburg or Altona, some of them from France. Only after 1790, when French naval and colonial power began to crumble, were non-French partners sought more frequently. Yet, these were not of German, but rather British origin[23]. The Huguenots themselves can hardly have caused this failure of social integration, as comparison with the Hamburg merchants established in Bordeaux easily shows. Among the Hanseats in this French city, exogamic marriage was most widely spread, and many of them allied with Huguenot families. Unlike in Hamburg, even the Portuguese Jewish merchant bankers were integrated into the Bordeaux mercantile community. However far acculturation and social integration of immigrants in Hamburg had come, it had been entirely due to their own efforts and achievements.

Schrader suggests that the main reason for the exclusive strategies of Hamburg's autochthonous burgers may be found in the city's political situation: the burgers were the masters of a sovereign city state, and they therefore defended their privileges against any immigrants. Yet, Lutheran merchants from all over Northern Germany easily melted into the very elite. In Bordeaux, the situation was very different: throughout centuries, this city had been struggling with the central power of the monarchy, and this facilitated alliances of the Catholic merchants' elite with traders of any other religious profession or nationality. In Hamburg, common interests that fostered integration across ethnic, religious and social lines of division emerged for the first time during the Napoleonic occupation, when a hitherto unknown patriotism to some extent united Lutheran burgers and migrant minorities[24].

Not only were Hamburg's Huguenot traders wealthy, but so was their parish. In 1750, its funds exceeded 75,000 Marks banco. Since its early years, the community continuously supported suffering coreligionists, e.g. the impoverished Brandenburg community (1688) and Calvinists expelled from Salzburg (1722)[25]. During the 18th century, the number of members of the Hamburg Huguenot community oscillated between 150 and 200. The community in Altona was of about the same size[26]. During the 19th century, when Britain had superceded France as the leading naval and colonial power, the French community shrank considerably, both in numbers and economic power. This, and the emergence of a more liberal mentality, contributed to a reduction of the previous socio-religious conflicts. Yet, the decline of the community was not halted. In 1910, there were barely 40 adult members, in a Lutheran city of almost one million inhabitants. The French had become a tiny minority within the group of Hamburg Calvinists, which then totalled some 8,100 members[27]. The most severe blow to the

23 Hamburgisches Geschlechterbuch, vol. 13, pp. 53–132.

24 SCHRADER, Handel (see note 21), pp. 81–84.

25 StAH, Bestand 521-4 (Französisch Reformierte Gemeinde). To illustrate the value of 75,000 Marks: At that time, the monthly wages of an experienced sailor hardly exceeded 35 Marks, those of a first mate 70 Marks.

26 KOPITZSCH, Franzosen (see note 8), p. 288. As Hamburg and Altona communties may have been overlapping, the total figure is likely to be far below 400, maybe even below 300.

27 StAH, Bestand 521-4 (Deutsche evangelisch-reformierte Gemeinde), Sign. IG 22/23, »Hamburgisches Gemeindeblatt«, 27 February 1910.

community had been the Franco-German war of 1870/71. Surprisingly, this blow had not come from outside, but from within.

During the war, when the Hanseatic city and many other German states sided with Prussia against France, the Calvinist Pastor Roehrich made it clear through patriotic addresses in his sermons and other public statements that the Huguenots were loyal citizens. Still, Roehrich was not a German nationalist[28], and this fact caused severe internal tensions with numerous members of the community, who expected him to take a more pronounced stand in favour of the German nation. This conflict resulted in the conversion of many members of the community. They preferred to become Lutheran, thus adhering to a faith group which unconditionally backed Prussian politics and its rather aggressive strategies in forging the nation state. A less radical alternative was to become attached to the German Calvinist denomination. It was in particular the members of the most eminent Huguenot families who converted, thus depriving the shrinking community of its social and economic backing[29]. Among those left behind, German family names prevailed. Once a generous donor, the parish had become a petitioner for financial support by the 1880s. Only the constant loyalty of its Swiss members enabled the small community to survive. By employing Swiss or Dutch born pastors who had been trained in Holland or Geneva, it maintained the cosmopolitan character that had always been a significant feature of the Huguenot refuge[30]. Only after World War II, did the French Calvinist community recover. In the 1970s, it counted some 200 members.

In this context, it may be of interest that many German merchant families who were established in French port cities for generations, without ever acquiring the citizenship of the host nation, did formally become French subjects during the 1870/71 war. Given its size and economic preponderance, it is notably the German community in Bordeaux that invites comparison[31]. In this case, however, the religious affiliations of the German minority was not affected. The similarities illustrate to what extent 19th century nationalism particularly galvanised the minorities of the societies involved in conflict[32].

Ironically, the elite of the Huguenot minority converted to Lutheranism at the very moment when it became possible to maintain their traditional Calvinist faith without facing discrimination. The new German nation state was created under the auspices of

28 StAH, Bestand 521-4, Sign. I Da 3a, includes sermons and public addresses by Roehrich, 1871. Also see Otto Wedekind, Die Réfugiés. Blätter zur Erinnerung an den zweijährigen Jahrestag der Aufhebung des Edicts von Nantes, Hamburg 1885, p. 65.

29 Kopitzsch, Franzosen (see note 8), p. 288.

30 StAH, Bestand 521-4 (Französisch Reformierte Gemeinde), Sign. 6, Protokollbuch 1852–1884, pp. 163, 212, 215, 221. Also see Peter Boué, Abriß der Geschichte der französisch-reformierten Gemeinde in Hamburg bis zum Jahre 1976, in: Hans W. Wagner (ed.), Hugenotten in Hamburg, Stade, Altona. Tagungsschrift zum Deutschen Hugenottentag in Hamburg, 23 to 26 April 1976, Obersickte 1976, pp. 14–22, see pp. 17–18.

31 Karin Dietrich-Chenel, Naturalisations et admissions à domicile d'Allemands à Bordeaux au XIXe siècle (jusqu'au 10 mai 1871), in: Alain Ruiz (ed.), Présence de l'Allemagne à Bordeaux du siècle de Montaigne à la veille de la Seconde Guerre mondiale. Hommage au Goethe-Institut de Bordeaux, à l'occasion de son 25e anniversaire, Bordeaux 1997, pp. 115–135; Michel Espagne, Bordeaux – Baltique. La présence culturelle allemande à Bordeaux aux XVIIIe et XIXe siècles, Bordeaux 1991, pp. 224–232.

32 See also the article of Mareike König in this volume.

a Prussian elite that overtly emphasised the importance of Lutheranism as an essential element of German national identity. Nevertheless, equal rights were granted to all citizens, regardless of their religious beliefs, in order to achieve loyal support from the entire population. For the first time in the history of the Hanseatic Cities[33], this standard in civil rights had been achieved, made possible only by exchanging the sovereignty of a city-state for membership of a powerful modern nation state. Yet, many Huguenots obviously found the prospects that were now offered even more promising if they, too, professed the Lutheran form of Protestantism, or at least the German Calvinist one. After all, the new nation had been forged through the combined military effort of the hitherto separated German states against France, still regarded as a Catholic country. These circumstances made it even more opportune to demonstrate national zeal through conversion to the triumphant faith.

This episode of Hamburg Huguenot history may be an example in support of the widespread assumption that proselytes often are the most ardent representatives of their newly acquired standpoint. Single examples are, of course, not representative, but it is hard to resist mentioning one member of the Boué family who, during the mid-1930s, maintained a brief correspondence with Adolf Hitler. In a devoted letter he sent him a genealogical table of the Hitler family, the result of his own investigation of historical and genealogical matters[34]. This may well be just one isolated case, yet it indicates to what extent the general pressure generated by aggressive German nationalism encouraged marginal groups to explicitly testify to their own loyalty to the Nazi state and its ideology. This was favoured by the fact that already within the German nationalist paradigm that had emerged in the 19th century, Huguenots were represented as »best Germans«. The French settlers in 18th century Prussian provinces were described as valuable agents in the process of colonising the autochthonous Slav population, considered an inferior race. These ideas even had their impact on the racist Nazi-ideologist Alfred Rosenberg, and far beyond[35].

As mentioned above, the Revocation of the Edict of Nantes is an important event even in a German commemoration of European history. Yet, in Hamburg neither the

33 It should be added: Excepting the years of Napoleonic occupation.

34 StAH, Bestand 622-1, Familie Boué, 3, Foto eines Stammbaums Adolf Hitlers; Abschrift eines Briefes Adolf Hitler an Boué 11.10.1934.

35 Max Beheim-Schwarzbach, Hohenzollernsche Colonisationen. Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte des preußischen Staates und der Colonisationen Deutschlands, Leipzig 1874. Also see Viviane Rosen-Prest, L'historiographie des Huguenots en Prusse au temps des Lumières. Entre mémoire, histoire et légende: Jean Pierre Erman et Pierre Chrétien Frédéric Reclam, Mémoires pour servir à l'histoire des Réfugiés françois dans les États du Roi (1782–1799), Paris 2002 (Vie des Huguenots, 23), pp. 532–550. On Rosenberg see Ursula Fuhrich-Grubert, Hugenotten unterm Hakenkreuz. Studien zur Geschichte der Französischen Kirche in Berlin 1933–1945, Berlin, New York 1994, pp. 422–425. On the occasion of the tercentenary of the Edicts of Fontainebleau and Potsdam, these ideas still resonated in a few commemorative articles published in the Huguenot church press; e.g. Günter Bransch, Fremde und ihre Wirkungen. Versuch einer Einschätzung der Gesamtbedeutung der Hugenotten, in: Reformierte Kirchenzeitung (RKZ), 15 August 1985, pp. 219–222, here pp. 219–220. With his consideration of »French blood«, its impact on Eastern German nobility, and contribution to a superior German culture on the frontier to »barbarism«, Bransch referred to Otto Heinrich von der Gablentz, Tragik des Preußentums, Munich 1948, pp. 33–34. Bransch was *Generalsuperintendent* of the Calvinist community in Potsdam (German Democratic Republic).

bicentenary nor the tercentenary of the Edicts of Fontainebleau and Potsdam were reflected in respective celebrations. The bicentenary was in 1885, when Chancellor Bismarck's *Kulturkampf* was still opposing the state against the German Catholics, whom he considered not to be loyal subjects because of their close relations with Rome. This conflict, that had lasted for a decade, had been a serious threat to the integrity of German Catholicism. After the conflicts within Hamburg's French Calvinist community, which were incited by precisely this issue of nationalist loyalty and its implication to faith, the remaining Huguenots preferred to keep a low profile on this occasion.

In 1985, the tercentenary was not reflected in the agenda of the French Calvinist parish, either. Celebrations were held in other German places of Huguenot refuge, like Potsdam and Hesse, but nothing similar was organised in the Hanseatic city. In the memory of the city's broader public, this community was barely present[36]. Yet, ten years earlier, in 1976, the »Convention of German Huguenots« (*Deutscher Hugenottentag*) had taken place in Hamburg. In his public address, the city's First Mayor Hans-Ulrich Klose mentioned the intolerance that the French suffered during their early years of exile in this place. Curiously, it was the representative of the Citizenry (*Bürgerschaft*, the city's parliament) who claimed that a tradition of open-mindedness and republican liberalism had always facilitated the integration of migrant minorities into the city's society[37]. But, when tolerance had been at stake, it had been precisely the predecessor of this political body that in the past had often acted against the more liberal stances of the Mayors and the Senate.

This paper does by no means intend to diminish the cruelty of religious intolerance exercised in France during the reign of Louis XIV. Still, the example of the French immigrants in Hamburg shows that the common image of the Huguenots as a faith group whose migration was caused exclusively by religious oppression does not always reflect the complexity of the historical events. In the case of Hamburg, economic reasons were by far the dominating factor for choosing this place. The city cannot even therefore be considered a Huguenot refuge, at least not in the strict sense of the term. This reminds us in very general terms that in many cases a fairly frequent narrative pattern on migration – depicting minority groups as victims of oppression who in the end overcome all hardship and succeed – may merit further questioning. Furthermore, this example illustrates how the conditions of an Early Modern city-state allowed a minority to maintain its cultural and religious identity, and many of these conditions even forced them to do so. It was not the intolerance of an Early Modern host society that almost caused the community's disintegration, but the emergence of modern 19th century nationalism. The liberal ideas with which this nationalism was blended allowed for a religious freedom hitherto unknown. However, the informal pressures exercised within an increasingly ideologised society caused the elite of Hamburg's Huguenots to abandon their traditional faith and community. The subsequent dissolution of the community's social and ethnic structure is one of the reasons why today the history of Hamburg Huguenots is hardly present in the commemorative practice of the city's broader public.

36 See the 1985 issues of RKZ, and Hamburg's major daily paper *Hamburger Abendblatt*, October 1985 issues.

37 Wagner, Hugenotten in Hamburg, Stade, Altona (see note 30), pp. 8–9.

MAREIKE KÖNIG

Celebrating the Kaiser's Birthday German Migrants in Paris after the Franco-Prussian War 1870/71

Migrants are ›strangers‹ in a new environment. They find themselves confronted with collective assumptions, almost exclusively defined by the host society. Their individual means of influence are rather limited[1]. This situation can be difficult for migrants, and it gets even worse, when assumptions towards a group of migrants change suddenly and positive images are replaced by negative stereotypes.

An estimated 60,000 German-speaking migrants in Paris had to deal with this situation when the Franco-Prussian War broke out in 1870. Having lived mostly peaceful and respected lives in the French capital, they suddenly became internal enemies. Although the public opinion and reaction was mixed, anti-Prussian atmosphere arouse on the Parisian streets at that time[2]. Daily life became unpleasant and even dangerous for the German-speaking migrants. Violence and events such as break-ins, destruction of German-owned stores, anonymous threatening letters and calls for denunciations in the French press occurred[3]. While the French government first tried to keep German men aged under 40 from leaving Paris, fearing they would join the Prussian troops, all Germans were expelled after the defeat at Sedan on 2 September 1870.

In fact, the war turned out to be a crucial break in the history of German immigration to France in the 19th century[4]. In the aftermath, French legislation became disadvantageous for German migrants, their representation in French publications was mostly negative, a flood of rouble-rousing propaganda was published, and the attitude of large parts of the population became hostile. On the German side, warnings were published not to immigrate to France. Those who left despite the warnings were described as irresponsible and reckless, and exaggerated narratives of French *revanche* circulated.

1 Jan Motte, Rainer Ohliger, Einwanderung – Geschichte – Anerkennung. Auf den Spuren geteilter Erinnerungen, in: Id. (eds), Geschichte und Gedächtnis in der Einwanderungsgesellschaft. Migration zwischen historischer Rekonstruktion und Erinnerungspolitik, Essen 2004, pp. 17–49, here p. 17.

2 Geoffrey Wawro, The Franco-Prussian War. The German Conquest of France in 1870–1871, Cambridge 2003; Stéphane Audoin-Rouzeau, 1870. La France dans la guerre, Paris 1989; Id., French public opinion in 1870–71 and the emergence of total war, in: Stig Förster, Jörg Nagler (eds), On the Road to Total War. The American Civil War and the German Wars of Unification 1861–75, Cambridge 1997.

3 Der Schutz der Deutschen in Frankreich 1870 und 1871. Briefwechsel des außerordentlichen Gesandten und bevollmächtigten Ministers der Vereinigten Staaten für Frankreich E. B. Washburne in Paris vom 17. Juli 1870 bis zum 29. Juni 1871. Ausgewählt, übersetzt und mit einer Einleitung versehen von Adolf Hepner, Stuttgart 1907, pp. 146–147.

4 Paul Lévy, La langue allemande en France, Pénétration et diffusion des origines à nos jours, vol. II, De 1830 à nos jours, Paris 1952, p. 5.

All this not only affected the quantity and the composition of the German community in Paris as far as profession and sex ratio were concerned, but it also had other consequences. Migrants' identities were troubled, their visibility and distribution over the city, their self-representation and commemorating practices were changed and questioned[5]. At the same time, a wave of enthusiasm for the fatherland triggered among German migrants worldwide[6]. As a result, German migrants adopted several strategies which can be subsumed in two main – and at first sight contradictory – behaviours: not attracting attention and hiding national identity on the one hand, strong cohesion and efforts to shape a collective identity on the other.

The first part of this article aims at looking at the changes in the migrants' attitude and behaviour after 1871 as well as at different interpretations and representations of this behaviour. The various perspectives are outlined by opposing official sources, census data, published and unpublished observations from French and German contemporaries and some rare migrants' narratives. The second part of the article is concentrated on associations and festivals of German migrants which show that nation and language had become the most important features of their identity.

I. IMPACTS OF THE WAR

With the outbreak of the war in 1870, the life and activities of the German communities in Paris almost came to a complete stillstand. German Schools and hostels were closed, associations dissolved. The expulsion *decret* only gave three days for the Germans to leave Paris, but not all of them left. Approximately 5,000 German migrants stayed in the town during the siege and the Paris Commune[7]. Most of them were part of the destitute communities living in the southern and in the northern part of the city. They were too poor, too old or too sick to leave and kept hiding themselves for weeks in their little huts, constantly threatened by their neighbours. Members of the U.S. embassy, who had accepted the Prussian demand to protect citizens of the *Norddeutscher Bund* during the war, supplied some of the families with money, food, and firewood[8]. Alsatian pastors held services in German and visited the families touched by cholera.

However, after the war German migrants came back to Paris, despite the propaganda on both sides of the Rhine and the warnings published by German authorities. The 1872 census already counted 15,739 Germans in the French capital. Ten years after the war, in 1881, the community comprised 31,160 Germans and was thus back to its pre-war level according to the official data (see table 1). Yet, contemporary estima-

5 From the extensive literature about the notion »identity« see for instance Aleida ASSMANN, Heidrun FRIESE (eds), Identitäten, Frankfurt a. M. 1998; Lutz NIETHAMMER, Kollektive Identität. Heimliche Quellen einer unheimlichen Konjunktur, Reinbek 2000.

6 See Stefan MANZ, ›Wir stehen fest zusammen | zu Kaiser und zu Reich!‹: Nationalism among Germans in Britain, 1871–1918, in: German Life and Letters, October 2002, pp. 398–415.

7 Der Schutz der Deutschen in Frankreich 1870 und 1871 (see note 3).

8 WAWRO, The Franco-Prussian War (see note 2), pp. 295–296; Der Schutz der Deutschen in Frankreich 1870 und 1871 (see note 3).

tions give a different impression. According to German sources, there were between 60,000 and 80,000 German-speaking migrants in Paris before the war, about 20,000 to 30,000 migrants in 1873[9], and 40,000 in 1885[10]. Based upon this information, the German community in Paris was halved in the aftermath of the war. French contemporary non-official sources vary: whereas rather neutral observers see the total number of Germans as having diminished, anti-Prussian pamphlets report an increase of up to 100,000 Germans in Paris after 1871[11], which they suspected to be Prussian spies and agents preparing the next war[12].

Table 1: Number of Germans in Paris, 1851–1886[13]

Year	Census	German estimations	French estimations
1851	12,245		
1861	27,097		
1866	30,456	80–60,000	40,000
1872	15,739	20,000	
1876	19,024		
1881	31,160	40,000	40–100,000
1886	30,229		

However, quantity is not the decisive point when talking about changes in the German community in Paris after the Franco-Prussian war. It is the composition of the immigrant population that is more important. Next to general changes in German industry and population, it reflects the migrants' adaptation to the new situation. Until 1871, the overwhelming majority of the German migrants consisted of unqualified workers and their families, performing hard physical work on one of the numerous Parisian construction sites or in the sugar, chemical or other industry[14]. After the war, mostly young and single working persons from the German Empire came to Paris: qualified workers, employees, traders, domestic servants and waiters[15]. For them, Paris kept its attraction as a place to earn money, especially during the period of the world exhibitions in 1889 and 1900. Thus, in La Villette, besides the Hessian street sweepers, richer migrants, workers and foremen, especially from the leather and fur

9 Archiv Christuskirche Paris, 110-1, Jahresbericht des Comités zur kirchlichen Pflege der Deutschen in Paris für 1872/73, p. 5.

10 Cf. Die Mysterien der deutschen Kolonie in Paris. I. Deutsche Noth und Ihr Hülfsverein von Vega, Paris 1885.

11 Paul Mahalin, Les Allemands chez nous: Metz, Strasbourg, Paris (1838–1899), Paris 1885, p. 347.

12 Lucien Nicot, Les Allemands à Paris, Paris 1887, p. 14; Édouard Rod, Les Allemands à Paris, Paris ²1880.

13 The total number of the Parisian population was 2,714,068 in 1901.

14 Mareike König, Brüche als gestaltendes Element: Die Deutschen in Paris im 19. Jahrhundert, in: Id. (ed.), Deutsche Handwerker, Arbeiter und Dienstmädchen in Paris. Eine vergessene Migration im 19. Jahrhundert, München 2003, pp. 9–26.

15 Käthe Schirmacher, Die Ausländer und der Pariser Arbeitsmarkt (Gibt es auf dem Arbeitsmarkt in Paris eine Arbeitsteilung nach Nationalitäten?), in: Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik 27 (1908) pp. 234–259, pp. 477–512, here p. 479.

industry, settled. As a result, the social level of this community in the north of Paris was »clearly risen«[16].

According to the 1901 census, 74 percent of the German women and 91 percent of the German men in Paris were employed. Especially for the women, this was a much higher percentage compared to other migrant communities (e.g. 49 percent Italian women)[17]. The Germans also formed the ›youngest‹ community in Paris: 40 percent of the German women and 38 percent of the German men were aged from 21 to 30 according to the 1901 census[18]. Thus, almost half of its members were born after the Franco-Prussian War, a fact that might have played a role when they decided to migrate to France and ignore warnings of French revenge.

Table 2: Number of German women and men in Paris, 1881–1911 (official census)

Year	Women	Men	Total	Percentage of Women
1881	15,719	15,441	31,160	50%
1886	17,461	12,768	30,229	58%
1891	16,510	10,353	26,863	61%
1896	17,198	10,209	27,407	63%
1901	16,258	9,310	25,568	64%
1906	16,916	8,915	25,831	65%
1911	17,772	11,199	28,971	61%

The percentage of women in the German community became remarkably high. From 50 percent in 1881 it went up to 65 percent in 1906 (see table 2). The same phenomenon, but less intense, could be observed within the English community, whereas the other communities had a rather equal sex ratio. The growing feminisation of the German community can be partly explained by the high number of domestic servants[19]. German governesses and nannies were popular in French families – even after the war. But there is another explanation for the high female sex ratio. As the absolute number of German men was constantly shrinking until 1906, it was probably not the German women who were overrepresented in Paris, but the German men who were underrepresented. They chose other cities than the French capital in order to avoid being exposed to anti-German attacks. For instance, as a result of the political crisis in German-French relations in 1887 that almost provoked a new Franco-German war, the

16 »entschieden gehoben«, Friedrich Bansa, Die deutsche Hügelgemeinde in Paris 1858–1908. Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der deutschen evangelischen Auslandsdiaspora, Berlin 1908, p. 92.

17 Most of them had a stronger family characteristic, like the Italian community for example: 90 percent of Italian men and 49 percent of Italian women worked in Paris in 1901, cf. Résultats statistiques du recensement 1901.

18 This was true for only 28 percent and 34 percent of the Austrian, 27 percent and 18 percent of the Luxembourgian, 26 percent and 21 percent of the English, 18 percent and 20 percent of the Swiss, 24 percent and 27 percent of the Spanish and 21 percent and 18 percent of the Belgian women and men respectively.

19 Cf. Mareike König, »Bonnes à tout faire«. Deutsche Dienstmädchen in Paris im 19. Jahrhundert, in: Id. (ed.), Deutsche Handwerker (see note 14), pp. 69–92.

number of German men in Paris decreased by almost 10 percent whereas the number of German women went down by only 5 percent.

Whereas in the years before the war, La Villette, in the North of Paris, was called »petite Allemagne« by French workers[20], there was no equivalent after 1871. The German pastors had difficulties in reunifying their parishes in the years following the war, as the Germans lived »dispersed and reclusive«[21], afraid of being associated with the German community; »hatred against everyone confessing to be German was strong and fanatic«[22].

Looking at the allocation of the German migrants in Paris, statistics show that they were indeed rather equally spread over the urban area and its 20 arrondissements. 10 percent of the German population in the 9th district was the highest percentage to be found, whereas 22 percent of the English community, for example, was living together in the 16th district[23]. This is true for all the post-war censuses: Germans – as far as statistics are concerned – did not appear as a consolidated and settled colony. This equal distribution of German migrants in Paris was presumably due to the fact that most migrants were single, young workers. So far, there is no evidence that – like in the Jewish community – earlier German migrants organised the dispersal of the new arrivals to avoid anti-German attacks[24].

Astonishingly, we do not get a different picture when looking at the – though incomplete – data of the pre-war census in 1866. No more than 10 percent of the German population lived together in the same district in that year either, only the absolute number was higher (2,400 against 3,019). Still, for the pre-war period contemporary French and German observers noted that some 300 German families were living together in what was then called »cités allemands«.

If massive accumulation of German migrants in several areas in Paris before 1870 is but a myth, like it has been shown for other communities[25], the difference could be that after the war, the Germans were less recognisable and less perceptible because of a change in behaviour. In fact, one observation is pointed out consistently by all sources, no matter of what political background. After 1870, German migrants in Paris were hiding their national identity. They pretended to be of Swiss, Luxemburg, Austrian, Alsatian ... or other German-speaking origin – anything but Prussian.

This practice was especially common among the female domestics. As nannies and teachers they had to be German-speaking, but not necessarily from the German Empire. Most of the French did not recognise the difference among various German

20 Jules MATHOREZ, La pénétration allemande au XIXe siècle, in: Revue des études historiques 89 (1923) pp. 71–112.

21 »zerstreut und zurückgezogen«, Jahresbericht des Comités zur kirchlichen Pflege (see note 9).

22 Sarepta Archiv Bielefeld, Sar 1/257, Die Deutschen evangelischen Gemeinden A.C. zu Paris, Pfarrer Anthes, Broschüre, 1902, pp. 6–7.

23 Résultats statistiques du recensement de 1901, volume 1, pp. 314–315.

24 Alain FAURE, Comment devenait-on Parisien? La question de l'intégration dans le Paris de la fin du XIXe siècle, in: Jean-Louis ROBERT, Danielle TARTAKOWSKY (eds), Paris le peuple XVIIIe–XXe siècle, Paris 1999, pp. 37–57, here p. 50.

25 Ibid. pp. 45–46.

dialects. Thus, it was easy to claim a different but German origin in order to avoid being put on a level with the hated Prussians[26].

The migrants' practice of denying their German origin was known and denunciated in French publications and the daily press. It reinforced and nourished the widespread idea of Prussian agents being omnipresent. It also led to the highly exaggerated estimations concerning the number of German migrants in Paris mentioned above. According to these sources, German migrants falsified census data by giving wrong answers when asked about their national identity[27].

However, confusion was common as language and national origin were mixed up by both, French and Germans. As a result, migrants from all the German-speaking countries had to deal with French suspicion. The Luxembourg women who profited largely from the »massive dismissal«[28] of German domestics in 1870, had to face distrust, as a lot of Luxembourg village names ended with a German sounding »-burg«[29]. French authorities expressly instructed their civil servants not to mix up German-speaking migrants from Luxemburg and Alsace with those from the German Empire[30]. A governess, born in a small village in Holstein (under Danish administration before becoming Prussian in 1866), was declared by the grandfather of the family she was working in as being Danish and not Prussian[31]. This interpretation helped him to accept her – now officially a Prussian – in his house.

A second way of hiding one's origin was not to speak German in public. The advice to avoid the German language was given by several contemporary observers, and many migrants seemed to have followed this advice. In this regard, their behaviour had undergone a change compared to the period before 1870. For the pre-war period, both French and German observers described for example Faubourg Saint-Antoine as a district where the German language could be heard everywhere and where entire workshops were filled with German-speaking workers[32].

One example shows that the guilt and fear of German migrants was internalised: The governess from Holstein mentioned above reports that after a concert given by the German singing association she had some difficulties in getting back her coat. Apparently, several German men were almost thrashing each other in order to be first in

26 König, Deutsche Dienstmädchen (see note 19). See as well the critical novel about living and working conditions of German governesses in Paris by Marie Louise Becker, Der grüne Unterrock, Dresden 1914.

27 Cf. Archives de la Préfecture de Police (APP), D/b 302, *La France*, 1 March 1895; Nicot, Les Allemands à Paris (see note 12) p. 12.

28 Antoinette Reuter, Les luxembourgeois en France et à Paris (XIX^{e} siècle), in: Migrance 20 (2002) pp. 50–59, here p. 58.

29 Germaine Goetzinger, »Da lôßt mech an den Dengscht gôen.« Zur Sozial- und Alltagsgeschichte der Dienstmädchen, in: Id., Antoinette Lorang, Renée Wagner (eds), »Wenn nun wir Frauen auch das Wort ergreifen ...«. Frauen in Luxemburg – Femmes au Luxembourg 1880–1950, Luxembourg 1997, pp. 192–205, here p. 195.

30 Archives de Paris (AP), V. ONC 196, Renvoi des ouvriers allemands occupés dans les chantiers municipaux 1887.

31 Deutsches Tagebucharchiv e. V. Emmendingen (DTA), 54, 1, Letter of Jenny Schaumann, 20 December 1885; see also Mareike König, Itinéraires des domestiques allemandes à Paris vers 1900: sources, méthodes et interprétations, in: Sextant 21/22 (2004) pp. 77–109.

32 Schifflein Christi 2 (January 1864) p. 26.

the queue. She turned to her companion, speaking out loud in French so that everyone could hear, and made remarks about the typically rude behaviour of Germans. As a result, so she says, the German men – thinking she was French – became very embarrassed and kept excusing themselves to her great joy and satisfaction[33]. This is a funny example, in which guilt and fear were used as a weapon among the migrants themselves. It would be interesting to get more information about what effect the hiding of one's national origin and language had on German migrants. Was it just a game, a means to avoid trouble or did it seriously affect identity?

Surely, these examples can only illustrate some tendencies. As we deal with individuals, the range of possible behaviour is wide and things were certainly different for German migrants of other social backgrounds. The lack of sources is a problem in this respect. We do not know whether the Hessian migrants for example, mostly employed as street sweepers, were hiding their origin and language in public. But we do have evidence that most of them never learned French, that they lived closely together and hardly had any contact with the Parisian population. This holds true for the time before and after the war[34]. Isolation and poverty were thus perceived as the two main characteristics of the day labourer communities by French journalists. German observers agreed. Especially the Hessians were said to be tenaciously holding on to their German origin, language, habits and customs[35], something that satisfied the pastors as the German parishes relied to a large part on them. But there was a difference in interpretation. The isolation of the German migrants, according to some German sources, was not chosen but imposed by French society and the state[36].

We have different observations for the German labourers in industry. They were said to have been in good and even private contact with their French colleagues. Never was anything heard of disputes, and a silent French-German approach emerged in the shadow of diplomatic efforts, according to a German contemporary newspaper in Paris in 1906[37]. In contradiction to that, research testifies to the difficulties of German labourers and craftsmen in the Parisian working world after 1871. They were subject to strikes and some of them got work only from employers that were of German origin themselves[38]. It is impossible to measure the quantity of these different experiences of isolation – self-chosen or not – and integration.

However, the Hessian street-sweepers were the ones directly affected by policies of the French Third Republic protecting national work and thus favouring French workers to be employed in civil service. In 1887, a letter by the Parisian »Direction de Service municipal de travaux« circulated, instructing the head engineers of the different »Sections de la voie publique« to dismiss all »subjects from the German Empire«[39] if

33 Letter of Jenny Schaumann, 1 May 1884 (see note 2309).
34 BANSA, Die deutsche Hügelgemeinde (see note 15).
35 Ibid.
36 Wilhelm VON DER RECKE (ed.), »Fluctuat nec mergitur ... «, Deutsche Evangelische Christuskirche Paris 1894–1994. Beiträge zur Geschichte der lutherischen Gemeinden deutscher Sprache in Paris und Frankreich, Sigmaringen 1994, p. 69.
37 *Pariser Zeitung*, 27 January 1906, p. 1.
38 Henri WEHENKEL, La Tour de France d'un typographe luxembourgeois, in: ID. (ed.), Luxembourg – Paris – Luxembourg. Migrations au temps de la Commune, Luxemburg 2001, pp. 71–96, here p. 87.
39 A P, V. ONC 196, Cantonniers allemands.

they did not ask for naturalisation. Apparently, most of the Hessians did not want to become French and therefore went back to their home villages[40]. As a result, the protestant community in La Villette shrank and consisted of no more than 600 families in 1888. Half of them were of Hessian origin, mostly naturalised. Still, they kept holding on to their mother language and their German way of life, they stayed members of the German church and sent their children to a German school[41].

II. PATRIOTISM AND CHARITY

During the same period, enthusiasm for the new fatherland arouse among the migrants and strong efforts were made to shape a national identity and to create national coherence among German migrants in Paris. This is known from other countries as well, due to a general movement in Germany at that period with the aim to look after the Germans abroad and strengthen the ties between emigrants and the homeland[42]. In some ways, the situation in Paris and in France was a particular one. The main actors were the Catholic and Protestant parishes, societies and organisations guided by nobles, wealthy merchants and craftsmen as well as the Imperial embassy. Their two principal aims were patriotism and charity: to help German migrants in difficult situations (so they would not be perceived as beggars with negative effects on the image of Germany), to protect young migrants against the insinuated »moral dangers« of the French capital, to strengthen the links between the migrants, and to shape a national identity they could refer to far away from home. Two means were employed for these aims: on the one hand organisations, associations and societies were formed. They served as vehicles for national culture, morality, and tradition. On the other hand national festivals referring to the actual and historic national background were celebrated.

1. Associations and societies

Associations and organisations play a central role in finding and keeping an ethnic identity among migrant communities. In a continual process, contents of this identity were defined by referring to special features of German ethnicity, and by constantly revitalising and reinterpreting these traits[43]. The link between nationalism, language

40 Few Hessians – mostly women – got a special permission to stay without naturalisation, because their sons served in the French army or because they were too old to be sent home. Ibid.

41 Bansa, Die deutsche Hügelgemeinde (see note 16), p. 91.

42 Jürgen Kloosterhuis, »Friedliche Imperialisten«. Deutsche Auslandsvereine und auswärtige Kulturpolitik, 1906–1918, 2 vol., Frankfurt a. M. 1994; Roger Chickering, We Men Who Feel Most German: a Cultural Study of the Pan-German League, 1886–1914, Boston 1984.

43 Anke Ortlepp, »Auf denn, Ihr Schwestern!«: Deutschamerikanische Frauenvereine in Milwaukee 1844–1914, Stuttgart 2003, pp. 12, 16; Meike Tiemeyer-Schütte, Das deutsche Sängerwesen in Südaustralien vor Ausbruch des ersten Weltkriegs zwischen Bewahrung von Deutschtum und Anglikanisierung, Münster 2000.

and German »Vereine« like singing societies, gymnastic clubs, and rifle clubs in the 19th century has been extensively explored by several researchers[44]. These associations combined political belief, public manifestations in ritual forms and social spare time activities and filled the term »nation« with emotion sometimes with aggressive and chauvinistic rhetoric. As a result, nation and language became the primary features of identity[45].

More than 60 German societies existed in Paris around 1900, which shows a high degree of organisation. Most of the associations were founded or re-founded after 1871, but not everything was new: the ecclesiastic parishes had already reunified the German-speaking migrants in Paris before the war with services, associations, and schools. The »Hülfsverein«, a benevolent organisation, financially supported by several German princes existed since 1844 and continued its work after 1871[46]. Associations like gymnastic clubs and singing societies – with or without political background – as well as job related societies and labour organisations had also existed in previous times.

After 1871, an extension and diversification among these organisations took place, especially as far as labour and women's associations were concerned. With the foundation of the German Empire, for the first time, a common national background existed. With the exception of most of the labour organisations, these societies – especially from 1900 onwards – referred to the new national and political background, its signs, symbols and representation. Nation and language were the primary features of this identity; religion and social class came second.

Five main types of organisations can be distinguished: 1. labour and political organisations, some of them laic, some under clerical charge; 2. associations attached to the parishes; 3. leisure and amusement societies, with or without political background and 4. organisations with a purely patriotic and militaristic background. 5. Benevolent societies.

Labour organisations, unifying migrants of the same profession, were by far the most frequent. Among these were the laic »Bookseller society« (Buchhändler-Verein), the »German commercial society« (Deutscher Kaufmännischer Verein), the »German-national commerce-trainee club« (Deutsch-Nationaler Handlungs-Gehilfen-Verband), the »Union of German waiters« (Deutscher Kellnerbund) and the »Society of female German teachers in France« (Verein Deutscher Lehrerinnen in Frankreich), to name but a few. Some of these labour organisations were branches of big German societies, like the »Society for trade-commission« (Verein für Handlungs-Commission v. 1858, Hamburg).

44 Cf. Stefan L. Hoffmann, Geselligkeit und Demokratie. Vereine und zivile Gesellschaft im transnationalen Vergleich 1750–1914, Göttingen 2003; Otto Dann (ed.), Vereinswesen und bürgerliche Gesellschaft in Deutschland, Munich 1984.

45 Dieter Düding, Die deutsche Nationalbewegung des 19. Jahrhunderts als Vereinsbewegung, in: Geschichte in Wissenschaft und Unterricht 10 (1991) pp. 601–624, here p. 609; Dietmar Klenke, Zwischen nationalkriegerischem Gemeinschaftsideal und bürgerlich-ziviler Modernität. Zum Vereinsnationalismus der Sänger, Schützen und Turner im Deutschen Kaiserreich, in: Geschichte in Wissenschaft und Unterricht 4 (1994) pp. 207–223.

46 The number of members had dropped from 674 in 1869 to 152 in 1873, cf. Franz Menges, Die deutschen Hilfsvereine in Frankreich vor dem ersten Weltkrieg, in: Francia 3 (1975) pp. 359–377, here p. 362.

Others were organised and financed by the parishes, like the »Society of Catholic Female teachers in Paris« (Katholischer Erzieherinnenverein in Paris), the »Catholic society of journeymen« (Katholischer Gesellenverein[47]), and the protestant »Young girls society« (Jungfrauenverein).

A political club was the »German social democratic reading club« (Deutscher sozialdemokratischer Leseklub), existing since 1877 and successful among German socialists who had to flee the German Empire because of Bismarck's *Sozialistengesetz*. Its members were involved in the founding of German language sections in the Parisian trade-unions, reunified in the »German trade-union cartel« (Deutsches Gewerkschaftskartell) in 1907[48].

Among the leisure organisations were several singing societies like the »Quartett-Verein«, founded in 1879, an acting society, the »Deutscher Schauspielverein«, gymnastic clubs like the »Deutscher Turnverein in Paris«, founded in 1877[49], dissolved by the French police in 1891 and then refounded in 1908[50] comprising the »German Soccerclub« (Deutscher Fußballclub). These associations followed also political aims and wanted to »develop the national-German idea«[51]. The French police counted them among the so called »pan-German« clubs[52].

As for the nationalist and militaristic clubs, the »German Navy club« (Deutscher Flottenverein) had a Parisian branch, founded in 1902 (30 members in 1913). The »German colonial society« (Deutsche Kolonialgesellschaft) also had a branch in Paris to help Germans coming back from the colonies to reintegrate or to inform those who wanted to go there[53].

This list, of course, is not exhaustive but gives an idea of the diversity and heterogeneity of these organisations. They differed in organisation and structure, in number and social background of their members, as well as in concrete aims and means[54].

As mentioned above, most of the associations followed patriotic and benevolent aims at the same time. On the one hand, they formed a network and supported Germans of the same profession with a job, money or lodging. On the other hand, they organised conferences, excursions, festivals, Christmas parties, tombolas, and often ran their own library, and thus participated in creating and keeping a »German-patriotic way of thinking«[55].

47 Sarah Neitzel, Priests and journeymen. The German Catholic »Gesellenverein« and the Christian social movement in the 19th century, Bonn 1988.

48 Gaël Cheptou, L'organisation syndicale des ouvriers de langue allemande à Paris 1900–1914, in: König, Deutsche Handwerker (see note 14), pp. 143–168.

49 To the role of sporting clubs in migration cf. Klemens Carl Wildt, Auswanderer und Emigranten in der Geschichte der Leibesübungen, Schorndorf bei Stuttgart 1965.

50 Archives du Ministère des Affaires Étrangères (MAE), Série C administrative 1908–1940, Nr. 251: Sociétés allemandes 1911–1914, Police Report, 12 August 1913.

51 Ibid., Police Report, 15 November 1913.

52 Ibid., Letter of the minister of the interior to the foreign minister, 18 July 1913.

53 Concerning military associations in general see Thomas Rohrkrämer, Der Militarismus der »kleinen Leute«. Die Kriegsvereine im Deutschen Kaiserreich 1871–1914, Munich 1990.

54 So far, no research has been done on German associations in Paris, neither on a particular society nor on the phenomena as a whole.

55 »deutsch-vaterländische Gesinnung«, Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amtes (PAAA), Paris 1672, C 53, Deutsche Vereine usw. in Paris, 1885–1914, Letter of Maris Schmitz to the Foreign Office, 30 July 1914.

According to a contemporary French observer, nothing did more than these associations to strengthen the bond between Germans living in France. No matter which party or confession they belonged to, all of them had kept the love of their fatherland and of the Kaiser and they all aimed to keep and reinforce the national feeling of Germans living in Paris[56]. The associations were also perceived as champions of »Germanness«[57] by the same French observer, stating that Germans would never lose an occasion to stress their patriotic feelings[58]. This could have been a reason for disputes between French and Germans. Yet, apparently the organisations were acting »noiselessly and without publicity«[59], according to a French observer in 1908. Only one reported incident was found in the archives (others probably existed): members of the »Verein für Handlungs-Commis« in Lyon were singing the German national anthem and pan-German and nationalist songs in a French café until French guests complained. From 1913 on, when activities became more visible, the French police kept a close eye on several of the organisations suspected of following pan-German aims[60].

The German official sides approved the grade and the content of the organisations among the migrants. The German consul v. Jecklin praised the loyalty the Germans in Paris proved towards their fatherland[61]. He was also pleased by the »beautiful German spirit« in the theatre plays and poems of the »Society of Catholic journeymen«[62]. The Foreign office, the embassy and the consulate granted money to several of these organisations (Protestant and Catholic). The ambassador, the consul and their wives also took over the presidency and chair of honour of some societies[63]. This support was probably a private engagement, as no evidence has been found so far of an extensive official strategy to advance German *Kulturpolitik* in France[64].

The bonds between the organisations seem to have been dense: with the »Union of German associations« (Verband deutscher Vereine), a sort of cartel was founded[65]; some societies had the same president; not only were official representatives invited to the reunions, festivals and soccer games[66] (and they followed these invitations), but the associations themselves sent speakers and greetings to other associations' events. There were dinners, concerts, theatre plays and balls with German waltzes and polkas that made you think »you were in the middle of Germany«[67].

56 Henri SCHOEN, Das Deutschtum in Paris, in: Deutsche Erde IX (1910) pp. 48–76, here 75–76.
57 »Deutschtum«, Henri SCHOEN, Les institutions allemandes en France, in: Revue alsacienne illustrée XI (1909) pp. 1–11, here p. 8.
58 Ibid. p. 10.
59 SCHOEN, Deutschtum in Paris (see note 56), p. 48.
60 MAE, Sociétés allemandes 1911–1914 (see note 49).
61 PAAA, Paris 1671, C 53, Deutsche Vereine und Wohlfahrtseinrichtungen in Frankreich, Letter of v. Jecklin, 2 November 1908.
62 »sehr erfreulichem deutschen Geist«, Ibid., letter of v. Jecklin to Ambassador Fürst Münster zu Derneburg, 27 April 1900.
63 MAE, Sociétés allemandes 1911–1914 (see note 49), Police Report 15 November 1913.
64 KLOOSTERHUIS, Deutsche Auslandsvereine (see note 42).
65 Ibid., Police Report 29 November 1913.
66 PAAA, Paris 1671, C 53 (see note 61), Deutscher Fußballverein, First official match 5 September 1913.
67 SCHOEN, Les institutions allemandes (see note 57), p. 6.

2. National Festivals

Festivals are an important way of bringing migrants together and of creating a common identity. They serve as a bridge between the past and the future, the individual and the group. Festivals build a sense of community and give cultural and social meaning to the lives of migrants[68]. They are also a means to visualise political contents and to create a framework of recognisable and durable structures to keep the fatherland alive in a ritual way[69]. In the German Empire, the *Sedantag* (the defeat of the French troops in the Franco-Prussian war) and the emperor's birthday were stylised as the two national festivals. This enshrinement of the war and the emperor was appreciated by bourgeois circles but not by socialists and Catholics[70]. In Paris, this was different. For obvious reasons, the *Sedantag* was not celebrated, neither by the embassy nor by societies and associations, at least not officially[71]. It was the emperor's birthday that achieved the status of a national festival in the German community in Paris, and the Kaiser's 25th anniversary of his rule in 1913 was even celebrated by Catholic parishes.

We do not know when German migrants in Paris came together for the first time to celebrate this event. In Marseille, it was in 1882 that the German consul informed the *Préfet* about a birthday dinner in a French restaurant organised for about 40 Germans. He gave assurence that by celebrating the Kaiser's birthday the Germans did not want to offend French public. Thus, no exterior emblems would be exposed nor would the Emperor's bust be set up in the dining room of the restaurant[72]. Due to Franco-German relations, pro-emperor migrants had to be more cautious than the German benevolent society in Moscow, for example, where a statue of Wilhelm I was erected next to Alexander II in the Garden of the Friedrich-Wilhelm-Victoria-Stift or the Germans in London[73].

In 1902 for the first time, a church service was held in the German Protestant *Christuskirche* in Paris to celebrate the birthday of the Kaiser. The congregations were affiliated to the Prussian state church and it was the idea of the German ambassador,

68 Heike Bungert, »Feast of fools«: German-American Carnival as a Medium of Identity Formation, 1854–1914, in: Amerikastudien 48.3 (2003) pp. 325–344.

69 Günter Riederer, Staatliche Macht und ihre symbolische Repräsentation in einer umstrittenen Region. Die Besuche von Kaisern und Staatsoberhäuptern in »Elsaß-Lothringen« 1857–1918, in: Helga Schnabel-Schüle (ed.), Vergleichende Perspektiven – Perspektiven des Vergleichs, Mainz 1998, pp. 383–417, here p. 386.

70 Fritz Schellack, Sedan- und Kaisergeburtstagsfeste, in: Dieter Düding, Peter Friedemann, Paul Münch (eds), Öffentliche Festkultur. Politische Feste in Deutschland von der Aufklärung bis zum Ersten Weltkrieg, Reinbek 1988, pp. 278–297; Allan Mitchell, Nationalfeiertage im Vergleich: Deutschland, Frankreich und die USA, in: Etienne François, Hannes Siegrist, Jochen Vogel (eds), Nation und Emotion. Deutschland und Frankreich im Vergleich, 19. und 20. Jahrhundert, Göttingen 1995, pp. 396–401, here p. 398.

71 The *Sedantag* was not celebrated in Alsace either. Cf. Günter Riederer, Feiern im Reichsland. Politische Symbolik, öffentliche Festkultur und die Erfindung kollektiver Zugehörigkeiten in Elsaß-Lothringen (1871–1918), Trier 1994, pp. 57–56.

72 MAE, Affaires diverses politiques, Allemagne, 1882–1883, Carton 27, Dossier 27, Célébration à Marseille de la fête de l'empereur d'Allemagne pour la colonie allemande, 1882.

73 PAAA, Paris 1578, C 30, Einwanderung nach Frankreich, Jahresbericht des Vereins zur Unterstützung hilfsbedürftiger Deutscher Reichsangehöriger in Moskau 1891. Manz, Nationalism among Germans in Britain, p. 410.

Fürst Radolin, a Catholic, to offer the German migrants another occasion to »prove and intensify their coherence and their love of the fatherland«[74]. In his service, the pastor underlined the moral and Christian task to keep the sense of fatherland and home alive while being abroad: patriotism had become a protestant duty[75].

The Catholic parishes did not lag behind and stressed the patriotic aims of its mission next to the social and clerical aims. The annual report of the *Liebfrauenmission*, situated in the south of Paris, underlined the importance of keeping *Vaterlandstreue* while abroad[76]. This mission also invited the German ambassador to the church service specially held for his majesty the Kaiser's 25th anniversary of his rule on 13 June 1913[77]. Thus, for the German parishes in Paris, nation – as a feature – had become closely linked and even more important than confession.

Next to the services and the official dinners of the embassy, where in 1914 about 300 persons were united[78], some of the German societies organised events for the Emperor's birthday. On 24 January 1914 for example, 800 Germans came together, including representatives from the embassy and consulate, to a festive event organised by the »Union of German associations«. Members of other societies were present, as well[79]. The German national anthem was sung and a telegram sent to the Kaiser while a speaker explained that the celebration was not directed against the French nation.

As far as historic events are concerned, in 1913, German migrants in Paris commemorated the 100th anniversary of the victory over Napoleon in 1813. This event was celebrated all over Germany and commemorated as an anti-French act thus pointing out the »fundamental hostility towards France«[80]. The gain of exterior freedom was interpreted as a first step to unify Germany. The official celebration in Paris once again took place in the solemn rooms of the Protestant *Christuskirche*. The liturgy followed the general tendency of the Protestant church in Germany: war was declared to be a means constituted by God, a well-fortified God, supporting the German side, of course[81]. The »Schulverein[82]« had a special idea to commemorate the German uprising against the »French tyranny«: rings were fabricated with an inscription saying: »I gave gold for iron«. According to the legend, in 1813 young German women – as a contribution to the war – gave their golden rings and received an iron ring instead[83]. We do not know anything about the success of the rings sold for 1.25 francs, nor about French or German reactions to it.

74 Fritz von Buttlar, in: *Deutsche Zeitung*, 30 January 1902.
75 v. d. Recke, Deutsche Evangelische Christuskirche Paris (see note 36), p. 78.
76 PAAA, Paris 1672, C 53 (see note 54), Jahresbericht der Liebfrauenmission 1908, p. 2 and Jahresbericht der Liebfrauenmission 1911, pp. 2–3.
77 Ibid., Invitation, 31 May 1913.
78 MAE, Sociétés allemandes 1911–1914 (see note 50), Report, 3 February 1914: Grand banquet de la colonie allemande.
79 Ibid., Report, 30 January 1914.
80 Stefan-Ludwig Hoffmann, Mythos und Geschichte. Leipziger Gedenkfeiern der Völkerschlacht im 19. und frühen 20. Jahrhundert, in: François, Siegrist, Vogel (eds), Nation und Emotion (see note 70), pp. 111–132, here p. 115.
81 v. d. Recke, Deutsche Evangelische Christuskirche (see note 35), p. 80.
82 About the Schulverein in general cf. Gerhard Weidenfeller, VDA. Verein für das Deutschtum im Auslande / Allgemeiner Deutscher Schulverein (1881–1918), Bern, Frankfurt a. M. 1976.
83 MAE, Sociétés allemandes 1911–1914 (see note 50), Report 1 September 1913.

III. CONCLUSION

German migration to Paris in the aftermath of the Franco-Prussian War of 1870/71 took place in an area of tension marked by the fraught French-German relations and the nationalising of the French and German nation state. The assumed antagonism of both countries – evinced in the theory of the »hereditary enemies« – led to a hostile atmosphere on both sides of the Rhine, manifested in strong resentments of the population, in political measures of the governments, as well as in cultural works like publications or theatre plays. German migrants in Paris lived isolated and were hiding their national identity in public, while at the same time initiatives occurred to unite and organise them. The escalating interaction between the minority of migrants, the nationalising nation state and the homeland policy of the *Kaiserreich* still has to be explored[84].

However, initiatives to create a common identity among German migrants in Paris exclusively referred to German elements. In this regard, similar initiatives in other countries show a different disposition. In America, for example, cultural memory of the German migrants also included German-American elements as the participation of German migrants in American nation-building was emphasised[85]. Due to the French-German opposition and to the fact that most of the migrants were only temporary in Paris, France as the host society was not part of this identity. German associations and festivals were means to keep the migrants linked to the German fatherland and to ›protect‹ them against a surrounding that was perceived or simply declared as dangerous and hostile. This interpretation implicated a degree of opposition against France, an opposition that varied according to the actual circumstances. It seems that a special identity of »German migrants in France« was not intended, which does not mean that it never existed. It would be interesting to research on memory and self-representation of these migrants once they had come back from France to Germany.

84 Cf. Roger Brubaker, Nationalism Reframed: Nationhood and the National Question in the New Europe, Cambridge 1999.

85 Heike Bungert, From Celebrating the Old to Celebrating the New: The Formation of a German-American Identity, 1859–1914, in: Udo Hebel (ed.), Sites of Memory in American Literature and Cultures, Heidelberg 2003, pp. 193–212.

TROUBLED AND CONTESTED MEMORIES

G. DANIEL COHEN

Remembering Post-War Displaced Persons
From Omission to Resurrection

Among the many illusions shattered by World War II was the idea that the proper place for citizens is within the territory of their state. The millions of displaced persons found by the Allies in 1945 (an unprecedented case of mass displacement on the European continent) provided a vivid illustration of this new possibility. If the liberation of Europe announced a long awaited return to at least partial normalcy, it also plunged the continent into a chaos of population movements. The magnitude of post-hostilities displacement did not come as a total surprise to the Western liberators. As early as October 1939, Franklin D. Roosevelt predicted that »when this ghastly war ends, there may be not one million but ten million or twenty million men, women and children belonging to many races [...] who will enter into the wide picture – the problem of the human refugee«[1]. Similarly, wartime British anticipations foresaw a dramatic »movement of people larger than any that history has seen in the modern time«[2]. Particularly sensitive to refugee problems and their significance for the modern world, Hannah Arendt was another voice warning of unprecedented upheaval. The end of the war in Europe, Arendt wrote in April 1945, »will not automatically return thirty to forty million exiles to their homes«; instead, she estimated, »a very large proportion will regard repatriation as deportation and will insist on retaining their statelessness«[3]. As rightly predicted, between ten to twenty millions European civilians found themselves on the move in the spring and summer of 1945, although five to six millions were already repatriated home by the fall. In Germany, former soldiers, slave labourers and concentration camp survivors emerging from captivity formed a heterogeneous mass of displaced persons, initially a military expression encompassing all the civilians encountered in combat areas by advancing Allies armies[4]. The displaced persons, in short, turned out to be one of the most prominent groups spawned by the aftermath of the war. From a few months to a few years, millions of individuals in Europe were categorised by the abbreviated Anglo-Saxon neologism DP.

A fact commonly overlooked in the historiography of post-war Europe is the sudden reversal of power relations provoked by the appearance of displaced persons on German soil. As Atina Grossmann observed, post-war Germany unexpectedly became

1 Quoted in Herbert EMERSON, Postwar Problems of Refugees, in: Foreign Affairs 21 (1943) pp. 211–218.
2 Kenneth G. BROOKS, The Re-Establishment of Displaced Persons, in: When Hostilities Cease, London 1944 (Papers on Relief and Reconstruction Prepared For the Fabian Society), pp. 99–123.
3 Hannah ARENDT, The Stateless People, in: Contemporary Jewish Record 8 (1945) pp. 137–153.
4 Malcolm PROUDFOOT, Anglo-American Displaced Persons Program for Germany and Austria, in: The American journal of economics and sociology 6 (1946) pp. 33–54.

»the unlikely, unloved and reluctant host to hundreds of thousand of its former victims«[5]. Another oft-overlooked consequence of the emergence of DPs as a distinct category of migrants is the creation of an extraterritorial refugee world in the heart of occupied Germany. Although the system of refugee camps and assembly centres stretched from the Danish border to the outskirts of Rome, it was in occupied Germany that a large »refugee nation« was shaped by Western techniques of population management. Breaking away from the interwar refugee definitions, new criteria and screening methods were perfected in the three Allied zones of occupation, with important consequences for asylum seekers in the West and for the governance of refugee camps in the world since 1945. Since the experience of Displaced Persons heavily weighed upon the 1951 Geneva Convention on Refugees, it has been correctly argued that »the modern institution of asylum is rooted in political geographies of displaced populations during World War II«[6].

Surprisingly however, this post-war DP moment has received brief attention in general surveys of European migration. For instance, Klaus J. Bade's »Migration in European History« (2003) only dedicates a few lines to the roughly 11 million displaced persons of post-war Germany, and concentrates instead on ethnic German expellees from Eastern Europe (the other large group of displaced European civilians coexisting with DPs after 1945). Leslie Page Moch's »Moving Europeans« (1992, 2003) points out that mass displacement »shaped the peacetime lives of western Europeans« and still »resonates in the human experience«, yet only devotes a paragraph to DPs[7]. Dirk Hoerder's »Cultures in Contact« (2002), a history of world migration, stands here as an exception. In this work, Hoerder situates the displaced persons experience into a global continuum of flight, expulsion and migration on the Northern Hemisphere since the 1920s[8].

This historiographical tendency to place the refugee crisis of the 1940s beyond the traditional pale of European migration history has not always been the norm. The significance of DPs was amply obvious to migration scholars in the 1940s and 1950s. For instance, Eugen Kulisher's »Europe on the Move« (1948), or Jacques Vernant's »The Refugee in the Post-World War« (1953) provided rich and useful data on displaced persons and refugee policies in the context of the early Cold War[9]. Yet this literature, often produced by former field workers and international civil servants – a whole new class of people who came to be trained as refugee experts in occupied Germany – unexpectedly contributed to the disappearance of DPs from the radar of subsequent mi-

5 Atina Grossmann, Victims, Villains, and Survivors: Gendered Perceptions and Self-Perceptions of Jewish Displaced persons in Occupied Post-War Germany, in: Journal of the History of Sexuality 11 (2002) pp. 291–318.

6 Jennifer Hyndman, Managing Displacement. Refugees and the Politics of Humanitarianism, Minneapolis 2000 (Borderlines, 16), p. 7.

7 Klaus J. Bade, Migration in European History, Malden, Oxford 2003 (The Making of Europe), pp. 213–216; Leslie Page Moch, Moving Europeans. Migration in Western Europe since 1650, Bloomington 2003 (Interdisciplinary Studies in History), p. 171.

8 Dirk Hoerder, Cultures in Contact. World Migration in the Second Millennium, Durham 2002 (Comparative and international working-class history), pp. 478–479.

9 Eugen Kulisher, Europe on the Move. War and Population Changes 1917–1947, New York 1948; Jacques Vernant, The Refugee in the Post-War World, New Haven 1953.

gration scholarship. For Cold War authors, the management of displaced persons was primarily a humanitarian success achieved despite dire budgetary and material conditions; in their eyes, the resettlement of DPs in various parts of the »free world«, facilitated by the International Refugee Organization (1947–1952), brought successful closure to one of the most daunting political and humanitarian challenges of the Cold War[10]. It is only after 1989 that scholars set out to revive this episode as a crucial milestone in the making of the post-war world. Displaced persons, they have argued, were not only outcomes of World War II nor geopolitical pawns in the Cold War; from a migration point of view, they also served as guinea-pigs for post-war »refugee knowledge«, European labour recruitment schemes and above all, the administration of political asylum in the West[11].

This »DP lull« in migration historiography from the 1950s to the 1990s, however, was only one aspect of the broader disappearance of displaced persons from the scope of public memory. In Europe, Israel, the United States and the Soviet bloc, DPs constituted an absentee category throughout most of the post-war years. This article seeks to interrogate the absence and the eviction of displaced persons from the »frames of remembrance« (to use Maurice Halbwach's famous concept) that have structured collective memories of World War II and its aftermath. In a second part, I will discuss the reasons underlying the resurrection of »DP memory« – both scholarly and public – in the course of the last fifteen years.

I. DISPLACED PERSONS OBJECTS OF POLICIES OR SUBJECTS OF HISTORY?

Assembled in the hermetic world of refugee camps scattered throughout Germany, displaced persons formed an aggregate of various national and ethnic groups. After the end of the relief and repatriation operations carried out in 1945–1946 under the aegis of UNRRA (during which the number of DPs in Germany dramatically dwindled), the so-called last million of permanent refugees fell under the »care and maintenance« of the International Refugee Organization (IRO), a modern type agency with strong expertise in field work[12]. In Germany, the IRO was in charge of nearly a million refugees composed of Poles, Jews, Ukrainian and Baltic people who refused or were simply unable to return home. Many factors accounted for this refusal: for Jews, the resurgence of antisemitism in Poland and a desire to divorce Europe; for Baltic and Ukrainian DPs, the fear of Soviet retribution and the persistence of strong nationalist

10 Louise Holborn, The International Refugee Organization. A Specialized Agency of the United Nations: Its History and Work 1946–1952, London 1956; John George Stoessinger, The Refugee and the World Community, Minneapolis 1956.

11 Kim Solomon, Refugees in the Cold War: Towards a New International Refugee Regime in the Early Postwar Era, Lund 1991; Liisa H. Malkki, Refugees and Exile: From Refugee Studies to the National Order of Things, in: Annual Review of Anthropology 24 (1995) pp. 495–523; Daniel Cohen, Naissance d'une nation: les personnes déplacées de l'après-guerre 1945–1951, in: Genèses 38 (2000) pp. 56–78.

12 UNRRA stands for United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Agency (1943–1947).

feelings; for Poles, anti-communism as well as straightforward economic motives; and for all, the continuation of a century-old East-West migration trend.

This heterogeneity of backgrounds and motivations shows that the DPs were a group hardly reducible to national, ethnic or political categorisations. Nonetheless, some contemporary observers such as the *New Yorker* journalist Janet Flanner, viewed DPs as a community of fate bound together by the experience of violence: »Some of them have smelled their families burning in crematories, (...) some have been beaten as slaves, some have been tattooed with serial numbers. Almost all of them have not only survived their frightful experience, but have physically recovered«[13]. Yet beyond these common characteristics of victimhood, a specific DP collective identity failed to emerge. This fact did not escape the attention of sociologist Edward Shils, who in 1946 conducted field research on displacement and identity in post-war Germany: »there was no community among the displaced persons such as ultimately developed among prisoners of war«[14]. If all DPs certainly viewed themselves as victims, their identity was first and foremost articulated in exclusive national terms. The spatial organisation of DP camps along ethno-national lines reinforced the fragmented nature of DP identity. Touring Germany, the same Janet Flanner reported in 1948 that »in order to maintain peace and cut down the number of fist fights, the IRO tries to arrange matters so that each camp houses only one religion or nationality«[15]. Far from being understood as segregation, the regroupment of DPs by nationalities was perceived as a form of protection fostering national identity. A Holocaust survivor remembering his days in the Feldafing Jewish DP camp summarised the benefits drawn from this isolation: »I felt free, without fear – freed from Poland, and from the concentration camp«[16].

Since DPs lived in a secluded national environment, their common identity was merely institutional. As the historian Wolfgang Jacobmeyer has argued, »it is very important to keep in mind that »DP« is an administrative and collective term which hardly describes any particular features of the displaced group«[17]. As countless publications and testimonies indicate, refugees overwhelmingly resented their categorisation as DPs. Viewed as a misleading euphemism downplaying their identity of political or racial refugees, »DP« was often derided as a bureaucratic serial number«[18]. DP status

13 Janet FLANNER, Letter from Aschaffenburg, in: *The New Yorker*, 30 October 1948.

14 Edward A. SHILS, Social and Psychological Aspects of Displacement and Repatriation, in: Journal of Social Issues 2-3 (1946) pp. 3–18. Recent research has challenged this view. See for instance Volodymyr KULYK, The Role of Discourse in the Construction of an Émigré Community: Ukrainian Displaced Persons in Germany and Austria after the Second World War, in: Rainer OHLIGER, Karen SCHÖNWÄLDER, Triadafilos TRIADAFILOPOULOS (eds), European Encounters: Migrants, Migration and European Societies since 1945, Aldershot 2003, pp. 213–237.

15 FLANNER, Letter from Aschaffenburg (see note 13).

16 Cited by Mark WYMAN, DPs: Europe's Displaced Persons 1945–1951, Ithaca 1998, p. 135.

17 Wolfgang JACOBMEYER, The Displaced Persons Problem: Repatriation and Resettlement, in: Johannes-Dieter STEINERT, Inge WEBER-NEWTH (eds), European Immigrants in Britain 1933–1950, Munich 2003, pp. 137–150.

18 A poem written by a refugee and entitled the »The DP's Song of the Songs« clearly illustrates this point: »Would you please excuse me / That I nothing know / I am only a number / In the long IRO row«. See Eduard BAKIS, The So-Called DP Apathy of Germany's DP camps, in: H.B.M. MURPHY, Flight and Resettlement, Paris 1955, p. 87. See also H.G ADLER, Aufzeichnungen einer displaced person, in: Merkur 6 (1952) pp. 1040–1049.

was therefore not internalised as a distinctive identity, not in the 1940s and hardly since then. One historian who conducted oral interviews with former DPs in the United States arrived at the following conclusion: »This was my first tip-off to a fundamental fact of the displaced persons experience: they were not, and are not, proud of their classification as DPs«[19]. A transnational denomination, the term DP only abstractly defined the members of the post-war refugee nation shaped by standardised Western administrative and humanitarian policies. »They had been placed under the guardianship of administrations, however well-meant«, stated Wolfgang Jacobmeyer; »and this provided for the fact that DPs were permanently object of policies, rather than subjects of history«[20].

This absence of collective identity – and lack of historical agency – helps us understand why DPs, and with them, the memory of the DP years, almost entirely disappeared from the radar of public memory after the closing of nearly all DP camps in 1952. Recent historiography of the remembrance of World War II in Europe has stressed the social nature of the production of memory. Following Maurice Halbwachs's well-known arguments about the social underpinnings of collective memory, Pieter Lagrou and Annette Wieviorka, to name a few examples, have shown how specific memories of the war period were spawned by facilitating groups engaged in fierce competition for visibility: war veterans, former resisters, returning POWs, labour conscripts, political and racial deportees all vied for recognition, commemoration and integration in national narratives after 1945[21]. This approach, however, could hardly fit the history of displaced persons. Even in the United States, which took in the largest number (400,000 DPs overall), DPs never formed a coherent group seeking to commemorate their migration experience or to enhance their particular status. As opposed to other groups of war victims, the DPs never evolved into autonomous producers of memory. »Why should not the DP experience have produced loyalties as profound as those of wartime?«, wondered the historian Mark Wyman, who throughout his investigation had learned of only one marginal group dedicated to DP memorialisation: »there seems to be no organisational equivalent of the multitude of war veterans' and concentration camp veterans' groups«[22].

Rather than fully disappearing, however, DP identity overlapped with more operational categories. While still in Germany, Jewish DPs named themselves the Surviving Remnant to describe their extraordinary fate. For them, »DP« came to symbolise a struggle for both personal and collective regeneration, as well as a transitory period leading to their final separation from the European continent[23]. With a self-perception of Holocaust survivors more than displaced migrants, Jewish DPs entered organisa-

19 Mark Wyman, On the Trail of the Displaced Persons: Sources, Problems, Dangers, Opportunities, in: Spectrum (Immigration History Research Center, University of Minnesota) 6 (1994) pp. 19–25.

20 Jacobmeyer, The Displaced Persons Problem (see note 17), p. 147.

21 Pieter Lagrou, The Legacy of Occupation: Patriotic Memory and National Recovery in Western Europe 1945–1965, Cambridge 2000; Annette Wieviorka, Déportation et génocide. Entre la mémoire et l'oubli, Paris 1992.

22 Wyman, DPs: Europe's Displaced Persons (see note 16), p. 2.

23 Zeev Mankowitz, Life Between Memory and Hope. The Survivors of the Holocaust in Occupied Germany, Cambridge 2002 (Studies in the Social and Cultural History of Modern Warfare).

tions such as the Federation of Jewish Victims of the Nazi Regime in the United States or the Surviving Remnant Societies in Israel[24]. Non-Jewish Eastern Europeans DPs also appropriated other identities as they merged with older immigration networks. For instance, Polish DPs joined the already established Polish-American diaspora or associated themselves with the Polish Concentration Camp Association[25]. The same process occurred in Canada: although there were marked differences between earlier Ukrainian migrants and the mid-20th century victims of Stalinism and Nazism, Ukrainian DPs were eventually absorbed into the ranks of the Ukrainian-Canadian community, albeit not without tensions between old-timers and newcomers[26]. For their part, DPs from the Baltic states annexed by the Soviet Union shifted their collective identity from DPs to »nation in exile« as they strove for national and cultural preservation away from their occupied homelands[27]. This anti-Soviet sentiment was not only a Baltic peculiarity. For Poles, Ukrainians and Eastern European refugees in general, anticommunism (just as Zionism in the case of Jews) offered a more dynamic alternative to the passivity and a-historical dimension embedded in the DP denomination.

This voluntary relegation of DP identity to the years of refugee life in Germany in favour of new group definitions was accompanied by a forceful eviction of displaced persons from national histories. In the Soviet bloc, DPs were framed as traitors and fascists who shunned retribution and/or the duties of post-war reconstruction at home. The excision of DPs from the polity and historical memory of Soviet-dominated Eastern Europe, reminiscent of the denationalisation of White Russians in the 1920s, was one of the earliest manifestations of the Cold War. As the fate of the DPs was being discussed on the international area, Soviet bloc representatives forcefully insisted on the alien nature of displaced persons in Communist nations[28]. These »undemocratic elements« were also branded as war criminals by the Soviets, since numerous Baltic and Ukrainian DPs had served in the »Waffen SS« and were now accepted as political refugees in the United States and the UK[29]. It is only after 1989 that Eastern European DPs were to be reintegrated into post-communist societies. As Mark Wyman found out, »by the mid-1990s, many top positions in business, government and academic life in the former Soviet satellites were occupied by men and women who had once been displaced persons«[30].

In the State of Israel, Jewish DPs were the target of political and historical appropriation. As recent post-Zionist scholarship has shown, Jewish DPs served a project of rescue and nation building. In early Israeli historiography and public memory, DPs

24 Hannah Yablonka, Survivors of the Holocaust. Israel after the War, New York 1999; Tom Segev, The Seventh Million: The Israelis and the Holocaust, New York 1993.

25 Anna Jaroszynska-Kirchmann, The Polish Post-War Diaspora: An Agenda for a New Millennium, in: Polish American Studies 57-2 (2000) pp. 45–66.

26 Lubomyr Y. Luciuk, Searching For Place. Ukrainian Displaced Persons, Canada, and the Migration of Memory, Toronto 2000.

27 Laura Hilton, Prisoners of Peace: Rebuilding Community, Identity and Nationality in Displaced persons Camps in Germany, 1945–52, Ph.D. thesis, Ohio State University 2001.

28 United Nations, Economic and Social Council, Documents of the Special Committee for Refugees and Displaced Persons, E/Ref.1.

29 David Cesarani, Justice Delayed: How Britain Became a Refuge for War Criminals, London 2000.

30 Wyman, DPs: Europe's Displaced persons (see note 16), p. 1.

were only remembered in the context of the clandestine immigration campaign (the *Brih'a* or covert transfer of eighty thousand refugees to the future State of Israel) organised by the Zionist leadership in Palestine. After 1948, this heroic episode became »a kind of cult theme in Zionist history, central to the story of the new Jewish redemption«[31]. Consequently, their transitory life as DPs in Germany – the majority of Jewish DPs did not emigrate through clandestine operations – became a mere footnote in the history of Jewish self-determination, with very little autonomous space left between Holocaust and the creation of the State of Israel. If Jewish survivors were claimed as »nationals« by the Zionist leadership in international discussions on the future of Palestine, they remained internally perceived as external (at least partially) to the national collective. Upon visiting the DP camps in 1945, David Ben Gurion characterised Jewish DPs as a »mob and human dust, without language and education, without roots and without being absorbed in the nation's vision and traditions«[32]. Not surprisingly therefore, Jewish ghetto fighters and Partisans became the iconic figures of Israeli remembrance, thereby evicting the »passive« and often traumatised DPs from the canons of early official Israeli memory of the Holocaust. This removal from mainstream historical discourse was also internalised by Jewish DPs who sought integration in the state of Israel. Post-Zionist historians have singled out a process of »disremembering« as a strategy used by survivors to merge into the new Israeli nation[33]. As I shall discuss later in this article, it is only in the last fifteen years that the Jewish DP experience has been re-legitimised, in Israel and elsewhere, as a singular historical moment worthy of autonomous remembrance.

The case of DPs in France and the UK provides a different typology of disappearance. The relatively low number of DPs resettled in Western Europe (150,000 at most, and many of them re-emigrated overseas after a short period) partially accounts for their lack of post-war visibility. Immigration figures, however, do not properly convey the intensity of the search for industrial workers conducted by French, British, (and to a lesser extent, Belgian) recruiting missions in displaced persons camps. As early as the summer 1945, policy-makers in these countries viewed the DPs as one of richest manpower reservoirs in post-war Europe. In the camps, recruiting teams in charge of filling severe labour shortages at home fiercely competed to »skim off the cream of the DPs«: young, able-bodied, mostly male and preferably unattached industrial and agricultural workers. Results proved disappointing: the prospect of hard manual labour combined with poor housing conditions lured many DPs away from Western European immigration schemes. Nonetheless, close to 80,000 so-called European Volunteers Workers (EVW) were brought to the UK, where, like the 30,000 workers imported to France, their DP identity lost much of its relevance. »Whilst the

31 Idit ZERTAL, From Catastrophe to Power: Holocaust Survivors and the Emergence of the State of Israel, Berkeley 1998.

32 Quoted by Gulie Ne'eman ARAD, Israel and the Shoah: A Tale of Multifarious Taboos, in: New German Critique 90 (2003) p. 5.

33 This approach has been challenged by Dalia Ofer who claims that early Holocaust remembrance revealed a range of complex feelings and tensions over how memorialisation should occur. See Dalia OFER, The Strength of Remembrance: Commemorating the Holocaust During the First Decade of the State of Israel, Jewish Social Studies 6-2 (2000) pp. 24–55.

European Volunteer Workers [i.e. DPs] had a clear conception of themselves as refugees«, argued one study of DPs in Britain, »the terms of recruitment drawn up by the Labour government defined them primarily as labour migrants«[34]. The urgency of industrial recovery transformed the DPs into regular migrant workers who in France and England were to rub shoulders with other Italian, Irish, and soon Algerian and Caribbean immigrants[35]. The forgotten contribution of refugee labour to Western European reconstruction was triggered by the deliberate blurring of political and economic migration in the late 1940s.

A survey of the fate of DP memory in Western Europe since the 1950s should also return to the main geographical site of post-war displacement. Did DPs play any role at all in West German collective memories? The question is not entirely rhetorical, since when the IRO took its final census in 1952, it found 177,000 still on the rolls, many of them employed in the German economy. In particular, 12,000 Jewish DPs stayed in the FRG after the closing of Jewish DP camps and formed the bulk of the new German Jewish community[36]. Numerically, however, DPs weighed little compared to the millions of ethnic German expellees who strained the resources of the newly-created Federal Republic. Although for a long time segregated and often resented as aliens by the native population, expellees provided solid background for the »rhetoric of victimisation« that permeated the German discourse of »self-rehabilitation« in the 1950s. As Robert G. Moeller has convincingly shown, expellees served as embodiments of victimisation in early West German attempts to come to terms with the past. Their stories of suffering, Moeller argued, fuelled a strong narrative of exculpation which helped to evade questions about the Nazi past[37]. Expellees were also active producers of memory: Pertti Ahonen has described the powerful influence exerted by their associations on German domestic and foreign policy until 1990[38]. In this context, DPs remained external to German memory: they were after all non-German nationals who between 1945 to the early 1950s had lived in a hermetic refugee universe, even if recent research has shown that many areas of contact between DPs and the German population (including Jewish DPs) actually existed[39]. Polls taken in the American zone of occupation show that from the onset, DPs were perceived as an alien population in Germany, often resented for their alleged delinquency, black marketeering or better food rations. It is therefore not entirely surprising that the millions of displaced persons who transited through the DP camps did not leave a strong mark on German remembrance. It is only after reunification, as I will discuss later in this article, that DPs could be integrated into the continuum of post-war German history.

34 Robert Miles, Diane Kay, Refugees or Migrant Workers? European Volunteer Workers in Britain 1946–1951, London 1992, p. 7.

35 Diana Kay, Westward Ho! The Recruitment of Displaced Persons for British Industry, in: Steinert, Weber-Newth, European immigrants in Britain (see note 17), pp. 151–170.

36 Ruth Gay, Safe Among The Germans. Liberated Jews After World War Two, New Haven 2002.

37 Robert G. Moeller, War Stories: The Search for a Usable Past in the Federal Republic of Germany, Berkeley 2001.

38 Pertti Ahonen, After the Expulsion: West Germany and Eastern Europe, 1945–90, Oxford 2003.

39 Atina Grossmann, Trauma, Memory and Motherhood: Germans and Jewish Displaced Persons in Post-War Germany, 1945–1949 in: Archiv für Sozialgeschichte 38 (1998) pp. 215–239.

II. THE REEMERGENCE OF THE DP PAST 1980s TO THE PRESENT

As shown above, the erasure of DP memory was the product of different factors of occultation. Yet a cursory Internet search provides ample evidence that the disappearance of DP memory can now be contextualised as a matter of the past. An abundance of websites dedicated to the DP experience or to specific DP camps (in Germany, Austria and Italy) indicate that the story of post-war displacement has been rescued from historical forgetting. DPs are manifestly back in force in commemorative practices as they have been in scholarly publications since the 1980s with books on US policy toward Jewish refugees or inquiries into the forced repatriation to the Soviet bloc of hundreds of thousands unfortunate »pawns of Yalta«[40].

More generally, the end of the Cold War seems an obvious chronological turning point in the trajectory of DP memory. Hitherto estranged from the national body, nationals-in-exile could now be reintegrated into the Polish, Ukrainian or Baltic national past. However, this inclusive shift should not be overstated. After a trickle of returns following the breakdown of the Soviet bloc, very few DPs in fact sought to return home, except for a handful of political or business leaders. As a historian and member of the Canadian-Ukrainian community acknowledged, »we are all here, and probably always were, to stay«[41]. Moreover, post-Communist societies have so far not paid particular historical attention to their post-war diasporas. Not surprisingly, historical research on Eastern European DPs continues to be mostly carried out by first and second-generation émigré historians in the United States, Canada and Australia.

Yet 1989 was a significant turning point in another area: the dramatic rise of restitution and compensation demands, bringing spoliation, slave labour and forced displacement to the forefront of public memory. What historian Dan Diner noticed in the case of post-1989 Holocaust restitution claims in Europe (»an anthropological conjunction between property and memory«) could also be applied to the vast number of DPs who had worked as slave labourers in wartime Germany and were now seeking delayed compensation. Like the demands for restitution of property in the case of dispossessed survivors, these DP claims were prompted by similar types of »recovered memories«[42]. The tidal wave of restitution demands, in which former DPs played a prominent role in the 1990s, succeeded in bringing about delayed recognition of DPs as victims of Nazi rule. After various organisations of former forced labourers in the United States and Europe instituted law suits against German firms, the Schröder government declared its commitment to compensation, thereby reversing four decades of exclusion from German indemnification policies[43]. Helped in this task by their nu-

40 Leonard DINNERSTEIN, America and the Survivors of the Holocaust, New York 1982; Mark R. ELLIOTT, Pawns of Yalta. Soviet Refugees and America's Role in their Repatriation, Urbana 1982.

41 LUCIUK, Searching for Place (see note 26), p. 281.

42 Dan DINER, Restitution and Memory. The Holocaust in European Political Cultures, in: New German Critique 90 (2003) pp. 36–44.

43 Ulrich HERBERT, Nicht entschädigungsfähig. Die Wiedergutmachungsansprüche der Ausländer, in: ID., Arbeit, Volkstum, Weltanschauung. Über Fremde und Deutsche im 20. Jahrhundert, Frankfurt a. M. 1995, pp. 157–192.

merous lawyers, DPs were finally entering the politics of recognition that has characterised the remembrance of World War II in Europe since 1945.

This upsurge of DP visibility in the 1990s was concomitant to an important paradigm change in German historiography. Beginning in the mid 1980s (not incidentally around the time of the famous *Historikerstreit*), the externality of DPs in German history was being challenged by historians of Nazi persecution and migration researchers who pointed to continuities between pre-war and post-war patterns of displacement and statelessness. The title of Wolfgang Jacobmeyer's pioneering book (1985) is revealing of this new continuum: »From Forced Laborers to Stateless Foreigners«[44]. Similarly, Ulrich Herbert emphasised continuities between wartime *Zwangsarbeiter* and post-war *Vertriebene* and *Gastarbeiter*; and so did other historians who now included DPs into the peculiarities of German migration history[45]. This agenda was further embraced by a new generation of historians who, by focusing on DPs, challenged the reductive meaning of »refugees« in German historical consciousness. The refugees of 1945, they asserted in keeping with the multicultural overtones of the 1990s, were not only ethnic German expellees but also Slavic and Jewish displaced persons who transited, lived, worked and at times settled in Germany. Since reunification, a spate of local and regional studies has fuelled this DP historiographical trend and recast the DPs at the core of the post-war German experience[46].

The rediscovery of Jewish DPs was an important part of this German historiographical shift. Extending the agenda of *Vergangenheitsbewältigung* into the 1940s, recent scholarly research on Jewish DPs has undermined the idea that 1945 brought an end to Jewish victimhood. As two co-authors wrote, »Most histories of Nazi persecution end in May 1945. The aim of this study is to show that the suffering of the Jewish survivors did not end when the war was over«[47]. This highly symbolic reintegration of Jews into the historical narrative of post-war Germany (a similar trend is also noticeable in Austria, the other Central European DP land after 1945[48]) stressed the persistence of antisemitic bias and xenophobic stereotypes. This scholarly resurgence was also the occasion for commemorative re-enactments such as student hikes along the paths of Jewish refugees' escape routes in the Tyrol or the organisation of conferences bringing together former DPs and contemporary scholars[49]. Often sponsored by *Länder*, public institutions or municipal archives, the reintegration of Jewish DPs in

44 Wolfgang Jacobmeyer, Vom Zwangsarbeiter zum Heimatlosen Ausländer, Göttingen 1985.

45 Ulrich Herbert, Zwangsarbeiter – Vertriebene – Gastarbeiter: Kontinuitätsaspekte des Wanderungsgeschehens in Deutschland, in: Rainer Schulze et al. (eds), Flüchtlinge und Vertriebene in der westdeutschen Nachkriegsgeschichte, Hildesheim 1987, pp. 171–175; Johannes-Dieter Steinert, Migration und Politik. Westdeutschland – Europe – Übersee, Osnabrück 1995.

46 To name a few local studies among many: Andreas Lembeck, Befreit aber nicht in Freiheit. Displaced Persons im Emsland 1945–1950, Bremen 1997; Patrick Wagner, Displaced Persons in Hamburg. Stationen einer halbherzigen Integration, 1945 bis 1948, Hamburg 1997.

47 Angelika Königseder, Juliane Wetzel, Waiting for Hope: Jewish Displaced Persons in Post-War Germany, Evanston 2001, p. 7.

48 Christine Oertel, Juden auf der Flucht durch Österreich: jüdische Displaced Persons in der US-Besatzungzone Österreichs, Vienna 1999.

49 Such as the »Internationale Konferenz zur Lage und Lebenswelt der Jüdischen Displaced Persons 1945–49« organised in Munich in July 1995.

German memory is to be seen as part of a pattern of remembrance, commemoration and symbolic apologies spurred by reunification. Yet beyond Germany, the study of Jewish DPs has also followed the triangular map of Holocaust research in which the United States and Israel stand as distinctive producers of memory. An important conference-exhibition held in the year 2000 in Washington, DC, indicated that »Life Reborn« had become a widespread research and commemoration theme in the US[50]. Finally, recent Israeli scholarship also contributed to the rise of a specific DP memory independent from Holocaust and Zionist history. In the 1990s, New Historians have challenged the narrative of »rescue« by provocatively arguing that DPs have in fact been discriminated against by the State of Israel as part of its ideological negation of the diaspora[51].

The trajectory of remembrance outlined in this article suggests that although transnational by nature, the experience of displaced persons did not result, once resurrected from its relative oblivion, in transnational memory. A category reified by post-war administrative language, the DPs never framed their experience other than in national terms. Although all lived in the same standardised refugee world, DPs never ceased to be Polish, Ukrainian, Baltic and Jewish migrants – the latter being formally recognised by the world as a territorial nation precisely when they experienced uprootedness and displacement[52]. The historical contours of DP memory serve therefore as a powerful antidote against idealistic attempts to construct the aftermath of World War Two as a drastic departure from the national paradigm: while challenging it, post-war displacement also came to »the rescue of the nation-state«[53]. The multifaceted reappropriation of the DP past also indicates that even in the case of transnational migrants, commemoration rarely transgresses, if at all, the boundaries of national remembrance.

50 US Holocaust Memorial, »Life Reborn: Jewish Displaced Persons 1945–1951«, Washington, DC, January 2000.

51 The title (translated from Hebrew) of a controversial post-Zionist book published in 1998 is a good example of this approach: Yosef Grodzinksi, Good Human Material: Jews vs. Zionists, 1945–1951, Tel Aviv 1998.

52 Dan Diner, Elemente des Subjektwerdung: Jüdische DPs in historischem Kontext, in: Jahrbuch zur Geschichte und Wirkung des Holocaust (1997) pp. 229–248.

53 I borrow this expression from Alan Milward, The European Rescue of the Nation-State, Berkeley 1992.

PIERRE DE TRÉGOMAIN

Constructing Authenticity
Commemorative Strategy of the Transylvanian Saxons in West Germany's Early Years

»We are an Association of poor wretches, that is why we often have to act slowly. We can't make leaps, we don't have the means to develop a grand propaganda, as necessary as it should be, but we have a precious capital to invest, our people's good name! And from this gift, we need to yield profit!«[1]

The man who pronounced these words in 1951 was Fritz Heinz Reimesch, the president of the Association of the Transylvanian Saxons in Germany, the main representative organisation of this German speaking minority from Romania of which a part had to leave its homeland at the end of World War II. By linking the material dispossession of the Saxons when they became refugees with the symbolical possession which they defended – their »good name« which is above all the positive representation of their history in the West German public arena – he revealed the Association's strategy: they intended to »yield profit« from this symbolical »capital« while staging it, using it in various forms, making a »brand« out of it, in order to defend publicly the political interests of the Saxons in the West.

For this minority whose history is part of the German colonisation in Eastern Europe, it was painful to be considered a foreigner when they meant not to immigrate but to »come back« to what they still called the German »mother land« *(Mutterland)*. The lobbying strategy which dealt with issues of integration could therefore use the past as an instrument of propaganda, as Reimesch suggested. Here, the president had in mind the »celebration of 800 years« of Saxon history in Transylvania, the largely mediatised commemoration which the Association organised in Munich on the 21 and 22 October 1950. This initiative was an opportunity to celebrate a mythical past rather than the recently lived experiences, a historical length rather than a historical event. Be it lived or made up, this created historical continuity was a way to reinforce the cohesion among the Saxons on the one hand, and on the other to transmit to the West German public a positive image of this minority.

This commemoration marked the official breakthrough of the Association since its founding in June 1949. Partly due to the financial help of the Government – the newly founded Ministry for Expellees, Refugees and Victims of the war, the »Bundesministerium für Flüchtlinge und Vertriebene«, but also to the presence of numerous political personalities, amongst them the President of the Federal Republic Theodor

1 Fritz Heinz Reimesch, Eröffnungsansprache der Generalversammlung des Verbandes, Dinkelsbühl [May 1951], Archives of the Siebenbürgen-Institut, Gundelsheim/Neckar, Germany (every quoted document is from the same archive, except special mention), BIII2, vol. 4/3.

Heuss, this event put the association from now on »under the spotlight of the whole Nation«[2].

This ceremony gives the opportunity to question a specific memory in migrant experiences (I.). It needs to be contextualised within the political frame work of the new born West German state and the situation of the Saxon minority at this time (II.). Judging from its preparation (III.), its programme (IV. and V.) and its political consequences (VI.), the »celebration of 800 years« can be examined as a struggle for the domination of the memory – even though what it is all about is less the reminiscing of the past, reduced to an instrument, but rather the set up of a political stratagem.

I. MEMORY AND IMMIGRATION

»The frameworks which insured the cohesion of society need to crumble in order for emigration to appear and perpetuate itself«[3], the sociologist Abdelmalek Sayad wrote. The emigrants who have left the society in which they were socialised are indeed not there anymore to acknowledge the changes which have occurred in their homeland and which provoked their leaving. The image of the *Heimat* – the country left behind – which they take with them, does not fit anymore to what they experienced before they set out. This image is frozen and often idealised: »Exile is the nursery of nationalism«, as Benedict Anderson remarks[4]. The *Heimat* is not present anymore but past, not everyday experience but a memory.

The experience of rupture for the *e*migrant implies for the *im*migrant the need to make a new start, which in the case of the Saxons was all the more urgent as the return to Romania was impossible in the context of the Cold War. This double step – leaving and beginning – was actually the main element that all Saxons in Germany shared. Because for the rest, they had highly heterogeneous biographies: most of these refugees were civilians from Northern Transylvania, annexed to Hungary in 1940, who were evacuated by the »Wehrmacht« in the autumn of 1944 to escape the advance of the Soviet army. Others were former soldiers of the »Waffen-SS« who were out of their homeland when King Mihai decided to change Romania's allegiance to the Allies. There were also civilians who were not allowed to go back to Transylvania when they were set free from the forced labour camps in the USSR. Others were already in Germany during the war, working for the administration or in some intellectual capacity.

This immigration was mostly involuntary even though it cannot be called an expulsion since the majority of the Saxons still lived in Romania after 1945. It upset all bearings and reinforced the need for the migrants to maintain the memory, to insert it into a tradition, into a historical continuity and to share these new values within a com-

2 Fritz Heinz Reimesch, Begrüssungsansprache für den »Großen Rat«, Dinkelsbühl, [May 1951], p. 7, BIII2, vol. 4/2.

3 Abdelmalek Sayad, Nationalisme et émigration, in: La double absence. Des illusions de l'émigré aux souffrances de l'immigré, Paris 1999, pp. 135–159, here p. 135.

4 Remark of Acton, cit. in: Benedict Anderson, L'imaginaire national. Réflexions sur l'origine et l'essor du nationalisme, Paris 2002, p. 11.

munity. The community of remembrance which these immigrants set up in West Germany's early years can be characterised as a »cultural memory«, as Jan Assmann described it: a collective memory which nourishes itself less from lived experiences than from transmitted, selected, interpreted remembrances – i.e. from myths. This memory has a sacred dimension; it cannot be transmitted by anyone but by special exegets and at special moments, outside of everyday life – like commemorative events. It is an »institutionalised mnemotechnic«, an »organised work on memory« which shows the past in its length and specificity in order to create a collective »historical consciousness«[5].

By organising an event which is commonly lived by the participants, the commemoration intends to provoke a fervent emotion which has to lead to the adhesion to the staged identity. The thus created community of remembrance is therefore based on the process of identification with a common memory. This strategy of memory is, as a consequence, also a matter of symbolical power amongst the different protagonists who claim to belong to the same community. In order to obtain the leadership, the competitors have to recreate an image of the past which most people can identify with. They also should elaborate a representation of the past which is compatible with the »master narrative« of the host country – the »cadres sociaux«, as Maurice Halbwachs wrote. But this symbolic domination is primarily conditioned by access to the media, indispensable to influence the public. The principle of this entire struggle is indeed that the representation becomes the norm, the »truth«, when it is the only one people have access to.

II. CONTEXTS

In the first years of the occupation of the West German zones by the Allies, the policy of denazification and the American project of »re-education« of the German population created a wide platform for public debate on the National-Socialist past. But this »anguished quest for the past« soon became secondary: the turning point was in 1948, the year of the monetary reform but also the year when the pressure of the Allies on the German population lessened[6]. Denazification had indeed turned into a vast »process of rehabilitation« with the progressive transfer of power to the German courts as from 1946 onwards[7]. Added to the material difficulties of everyday life, the Germans felt increasingly that the politics of the Allies were based on the belief of a »collective guilt« which they rejected, they tended towards forgetting their Nazi past. Konrad Adenauer, the Federal Republic of Germany's (FRG) first elected chancellor in September 1949, promised to »make a clean sweep« over the past and he set up a corresponding policy: amnesty and integration of the non-denazified Germans and a

5 Jan Assmann, Das kulturelle Gedächtnis. Schrift, Erinnerung und politische Identität in frühen Hochkulturen, Munich 2002, see chapters I. and II.

6 Jean Solchany, Comprendre le nazisme dans l'Allemagne des années zéro. 1945–1949, Paris 1997, p. 74.

7 Lutz Niethammer, Die Mitläuferfabrik. Die Entnazifizierung am Beispiel Bayerns, Berlin 1982, p. 13.

distancing from the far-right[8]. The »master narrative« on which Adenauer's measures were based, was also carried out by FRG's first President, Theodor Heuss who imposed on the West German public the notion of »collective shame« as the correct attitude to deal with the recent past. This was a suitable alternative to the supposed »collective guilt«; it was at the same time a means to reassure the anti-Nazi consensus of the new Republic and to silence the crimes of Hitler's regime.

The new West German society had to familiarise itself with the troubled bearings of its new identity: belonging to the western side of a divided world, the new borders and the recomposition of its population, almost eight million German refugees and expellees, coming from territories which were after the war out of the occupied Germany's borders. This heterogeneous group, which was stigmatised as responsible for the war during the occupation and for the criminality of the postwar period, now represented a big electorate which the political parties actively canvassed. Each group created its own Association in 1949 and they founded a common Federation, the »Bund der Vertriebenen«, in order to defend their political demands. The Ministry of Expellees soon became their main protector.

Amongst these repatriated Germans, the Transylvanian Saxons constituted a relatively small group – they were in 1951 around 30,000 in West Germany, whereas 170,000 were still living in Romania[9]. The National-Socialist propaganda had placed them at the heart of its expansionist foreign politics and contributed to their fanaticisation. After the end of World War II they had to face a general disillusion, finding out that the solidarity they expected from the praised *Mutterland* in the name of the *Volksgemeinschaft* (an organic community of the German people) was just a chimera: they mostly experienced indifference and ostracism from their new fellow-citizens who they still called *Reichsdeutsche* (Germans of the Reich).

During the first years after the war, the main gathering point for the Saxon refugees was the Help Committee of the Transylvanian Saxons and Banatian Swabians, under the responsibility of Germany's Lutheran Church. The active work of representation of the Saxons began only with the Association in 1949: its main goal was to »maintain the *Heimat*'s heritage and to create its understanding in the widest possible public« while defending what they considered as the Saxons' and Swabians' political interests – the latter being migrants also from Romania, but Catholic and coming from the Banat region[10].

The Association worked closely with the other organisations representing the repatriated Germans. By signing with them the official »Charter of the *Heimat* expelled Germans« in August 1950, it claimed for itself the name »expelled« which had progressively gained the upper hand in the FRG's official language, to name the various

8 Cit. in: Norbert Frei, Das Problem der NS-Vergangenheit in der Ära Adenauer, in: Bernd Weisbord (ed.), Rechtsradikalismus und politische Kultur: die verzögerte Normalisierung in Niedersachsen in der Nachkriegszeit, Hannover 1995, pp. 19–31, here p. 25.

9 For the first number see Reimesch, Begrüssungsansprache (see note 2), p. 4; for the second, valid for 1948: Hans Otto Roth, Über die Siebenbürger Sachsen 1948, in: Zeitschrift für Siebenbürgische Landeskunde 26 (2003) vol. 1, pp. 80–82, here p. 82.

10 Satzungen der »Landsmannschaft der Siebenbürger Sachsen in Deutschland e.V.«, [May 1951], BIII2, vol. 27/1.

paths followed by the *Auslandsdeutsche* and Germans from the lost territories at the end of the war[11]. This designation was officially recognised as a juridicial statute with the law of 1953 and gave from then on rights to financial compensation for lost material goods. This formalisation represented above all the official recognition of the repatriated as victims in West Germany[12].

III. PREPARATION I: STRUGGLE FOR REPRESENTATIVITY

The first years of the Association were characterised by constant quarrels over its legitimacy to represent the Transylvanian Saxons in West Germany – it only had 4,000 members in 1951[13]. One must note that although it was initially called the »Association of the Transylvanian Saxons and Banatian Swabians in Germany«, it soon became clear that the Association mostly represented the Saxons, so that the Swabians eventually founded their own organisation. The new Association from then on intended to defend exclusively Saxon interests. Herwart Scheiner's initiative illustrates this exclusive ambition by provoking a lasting conflict: Scheiner, one of the association's members, founded in September 1950 the »Association of the Germans of Romania« which intended to defend the interests of *all* the German speaking minorities from Romania in the West. Reimesch's organisation immediately declared the membership of both organisations as »impossible«[14]. Scheiner's partisans who were threatened with exclusion condemned this »unjustifiable pretension to totality«[15] and started legal procedures against the Association – a cause of great tension during the period of the commemoration.

The Association and the Committee shared at the beginning a part of their structure – and their president. An unwritten separation of their competencies was established: the Committee was in charge of the »inner« activities – the religious part – whereas the Association did the »outer« part – the political representation. However, a certain duality appeared at this time between Munich, where the Association had its main seat, and Stuttgart, where critical members of the Committee were based. This worried president Reimesch who noticed a few months before the commemoration: »The critical voices multiply increasingly, voices not only against the celebration of 800 years, but also against the Association itself.«[16] He got carried away against Alfred

11 Cf. Karin Böke, Flüchtlinge und Vertriebene zwischen dem Recht auf die alte Heimat und der Eingliederung in die neue Heimat. Leitvokabeln der Flüchtlingspolitik, in: Id., Frank Liedtke, Martin Wengeler (eds), Politische Leitvokabeln in der Adenauer-Ära, Berlin 1996, pp. 131–210, here pp. 127–206.

12 For the victim memory of the *Auslandsdeutschen*, cf. Rainer Münz, Rainer Ohliger, Auslandsdeutsche, in: Etienne François, Hagen Schulze (eds), Deutsche Erinnerungsorte I, Munich 2001, pp. 370–388; Eva Hahn, Hans-Henning Hahn, Flucht und Vertreibung, in: Ibid. pp. 335–351.

13 Hubert Gross, Bericht des Hauptgeschäftsführers über das Geschäftsjahr 1950/51 [May 1951], p. 2, BIII2, vol. 4/3.

14 Verband gegen Zersplitterung, in: *Siebenbürgische Zeitung*, November 1950, p. 4.

15 Hans v. Kuales, Unangebrachte Unduldsamkeit, in: *Patria*, November N°1/1951, also distributed as a tract.

16 Letter of Reimesch to Hammrich, 13 September 1950, BIII3, vol. 27/27.

Coulin, the representative of the Association in Stuttgart, who believed that only the Lutheran Church in Romania, led by Bishop Friedrich Müller, had the »moral legitimacy« to organise such an event: »Why don't we have a ›moral legitimacy‹?« he asked, irritated[17]. This was the reason why Reimesch prefered not to select any representative of Müller's Church for the programme of the ceremony who could, so he feared, delegitimise the Assocation's initiative[18]. Hans Philippi, a man of the Church and a Committee member, protested as well against the idea of such a celebration which was only conceived for the West, he explained: »This whole talk of the West, ours too, is useless. The life of our people at home has no meaning if we, in the West, don't give it one. We should have the opportunity, but not through speeches and seminars.«[19] Some other Saxons demanded that Romanian personalities in exile should also be invited – in vain.

The preparation revealed contradictory opinions within the directory: Reimesch quickly felt overtaken by the degree of mediatisation of the celebration; he even recognised that he felt »relieved« when President Heuss first announced that he would not be present: »So, our feast will not turn into a political event which we had feared at the start«[20]. He condemned the »mediatic hurly-burly« which his vice-president Erwin Tittes, who was the real initiator of the event, was planning: »You consider the celebration of 800 years [...] from the perspective of propaganda in order to put us in a good place within the sphere of the refugees' Associations and the groups of the *Reichsdeutschen*«[21]. It was a matter of degree more than a deep conflict, Tittes, who represented the Association for every political negotiation in Bonn, was anyway going to impose his point of view.

To justify the Association's representativity implicated the elimination of competitors from the public arena: Romania's other German speaking minorities, but also Scheiner's association and the majority of the Saxons who remained in the East experienced this strategy of exclusion. The preparation of the celebration turned out to be a way to insure the Association's public monopoly of the past.

IV. PREPARATION II: CONSTRUCTING AUTHENTICITY

The discussions within the directory focused on programmatic issues. The main disagreement concerned the musical entertainment: Reimesch wanted to hire the »Choir of Lechnitz«, a well known traditional Saxon ensemble, whereas the directory's majority, led by Erwin Tittes, found that it would be »wrong to underline too much the peasant touch« and proposed instead a Beethoven Quartet[22]! But Reimesch insisted: »Our strength has been all through the centuries the healthy peasant who always re-

17 Ibid.
18 Cf. Reimesch's letter to the head of the Association, 29 June 1950, BIII3, vol. 27.
19 Hans Philippi to Zillich, 3 October 1950, p. 6, BIII3, vol. 27.
20 Reimesch to Tittes, 12 August 1950, BIII3, vol. 27.
21 Ibid.
22 Ibid.

generated the city people. Let us be proud that it has been so«. Stressing the importance of the traditional garb, he affirmed that this element represented on stage

> the main attraction for the *Reichsdeutschen*! We also have to keep this in mind (since the other associations don't have so much to offer, above all not such an AUTHENTICITY.) [...] We want to honour our nationality through the celebration of 800 years of immigration, we don't want to make a dull academic affair out of it! Do we want to put on stage a few musicians dressed in black who will, even with talent, only be able to play something which does not come from us, or do we want to accompany instrumentally the celebration with these folk songs which have stemmed for centuries from our blood, from our love, from our enthusiasm?[23]

This episode reveals significant differences in »Saxon identity«: is it represented above all by a cultivated elite or by traditionalist peasants? As it shows here, memory is primarily a question of identification: Reimesch claimed that folk traditions not only validated his personal heritage but that of all his fellow Saxons. But what he called authenticity is not only his personal representation of real Saxon history; it is also what he believed to be adapted to the *Reichsdeutschen*'s representations, such as a need for traditions, a search for »roots«, for a more urbanised population than the Saxons which had supposedly lost its original identity through the cataclysms of the »Third Reich« and the war. Authenticity appears therefore as a staging, halfway between an intimate feeling of the real and the true, and the expectations attributed to the public. The choice of the instrumental accompaniment brings to light a fundamental question: Should the common history between the Germans and the Saxons be put forward, or on the contrary, should the stress be laid on a Saxon specificity, on their exotic authenticity? Reimesch had clearly answered and he did not try to hide his aversion to those who, according to him, had lost their identity in Germany through assimilation: therefore he once again threw himself against Coulin whom he accused of infidelity to his people because he had criticised Zillich's books and the Association's policy: »If, for instance, I had adopted this position when I arrived in Germany in 1920, I would have become a *Kraut* a long time ago, but I have thought every single day of the *Heimat*, not for sentimental reasons but rather due to a certain moral obligation«[24]. Tittes was nevertheless in the position to impose his view and to »eliminate everything that can prove even allusively our peasant origins«. Reimesch could only ascertain with bitterness that he and Tittes had »very different opinions on our historical point of view of our People's past« and condemned the commemoration's staging as a »betrayal of history«[25]. Reimesch was actually overwhelmed by the degree of mediatisation which the celebration's preparation had received. He initially considered it as a way of recreating a cohesion amongst the immigrated Saxons – it converted itself into an event for the West German public.

The Saxon image that dominated was based on another representation of what the West Germans' expectations were and a member of the Association imagined one of them reacting to Reimesch's traditionalist concept: »›What will there be? A few nice

23 Original in capitals, Reimesch to Tittes, 29 July 1950, BIII3, vol. 27.
24 Reimesch to Breckner, 2 January 1950, BIII3, vol. 27.
25 Reimesch to Tittes, 12 August 1950, BIII3, vol. 27.

looking traditional costumes and some heartfelt folk songs?‹ This will be the reaction of eighty per cent of our guests. But these are the people to whom we want to show ourselves from a different side, a side which they do not know of or are not used to seeing«[26]. This was why the claim of a common heritage with the Germans – Beethoven's classicism – would be put forward during the commemoration, whereas Saxon folklorism was considered not to be of any support to the political, economic and social integration in the context of the reconstruction of the new *Heimat*.

The choice of Heinrich Zillich as main speaker did not create such a conflict within the Association's directory. This writer, known by all the Saxons and famous in Germany for the numerous copies of his novels during the »Third Reich«, was indeed, more than anyone, in a position to »yield profit« from the Saxons' symbolical »capital«: Zillich »has at his disposal precious connections with well known personalities in the intellectual and public milieu«, as a member of the German Lutheran Church remarked[27]. Settled in Germany in the 1930s, he had been a sympathiser of Nazi ideology which he actively helped to spread within the German speaking minority in Romania. He scorned the Allies' denazification project and rejected the FRG's parliamentary democracy. As a former member of the fallen NS-Regime's elite he was, since the end of the war, active in the Saxon groups of Germany although he maintained a certain aristocratic distance with regard to the refugees' misery.

V. PREPARATION III: WHICH PAST TO COMMEMORATE?

The directory's members were unanimous that the twelve years of National Socialism would not be evoked. More than ever, it was considered as necessary to silence the compromising activities of the Saxon Church with the »movement of renewal«, this NS-organisation which obtained the majority in the Saxon parliament in 1933, or the participation of the Saxons in the war of extermination on the Eastern and Balkan fronts in the »Waffen-SS«. Reimesch a few months before the commemoration brought to order a member of the Committee, Brigitte Csaki, who depicted, in a published article, the Saxons' bishop of the war period Wihelm Staedel (1940–1944) as a »Nazi bishop«: »We have made it our duty, for instance, to help out of prison all these poor wretches who have served in the SS, more or less involuntarily, yes, we have done our best to veil with the coat of Christian charity certain things which many of us did with real enthusiasm during the Nazi period and who could not know how it all would turn out. [...] One does not need to embellish anything, but one can and one has the right to silence the things which no longer can be repaired«[28].

Keeping silent the violence of a »total war« which represented the peak of the nationalist evolution in Europe since the 19th century and which at the same time had provoked the atomisation of the Saxons – was not something which was obvious only four

26 Breckner and Bruckner to Reimesch, 19 August 1950, BIII3, vol. 27/27.
27 Maurer to Gerstenmaier, 12 February 1949, Archiv des Diakonischen Werkes der EKD, ZB, 980.
28 Reimesch to Csaki, 26 October 1949, BIII3, vol. 13.

years after the end of the war. In order to do this, one had not to insist on precise events and rather to insist on the larger period of history, to lean towards an epic narrative rather than a dramatic one. The myth of 800 years of Saxon history in Transylvania was a suitable narrative since it created a historical continuity between the beginnings and the ruptures of August 1944. It offered the possibility to claim an almost ahistorical, atemporal ancestry which conformed to the transmission of a cultural memory as described by Jan Assmann.

This use of the past inserted itself in the tradition of a romantic historiography set up in the 19th century which made the arrival of the ancestors in Transylvania date back to the 12th century and which attributed to them the function of a Western bulwark against the Ottoman »barbarians«[29]. This historiography considered the colonisation in Transylvania in the light of the German nation building process of the 19th century and presented the Saxons as »Germans«, from their origins to the present. At the time when the Saxons were at the fringe of Germany's national state building, they claimed to be indispensable for the Christian West in their quality of bulwark and sentinel. The »Third Reich« updated this representation of the sentry into the myth of the advanced post: the Saxons, as well as the other German speaking Eastern European minorities, were described as the representatives of the new Germanic order and at the front of Europe's defence against the »barbarians« – this time not the Turks but the Soviets. Heinrich Zillich exploited without hesitation this argument to let the youngest Saxons enrol themselves into the »Waffen-SS«, although Romania had already changed its allegiance in the summer of 1944: he clearly stated in his »appeal to South Eastern European Waffen-SS soldiers« the Saxons' predestination: »We, the sons [of the Carpathian Mountains, PdT] are the Reich's protectors. [...] We have until now never stopped being outposts, South Eastern soldiers, with wives and children!«[30]

VI. THE »CELEBRATION OF 800 YEARS« AND ITS PROFIT

Placed under the high protection of the Bavarian State secretary for refugees, the official celebration took place on Saturday 21 October 1950 in the hall of the Bavarian ministry of the economy. According to one of the organisers, the atmosphere was »of great gravity and of grand dignity«[31]. As the preliminary discussions had stated, all folklorist evocation was banished and the ceremony began finally with a *concerto grosso* from the baroque Italian composer Arcangelo Corelli – and not with Beethoven. The public was composed of guests of honour – local, regional and national politicians, high dignitaries of the Church – and Association members who had managed to get an invitation. Everybody had received a copy of the *Siebenbürgische Zeitung* special edi-

29 Georg Daniel Teutsch, Geschichte der Siebenbürger Sachsen für das sächsische Volk, Hermannstadt 1899.

30 Heinrich Zillich, Das Reich macht Euch frei! An die südostdeutschen Soldaten der Waffen-SS, Berlin, Grenze und Ausland, [1944], p. 16.

31 Gross, Bericht (see note 13).

tion dedicated to the event. Oskar Schuster, the Association's representative in Munich, opened the ceremony instead of F. H. Reimesch who was ill. He was followed by Ottomar Schreiber, State secretary to the refugees, and then by Heinrich Zillich. The ceremony finished with a hymn. Dinner was served in the evening at the Bayrischer Hof, a famous Bavarian hotel, and was reserved for the politicians who received an exemplary of Zillich's book »Wir Siebenbürger«. It stood out with the unexpected presence of President Heuss who held a speech. He was familiar with Saxon issues since he had written an article on the Saxon national hero, Stefan Ludwig Roth, »martyr« of the revolts of 1848[32]. A service took place the day after in the morning and was followed by various entertainments which non members could also attend – the *Siebenbürgische Zeitung* evoked quite unrealistically the presence of 3,000 Saxons. Smaller celebrations also took place the same day or later in Frankfurt/Main, Uffenheim, Bamberg, Nuremberg and Rothenburg.

The special edition of the newspaper presented the commemoration under the auspices of »800 years of mission at the service of the West«[33]. It evoked »the 800th anniversary of a truly historical occurrence, the ancestors' emigration in what was the desert at the feet of the Carpathian Mountains« and mentioned that the presence of »Germans« was »certified« since 1150[34]. The newspaper illustrated through all its articles the myth of the Saxons' »divine mission« to represent Christian civilisation in South Eastern Europe: it was all about the supposed specific Saxon values such as work, perseverance, faith, and traditions, serving their »civilising performances«. History was reduced to a slogan, repeated all through these two days of celebration, which Oskar Schuster summarised clearly by saying: »It is not a small thing when we celebrate the Saxons' history, it is, in a word, the spirit of the West whose faithful outposts the Saxons have always been for the last eight centuries.«[35] Heinrich Zillich explained in his solemn speech what he meant by the »West«: ideally incarnated by Charlemagne in History, the »Reich [...] is not only a short-lived state construction, it is the representation of the West, the guarantee of a superstatal European community«, wanted by God, and he called for its resurrection[36]. In this way, he could adapt a revisionist speech to the fashionable subject in 1950 of Europe's unification.

As one can see in this speech, the »Third Reich« was never far and the myth of *völkisch* solidarity of the *Volksgemeinschaft* was strongly reactivated. The Saxons were, during the commemoration, above all presented as Transylvanian »Germans«, so that their belonging to the master culture could be stressed and their difference lessened. Under the commemorative surface of »800 years«, the years of the Nazi regime were in reality omnipresent. This came spectacularly to light with the hymn sung at the end of the ceremony. The *Siebenbürgische Zeitung* only mentioned that the public sang, standing, the *Heimat* hymn »Siebenbürgen, Land des Segens«, however, a wit-

32 Cf. Stefan Ludwig Roth, in: Theodor Heuss, Schattenbeschwörung. Randfiguren der Geschichte, Tübingen 1950, pp. 189–202.

33 800 Jahre abendländischer Sendung, in: *Siebenbürgische Zeitung* No. 4, October 1950.

34 Die Heimat im Herzen, in: Ibid. p. 1; Die Herkunft der Siebenbürger Sachsen, in: Ibid. p. 3.

35 Dr. Oskar Schuster, Begrüssungsansprache, 21 October 1950, p. 1, BIII2, vol. 4/1.

36 Heinrich Zillich, Das Abendland ist unser Volksgesetz, in: *Siebenbürgische Zeitung* No. 5, November 1950, p. 3.

ness related another more compromising version: one of the strophes of the German Hymn »Deutschlandlied« was sung and immediately followed, as if it were one unique hymn, by the »Horst-Wessel-Lied«, a military hymn of the »SA-troupes« which was traditionally sung at the end of every National Socialist meeting until 1945 – still a common habit at that time[37]. The ceremony was also marked by the use of the *Lingua Tertii Imperii*, like »*Gaue*« (region) or »*Volksgruppe*« (ethnic group). It above all incited the public to condemn denazification and to reject the »collective guilt thesis«. An article from the special edition, written by a former soldier of the »Waffen-SS«, related the fight of Narwa against the Soviet army in Estonia in 1944:

> We did our duty as we saw fit. For our *Heimat*, for Europe, for life. [...] We were not bandits and murderers, we did not participate in the concentration camps, in the blood trials nor in the crimes against humanity which occurred and which we rejected energetically if ever we heard of them! We were soldiers like a million others too.[38]

The authour defended not only an uncriminal past, but also a glorious one: according to him, the »Waffen-SS« soldiers would have fought for Europe's freedom like their Saxon ancestors. His vision of history was officially acknowledged by state minister Dr. Lukaschek who insisted on the sufferings due to exile and celebrated »the glorious history of a colonist people who owes nearly all of its value of recognition only to its peaceful cultural work«[39].

Addressed to the exterior, the commemoration of this imprecise and legendary past in the pretentious context of a mediatic ceremony with journalists and politicians was a pretext: it had to be used to transmit to the West German public a seductive image of the Saxons, an authenticity adapted to their presumed expectations. Zillich drew a positive conclusion years after: this feast »had presented us, the Saxons, to the Germans in a really impressive way, this time not only as a folklorist novelty but as a community with high cultural value«[40]. Through this transmitted representation, the commemoration intended to satisfy the Association's political claims. The slogan of the Saxon »mission« for the West had to create a relationship of debt from the »mother land« towards the Saxons: the FRG was as a logical consequence expected to express its gratitude to them for their service. In the name of this »glorious history«, the Association claimed therefore concrete rights: the right to participate in the elaboration of the judicial status of the refugees (*Lastenausgleichgesetz, Fremdrentengesetz* etc.) which brought financial compensations and an equal treatment with their German fellow citizens. It also intended not to be overwhelmed by the other far bigger organisations of repatriated Germans, like the powerful association of the *Sudetendeutsche*. Although the Association shared common interests with them and developed a similar lobbying strategy, stressing among other things its status as an expellee group, it tried to distinguish itself by insisting on the concept of a Saxon

37 This anecdote was told the author from a witness in June 2004.

38 Das Erlebnis von Narwa, in: *Siebenbürgische Zeitung* No. 4, October 1950, p. 6.

39 Dr. Lukaschek, Ruhmreiche Geschichte eines Kolonistenvolkes, in: Ibid. p. 3.

40 Zit. in: Dr Heinrich Zillich zum Ehrenvorsitzenden erhoben. Abschiedsrede des aus dem Amt scheidenden Sprechers, in: *Siebenbürgische Zeitung*, 15 December 1963, p. 2.

historical exception. Obtaining arable land or credits was one of the main goals of this competitive race. The Saxon Association also lobbied for family reunification, that is the organised emigration of the Saxons still living in Romania to the FRG. While evoking decisions which were about to be taken by the government for the economical integration of the refugees, Lukaschek promised during the ceremony: »You can be sure that the Transylvanian Saxons will not be forgotten either«[41].

For all these claims, the commemoration seemed to have played a significant role, and Hubert Groß, the Association's treasurer was satisfied with the results for the year 1950–51: there was an improvement in the judicial status of retired Saxon civil servants, a relatively high number of peasant holdings had been attributed to Saxon peasants, the implementation of housing construction programmes etc. He also noticed that the Association's importance had significantly grown within the associations of repatriated Germans thanks to Heinrich Zillich who was increasingly invited to make speeches for numerous public ceremonies[42]. This discourse thus set up partly took on the constitutive elements of the »master narrative« as developed by Adenauer: anti-communist consensus, the restoring of conservative values, the claim for a »clean sweep« over the Nazi past. But it was also different: this discourse rejected parliamentary democracy and kept up the nostalgia of a pan-Germanic Order in Europe. Last but not least, it refused the »collective shame« with regards to the Nazi crimes as suggested by Heuss.

This commemoration was also on the other hand addressed to potential members of the community of remembrance which the Association aimed to create. Sunday 22 October 1950 was dedicated to such an adhesion – a material adhesion but also a symbolical one: the positive past which had become a synonym of »mission« and »success« had to facilitate the identification of the highest denomination with the represented memory. The discourse on historical continuity had to lessen the unprecedented ruptures which the refugees had experienced in the past years and which they still felt through the instability of their everyday life. This commemoration was indeed not a historical work but a memory activity which had to fix the representation of the past: commemorating 800 years of Saxon history did not mean celebrating the history but rather its annihilation, it was less the remembrance of events than the victory of a symbolical domination: the domination of a representation of the past whose monopoly the Association publicly claimed.

Groß announced in the same report that the number of members had increased by 50 percent since 1950 and reached 4,000, which meant that 12,000 Saxons had been reached according to his estimation. This number would keep on increasing during the following years and would attain 10,000 in 1963[43]. The new calibre of the Association in the public arena reinforced its historical representation of the Saxons: when the media transmits one single memory image, the latter is more performative than ever – and becomes the norm. The Association justified its representativity through an act of strength.

41 Lukaschek, Ruhmreiche Geschichte eines Kolonistenvolkes (see note 39).
42 Gross, Bericht (see note 13), pp. 3–5.
43 Cit. in: Hans-Werner Schuster, 50 Jahre Landsmannschaft der Siebenbürger Sachsen in Deutschland, Munich 1999, p. 10.

Not all Saxons, though, identified with this imposed image. The Stuttgart branch of the Association refused to support Zillich as candidate for the Association's presidency in 1952 and evoked his speech at the »celebration of 800 years« as a central argument: one had the impression through his articles and speeches, as was written in the resolution presented by Alfred Coulin, that Zillich

> is politically close to a reactionary radical group which, defending a spirit of revenge, is completely rejected by young people who experienced the war at the front or the deportation to Russia, as we know from numerous testimonies. [...] The depth and the consequences of the collapse of 1945 seem not to have been reflected enough. [...] The old times will not come back, not in Germany, not in Transylvania or anywhere. And we must not let nationalism be reborn in the shape of a European ideal, whereas secretly the 'German Order' is considered to be the only right one[44].

This virulent criticism of the representation of the past as defended by Zillich's clan, however, did not prevent the Saxon writer from being elected again and again at the Association's presidency for twelve years. As for the Saxons who stayed in the Transylvanian *Heimat*, their identification was also improbable as one of them admited, reacting to a 1949 Saxon brochure printed in West Germany: »It is as if these people had landed on the moon after the world had collapsed [...] and they do not mention, not a single word, that in the meantime their world had crumbled«[45].

44 Alfred Coulin, Bericht über den Verbandstag der Landsmannschaft am 13. April 52, 6 May 1952, BIII3, vol. 13.

45 Brief aus Hermannstadt, 25 May 1949, BIII3, vol. 22/A–E.

LAVINIA STAN

Media Discourses about Romanian Exile before and after 1989

Just like a very strained body which relaxed all of a sudden after a long period of tension, Romania still feels uncomfortable with the new sensation of freedom brought by 1989. Because of the totalitarian nature of the communist regime in Romania, dealing with the recent past is an essential condition for healing and stepping forward. Confusion about the new reality, ignorance in approaching, defining, explaining and understanding its former condition, are some of the issues that Romanian society faces after 1989. However, as one exile affirmed, after a short period of growing interest, a sort of »collective amnesia« spread among the public while just a small part of the Romanian elite initiated and continued to fight the windmills of forgetting. In this context, the history of exile must be integrated within the general framework of the history of Romanian communism from which the exile was an outcome that constantly challenged its creator. This article will present and analyse the constructed image of Romanian exiles as it can be identified in media discourses during and after the communist regime.

Since the end of World War II, Romanian exiles were involved in contesting the communist regime imposed by the Soviets, thus striving »to overpower a native government without challenging the existence of the nation-state«[1]. The traditional approach in defining exile focuses on three issues: the experience of the exiles before leaving their country; the causes, motivations and means of their departure; and the situation in the country of asylum. Yossi Shain considers that this approach should be improved by focusing on the exiles' activism – political, cultural and/or humanitarian – in the host countries, which individualises them within the different sub-groups of migrants[2].

Starting from this idea of exiles' activism, the article applies critical discourse analysis to the construction of the image of the exile as a social group employing partially the formula proposed by Ruth Wodak et al. for analysing the national identity construction, focusing on discursive strategies for positive self-presentation versus negative other-presentation[3].

1 Yossi SHAIN, The Frontier of Loyalty. Political Exiles in the Age of Nation-State, Middletown 1989, p. 1.
2 Ibid. pp. 8–9.
3 Ruth WODAK et al., The Discursive Construction of National Identity, Edinburg 1999, pp. 37–41.

I. MEDIA DISCOURSE BEFORE 1989

The Romanian written media generated a public discourse about the exiles assigning them an identity that was politically constructed by the communist ideology[4]. In Romania, as in most totalitarian countries, the media played a key role in propaganda. The same tool was used by the West to counteract communist efforts. It resulted in endless opposing actions and re-actions in which nobody could say what came first. The outcome was the creation of totally antithetical images in East and West, which continued with different intensity after 1989.

The Romanian communist mass media scarcely referred to the exiles and it did not use words such as exile when referring to Romanians living abroad. Traditionally, the exile was associated in Romanian history with the 1848 revolutionaries who are symbols of the Romanian nation building process, and they were appreciated as romantic emblematic figures assigning a very strong positive connotation to the generic exile. On many occasions, the exiles after 1945 described themselves as successors to the 1848 exiles[5]. Therefore, the communist media avoided any possible equivalence between Romanians living abroad defined through words, concepts, stereotypes, and tropes with strong negative connotations, and the exiles.

With regard to the structure of the Romanian community in Western Europe, it was different during the Cold War. Between 1940 and 1948 the exile community included mainly, but not only, right wing intellectuals and politicians who fled the country in the context of internal political changes[6]. They formed a rather homogeneous group as it embodied people with similar education, social status, and principles and values, in spite of different and sometimes conflicting political beliefs. The exiles considered that the communist regime would be temporary, thus organising an alternative political leadership abroad to be ready for the moment of returning ›home‹. After the 1956 Hungarian revolution however, it became indisputable that the communist regimes would last for a while. From this point on and given the fact that political actions were officially impossible because there was no recognition of a Romanian government in exile, cultural action prevailed, the so-called »politics through culture«. In the 1970s and 1980s, two successive waves of newcomers to Western countries brought a different background, having different expectations and most of them did not get involved in any action against the communist regime in Romania[7]. Following the 1975 Helsinki Final Act the focus was on humanitarian actions, opening the closed elite group to larger participation of Romanians abroad, which increased the general fear of the exiles

4 Călin Mihai Vulcu, Construcţia identităţilor politice în discursul oficial din România, 1948–1965 (Constructing Political Identities in the Official Discourse in Romania, 1948–1965), Cluj-Napoca 2005.

5 Neagu Djuvara, Souvenirs de l'exil de 1948, in: Revue Roumaine d'Historie 1-2 (1995) pp. 17–53.

6 On the history of Romanian extreme right movement see Armin Heinen, Legiunea Arhanghelului Mihai. Mişcare socială şi organizaţie politică. O contribuţie la problema fascimului internaţional (The Archangel Michael's Legion. Social Movement and Political Organisation. A Contribution to the Problem of International Fascism), Bucharest 1999. On anti-communist migration see Ghiţă Ionescu, Comunismul în România (The Communism in Romania), Bucharest 1994.

7 Eva Behring, Scriitori români din exil (1945–1989). O perspectivă istorico-literară (Romanian Writers in Exile (1945–1989). A Historic-Literary Perspective), Bucharest 2001, pp. 23–45.

that the Securitate would infiltrate them more easily[8]. In general, it can be asserted that during the entire Cold War, the common aim of Romanian exiles was to determine a change in the Western powers' behaviour towards Romania so that they would eventually intervene to overthrow the communist regime. On the other hand, in spite of this political variance, when it came to cultural activities the exiles' world seemed to be much more coherent, as one could find within the pages of the same magazine writers both with strong rightwing and leftwing orientation.

With respect to the image assigned to the exiles during the communist regime, there were two main tendencies which corresponded with different historical contexts, i.e. with Stalinism under Gheorghe Gherorghiu-Dej, and national communism under Ceauşescu. Symptomatic of the first period is the attack on Romania's legation in Bern in 1955 and of the second, the conflict originated in the 1970s between Săptămâna and Radio Free Europe. Both incidents were exemplary of the attitude the Romanian government had towards its former citizens living abroad. In the discursive construction of the identity of the exiles almost all claims, warrants and grounds used in the ideological confrontation with the West were used by different authors.

The first event under scrutiny is the attack on the Romanian legation in Bern in February 1955 by five Romanians living abroad who had occupied the legation for several days, taking hostages and injuring the driver of the legation who eventually died[9]. The discourse about Romanians abroad was constructed around the victim-perpetrator issue with the negative presentation of the other as perpetrator. Through a strategy of victimisation no individual was mentioned as victim, but the Romanian legation, which became the victim-institution. Successively, this victim, through a strategy of singularisation and personification, received a name, Stoeffel, the representative of the Romanian legation who incorporated all the features of the institutional victim. In general, in what regards the other, the description was vague, the attackers being identified as »a gang of Romanian fascists«, clarifying that albeit they were Romanians, they were organised in a gang, thus belonging to the sweepings of the gutter. Besides the attackers themselves, there was presented a sub-group, the radical adversaries of communism who were compromised during World War II to which a vague »other criminal elements« were associated. These sub-groups were assigned negative common features such as the fact that they all lived abroad and they were armed with »automatic weapons, axes, knives, borers, instruments of opening up lockers and safes«[10].

These auxiliary elements fed, in a way, the general fear of the imperialist conspiracy against Romania of some unknown people with a powerful bellicose potential. This

8 Mihai Pelin, Culisele spionajului românesc. D.I.E. 1955–1980 (The backstage of Romanian Espionage. The Department of Foreign Information, 1955–1980), Bucharest 1997.

9 For the entire story, see Stejărel Olaru, Cei cinci care au speriat Estul. Atacul asupra Legaţiei RPR de la Berna (februarie 1955) (The Five Who Scared the East. The Attack on the Romanian Legation in Bern), Iaşi 2003.

10 Atacul banditesc împotriva legaţiei Republicii Populare Române la Berna (The Villain Attack on the Legation of the Romanian People's Republic in Bern), in: Scînteia 3209 (16 February 1955) p. 4. Identical formula was used in Nota de protest a guvernului RPR adresată guvernului elveţian (The Protesting Note Addressed by the Romanian Government to the Swiss Government): in Scînteia 3209 (16 February 1955) p. 1.

situation was symptomatic of the first period of the Cold War when an outbreak of conflict was expected. Moreover, the presence of an arsenal might be interpreted as a proof for the substantial alien support provided by a still unknown entity.

The responsibility was constructed using the strategy of justification by shifting the focus from the attackers themselves to an institutional-perpetrator, i.e. the Swiss authorities, initially not involved, but sympathetic to the attackers. As the events developed, they were to be blamed for »permitting the fascist banditos to maintain the occupying of the legation«, offering them the time for »devastating the archives«. The responsibility of the Swiss authorities grew gradually in the narrative as »they did not have in every situation an *appropriate* attitude«. At this point, it was suggested that the Swiss authorities were accomplices to the theft of the six million Swiss francs, perpetrated on Swiss soil by »the traitor and fugitive Cretzeanu and his accomplices who had betrayed his homeland«[11]. It is interesting that the names of the five attackers were not mentioned, but the name of one of the most important political leaders in exile, Nicolae Cretzeanu. This could be interpreted that the Romanian communist authorities emphasised that the attackers had been just tools in the hands of more powerful individuals which were the real enemies of the country, who posed a greater threat.

Moreover, the entire political leadership of the exile was explicitly associated with the Bern attack as »two American spies suspected of belonging to the attack's organisers«, i.e Mihai Fărcăşanu and Barbu Niculescu, leaders of a »fascist organisation«. The proof is »a secret meeting« in Paris of the groups of Romanian traitors and fascists in order to »analyse the situation« with the participation of M. Fărcăşanu and Constantin Vişoianu, »embittered agents of the American warmongers«[12]. Finally, the perpetrator category became extremely inclusive as »several governments in the Occident« were hosting »traitors of the homeland, guilty of crimes against our people« and this attitude was symptomatic of a general »aggressive policy«.

It must be emphasised that in most cases, the other was the enemy, never plotting or acting alone, he or she had accomplices and all criminal actions were possible due to several factors, such as the lack of vigilance of the local authorities, and the existence of certain financial support, in this case the six million Swiss francs which »served for the sustenance of the fascist criminals who had fled the countries of people's democracy«. Under the »protecting look« of the same authorities, press campaigns have been organised in order »to slander Romania, to monger against Romanian people«[13].

On the other hand, the positive self-presentation concept of ›us‹, comprises »the Romanian people« as a whole and as owners who are responsible for Romania in order to emphasise the national uniqueness. To the Romanian people have been attributed exquisite qualities, as it »recognises the hand and the knife of these criminals«, con-

11 One of the main reasons of disagreements among the Romanian exiles was the so-called Cretzianu Fund. During World War II, Ion Antonescu had put six million Swiss francs at the disposal of Romanian embassies abroad, and the money was deposited on the name of Cretzeanu. See Romania/Exile. Radio Free Europe Archives. Budapest: Open Society Archives, 300/60/1/197, 1951–1967, Item no. 06442/53.

12 Autorităţile elveţiene au eliberat doi spioni americani bănuiţi a face parte din organizatorii atacului banditesc (Swiss Authorities Set Free Two American Spies Suspected to Belonging to the Organisers of the Villain Attack), in: Scînteia 3213 (20 February 1955) p. 4.

13 Atacul banditesc împotriva legaţiei Republicii Populare Române la Berna (see note 10).

structing the image of a responsible and omniscient people calling upon the testimonies of several Romanian citizens, in order to condemn what happened[14]. The declarations pertain to individuals with names mentioned and who belong to a wide spectrum of professions, including lathe operators, managers and professors.

In constructing the discourse about the Bern attack, in successive numbers of *Scînteia* the discourse construction was accomplished by the story about the bringing back of Aurel Şeţu's corpse and the funeral ceremony which could be compared with that of Ioan Moţa and Vasile Marin in the inter-war period[15]. The media presented this event as a martyrdom of the victim Aurel Şeţu in order to illustrate several legitimate attitudes such as the need for revenge »the hearts of the crowd seethed with anger against the legionnaires' gang of assassins«, and with a sense of justice »the legionary brutes should receive their deserved punishment«[16].

The second long-term event in analysing the image of the exiles in the Romanian media is the conflict between RFE and the editor-in-chief of the weekly *Săptamâna*, Eugen Barbu. Arch Puddington claims that »under its two famous editors Noel Bernard and Vlad Georgescu, the Romanian section carried out a relentless polemical offensive against Ceauşescu – the tone was biting, personal and sarcastic. During Bernard's editorship, the Romanian section was not infrequently cited for violation of the station's strictures against vituperation and rhetorical excess«[17]. Katherine Verdery places this conflict within the more general framework of the nationalist transformation of communism under Ceauşescu[18].

Contrary to the previous period when the language used was rougher, in the 1970s and 1980s, in *Săptămîna*, a difference was made by using mostly irony. When attacking an editor, who compared contemporary Romania with the time of Vlad the Impaler, Eugen Barbu argues that »I inform him [i.e. the RFE editor, LS] that the Romanian government ordered a massive crop of traditional splinters, in Baragan where this year it will be sowing not wheat but hard cudgels on which will be impaled those nasty and external enemies of Romania«. Monica Lovinescu was ironically called »the marvellous Western philosopher«[19] while Virgil Ierunca was called »ginerică« pertaining to the fact that being married to Monica Lovinescu, his identity was a consequence of

14 See C. Paraschivescu-Bălăceanu, Criminalii legionari să-şi primească pedeapsa meritată (The Legionnaires' Killers Deserve to Receive their Punishment), in: Scînteia 3211 (18 February 1955) p. 4; Intregul popor îşi exprimă mânia faţă de criminalii legionari şi instigatorii lor imperialişti (The Entire People Express Their Anger Against the Legionnaire Killers and Their Imperialist Instigators), in: Scînteia 3213 (20 February 1955) p. 3.

15 In February 1937, the corpses of Ion Moţa and Vasile Marin, two important figures in the leadership of the Iron Guard, who died in the Spanish civil war, were brought back to Romania for an impressive funeral ceremony. Heinen, Legiunea Arhanghelului Mihail (see note 6), pp. 293–294.

16 Banda de ucigaşi legionari trebuie să-şi primească pedeapsa meritată. La catafalcul lui Aurel Şeţu (The Gang of Legionnaire Killers Have to Receive Their Punishment. At Aurel Şeţu's Catafalque), in: Scînteia 3214 (22 February 1955) p. 3.

17 Arch Puddington, Broadcasting freedom. The Cold War Triumph of Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty, Lexington 2000, p. 239.

18 Katherine Verdery, National Ideology Under Socialism. Identity and Cultural Politics in Ceauşescu's Romania, Berkley 1991, pp. 170–171.

19 Eugen Barbu, Mămica Lovinescu şi marxismul (Little Mommy Lovinescu and the Marxism), in: Săptămîna 326 (4 March 1977) p. 7.

being the son-in-law of one of the biggest Romanian literary critics, Eugen Lovinescu, and not to his personal qualities[20].

It is interesting that in the offensive undertaken against the RFE by Eugen Barbu, the ›we‹ is not the same passive entity, which calls out their revolt in front of a catafalque, but an active element. The ›we‹ designates, not the people, but the editors from *Săptămîna* in general, and in particular Eugen Barbu. The purpose of the retort that *Săptămîna* gives to RFE is »a private action of a writer who had enough to permit ... the use of a radio station which broadcasts in Romanian to comb us down every night«[21].

Nonetheless, there was a passive, neutral ›they‹. Contrary to the previous period, and due to the nature of the debate, ›they‹ are not the enemy, but the »innocent Romanian people«, receiving false information offered by RFE. The ›we‹ feels responsible for protecting the potential victims, ›they‹ (them) of the lies proffered by RFE, hence the anger of Eugen Barbu who was »furious because systematic lies are thrown in some naives' ears«[22]. This definition was not consistently employed as sometimes the ›we‹ category was more inclusive. It was extended to the omniscient Romanian people who knew the truth, and »who can have fun when listening to RFE«. For the first time while speaking about Romanians living abroad, a differentiation is made between a clearly identifiable sub-group of Romanian intellectuals in exile, albeit never using the word ›exile‹ or ›exilé‹, and the other Romanians living abroad usually labelled as ›traitors‹. This aspect must be related to the initiative of the communist regime to integrate some personalities previously damned, but very important for the new national-communism into the national culture. Some of them such as Mircea Eliade, Emil Cioran, Eugen Ionescu or Tristan Tzara were in exile[23], but information about their lives was limited, never mentioning their choice of living abroad, and their works were partially published to serve the regime's interest. ›We‹, Romanians, appreciate the quality recognised by everybody else, appropriating if necessary figures to justify our national uniqueness.

In contrast with the previous period when the otherness was constructed or better to say suggested throughout a vague ›they‹, this time the other was sometimes a plural ›you‹, different from the above mentioned sub-group of personalities. The ›you‹ subgroup consisted of those who worked at RFE, who lacked professionalism. They were »second hand professionals, who grasped every opportunity to praise themselves«, producing »tenebrous broadcasting«[24]. A contested quality of collaborators or employees of RFE was their credibility as »those who taught us Marxism in Romania, fight against it now at RFE«[25].

20 Id., Ginerică cu leduncă sau spălătorii de morţi, in: Săptămîna 582 (29 January 1982) p. 7.

21 Id., Revelion la Europa Liberă (New Year's Eve at Radio Free Europe), in: Săptămîna 318 (7 January 1977) p. 7.

22 Id., Necroforii, in: Săptămîna 331 (8 April 1977) p. 7.

23 Behring, Scriitori români din exil (see note 7), pp. 202–210.

24 Barbu, Revelion la Europa Liberă (see note 21).

25 In fact, this was a recognised policy at RFE that the higher the hierarchical position of an individual in Romania was, the higher was the possibility of working at RFE.

The same argument as in the case of the Bern attack was evoked, namely that the RFE editors were guilty of being paid by American institutions. They were qualified as »a clique of hirelings«, »mercenaries who have sold their conscience for a handful of money«. Radio Free Europe is »a fortified den as a result of the last decisions of some bodies over the ocean«, »it is not a benign association of affable people willing to inform us, but a poisoned source of propaganda«, a »den of anticommunist propaganda«[26].

II. MEDIA DISCOURSES AFTER 1989

In the context of the new challenges that Romanian society faced after the fall of communism, the question about the contribution of the exiles to Romanian history needed an answer. Certain authors claim that in what concerns at least the literature produced by Romanians in exile, after 1989 there has been a real interest to integrate it. This could be explained as a consequence of the need for »uncensored autobiographies, hidden journals and all means of credible testimonies about the dictatorship«[27]. However, for the time being there were not systematic research initiatives to recover the memory of the exile. Political power in post-communist Romania did not have any interest in associating former exiles to leadership. Thus culture remained the only domain where integration was possible.

On the other hand, a part of the Romanian cultural elite perceived with frustration »the negligence of all political administrations in Bucharest regarding Romanians in exile. From the open, aggressive, and dominated by hatred denial specific to Ceauşescu, to Iliescu's not hidden suspicion and Constantinescu's not really innocent indifference, there is an absolutely astonishing continuity pattern«[28]. In general the attitude of Romanians could be characterised by two main traits: for the old exiles, scepticism and suspicion to any initiative, and for the newcomers, the emigrants, indifference. In its effort to sustain the European integration of Romania, the government after 2000 tried to connect Romanians abroad with »the national interest«. The Romanian government created in 2003 a new institution, the Institute for the Memory of Exile in Bucharest, to which many Romanians abroad are relatively reluctant given the fact that some of the personnel are considered to be controversial.

Public conferences about evaluating Romanian literature were organised both in and outside the country. For example, the Romanian Cultural Foundation used »to organise symmetrically, every time the opposition prepared a colloquium with participants from exile, a counter-conference to prove that not all Romanians abroad contest the power in Bucharest«[29]. Last but not least, there have been successful initiatives to

26 Mihai Beniuc, Noi, ca ţară şi popor, am ales drumul (We as Country and People, We Have Chosen the Way), in: România literară 10-14 (7 April 1977) p. 3.

27 Behring, Scriitori români din exil (see note 7), p. 213.

28 Vladimir Tismăneanu în dialog cu Mircea Mihăieş, Încet, spre Europa (Vladimir Tismăneanu in Dialogue with Mircea Mihăieş, Slowly, Towards Europe), Iaşi 2000, p. 69.

29 Alina Mungiu, Românii după '89. Istoria unei neînţelegeri (Romanians after '89. The History of a Misunderstanding), Bucharest 1995, p. 207.

save what can be saved from the memory of Romanian exile and these materialised in the fact that several printing houses, such as Humanitas, Jurnalul Literar, Polirom, and Apostrof specialised in publishing the work of certain authors in exile, such as Mircea Eliade, Emil Cioran, or Eugen Ionescu. Still none of the big Romanian literary figures in the West chose to return to Romania after 1989.

This split can be found in the discursive construction of the image of exile by Romanian post-communist media which offers rather conflicting narratives which were used by political power, according to the orientation of publications. In his study of Romanian post-communist media, Peter Gross identifies certain continuities in Romanian communist and post-communist media, as they were not structured for playing a central role in reshaping the political culture after 1989, because of the personal involvement of Ceauşescu[30]. Contrary to other communist regimes in Central and Eastern Europe, the Romanian media resisted and opposed any changes which occurred in the mass media in Hungary after 1956, in Czechoslovakia after 1968, and in Poland after 1980[31].

Two rather opposite discourses about the exile ensued after 1989. Romanians living abroad were specifically labelled as exiles, the only group untouched by communism. On the other hand, the pattern developed by *Săptămîna* was maintained, as some publications continued to make a split into two sub-groups, a positive in-group, always associated with the word *exile*, and the other, a negative out-group, never labelled as exiles.

The positive discourse about the exile as an in-group included Romanian intellectuals who lived abroad during the communist regime. They were presented as an organised body, with publications which arose »from the need of uniting all exiles to fight against the dictatorial regime of Ceauşescu, through promoting an activity of exposing and condemning the former regime, lobbying Western governments to save Romania and Romanians«[32]. The image presented is that of an organised unity, with the clear aim and means to achieve it, as an active factor with messianic saving purposes.

For *România literară*,, a cultural magazine that hosted debates on the fate of Romanian culture after 1989, an important issue was to pay homage to the efforts made by Radio Free Europe for safeguarding Romanian culture in general. Hence, its directors and editors, especially Monica Lovinescu and Virgil Ierunca, gained a positive reputation, emphasising that during the last years, when »there is nothing we can do« became the slogan of the exiles, »there have been Western radio stations broadcasting in Romanian which kept a spark for those at home«[33]. This view of passive-active roles made a differentiation between two sub-groups of Romanians living

30 Peter Gross, Colosul cu picioare de lut. Aspecte ale presei româneşti post-comuniste (The Giant with Clay Legs. Aspects of the Romanian Post-Communist Press), Iaşi 1999.

31 Ágnes Gulyás, Communist Media Economics and the Consumers. The Case of the Print Media of East Central Europe, in: JMM 3-II, (2001).

32 O importantă organizaţie a românilor de peste hotare: Congresul Mondial Românesc (An Important Romanian Organisation Abroad: the Romanian World Congress), in: Adevărul (Bucharest) 1-10 (10 January 1990) p. 5.

33 Ion Negoiţescu, Monica Lovinescu şi Virgil Ierunca: in România literară XXIII-3 (18 January 1990) p. 19.

abroad. The active part was the one who preserved the hope. Contrary to the previous period, there was no antinomy between the positive ›here‹ and the negative ›there‹, the idea of home being inclusive for the exiles who had the same home, worth fighting for.

The alternative discourse was constructed by publications that have been continuers of the communist ones. There was a positive in-group, labelled as the exiles, which embodied among others, Mircea Eliade, Emil Cioran, Eugen Ionescu, Tristan Tzara, Vintilă Horia, enjoyed mostly positive evaluations. In this regard, Vintilă Horia is »the untainted friend showing himself punctually at the meeting with Romanian history, culture [...] Physically and spiritually, the talented writer Vintilă Horia is a concentrated expression of those fighters born from sufferings and expectations, carrying its freedom like a hope, like an emblem of his rough life lived almost a half century in exile [...] Brilliant significance and brilliant success of this authentic Romanian writer banished by a repressive policy«[34].

The discursive strategy which presented the exiles as two sub-groups mirrors the category of communists in Romania, divided as well into two sub-groups. They were split into national communists and internationally oriented communists, the so-called »cominternists«. Therefore, the black and white portrayal opposes the exile-victim to the communist-perpetrator, Vintilă Horia being the victim of »a people's court trial« which condemned him »to forced life work« for »imagined guilt, among other the guilt of having been a legionnaire«[35]. If in the previous period the focus was on the fact that the exiles escaped the justice of the people, now the media considers them escaping the injustice of the regime. It is interesting that the group of national communists is not described, the strategy of avoidance being used largely, while the responsibility and blame is shifted to the cominternists. The dichotomy good-guys / bad-guys continues to function, including two opposed sub-groups. In the debate about the role and the place of the culture produced abroad by Romanians, it is implied that, in fact during the communist regime there should have been integration, cancelled because of the isolated intervention of the cominternist. Thus, the exiles were prevented from following the ›normal‹ path of integration.

To construct the negative image of the non-named out-group, *Săptămîna's* editors employed the same discursive strategy as before 1989, when fighting Radio Free Europe. The former opponents of Ceauşescu became shortly after December 1989 the »people who are against the interests of their own country«[36]. »Following a very short intermezzo, the enemies continued to be those in the last years of Ceauşescu's regime: Radio Free Europe, Western journalists, United States Congress which refused to grant Romania (and implicitly Iliescu's regime) most favoured nation status«. Not to mention the fact that the first counter-candidates for Ion Iliescu during the first elections

34 Ionel Protopopescu, Vintilă Horia sau pribeagul literaturii române (Vintilă Horia or the Vagrant of Romanian Literature), in: Săptămîna 21 (21 October 1991) p. 5.

35 Ibid.

36 Mungiu, Românii după '89 (see note 29), p. 222.

37 Ibid. pp. 42–43, 54.

were Romanians who came back after a long exile, and who where »annihilated« together with the all exiles who did not eat »soy salami«[37].

In *Săptămîna*, the ›exile‹ was not associated with this category. The entire Free Europe team, Monica Lovinescu and Virgil Ierunca in particular, was called pejoratively »You! Sirs! Who are not patriots«[38]. The idea of the employees of Radio Free Europe who were paid by the ideological enemies persisted in *Săptămîna* after 1989. »We will not miss a certain cultural atmosphere initiated and conducted by two sentinels [i.e. Monica Lovinescu and Virgil Ierunca, LS] long ago pensioned off and paid by we all know whom«[39]. Again it is implied that there is a dichotomous ›we‹, including the editors and the omniscient public which cannot be fooled versus a ›they‹ as long as they continue to be paid by an unnamed enemy entity. For strengthening the differentiation between the exiles, press discourse strategies seldom pointed out an unchallenged authority. In this case, Emil Cioran is mentioned as he did not collaborate with any radio station and he did not »make any propaganda plotting« against Romania[40].

In order to discredit this sub-group, one author implies that the foreign radio station was not such a big deal, as »suggested« by other media, its audience was not so great because of the fear of the ubiquitous Securitate. Some authors confess that they did not listen to foreign radio stations because of the fear from the Securitate »because of the embarrassment I felt for the broadcasting of those on the other side of the curtain who, please excuse me, were tendentious with poisoned lips. Besides the communist regime, these guys usually swore without any reason a lot of persons who honour our people. But, shall we leave Free Europe to ... those gentlemen, traitors of their own people and to those who are looking for their hidden interests«[41]. In the discursive strategy, even though the radio stations were given some credibility as they were against the dictator and his wife, still they were blamed for criticising certain individuals »who honour our people«. One can easily identify the stereotype which defines the out-group of Romanians working for RFE as the one who betrayed »their own people«.

Finally, it can be asserted that there are interesting continuities between the images presented before and after 1989, the main discursive strategies being the positive self-presentation vs. the negative presentation of the other. Stereotypes which survived in publications of nationalist orientation or in those used by the newly installed government in December 1989 have been seldom constructed via conflicting narratives.

In conclusion, the analysis of the way Romanian mass media constructed the image of the exile proves that this topic was a salient issue for both the communist propaganda during the Cold War and the political power after 1989. For a while, the tactic of ignoring a reality could have been the best option, but it is obvious that the past is breaking through and calls for healing. Many exiles have been prosecuted before leav-

38 Valeriu Mihăilă, Cine se teme de Eugen Barbu (Who is afraid of Eugen Barbu?), in: Săptămîna 26 (25 November 1991) p. 4.

39 Adio, Europa Liberă!, in: Săptămîna 12 (42) (23 March 1992) p. 3.

40 Ionel Protopopescu, Emil Cioran sau floarea creatoare a exilului românesc (Emil Cioran and the Creator Flower of Romanian Exile): in Săptămîna 22 (28 October 1991) p. 5.

41 Dan Claudiu Tănăsescu, Domnule John (Mr. John), in: Săptămîna 4 (June 1991) p. 5.

ing Romania and they have dedicated their lives to make public the atrocities of the Romanian totalitarian regime. The recovering of their history is, no matter how successful they were or not, an act of recognising their contribution to the history of totalitarian regimes in general and of Romanian communism in particular. Lacking this dimension, most probably the complexity of the phenomenon cannot be grasped totally, and thus a society in transition will not overcome certain trauma. Unfortunately, for the time being, there are no systematic research projects and this means that the transition will last longer than initially considered. Though, the analysis of the impact this created image had on Romanian public opinion both before and after 1989 could be the focus of future research. Moreover, new investigation directions could be the semantic and/or content analysis of Romanian publications about the exile or by comparing situations in different communist countries in Central and Eastern Europe. The memory of the communist regime as a whole and that of exile as one of its outcomes needs further research, being at this point still in its early childhood. We have an exile and we are still looking to find what to do with it.

DOVILĖ BUDRYTĖ

Democratisation of History? Remembering Stalinist Deportations and Repression in the Baltic States

A growing body of literature on the politics of memory suggests that socio-political changes are likely to be accompanied by different uses of memory. Often memory about traumatic events is used to reinforce nationhood and to challenge the political structures that contributed to mass suffering. As Benke and Wodak suggested, »deconstruction of silence and taboos [related to painful historical events] has a cathartic effect if done in a way that leads to more reflection, understanding and moral evaluation«[1]. The key question that democratising societies have to address is how to find ways to deconstruct these »silences and taboos« of the past so that public discussions of the painful events of the past result in reflection and understanding instead of political polarisation or ethnic segmentation. To gain insight into this question, this essay revisits the experience of the post-Soviet states of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia.

Public remembrance of Stalinist deportations has played a major role in the construction of post-Soviet Baltic identities, especially during the period of national revival during the late eighties[2]. Given the scope of these forced migrations, it is not surprising that they became the focal point of public and private commemorations. According to the state-supported Lithuanian Genocide and Resistance Research Centre, »every third Lithuanian became the victim of Soviet terror«[3]. Latvia and Estonia experienced similar policies.

The post-Soviet Baltic states are not unique in their preoccupation with the Stalinist deportations and repression. These events play an important role in public memory in other post-Soviet republics. For example, a survey of national history competitions conducted in Ukraine and Russia in 2003/04 and 1999 (Russia) found that the

1 Gertraud BENKE, Ruth WODAK, Remembering and Forgetting: The Discursive Construction of Generational Memories, in: Mirjana N. DEDAIC, Daniel N. NELSON (eds), At War with Words, Berlin 2003, pp 215–244, here p. 221.

2 I discussed the role of historical memory in the construction of post-Soviet Baltic identities in: Today's Politics and Yesterday's Embitterments: Ethnic Restructuring and Its Aftermath in the Baltic States, in: Rainer MÜNZ, Rainer OHLIGER (eds), Diasporas and Ethnic Migrants: Germany, Israel and Post-Soviet Successor States in Comparative Perspective, London 2003, pp. 206–210; Coming to Terms with the Past: Memories of Displacement and Resistance in the Baltic States, in: Kenneth CHRISTIE, Robert CRIBB (eds), Historical Injustice and Democratic Transition in Eastern Asia and Northern Europe, London 2002, pp. 118–138; Taming Nationalism? Political Community Building in Post-Soviet Baltic States, Aldershot 2005, pp. 179–195.

3 The Centre for Genocide and Resistance Research in Vilnius, <http://www.genocid.lt/GRTD/Tremtis/categori.htm> (September 28, 2005).

Stalinist deportations and repression were the most popular topic chosen by high school students for their history papers. The same survey found that the Stalinist period plays a major role in public discourse and national curricula in Ukraine and Russia. Consequently, a comparison of the Baltic cases may help to generate hypotheses about the forces behind changes in commemorative practices that go beyond Baltic national frameworks.

Theoretically, the essay builds on the concept of the »democratisation of history« developed by Eva-Clarita Onken. She conceptualised the »democratisation of history« as a transition from a stage when society is preoccupied with historical memory to a stage when the use of historical memory for political purposes has declined[4]. Onken outlined several processes associated with the »democratisation of history« in post-Soviet Latvia. »Individualisation« is one aspect of the »democratisation of history«. It involves getting rid of collective categories such as »all Latvians were victims« or »all Russians were occupiers«. Guilt is analysed in individual, not ethnic terms. When society is undergoing the »democratisation of history«, it is likely to include histories of ethnic minorities in history textbooks. This is the second dimension of the »democratisation of history«, or »diversification«. The third dimension is »academisation« as historical debates enter academic journals and disappear from popular mass media. Finally, the »decentralisation« of history starts to take place as local and regional (not only national) histories receive attention in academic journals, schools, and individuals[5].

To find out which conditions are necessary for the start of the »democratisation of history«, the paper outlines this process in the Baltic states. The first part describes instances of public commemoration related to Stalinist deportations and the beginning of the construction of the communities of suffering in the Soviet Baltic republics. The second part focuses on memory struggles as the Stalinist deportations were commemorated as a »Soviet genocide« in independent Baltic states after 1991.

I. THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE BALTIC NATIONS AS »FIGHTING AND SUFFERING HEROES« DURING THE SOVIET PERIOD

The Soviet Baltic history narrative was based on what Vladimir Solonari called the »basic structure of Soviet discourse on the history of the Soviet Union and its constituent republics«[6]. There were two leading narratives in this discourse. The first narrative was about a nation with the same ethnic core. The nation is involved in four

4 »Democratisation of history« involves a transition from historiographic nationalism to a more liberal historic consciousness. Eva-Clarita Onken, Demokratisierung der Geschichte in Lettland, Hamburg 2003, p. 226.

5 Id., Democratizing History: Politics of History and Integration of Society in Latvia, presentation at the conference »Reconciliation, Remembrance, Restorative Justice«, University of Cape Town (South Africa), September 2002.

6 Vladimir Solonari, Narrative, Identity, State: History Teaching in Moldova, in: East European Politics and Societies 2 (2002) pp. 414–445, here p. 416.

activities: it originates, suffers (under a foreign yoke), fights (for independence) and creates. Throughout these activities, the hero – i.e., the nation – basically remains the same. The second narrative was about class struggle, inspired by Marxist theory. The main hero – i.e., the people, or the nation – is the same as in the first narrative, only this time the hero is shown as the »toiling and exploited masses« that once again suffers from the oppressors, fights for the socialist revolution, and achieves the final victory of Soviet power[7].

By and large, official narratives did not have an emotional appeal, but they did create a long lasting image of a nation as a fighting and suffering hero. The Baltic nationalist movements during the late eighties (which aimed to re-write history and make the Soviet rule seem illegitimate) could not get rid of this image. Mart Laar's (who in 1988 served as a chairman of the Estonian Heritage Society and later became a Prime Minister of Estonia) image of nationhood in his book on Estonian history is a case in point. Laar and his co-authors traced the Estonian struggle for independence from »the stone age to the age of the Vikings«[8]. According to their vision of the Estonian national story, throughout ages, the Estonian nation suffered under the »yoke of foreigners«[9]. Creation of an independent Estonian state during the interwar period was one of the greatest achievements, a fulfilment of the will of the nation. In the mid-eighties, when Gorbachev came to power and started the process of liberalisation in the former USSR, the Estonian nation had a chance to »revive«[10].

The publications of the popular fronts (nationalist movements) in the three Baltic states included articles about what was described as the Soviet genocide (that is, Stalinist deportations and repression) of the Baltic nations. In June 1989, »Memento«, the Association of the Illegally Repressed in Estonia, published a letter addressed to the Estonians around the world arguing that after occupying their country in 1940, the Soviet Union started »a systematic physical and spiritual destruction of a small Estonian nation«[11]. Historian Mart Nutt noted that »on 14 June 1941, from 10,000 to 22,000 people were sent out from their homes to Siberia – only because they were Estonian«[12]. The emerging genocide narrative asserting that the Soviet regime was killing the Baltic nations was strengthened by numerous memoirs of the former deportees that were published and bought in huge numbers during *perestroika*.

Although commemoration of mass deportations was an important part of the Baltic nationalist movements during the late eighties and early nineties, vocal non-governmental movements such as »Lietuvos Laisvės Lyga« (the Lithuanian Freedom League), a movement led by dissidents in Lithuania, The Estonian Group for the Publication

7 Ibid. p. 420.

8 Mart Laar, Heiki Valk, Lauri Vahtre, Otcherki istorii estonskogo naroda (Sketches of Estonian National History), Tallinn 1992, p. 26.

9 Ibid. p. 33.

10 Ibid. p. 220.

11 Memento, Estontsam vsego mira (To the Estonians of the World), in: Vestnik narodnogo fronta 21 (1989) p. 1.

12 Mart Nutt, Tchto oznatchayut daty 14 i 17 iyunia (What is the Meaning of June 14 and 17), in: Vestnik narodnogo fronta 21 (1989) p. 1. In fact, not only ethnic Estonians, Latvians, Lithuanians, but also the members of other ethnic groups who lived in the Soviet Baltic states were subject to deportation.

of the Secret Protocols of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, or Helsinki-86 in Latvia were primarily interested in de-legitimatising the Soviet regime and making Moscow and the rest of the world recognise that the Baltic states were illegally occupied by the USSR in 1940. To the members of these groups, making information about the Stalinist deportations public was necessary to challenge the official Soviet version of history. Other stories – about the independent interwar republics and the secret protocols of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact – also attracted public attention.

In the late eighties, in Latvia and Lithuania, where Jewish communities historically were larger than in Estonia[13], stories of suffering related to the Holocaust entered the public sphere. (The experience of the Holocaust was by and large absent from public consciousness during the Soviet period.) According to Mavriks Vulfsons, an active member of Latvia's popular front, good ethnic relations in independent Latvia had to include the acknowledgment that »there were Latvians [this is also applicable to the case of Lithuania] who participated actively in the genocide against the Jews«[14]. In his memoirs, Vulfsons argued that there had to be »adequate memory of the victims of both totalitarian regimes [Stalinist Russia and Nazi Germany]«[15].

Yet what would this »adequate memory« entail? During the late eighties, the term »genocide« was often used to describe the mass deportations and suffering during the Stalinist period. The use of this term suggested that it was appropriate to compare the two totalitarian regimes. Finding appropriate ways to commemorate the victims of the two regimes became a major challenge during the early stages of independent statehood.

II. CHALLENGES TO THE »FIGHTING AND SUFFERING HEROES«: MEMORY STRUGGLES AFTER 1991

According to Vulfsons, in post-Soviet Latvia tensions over historical memory started during the national revival period (as early as 1990) when the former members of the German Wehrmacht were rehabilitated by the independent Latvian state[16]. During the German occupation of Latvia (1941–1944), up to 150,000 Latvian men were recruited to the Waffen-SS Legion. It is estimated that approximately 80,000 were captured by the Soviet army when the Soviet Union re-occupied Latvia in 1944[17]. The captured soldiers were subject to deportations and repression by the Soviet forces. In his memoirs, Vulfsons argued that he and many other members of Latvian Jewish community were

13 According to Misiunas and Taagepera, there may have been approximately 200,000 Jews before the Soviet takeover in 1940 in Lithuania. There were approximately 93,000 Jews in Latvia in 1939. There were fewer than 5,000 Jews in Estonia in 1939. Approximately 1,000 remained in Estonia after the Soviets were pushed out east by the advancing German army. Romuald Misiunas, Rein Taagepera, The Baltic States: Years of Dependence 1940–1990, Berkeley 1993, p. 64.

14 Mavriks Vulfsons, Nationality Latvian? No, Jewish, Riga 1998, p. 102.

15 Ibid.

16 Ibid. p. 147.

17 Misiunas, Taagepera, The Baltic States (see note 13), p. 59.

offended by the publications in the post-Soviet Latvian press »which glorified those who had fought with the Germans and continued to oppose the Soviet occupation«[18].

On 24 November 1991, tensions over memory were evident during a commemoration of the largest mass murder of the Latvian Jews in 1941. Anatolijs Gorbunovs, the leader of the Latvian Popular Front, spoke during this commemoration, attended by the Latvian Jewish community. Vulfsons quoted Gorbunovs's speech during this ceremony: »The Latvian nation in this half century has suffered from Stalinism and Fascism, and now it is on the edge of destruction«[19]. Gorbunovs suggested that both Latvians and Jews should be able to evaluate history critically. He encouraged the Jews to »look back critically on the role that the previous generation played« during the Bolshevik revolution and during the beginning of the Soviet occupation in Latvia. His comments offended the participants of the ceremony because Gorbunovs, like many other politicians during the nationalist revival period, made an explicit connection between the Soviet regime and its crimes (including Stalinist deportations) and Latvia's Jews[20]. Gorbunovs' speech suggested that Latvia's Jews supported the Soviet regime, and therefore had at least some responsibility for the crimes of this regime.

Similar battles over historical memory related to 1940–1941 and the post-war period were evident in post-Soviet Lithuania. Discussions of Jewish-Lithuanian relations before and during World War II started during the national revival period during the late eighties. In the nineties, the so-called ›theory‹ of »double genocide« became very popular in public debates. According to this popular belief, there were two genocides in Lithuania between 1940 and 1953. The first one, 1940–1941 and 1944–1953, was committed by the Soviets. It included mass deportations and repression. The second genocide was committed during World War II by the Nazis. Those who embraced this perspective argued that the Lithuanian Jews had actively participated in the deportations of Lithuanians, and that Lithuanians had collaborated with the Nazis and participated in the Holocaust as an act of revenge. (Although some Lithuanian Jews were members of the Communist party, they suffered during both regimes. The Stalinist deportations and repression were initiated and pursued by the occupying Soviet Union, not the local Jews[21].)

This ›theory‹ was challenged in numerous popular and scholarly articles and books. The events of 1940–1941 and the participation of Lithuania's residents in the two occupation regimes were explored in a growing body of scholarly research. There was hope that historical research would help to challenge anti-Semitic myths, including the ›theory‹. In spite of numerous academic conferences about World War II, Vulfsons's call to construct an »adequate memory« of the Stalinist deportations and repression,

18 VULFSONS, Nationality Latvian? (see note 14), p. 147.

19 Ibid. p. 150.

20 Ibid. pp. 150–151.

21 The name of a famous Lithuanian writer Jonas Mikelinskas became associated with this ›theory‹. In 1996 Mikelinskas wrote a controversial and much discussed article »Teise likti nesuprastam, arba Mes ir jie, jie ir mes« (The Right to Remain Misunderstood, or We and They, They and We). This article was reprinted in a book by Jonas MIKELINSKAS, Kada KODĖL taps TODĖL: Holokaustas be politikos ir komercijos, Vilnius 2004 (When WHY will become BECAUSE: The Holocaust without Politics and Business), pp. 12–96.

and the crimes committed during the Nazi occupation, remain a challenge in the Baltic states. The tendency to view nations as fighting and suffering heroes does not help to deal with this challenge.

Numerous actors – international organisations and outside actors (for example, Baltic societies remember several visits by Efraim Zuroff from the Simon Wiesenthal Centre) and local interest groups, such as the organisations uniting former deportees and political prisoners, have been engaged in construction of an »adequate memory« about the two regimes. To cope with these numerous conflicting claims about the »correct« version of the past, in 1998 the Baltic governments initiated international commissions to explore the crimes of both totalitarian regimes. The commissions asserted that their aim was to »objectively« explore the crimes against humanity (including Stalinist deportations and the Holocaust) and come up with »an internationally accepted« version of the crimes conducted by the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany[22]. According to Saulius Sužiedėlis, a leading Lithuanian American historian, who is a member of the International Commission for the Evaluation of the Crimes of the Nazi and Soviet Occupation Regimes in Lithuania, the Lithuanian Commission was »immediately criticised as an awkwardly unnecessary conflation of the Nazi and Soviet occupations, a charge that resonated among Israelis and diaspora Jews«[23]. It appears that instead of creating one national memory, creation of the commissions prompted new conflicts over memory.

Another major conflict over an »adequate memory« of the two regimes and their crimes took place in early 2005. Numerous heated debates about World War II and the perceived lack of understanding of Stalinist crimes took place. These public debates were prompted by a question on whether the Baltic presidents should attend the celebration of the end of World War II hosted by Russia's President Putin. Those who were against the participation of the Baltic states in Moscow's ceremonies argued that the choice was between emancipation and giving in to Moscow's pressure. »Emancipation« meant leaving the Russian sphere of influence and drawing the attention of the international community to the crimes of the Soviet regime, including Stalinist deportations and repression. »Giving in to Moscow's pressure« meant acknowledgment of Soviet occupation[24]. Predictably, the association of the former deportees and political prisoners in Lithuania argued against Lithuania's participation in the celebration. The association released an open letter addressed to the »world community«, in which the Stalinist deportations were remembered[25].

22 Estonian International Commission for the Investigation of Crimes Against Humanity, <http://www.okupatsioon.ee/english/estonian_international_commissio.html> (September 28, 2005).

23 Saulius Sužiedėlis, Recent Historical Discourse on Lithuania's Minorities during the Second World War, presentation at the Southern Conference on Slavic Studies, Nashville (Tennessee, USA), p. 14.

24 Ronaldas Račinskas, Ar nesupratę savo istorijos amžinai liksime vaikai? (Will We Remain Children Forever if We Don't Understand Our History?), in: ELTA January 14 (2005). The idea of »emancipation« was well developed by Leonidas Donskis, Aukos meilė budeliui, arba Už ką lietuviai taip myli Rusiją?, in: Klaipėda February 28 (2005).

25 Lietuvos Politinių Kalinių Ir Tremtinių Sąjunga, The History of World War II and Commemoration of Victory in Moscow, open letter, Vilnius, February 16 (2005).

The opinion polls suggested that Russian minorities and less educated inhabitants of rural areas supported the participation of the Baltic leaders in Moscow's event[26]. The necessity to maintain good relations with Russia was often cited by those who argued that the Baltic presidents should attend the commemoration of the end of World War II in Russia[27]. In the end, Latvia's President Vaira Vike-Freiberga decided to accept Putin's invitation, arguing that this occasion would help her to push Russia to denounce the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact, condemn Stalinist crimes and educate the West about the Baltic experience of the Stalinist regime.[28] Estonia and Lithuania decided to reject the invitation.

These debates show how difficult it is to come up with a version of »usable« past that could be morally acceptable to most Baltic Russians and non-Russian populations in Latvia and Estonia. According to Ieva Gundare from the Museum of Occupation in Latvia, many Latvian Russians continue to view commemorations of Stalinist deportations and criticism of the Soviet regime as being embraced only by ethnic Latvians[29]. Furthermore, given conflicting memories of the Soviet past, it is difficult to find a way to teach Latvian and Estonian history to the Russian children. »Should we teach it in a very diplomatic way so that we don't offend people who belong to a different ethnic group? Or should we teach it the way that the Estonians see it?« asked Haapsalu Margus Maiste, a history teacher in Estonia[30]. Joke van der Leeuw-Roord, Executive Director of the European Standing Conference of History Teachers' Associations, who consults the European Council on history teaching and civic education, argued that the best way to teach painful history dealing with the Soviet past in Latvia and Estonia (the countries with sizable Russian minorities) would be to present several narratives (which may be conflicting) of the past and let the students evaluate the validity of these narratives themselves. According to her, this approach was tried in the two Baltic states and was successful[31].

This approach may work in multi-ethnic classrooms because research suggests that the younger generation in democratic societies tends to revolt against one-sidedness and silences in historical memory[32]. The younger generation in post-Soviet Baltic states was exposed to stories about a »fighting and suffering hero« constructed during the national revival movement as well as stories about the Nazi period many of which were promoted by international actors. At the same time, this generation lives in capitalist, democratic societies where pleasure and consumption, not past pain, usually is the

26 Sužiedėlis, Recent Historical Discourse on Lithuania's Minorities during the Second World War (see note 23), p. 2.

27 For example, see Andrei Demenkov, Do 9 maya yest vremya povzroslet (There is Time to Grow Up Before May 9), in: (Russian) January 18 (2005).

28 Latviya nastayivayet na tom, tcho Rossiya dolzhna osudit pakt Molotova-Ribbentropa (Latvia is Demanding that Russia Condemns the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact), in: LETA January 14 (2005).

29 Ibid.

30 Drug li istoriia? (Is History a Friend?), in: Estoniia September 23 (2003) p. 4. This article was originally published in Eesti Paevaleht.

31 This comment was made during EUSTORY symposium »Commemorating 20th Century Migration in National Societies«, Polish Academy of Sciences (Warsaw), 29 January 2005.

32 Gabriele Rosenthal (ed.), Der Holocaust in Leben von drei Generationen. Familien von Überlebenden der Shoa und von Nazi-Tätern, Gießen 1999.

most common preoccupation. Will this generation continue the process of the »democratisation of history« which started during the first decade of independent Baltic statehood?

There is some evidence which suggests that the younger generation has lost interest in the national meta-narrative about the past sufferings. Although the memoirs of the deportees are still published, their numbers are significantly lower than during the nationalist period. According to Jura Avizienis, a literary scholar who visited Lithuania in 2000, most memoirs of those formerly deported are »framed neither as history nor as literature«, and they »flounder in a no-man's land«[33]. Avizienis told a story about her encounter with an undergraduate philology student who »demonstratively raised her arms in the air and asked me why I was wasting my time [researching memoirs of the formerly deported]. The memoirs have no artistic value, she told me«[34].

Some memoirs did become a text which is considered to be part of Lithuania's literature. They are quoted in the textbooks and read in high schools[35]. At the same time, it appears that the Baltic immigrants residing in North America and the members of the Baltic diaspora who re-settled in the Baltic states after the fall of the USSR, are more interested in recording and analyzing the experiences of deportees than the residents of the Baltic states. In spring 2005, the »Journal of Baltic Studies«, a publication of the Association for the Advancement of Baltic Studies, which primarily consists of scholars working on Baltic issues that are based in North America and Western Europe, published a special issue on Baltic life stories focusing on Stalinist deportations. All but one of the contributors to this issue were based in universities outside of the Baltic states. They applied gender analysis to understand the experiences of women who went through Stalinist deportations.

In 2004, a similar gender-sensitive approach to memory about mass deportations was undertaken in a collection of articles (»She Who Remembers Survives: Interpreting Estonian Women's Post-Soviet Life Stories«) edited by Tiina Kirss, Ene Koresaar, and Marju Lauristin and published by Tartu University Press (Estonia). The articles have embraced a biographical approach and tried »to build the microstructures of historical and cultural context necessary for comparative work«[36]. The articles exploring women's experiences in the places of deportation and memories about displacement, were first presented at a conference in English. The book was also published in English. The editors referred to it as part of an »international life story project«, and acknowledged the leadership of their Finnish colleagues[37]. This is probably the first systematic attempt to place memory about Stalinist deportations into a broader international framework instead of using nation-centred categories.

33 Jura Avizienis, Mediated and Unmediated Access to the Past: Assessing the Memoir as Literary Genre, in: Journal of Baltic Studies 36 (Spring 2005) p. 42.

34 Ibid.

35 For example, see Agnė Iešmantaitė (ed.), Partizanų, politinių kalinių, tremtinių kūryba ir atsiliepimai (Works and Responses from the Partisans, Political Prisoners, and Deportees), Vilnius 1999.

36 Tiina Kirss, Introduction, in: Tiina Kirss, Ene Koresaar, Marju Lauristin (eds), She Who Remembers Survives: Interpreting Estonian Women's Post-Soviet Life Stories, Tartu 2004, pp. 13–18, here p. 13.

37 Acknowledgements, in: Ibid. p. 7.

At the same time, the collection of memoirs of those formerly repressed and deported still continue to be part of national memories. State supported institutions still support the collection and publication of memoirs as a form of official commemoration. In 1999 and 2001 in Estonia, the anniversaries of mass deportations conducted in 1941 and 1949 were commemorated with anthologies of deportation life stories. In 2001, Estonia's President Lennart Meri initiated a collection of life stories of the former deportees by school children[38]. Similar events (»The Living History« programme) were organised by the Lithuanian Genocide and Resistance Research Centre. This centre publishes the best essays on the Stalinist repression and deportations written by school children.

A survey of Lithuanian teenagers (aged seventeen and eighteen) conducted in June 2004 by the Lithuanian Genocide and Resistance Research Center, suggests that the younger generation is not moved by official commemorations. Most respondents (more than 75 percent) say that they think that it is important to remember the Stalinist deportations and repression. However, individual stories, trips to the places of deportations and repression, but not state-supported official ceremonies, were identified as the most meaningful ways to commemorate the past[39]. A recent history essay competition held in Latvia with support of the EUSTORY (a project of the German-based Körber foundation) suggests that there is a growing interest in the fate of individuals and family history during the Soviet period. According to a Latvian history papers competition organiser, the majority of Latvian students (ages 14 to 20) focused on the stories of individuals, not collective victimhood. The students were interested in finding photographs and reconstructing traditions of their families[40].

The current »guardians of memories« – state supported research centres and museums – have tried to adjust to the emerging need to make history personal[41]. Instead of organising mass events commemorating the days of deportation, the agents of memory, such as the Lithuanian Centre for Genocide and Resistance Research, now focus on the »personalisation« of memory. The personal items of deportees – rosaries, documents, photographs taken in the places of displacement, letters – are put on display in museums, photographed and posted online. The exhibitions in the museums commemorating the mass deportations try to create a sense of »being there«, experiencing living in exile. These developments suggest that the imagery of nation as a »fighting and suffering hero« constructed during the Soviet period is changing. As a post-Soviet generation enters political and social life, it is likely to perpetuate this increasingly fashionable individualisation of history, which is usually embraced by safe and secure capitalist democratic societies.

38 Rutt Hinrikus, Ene Koresaar, A Brief Overview of Life History Collection and Research in Estonia, in: Kirss, Koresaar, Lauristin, She Who Remembers Survives (see note 36), pp. 19–34, here p. 24.

39 Arvydas Anušauskas, Jaunuomenei nereikia oficialių minėjimė (The Youth Is Not Interested in Official Ceremonies), in: Atgimimas, June 18–24 (2004) pp. 11, 15.

40 Latvian competition organiser, quoted in Eva-Clarita Onken, The Legacy of Parents and Grandparents: How Do Young People in Central and Eastern Europe Reflect on the Communist Past?, in: Martin Roberts (ed.), After the Wall: History Teaching in Europe since 1989, Hamburg 2004, pp. 239–248, here p. 244.

41 The phrase »guardians of memories« was used by Raphael Sassover, film review, in: Bridges 11 (Spring/Summer 2004)pp. 163–167, here p. 165.

III. CONCLUSION: DEMOCRATISATION OF HISTORY AS A SERIES OF CONFLICTS

This article traced the changes in the ways that Stalinist deportations were remembered by Baltic societies. During the period of nationalist movements in the late eighties and during the early stages of the state building in the nineties, the Baltic societies developed a narrative which focused on the suffering and loss of homeland during the Stalinist period and resistance to the Soviet regime. The nation was seen as a »hero«. The imagery constructed during the Soviet times was used. Recently this image was challenged as other stories of suffering were introduced and individualisation of history became increasingly popular.

The Baltic case studies suggest that preoccupation with the individual stories does not mean that the dilemma on how to find ways to construct an »adequate memory« about the Nazi past and the Soviet past was solved. Tensions are likely to emerge in the future if the public sphere remains open to different discourses about the past. Drawing on the Baltic case studies, the concept of the »democratisation of history« can be re-defined as a series of conflicts which challenge the image of nation as a cohesive hero capable of different actions. In the case of the Baltic states, challenges to a national story about collective suffering and resistance came from ethnic minorities who wanted recognition for their stories of suffering. In addition, challenges came from international actors who brought their version of history about World War II.

The case studies explored in this article underline the importance of state structures. Once functioning state institutions are established, they can sponsor international commissions, help with academic publications and support alternative accounts of the past. During the initial stages of state building, the partial appropriation of painful historical memories by the state introduces a sense of security and self-esteem (»our« history is written down; it has made its way into the textbooks and museums). However, for democratisation of history to continue, state-supported »guardians of memory« (research institutes, commissions, and museums) have to be subject to an ongoing scrutiny by international actors. During international encounters (for example, academic conferences, joint research projects, common memory work), conflicts occur and an on-going revision of the main story is carried out, thus threatening the existence of fighting and suffering heroes.

MAKING MIGRANTS VISIBLE

JOACHIM BAUR

Commemorating Immigration in the Immigrant Society
Narratives of Transformation at Ellis Island and the Lower East Side Tenement Museum

While the discussion about the creation of immigration museums is ongoing in several European countries, New York City has seen the opening of two such museums within the last two decades: the Ellis Island Immigration Museum and the Lower East Side Tenement Museum. Being at the same time one of the most diverse cities in the world and one of the cities with the largest number of museums, it seems only logical that histories of immigration have entered the museum world here earlier than elsewhere. Apart from the peculiarities of the city, however, it is indispensable to take the cultural context of the US into account when considering the phenomenon. Unlike European societies which in many cases perpetuate homogeneous national master narratives that neglect migrants and their transnational historical experiences, the US has long acknowledged its immigrant tradition and, in fact, built its own master narrative on this tradition. This has significant consequences for the commemoration of immigration. In general, presenting the history of immigration in the US means to talk about majorities, not minorities. The main issue is not or no longer, as is the case in the European debate, to include a principally marginalised history of immigrants and immigration in the national narrative[1], but to question whose immigration experiences are represented, how they are represented and to what end. It is, after all, a core aspect of US American national identity that is negotiated in these representations.

This paper attempts to identify distinct approaches to the representation of immigration history in the two museums. Moreover, it tries to draw attention to links between particular presentations of immigration history and narratives of the nation and, thus, touches on the farther-reaching questions about individual and collective identities. The study suggests that both the Ellis Island Immigration Museum and the Lower East Side Tenement Museum, albeit in different forms, tell immigration history in terms of »Becoming American«. To illuminate particular narratives of transformation is the main goal.

1 For the German case cf. Mathilde JAMIN, Migrationsgeschichte im Museum. Erinnerungsorte von Arbeitsmigranten – kein Ort der Erinnerung?, in: Jan MOTTE, Rainer OHLIGER (eds), Geschichte und Gedächtnis in der Einwanderungsgesellschaft. Migration zwischen historischer Rekonstruktion und Erinnerungspolitik, Essen 2004, pp. 145–157, pp. 148 and 155–157; Aytaç ERYILMAZ, Deutschland braucht ein Migrationsmuseum. Plädoyer für einen Paradigmenwechsel in der Kulturpolitik, in: Ibid. pp. 305–319; for France: Philippe DEWITTE, Un centre d'histoire de l'immigration: Pourquoi et comment?, in: Homme et Migration Jan.–Feb. (2004) pp. 6–15; for the European dimension: Rainer OHLIGER, Towards a European Migration Museum. Paper given on the Conference on Migration, Work and Identity, Copenhagen Nov. 22–23, 2001, URL: <http://www.worklab.dk/worklab5/migraConf 2001.pdf> (October 2005).

This article offers mainly a reading of the museums. It intends to trace dominant narratives by deciphering the order of objects, the implications of label texts, and the structure of the stories told. In doing so, I do not intend to give a comprehensive overview of the museums, nor do I claim to capture the motives of the exhibitors or the messages picked up by the visitors[2]. Rather I will look at some well-defined parts of the presentations and interpret them in a specific way. And as much as exhibitions are not merely mirroring past or present realities, but rather help to construct them, such a reading can likewise not be a reflection of the ›true‹ meaning of an exhibition. In contrast, it is a particular and positioned interpretive, i.e. creative, act that produces one distinct way of looking at its subject[3].

I. THE ELLIS ISLAND IMMIGRATION MUSEUM

The Ellis Island Immigration Museum can be considered *the* immigration museum in the United States. Opened in 1990, it was the first large museum of its kind worldwide and despite ongoing efforts to diversify the field, it remains the most prominent place in the US where immigration history is narrated[4]. More than 3.5 million people annually visit the island in New York Harbor where the museum is located and tour the exhibitions that are shown in the renovated main building of the former immigration station.

Ellis Island is in many respects a troubled museum. It is a popular tourist destination with more than 10,000 visitors per day, but despite its significance it is chronically underfinanced. It is a National Park with the explicit mission to interpret the history of its specific site and, by its prominence and the lack of comparable institutions, a de facto national museum of immigration. As such it appears to represent the whole history of immigration into the US, although its site and most of its exhibitions reflect a very particular form of immigration, the European migration from 1892 through 1924[5]. Finally, it can be described as a »multivocal and fragmented heritage landscape«[6]

2 For a semiotic approach, which inspired this account, cf. Mieke BAL, Double Exposures. The Subject of Cultural Analysis, New York 1996; Jana SCHOLZE, Medium Ausstellung. Lektüren musealer Gestaltung in Oxford, Leipzig, Amsterdam und Berlin, Bielefeld 2004. For a criticism of a one-dimensional semiotic approach cf. Sharon MACDONALD, Introduction, in: ID., Gordon FYFE (eds), Theorising Museums: Representing Identity and Diversity in a Changing World, Oxford 1996, pp. 1–18, pp. 4–5. I have touched on the agendas behind the two museums elsewhere: Joachim BAUR, Standpunkte und Standorte. »Points of Departure« in drei New Yorker Immigrationsmuseen, in: Henrike HAMPE (ed.), Migration und Museum. Neue Ansätze in der Museumspraxis. 16. Tagung der Arbeitsgruppe für Sachkulturforschung und Museum in der Deutschen Gesellschaft für Volkskunde, Münster 2005, pp. 71–82.

3 MACDONALD, Introduction (see note 2), p. 5.

4 For a detailed account on the museum project cf. F. Ross HOLLAND, Idealists, Scoundrels and the Lady. An Insider's View of the Statue of Liberty-Ellis Island Project, Chicago 1993. For the long history of the museum prior to its opening proper cf. Barbara BLUMBERG, Celebrating the Immigrant. An Administrative History of the Statue of Liberty National Monument 1952–1982, New York 1985. Currently, there are initiatives in Paso al Norte, TX, San Diego, CA, and San Francisco, CA, to bring up additional immigration museums in the US.

5 This contradiction is one of the main starting points for Kirshenblatt-Gimblett's harsh critique of the museum, Barbara KIRSHENBLATT-GIMBLETT, Destination Culture. Tourism, Museums, and Heritage,

as its five separate permanent exhibits show a diverse variety of sometimes contradictory facets. The narrative perspective ranges from the presentation of some concrete individual family stories in »Treasures from Home« to a focus on (mostly) anonymous individuals in »Through America's Gate« to the mentioning of ethnic communities in »Peak Immigration Years« and, finally, statistics in »The Peopling of America«. It describes immigration as an event in »Through America's Gate« and tries to balance it by a broader scope in »Peak Immigration Years«. It stresses the agency of immigrants in a given (and unquestioned) situation in »Through America's Gate« and adds a discussion of the political and social context, namely the US policy on immigration and the reactions of the ›natives‹, in »Peak Immigration Years«. It is predominantly concerned with immigration in a historical context, although sporadic references are made to immigration as a contemporary issue.

Given the range, scope and diversity of its exhibitions, it is virtually impossible to reduce the Ellis Island Immigration Museum to a common denominator. Nonetheless I want to suggest that there is one particularly strong narrative that pervades the museum presentations. It is the notion of a successful transformation of a heterogeneous multitude of immigrants into an »imagined community« of Americans and, by and large, of Ellis Island as the site for this transformation. Three observations may illustrate this view.

The first case is the plot of the exhibition »Through America's Gate«, the exhibit that deals with the entire inspection process on Ellis Island. The exhibition is located in the original rooms where the inspections took place and the narrative follows the path of the immigrants through this process. The story focuses on the experience and agency of a multitude of individuals, a perspective reinforced by the many oral history accounts which appear as quotes on panels and in audio stations. However, by following the given itinerary the visitors automatically reenact the way and the fate of the successful immigrants. Although the panels mention the cases of people who were turned back or were detained for a variety of reasons, their stories appear merely as those of drop-outs along the unstoppable way of the ›ordinary‹ immigrant towards the train ticket office and, more in general, to the land of opportunity[7]. This notion of immigra-

Berkeley, London 1998, pp. 177–187, here p. 180. Further critical, though more positive reviews: Michael Wallace, Mickey Mouse History and Other Essays on American Memory, Philadelphia 1996, pp. 55–73; Judith Smith, Exhibition Review: Celebrating Immigration History at Ellis Island, in: American Quarterly 1 (1992) pp. 82–100.

6 Luke Desforges, Joanne Maddern, Front Doors to Freedom, Portal to the Past. History at the Ellis Island Immigration Museum, New York, in: Social and Cultural Geography 3 (2004) pp. 437–457, here p. 453.

7 It might be necessary to stress that this is not at all due to a manipulation of historical facts. It was indeed only a fraction of 2 percent of the immigrants that was turned back on Ellis Island. The problem lies in the general approach which registers those 2 percent as the unfortunate downside of the Immigration Control Station and not as its intrinsic meaning. The linearity of the narrative, in turn, is partly caused by the fact that the main building is the only interpreted structure on the island, the remaining almost 40 buildings, including the detention buildings, the hospital and the psychiatric hospital, in contrast, are not open to the public. For an analogous linearity on a different scale in the exhibition »Peak Immigration Years« cf. Gisela Welz, Inszenierungen kultureller Vielfalt, Frankfurt a. M., New York City, Berlin 1996, pp. 182–184. For a general account on the role of the visitor performance in museums

tion as an individual success story is reinforced by a principle problem with the oral history accounts, which were recorded in the mid-1980s upon public request. Persons who answered the request, interested and willing to tell their story, were almost entirely people who had made it in the US. This basically positive lifetime experience is reflected throughout the interviews and contributes to a harmonised, if not romanticised picture of the Ellis Island Immigration Station and related US immigration policy.

The second observation illustrates more specifically the narrative of transformation. It relates to the obvious effort to show immigrants as individuals with a distinctive face (implying a distinctive story) in order to humanise the immigration experience and the history of immigration as such. For this reason there are countless large-scale photographs of immigrants all over the exhibitions, most notably in a gallery on the second floor. The people pictured there are indeed very diverse, but the only feature that seems to be of real importance – i.e. the only one that is stated on the label – is their nationality. In fact, it appears that the persons in the pictures are not ›real‹ individuals, but rather representatives of nations. Thus, the gallery of individual immigrants turns into a generic »gallery of nations«[8]. The fact that the labels focus exclusively on the nationalities of the immigrants and do not state names, occupation, age, or the individual story of the person pictured, might well be due to the fact that often this information is just not known. My point, though, is not to blame the curators of the exhibition for excluding information that is simply lost. Nor is it to claim that the attempt to humanise the immigrant experience in this case fails and, in fact, re-de-humanises the immigrants as pure specimens of a certain type (i.e. in this case: a nation). Of greater relevance is the image of immigration presented in these installations. Not only are the immigrants viewed as mainly constituted by their nationality, but by privileging a national perspective the whole immigration process is implicitly reduced to the process of becoming American. The picture evoked is that of the funnel: a multitude of foreigners arrives at the doors of Ellis Island, and when they leave they are somehow transformed into Americans, making up one nation, an »imagined community« of immigrants.

The third observation, finally, relates to the presentation of objects in the exhibition »Treasures from Home«. Apart from the display of items from particular families, there are a number of installations showcasing particular topics like »Clothing and Ornament« or »Family Life«. The cases are packed with artifacts: traditional costumes from various countries, musical instruments, oddly shaped pipes, a horseshoe, a matchbox, a coconut. All of them have been carried by immigrants on their way to America and through Ellis Island and their presentation is, in the words of the introductory label, meant to »lend insight into how immigrants prepared for life in an unknown land, what they expected to find here, and what hopes they had for the future«. But somehow the display appears strange; the stories of the individual immigrants do not

and particularly the importance of the itinerary on the production of knowledge cf. Tony BENNETT, The Birth of the Museum. History, Theory, Politics, London, New York 1995, p. 43 and pp. 179–186.

8 The introductory text of the section, which gives information on one of the photographers, also exemplifies this approach. One sentence reads: »His collection of over 135 images provides an extraordinary record of the many nationalities who came to the United States during the peak years of immigration.« For the tradition of the »gallery of nations« as organising principle for books and later exhibitions and fairs cf. KIRSHENBLATT-GIMBLETT, Destination Culture (see note 5), p. 37.

materialise. The reason might be that the object labels, analogous to the above-mentioned portraits, privilege a national perspective. They state the countries of origin in bold type as the first line of information, brushing aside significant regional or local, religious and other differences by reinforcing an abstract norm of the nation, while at the same time reducing the immigrants to representatives of these nations. The indefiniteness might stem from the fact that one learns little about the objects from these text panels except for, as stated, their country of origin plus a title, the name of the owner and a date, sometimes supplemented by a one-sentence-description. Nothing about the cultural context in which these objects were originally used, let alone in which they were used in the US, if or how they kept, lost or changed their meaning in a new environment. Finally, it is the order in the cases that is bewildering. A violin next to a pillow beater, »Russia« next to »West Guyana«, »1880« next to »1924« – basically, a potpourri of oddities, isolated and exotic specimens from other worlds and times.

It is not until one steps back from the cases and contemplates them as a whole that the display begins to make sense and the message becomes clearer. It seems as if the individual object is actually not of interest, what really matters is the case. In this perspective, the peculiarities of the artifacts are not important and the lack of context not decisive. Put together in the case, the objects are sublated in a new context, collectively transformed into a larger whole where they all have their place: Unity in diversity, e pluribus unum – the cases are perfect metaphors for a neatly ordered and harmonious multicultural America.

The visitors' retracing of the path of the successful immigrants, the depiction of immigrants as representatives of nations with the implication of the funnel metaphor and the merging of disparate objects in a unifying context are all variations on the notion of a successful transformation of a multitude of immigrants into Americans, the story of »Becoming American«: a story of the American nation. This nation is conceived as multicultural, to be sure, and thereby counters older conceptions of Americanisation along the lines of Anglo-conformity, but it is nonetheless homogenising by pressing this multiculturalism in an exclusively national framework.

Once aware of this narrative one discovers materialisations of it all over the museum. We find a playful version in »The Peopling of America«: the pictures of a multiplicity of individuals from different ethnic backgrounds and ages turn into the stars and stripes of the American flag as the visitor walks by, the smiles on the faces of the people suggesting their happy consent with being rendered invisible. A monumental version is the American Immigrant Wall of Honor outside the museum where visitors can have the names of ancestors inscribed. Here, an enormous number of people is symbolically welded together in a steel circle unmistakably representing the nation. The diversity of their backgrounds is still noticeable in the distinctness of the names, but they are equalised and homogenised by the uniformity of the design and the strict and arbitrary order of the alphabet. In its form maximal different, in its symbolical content equivalent, the most mundane version of the narrative's objectification can be found in the museum shop: a colorful pennant shows the flags of numerous countries tapering off in an American flag. And at the center of it is a picture of Ellis Island.

The narrative of transformation is intensified by the site of the museum. Although some of the presentations inside the museum try to convey a broader story of immi-

gration, the former Immigration Station privileges a focus on the few hours of the formal processing of immigrants and implies a picture of immigration as event. It evokes the notion of a clear-cut and successful procedure with a definite before and after and tends to constitute this event as the decisive moment of »Becoming American«.

II. THE LOWER EAST SIDE TENEMENT MUSEUM

The Lower East Side Tenement Museum was opened in 1988 in a former tenement building at 97 Orchard Street in New York City's Lower East Side. Since its opening it has won nearly unanimous acclaim throughout the museum field. In the last years around 100,000 persons annually visit the museum[9].

A visit to the Lower East Side Tenement Museum begins on the street in front of the building. Visitors have to join one of the two available tours, »Piecing It Together: Immigrants in the Garment Industry« or »Getting By: Weathering the Great Depressions of 1873 and 1929«. From the very beginning the themes discussed transcend immigration history by including topics such as labour issues or women's history and visitors are constantly encouraged to engage in discussions and make connections to today. The main artifact of the museum is the building itself. On the stairs in the hall the guides give brief summaries of tenement housing, of the history of this specific building and the story of its ›discovery‹ and restoration. The actual exhibitions spread over six apartments: five are meticulously recreated and illustrate the lives of particular families who once lived in the respective apartment. The sixth is left as a ›ruin‹, in the original condition as when the museum moved in.

The family histories cover different points in time, different ethnic groups and circumstances. One example shall suffice. Upon entering a recreated apartment on the third floor we stand in the midst of a dim, modestly furnished kitchen. On the table one finds dishes and bread. The tour guide begins to tell the story of the Gumpertz family: Julius Gumpertz and Nathalie Rheinsberg, both German Jews, left Prussia around the age of 22 and met and married in New York. By 1870, the couple had settled at 97 Orchard Street. Julius Gumpertz first worked as a shoemaker, than as a small-time merchant before the economic depression in the 1870s forced him back into the shoe trade. Registration documents from 1884 still mentioned Nathalie Gumpertz and her children as living in the building, but no longer Julius. Further documents suggested that he had left the house on the morning of 7 October 1874 and never returned. (The installation represents this exact date.) The guide opens a door, and the front room (recreated to 1878) shows the workplace of a seamstress. Nathalie Gumpertz had ap-

9 Virtual tours can be taken on the museums website, URL: <http://www.tenement.org> (October 2005). The extensive programming of the museum, ranging from walking tours of the Lower East Side over the display of contemporary art in its windows to English language classes for recent immigrants cannot be discussed here, neither the ambitious initiative of the Tenement Museum to form an International Coalition of Historic Site Museums of Conscience, URL: <http://www.sitesofconscience.org> (October 2005); cf. Ruth J. Abram, Harnessing the Power of History, in: Richard Sandell (ed.), Museums, Society, Inequality, London, New York 2002, pp. 125–141.

parently opened her own business and thereby managed to pay the rent and even keep her daughters in school. Nine years after Julius' disappearance she went to court and had him declared dead in order to be entitled to inherit from his father. After she got the money she moved with her daughters to the new German neighborhood of Yorkville on the Upper East Side.

What is exemplary about this story for the construction of knowledge at the Tenement Museum? It is about immigrants, of course, German Jews, to be precise, and as such about members of a significant ethnic group on the Lower East Side at the time. It deals with the garment industry and the dependence of the immigrants upon economic cycles and crises. It tells about hardship, but also about overcoming it. By taking the living and working conditions of immigrants as a starting point and following an individual family over the course of several years it clearly depicts immigration as a process. The Lower East Side figures in this narrative as one stop on a much longer way. In its basic structure, it focuses on individuals, their stories and, importantly, their agency. Outside and macro structures (government policies, the law, reasons for emigration, to name only a few) are, by and large, left aside or are only addressed in close connection to the family story. In this case, and that is emblematic, it evolves around an ordinary, yet extraordinarily strong woman.

The clear narrative about individual persons in conjunction with an exhibition strategy that communicates an »authentic experience«[10] allows for an ultimate closeness of the visitors to the presentation and a maximum of empathy with the protagonists and with immigrants in general. Moreover, by illustrating general and enduring issues of immigration through these stories and by encouraging the visitors to make connections to today the museum makes it possible to implicitly and even explicitly discuss current immigration issues through its exhibitions. As such the Tenement Museum is in and by its presentation doing ›social work‹, work on the conditions of society.

Beyond this immediate concern, however, the Tenement Museum is at the same time doing »Work on Myth« (Hans Blumenberg). As a key concept it draws on the model of the pioneer in its presentation of history and, applied to the particular context, describes the immigrants as »urban pioneers«. The tenement, thus, becomes an »urban log cabin« and the Lower East Side the »urban frontier«[11]. The museum clearly opted for this interpretation in an effort to value the immigrant experience and to revise a traditional American founding myth. But this decision has some serious implications on the image of the individual that is conveyed. »(S)trong in mind, body and determination, ready to put up with hardship because they believed in themselves and their new

10 There is not enough space here to discuss the Tenement Museum's display strategy in detail and its obsession with »historic truth« (Abram, Harnessing the Power (see note 9) pp. 130–132) and the »present-day myth« of authenticity (for a general critique see Richard Handler, Eric Gable, The New History in an Old Museum. Creating the Past at Colonial Williamsburg, Durham 1997, pp. 222–224). It is only to say that the strong emphasis on authenticity in the museum's presentation is closely linked to its strategy of »using the past to shape the future«. If the past »only exist[ed] as we narrate it today« (Ibid. p. 224) the museum's project would smell like propaganda. In contrast, the past has to be created as an independent entity, independent from its creators. It has to be authentic in order to be useful. Otherwise the museum would have to acknowledge that the past does not provide powerful lessons (Ruth J. Abram, Using the Past to Shape the Future. New Concepts for a Historic Site, in: Museum International 1 (2001) pp. 4–9, here p. 9), but merely usable arguments.

country, and busting out with the daring needed to travel far from roots and the adventuresomeness to keep learning, learning«[12] – that's the way a reviewer of the museum characterised the »urban pioneers«, in explicit and excited denial of the »huddled masses« and »wretched refuse« imagery of Emma Lazarus[13]. It is no coincidence or simple reproduction of the museum's rhetoric that leads to such heroicising descriptions. Nor is it a misreading of the museum's exhibitions; such understanding is rather implied in the presentations themselves. Nathalie Gumpertz, for example, is portrayed as a woman who by her will and hard work manages to turn her miserable situation into an immigrant success story[14]. The narrative of the Levine family, evolving around the cramped conditions and hard work in their apartment/garment shop, peaks in their successfully moving to a better neighbourhood in Brooklyn where they open a garment shop outside their apartment. And another family's failed upward mobility is recounted as the exceptional story of Fannie Rogarshevsky who became the buildings careful janitor and stayed on after all the tenants of 97 Orchard Street had been evicted.

The museum's apparent agenda to highlight the agency of immigrants, to challenge the image of them as disenfranchised victims, tends all too often to a glorification of their perseverance, their individualism and strengths. Weakness and failure, not to speak of wickedness or viciousness have no place in this version. The presentation basically reiterates ›American‹ values from a new perspective and affirms the notion of the (urban) frontier as the »line of most rapid and effective Americanization« (Frederick Jackson Turner)[15]. The effort to revise traditional narratives of American history, thus, helps to revitalise an American founding myth by introducing a new protagonist, the ordinary immigrant.[16]

11 Dara HORN, The Tenement Museum, in: American Heritage 2 (2000) p. 58; Lower East Side Tenement Museum, A Tenement Story. The History of 97 Orchard Street and the Lower East Side Tenement Museum, New York 2004, p. 11. The introductory sign at the museum entrance states with regard to the immigrants: »We salute them as our urban pioneers on the municipal frontier.« The term »urban frontier« was repeatedly used by the guides on the tours I took in May and June 2004. The terminology also resonates in some of the reviews, e.g. J. B. BROWN, Urban Log Cabin, in: Historic Preservation Jan.–Feb. (1994) pp. 22–25, 85. For a critique of the model of the »urban pioneer«, albeit in another context, cf. Neil SMITH, The New Urban Frontier. Gentrification and the Revanchist City, London, New York 1996, esp. p. 33. To what extent the Tenement Museum plays a role in the process of gentrification of the Lower East Side (which is Smith's actual topic) cannot be discussed in this context.

12 A. M. ROSENTHAL, Log Cabin in New York, in: *New York Times*, 3 December 1996, p. A25.

13 Emma Lazarus' famous poem »The New Colossus« helped turn the Statue of Liberty into the »Mother of Exiles«, an icon of the land of opportunity for poor and in their countries persecuted immigrants, and is still well-known and often-cited.

14 In the reading of one reviewer the heroine of the story clearly distinguished herself from others. After describing the efforts of some women in a similar situation to find their missing husbands, she declares: »Natalie [sic!] Gumpertz, however, didn't bother with any of that. Instead she looked adversity in the face and went into business for herself«, HORN, Tenement Museum (see note 11), p. 54.

15 Volker BISCHOFF, Marino MANIA, Melting Pot-Mythen als Szenarien amerikanischer Identität zur Zeit der New Immigration, in: Bernhard GIESEN (ed.), Nationale und kulturelle Identität. Studien zur Entwicklung des kollektiven Bewußtseins in der Neuzeit, Frankfurt a. M. 1991, pp. 513–536, here p. 526.

16 For the synergy between the pioneer and the immigrant in American mythology cf. John HIGHAM, Immigration and American Mythology, in: ID., Hanging Together. Unity and Diversity in American Culture (ed. by Carl J. GUARNERI), New Haven, London 2001, pp. 101–109, here p. 105.

III. ELLIS ISLAND AND THE TENEMENT MUSEUM CONSTRUCTING »GATEWAYS TO AMERICA«

The Ellis Island Immigration Museum and the Lower East Side Tenement Museum are clearly related. They both deal with immigration to New York City and, more generally, the US. They both focus, by and large, on the time period of 1880–1930 and on immigration from Europe. They both tell powerful stories about a past that not long ago has been largely disregarded by historiography and museums alike. And they both are clearly sympathetic to the experience of the immigrants. They are, metaphorically speaking, less like distant relatives than unequal siblings.

As for these, there are a whole lot of differences one discovers after breaking through the first layer of similarities. The two museums follow separate paths, alternative approaches in re-presenting immigration history. The perspectives on immigrants, for instance, differ fundamentally in the two museums: whereas the Tenement Museum focuses on a very limited number of individual persons or families and tells relatively detailed stories about their lives, the Ellis Island Immigration Museum predominantly privileges a macro view on the totality of immigrants. Where individual voices are included (as in the oral history accounts) they merely illustrate a given plot rather than constitute it and the depiction of particular immigrants (e.g. in the mentioned photographs), in fact, only reveals a generic perspective on them as representatives of (national) macro groups[17]. Also, I have argued, they differ in the overall conceptualisation of their topic: the Ellis Island Immigration Museum conveys a notion of immigration as event, whereas the Lower East Side Tenement Museum shows immigration as process.

It might not particularly come as a surprise that different museums choose alternative approaches for similar topics and that as a result their respective presentations differ substantially. What might be remarkable, though, is that despite or apart from the described differences there is some significant common ground between the Ellis Island Immigration Museum and the Lower East Side Tenement Museum: both are, after all, essentially concerned with American identity and frame immigration history in terms of »Becoming American«. I have already pointed to the reiteration and revitalisation of founding myths: the »funnel myth« in the case of Ellis Island and the myth of the »urban pioneers« and their set of ›American‹ values at the Tenement Museum. To wrap up these observations I would like to point to another element that plays a prominent role in both museums and which might be suitable in clarifying the two museums' versions of the »Becoming American« theme: the metaphor of the »gateway«.

At Ellis Island the metaphor is omnipresent. The main introductory panel sports the headline »Ellis Island: From Gateway to Museum«, and in the text the island is dubbed »the nation's chief gateway during the years 1892 to 1924«. »Through America's Gate« is the title of one of the core exhibitions and countless publications make use of the image[18]. Finally, even one of the boats that take visitors to the island is named

17 On a more principal level the Lower East Side Tenement Museum also follows a metonymic approach: the individual families and their stories are merely parts of a larger and more complex immigration history, but they are, beyond their peculiarity, meant to represent this larger history.

18 As a few examples: Mary J. SHAPIRO, Gateway to Liberty. The Story of the Statue of Liberty and Ellis Island. New York 1986; Susan JONAS (ed.), Ellis Island: Echoes from a Nation's Past. The Celebration

»Miss Gateway«. At the Tenement Museum the metaphor is less ubiquitous, however, it figures prominently in the museum's mission where Manhattan's Lower East Side is called »a gateway to America«.

How does this relate to the narrative of »Becoming American« and what does it tell about the conceptualisation of immigration in the respective museums? »Gateway« is a metaphor of transition. It implies two separate and distinct places, but it simultaneously emblematises their connectedness and the permeability of the line between them. In fact, the »gateway« describes the status of »in between«, or rather, of »not yet«: despite all the precariousness it symbolically contains, it holds the promise of arrival, in a new place, a new land. It is evident that the meaning of this arrival and transition goes beyond mere geography although the image surely plays with this notion[19]. »Stepping through the gateway« implies not only entering another country, but entering into a new life, adopting a new identity. It captures in one word the idea of transformation.

Relating to the alternative conceptualisations of immigration – as an event at the Ellis Island Immigration Museum and as a process at the Lower East Side Tenement Museum – this transformation takes different forms. At Ellis Island the »gateway« is really a »gate«, a liminal space that is to be crossed in very short time. »Becoming American« here is mainly a matter of a formal act. The presentation at the Tenement Museum, in contrast, stresses the second part of the metaphor, the »way«. The »gate« becomes a »tunnel«, so to speak, not the formal act of immigration is decisive, but the continued actions as newly arrived immigrants. The (successful) struggle for a better life becomes the practical test and the affirmation of values the basis for the inclusion in the grand narrative of the pioneer. »Becoming American« at the Tenement Museum is constructed as a »matter of the spirit and of the soul« (Theodore Roosevelt)[20].

The important differences in the concepts of the two museums notwithstanding, they share a basic message and construct a »centering« version of immigration history[21]. The »gateways«, Ellis Island and the Lower East Side, are the sites for rites of passage and they epitomize the successful initiation of millions of immigrants into American society[22].

of the Gateway to America, New York 1989; Pamela REEVES, Ellis Island. Gateway to the American Dream, New York 1991.

19 In terms of geography the popular use of the term does not really make sense. In this respect Ellis Island and the Lower East Side simply are located *in* and are not »gateways to« America.

20 BISCHOFF, MANIA, Melting Pot-Mythen (see note 15), p. 524.

21 For multiculturalism as a »centering operation« cf. Barbara KIRSHENBLATT-GIMBLETT, Common Coin, in: Midwest (New Zealand) 3 (1993) pp. 9–11, here p. 11.

22 For a paradigmatic shift of the immigration narrative from »Becoming American« to »Being in America« see the presentations at the Museum of Chinese in the Americas in New York City. Here, the mere and undisputable fact of the presence of immigrants in a particular place – America – gives rise to the multifaceted question as to what this presence means for particular individuals, for families or for a whole community. The exhibitions centre a notion of »cultural betwixt-and between-ness« and the problematising of fixed individual and collective identities is the prevalent theme throughout the museum. Cf. John Kuo Wei TCHEN, Creating a Dialogic Museum. The Chinatown History Museum Experiment, in: Ivan KARP et al. (eds), Museums and Communities. The Politics of Public Culture, Washington, London 1992, pp. 285–326; WELZ, Inszenierungen (see note 7), pp. 223–230; BAUR, Standpunkte (see note 2).

JAN MOTTE AND RAINER OHLIGER

Men and Women With(out) History? Looking for »Lieux de Mémoire« in Germany's Immigration Society

I. INTRODUCTION

In his social theoretical writings Alfred Schütz introduced a number of social characters. One of these characters was »the stranger« as a »man without history«[1]. Within his (or her) new environment, the stranger is culturally atomised, detached from resources of collective meaning. His or her ability to be recognised in society is limited to individual actions and the attention that his or her person derives from it. To add to Schütz' analysis, one can elaborate and emphasise that the stranger is also confronted with collective assumptions. These assumptions are based on the monopoly of definition that is exercised by the receiving society. Thus, he or she faces interpretations of how the receiving society imagines and construes the stranger. The stranger cannot exercise any cultural capital beyond a tolerated exoticism or a preserving ethnic folklore, based on his or her (often imagined, but powerful) traditions.

This means that the establishment of new narrative (social) forms, the anchoring of migration history as part of social memory or as commemorated history is far from being realised. Is migration thus a topic without history, without any *lieux de mémoire*? If one analyses the slowly emerging historical research on contemporary migration history in Germany, one clearly discovers a vacuum of commemoration with regard to immigration. Other media be it history textbooks for schools[2] as final products of a political-administrative and ideological process, be it monuments and street names as conventional places of recognition and public participation, mostly remain empty placeholders. These »places« rarely transport or symbolise the codes and signs of immigrants, immigration or immigration history. »The stranger« lives a life apart from society. He or she does not participate in creating the symbolic inventory of his world. Beyond the private world or the world of ethnic enclaves immigration is hardly historically represented or symbolised. It could be seen as a situation of symbolic exclusion. This fact is a product of the receiving society. With its hegemonic power it

1 Alfred SCHÜTZ, The Stranger, in: Alfred SCHÜTZ, Collected Papers, vol. II, The Hague 1964, pp. 91–105.

2 For textbooks see Bettina ALAVI, Geschichtsschulbücher als Erinnerungsorte: Ein Gedächtnis für die Einwanderungsgesellschaft?, in: Jan MOTTE, Rainer OHLIGER (eds), Geschichte und Gedächtnis in der Einwanderungsgesellschaft: Migration zwischen historischer Rekonstruktion und Erinnerungspolitik, Essen 2004, pp. 199–212; Rainer OHLIGER, Deutsche Minderheiten, Flüchtlinge, Vertriebene: Schulbücher als Orte historischer Repräsentation von Minderheitenexistenz und Zwangsmigration, in: Ibid. pp. 213–234.

also owns the cultural capital to reproduce and narrate its own big history that includes all the small stories.

II. COMMEMORATING THE HISTORY OF LABOUR MIGRATION

Historical knowledge about (recent labour) migration and public commemoration of this history is not yet widely spread in German society. Fifty years after the first labour recruitment contracts were concluded in 1955 the question can be asked what traces this history has left in Germany's mnemoscape. How present is the group of labour migrants, many of them citizens by now, in the societies' collective memory? Which (potential) *lieux de mémoire* or discernable historical traces can be found in the public sphere? Which points of reference and commemoration has immigration left beyond the narrow realm of historical scholarship? Historical research of German labour migration history is slowly becoming professionalised. Ever since the 1990s scholarly work in this area has grown[3]. Research in contemporary history provides results in various areas of the field, such as migration policy, *Alltagsgeschichte* of migration, business and economic history. Thus, migration's history is more and more present in scholarly debates. However, with regard to collective memory and the historical and cultural inventory of the public sphere it remains largely invisible. This invisibility also pertains to the discourse of commemoration[4]. This observation contrasts with the fact that everyday life in Germany, in particular its cities, is significantly shaped by migrants and their culture.

3 Possible examples are Barbara SONNENBERGER, Nationale Migrationspolitik und regionale Erfahrung. Die Anfänge der Arbeitsmigration in Südhessen 1955–1967, Darmstadt 2003; Karen SCHÖNWÄLDER, Einwanderung und ethnische Pluralität. Politische Entscheidungen und öffentliche Debatten in Großbritannien und der Bundesrepublik von den 1950er- bis zu den 1970er-Jahren, Essen 2001; Ulrich HERBERT, Karin HUNN, Gastarbeiter und Gastarbeiterpolitik in der Bundesrepublik. Vom Beginn der offiziellen Anwerbung bis zum Anwerbestopp (1955–1973), in: Axel SCHILDT, Detlef SIEGFRIED, Karl LAMMERS (eds), Dynamische Zeiten. Die 60er Jahre in den beiden deutschen Gesellschaften, Hamburg 2000, pp. 273–310; Yvonne RIEKER, ›Ein Stück Heimat findet man ja immer.‹ Die italienische Einwanderung in die Bundesrepublik, Essen 2003.

4 For the scholarly debate on memory and commemoration see Jan ASSMANN, Kollektives Gedächtnis und kulturelle Identität, in: ID., Tonio HÖLSCHER (eds), Kultur und Gedächtnis, Frankfurt a. M. 1988, pp. 9–11; Aleida ASSMANN, Dietrich HARTH (eds), Mnemosyne. Formen und Funktionen kultureller Erinnerung, Frankfurt a. M. 1991; Harald WELZER (ed.), Das soziale Gedächtnis. Geschichte, Erinnerung, Tradierung, Hamburg 2001; Aleida ASSMANN, Ute FREVERT, Geschichtsvergessenheit – Geschichtsversessenheit. Vom Umgang mit deutschen Vergangenheiten nach 1945, Stuttgart 1999.

III. THE ONE-MILLIONTH »GUESTWORKER« BETWEEN ICON AND CLICHÉ

Probably the most important and also controversial *lieu de mémoire* of labour migration in Germany is the picture of Armando Rodrigues de Sá, the one-millionth »guestworker«, who arrived in 1964. The picture of Rodrigues de Sá and his welcome present, a motor-bike, deserves critical attention[5]. This picture has become *the* photographic icon of memory in postwar German history with regard to immigration. It was reproduced by various media over and over again and found its place in numerous history textbooks[6]. Today, the motor-bike of the late Rodrigues de Sá, who died in 1979, is owned by the »Haus der Geschichte der Bundesrepublik Deutschland« in Bonn, Germany's museum of contemporary history. It was bought from Rodrigues de Sá's family[7]. By presenting the motor-bike in the museum the gesture of donation is being petrified, historically ennobled and perpetuated. This form of representation and commemoration does not sufficiently match the perspective and interpretation of immigrants themselves[8]. However, it is the *lieu de mémoire* of the one millionth »guestworker« Rodrigues de Sá and his motor-bike that provide ample room for deconstruction and re-interpretation of immigration history. The welcoming of Rodrigues de Sá needs to be put into the context of his biography and German migration history. Limiting it to one, moreover glorifying aspect does not help to understand the complexity of the issue. The stylised museum icon Rodrigues de Sá needs to be contextualised in three ways. First, the picture conveys the known cliché, that labour migrants to Germany were predominantly young and male. Social historical research, however, has put this wrong perception into its correct perspective[9] by reconstructing in detail the degree to which women immigrated or in which sectors the migration of families predominated[10]. Second, the picture represents the social reality of arrival in a heavily

5 The picture or rather the numerous variants of the motif usually show a somewhat shy Rodrigues de Sá, who is welcomed by a committee of employers and journalists. He is given a bouquet of flowers and a motor-bike as welcome presents. The German press agency dpa reported that a band played German march music and »To the fight, Torero« from Georges Bizets' opera Carmen.

6 See for example the following textbooks: Florian OSBURG, Dagmar KLOSE (eds), Expedition Geschichte, vol. 4 (Grade 10), Ausgabe Berlin, Frankfurt a. M. 2000, p. 106; Hans-Otto REGENHARDT, Claudia TATSCH (eds), Forum Geschichte, vol. 4, Vom Ende des Ersten Weltkriegs bis zur Gegenwart, Cornelsen, Berlin 2003, p. 294. The print media has been using the picture continuously since 1964. See for example the cover story of the leading German news magazine *Der Spiegel* as of 7 October 1964, p. 44.

7 For an interpretation by the Haus der Geschichte der Bundesrepublik Deutschland see the book by Veit DIDCZUNEIT and Hanno SOWADE (eds), Zündapp Sport Combinette. Geschenk für den millionsten Gastarbeiter, Bonn 2004. The Haus der Geschichte owns most of the artifacts related to the history of Rodrigues de Sá.

8 For an alternative interpretation see <http://www.angekommen.com>. This prize winning webpage was launched in September 2004 when the 40th anniversary of Rodrigues de Sá was commemorated at the train station in Cologne-Deutz, where he had arrived in 1964.

9 See Monika MATTES, Zum Verhältnis von Migration und Geschlecht: Anwerbung und Beschäftigung von »Gastarbeiterinnen« in der Bundesrepublik 1960 bis 1973, in: Jan MOTTE, Rainer OHLIGER, Anne VON OSWALD (eds), 50 Jahre Bundesrepublik – 50 Jahre Einwanderung: Nachkriegsgeschichte als Migrationsgeschichte, Frankfurt a. M. 1999, pp. 285–309.

10 Beyond this, the pictures of Rodrigues de Sá are pretty strongly shaped by stereotypes of masculinity. The newly arrived immigrant receives a motor-bike as welcome present. This gift epitomises male in-

biased way. The representation mirrors neither the exhausting train journey from Greece, Spain, Portugal or Turkey, until 1970 often in local trains[11], nor the very limited living conditions in »guestworker« camps[12]. Moreover, the picture does not contribute anything to understanding the social and historical reasons for migration. The historical context thus remains empty. Third, Armando Rodrigues de Sá's biography is usually not told when representing the photo. Or it is reduced to the limited aspect of arriving in Germany. However, it seems to be important to get to know more about the person and his social setting to fully grasp the meaning and prevent the emergence of historical myths or fictions. One should at least be informed about the fact that Rodrigues de Sá died in 1979 in Portugal as a late consequence of having had an accident at work in Germany. He did not know that his German health insurance also covered health costs in Portugal and thus was medically treated too late. As an effect of late treatment he died early[13].

IV. EMPTY PLACEHOLDERS HISTORICAL MONUMENTS FOR »GUESTWORKERS«

In its issue of 25 February 2004 the German daily *Frankfurter Rundschau* reported under the headline »Monument for ›Guestworkers‹« that the department of culture in the city of Frankfurt had launched a competition for such a monument. The competition calls for striking ideas of how to commemorate the labour migration that was directed toward Frankfurt[14]. The initiative goes back to an idea of an Italian labour immigrant involved in local politics. The monument shall be built at the main train station where most labour immigrants arrived. It is supposed to fill an existing vacuum, since »nothing in the public realm reminds the citizens of the process of migration which affected more than 20 percent of Frankfurt's population«[15].

The city of Frankfurt is decisively shaped by immigration. It is one of the (few) cities in Germany that fully recognises this fact, not least by having implemented a multi-

dependence in a time when James Dean and his movie »Rebel Without Cause« or his German equivalent Horst Buchholz (»Die Halbstarken«) were still vividly remembered. However, the symbol was chosen at a moment when German society shifted from motor-bikes to cars. And it was not least the automobile industry that played the leading role in labour recruitment. For a critique of the picture see also: Geschichtswerkstatt Göttingen, angeworben ... – ein falsches Bild, in: Katja DOMINIK, Marc JÜNEMANN, Jan MOTTE, Astrid REINECKE (eds), Angeworben, eingewandert, abgeschoben. Ein anderer Blick auf die Einwanderungsgesellschaft Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Münster 1999, pp. 13–14.

11 See Mathilde JAMIN, Fremde Heimat: Zur Geschichte der Arbeitsmigration aus der Türkei, in: MOTTE, OHLIGER, VON OSWALD, 50 Jahre (see note 9), pp. 145–164.

12 See Anne VON OSWALD, Barbara SCHMIDT, »Nach Schichtende sind sie immer in ihr Lager zurückgekehrt ...«: Leben in »Gastarbeiter«-Unterkünften in den sechziger und siebziger Jahren, in: Ibid. pp. 184–214.

13 For details see Mathilde JAMIN, Migrationsgeschichte im Museum: Erinnerungsorte von Arbeitsmigranten – kein Ort der Erinnerung?, in: MOTTE, OHLIGER, Geschichte und Gedächtnis in der Einwanderungsgesellschaft (see note 2), pp. 145–157.

14 See Stadt Frankfurt am Main, Press information of the Cultural Department, 10 February 2004.

15 See Denkmal für ›Gastarbeiter‹, in: *Frankfurter Rundschau*, 25 February 2004.



»Der Ausländer – der Reisende«, sculpture made by Guido Messer, opposite the train station Stuttgart-Obertürkheim (picture: Veit Müller, Markgröningen).

layered policy of multiculturalism and the establishment of a specific office dealing with these issues. Frankfurt will construct a monument for »guestworkers« for which plans existed before in numerous other cities. Those plans, however, all failed to come into existence. For instance, the small town of Reichenbach at the Fils in Baden-Württemberg launched a competition for a migration sculpture in the early 1980s. It was planned to be placed in the pedestrian zone, i.e. in the very centre of the town. The artist Guido Messer won the competition with his art work »The Foreigner«, but in the end the project was not completed. Controversies in the city council blocked the effort for seven years. Thus, it was impossible to put »The Foreigner« into the centre of the community[16]. It took ten more years until Messer was able to carry out the plans for his sculpture in front of the train station in Stuttgart-Obertürkheim. This fruition became possible only by way of a trick: »The Foreigner« went through a metamorphosis and was turned into »The Traveller«: »This was the only possibility to find financial support for the project«[17]. In the meantime, the artist succeeded in re-establishing the original name, so that »The Foreigner« actually could be achieved in this clandestine way. Messer's sculpture is accepted by the local population.

Another comparable project failed almost simultaneously in the then German capital of Bonn. There the Spanish group of the Catholic Workers' Association took the initiative in 1989 for a »Monument of Co-existence of Germans and Foreigners«, or shorter: a »Monument for Integration«. The city administration responded to the proposal with a rejection[18]. It was argued that the time elapsed since the immigration process was not enough, that it was not directed at commemorating a specific person or event and moreover, that a monument would not help to improve relations between Germans and foreigners and thus foster integration.

Monuments can be understood as a way of establishing consensus about historical and cultural events and thus creating identity. This, however, was not possible in previous cases. For instance, the failure to erect Messer's sculpture »The Foreigner« and the intention to deny its original meaning or make it invisible show the potential for conflicts that bringing immigrants and foreigners into the public space holds. One can conclude that there is not just a lack of political, but also of cultural recognition with regard to the representation of immigrants. In Germany's symbolically communicated historical space segregation of memories prevails. This space is (so far still) more or less void of (labour) immigrants and their history. »The Foreigner« was not put into the centre of a city, the pedestrian zone, as originally planned. It was erected in front of a train station. At this place it might be seen as symbol for arrival. Train stations, however, are ambivalent locations. People do not wait at train stations after having arrived. One waits for trains that depart. Thus the journey of »The Foreigner« might rather be directed home in the view of the receiving society. In the pedestrian zone the sculpture would have been removed from the place of arrival and departure. Then it

16 Note of the artist Guido Messer to Jan Motte, 25 June 2003.

17 Ibid.

18 Cf. the answer of the city's head of administration to the Federal Commissioner for Foreigner's Affairs, October 1989. The letter is held by Mr. Vidal Olmos. The project was also known in Spanish as »Monumento al Emigrante«, i.e. »Monument for the Emigrant«.

would have emphasised the process of staying and remaining in the host society. The situation of coming, arriving and staying was symbolically kept ambiguous.

V. COMMEMORATION IN THE URBAN PUBLIC SPHERE STREET NAMES AS MEANS OF RECOGNITION

In its issue of 3 March 2004 the daily *Solinger Morgenpost* headlined: »Commemoration between trees and benches: A Mercimek-Square shall remind of the arson attack at the Untere Wernerstraße«. Eleven years after an arson attack in which five Turkish immigrant women and children were killed as a consequence of a xenophobic act, this event shall be symbolically remembered. The square will be located in a newly established neighbourhood close to the house that was burned in 1993[19]. The name Mercimek-Square points to the Turkish village from which the victims, the Genç family, originated. This project will finally be fulfilled after endless debates were held in the city council and recurring public demands for renaming a street to remember the victims occurred. Previously this protest was articulated in Solingen several times, by symbolically renaming a street without a vote of the city council. This happened most recently in 2003, when the tenth anniversary of the arson attack was commemorated. The protestors particularly demanded to remember the victims as people and thus give the act of commemoration a face. They asked to rename a street close to the burnt house »Hülya Street«[20]. The solution that was proposed by the city administration, however, points to the victims' place of origin. The direct link to the murders and the victims, the original reason for the plans, is no longer clearly visible. Again in Frankfurt, in the area of Bockenheim, there is a symbolic commemoration of the victims in Solingen. In 1999, a square was officially named »Hülya Square«. This initiative was launched by the city's foreigners' council *(Ausländerbeirat)*, the official representation of immigrant's interests.

A third example can be found in Cologne. In 1993 a street was named after Bahide Arslan, who was the victim of a xenophobic attack in the city of Mölln in 1992. The examples show a certain trend: in German cities and towns labour immigrants are not or only marginally represented when it comes to street and square names. In the few cases, however, where labour immigrants are publicly commemorated, it is with regard to violent attacks, murders and racism. How to interpret this fact? Does it mean that the threshold for symbolic policy of commemorating labour immigrants is built by acts of murder and physical violence? The current symbolic practice seems to indicate that immigrants are predominantly seen and remembered as victims of violence. Probably the most well-known examples in this line and tradition of commemoration stem from the cities of Kassel and Hamburg. Here citizens' initiatives (unofficially) renamed

19 The ruins of the house were removed in order to avoid becoming a place of negative memories. A small monument at the former site of the house reminds of the arson attack. Moreover, a monument was built on the area of the Mildred-Scheel-School in Solingen.

20 Hülya Genç was one of the five victims.

squares after Cemal Altun. The name reminds the public of an asylum seeker who committed suicide out of despair. Thus the symbolic act points to a rigid asylum policy instead of an individual person[21]. One can conclude that the lack of monuments and street names with regard to the history of labour migration represents a general policy of non-recognition on the local level.

VI. FROM EXHIBITION TO MUSEUM

Museums and curators in Germany have discovered migration history as a topic worth showing. In the last ten years numerous historical exhibitions were displayed. With the 50th anniversary of the recruitment of labour migration having been celebrated in 2005 even the national history museum in Berlin organised an exhibition on the topic[22]. Moreover, immigrant associations and a circle of younger historians and intellectuals have started a debate on the establishment of a migration museum. Though the idea about creating and institutionalising a migration museum goes back as far as the 1970s and early 1980s, it has only gained momentum more recently.

Close to the time of the labour recruitment stop in 1973 the first historical exhibitions on labour migration were curated. The first exhibition in West Germany was probably »Gastarbeiter – Fremdarbeiter« (»Guestworkers – Foreign Labour«) in Berlin in 1975. It was put together by the Greek artist Vlassis Caniaris. The title emphasised the continuity of employment of foreign labour stretching back to the time before 1945[23]. Simultaneously the Cultural Office in Berlin-Kreuzberg showed the exhibition »Mehmet kam aus Anatolien« (»Mehmet Came from Anatolia«)[24]. According to Martin Düspohl, the director of the Kreuzberg Museum, this was an exhibition that showed the Turkish labour immigration from a cultural perspective[25]. This first phase of social and cultural historical exhibitions ended at the beginning of the 1980s[26]. The number of exhibitions decreased until a virulent debate about asylum and immigration started in the early 1990s. New historical exhibitions paralleled these political controversies about immigration at the beginning of the 1990s.

21 On Cemal Altun and the consequences of German asylum policy see Rolf Gössner, Fanal ohne Wirkung?, in: Ossietzky, Zweiwochenschrift für Politik/Kultur/Wirtschaft 18 (2003). Next to the symbolic street names in Hamburg and Kassel a monument in Berlin-Charlottenburg reminds of Cemal Altun.

22 Rosemarie Beier-de Haan (ed.), Zuwanderungsland Deutschland. Migration 1500–2005, Wolfratshausen 2005.

23 This exhibition was organised by the Berlin artist programme of the German Academic Exchange Office (DAAD) and the Neue Gesellschaft für Bildende Künste in Berlin.

24 Kunstamt Kreuzberg (ed.), Mehmet kam aus Anatolien. Ausstellungskatalog, Berliner Festspiele GmbH, Berlin 1975.

25 Martin Düspohl, »In jeder Generation tauscht sich die Bevölkerung einmal aus ...« Migrationsgeschichte in der Konzeption des Kreuzberg-Museums (Berlin), in: Motte, Ohliger, Geschichte und Gedächtnis in der Einwanderungsgesellschaft (see note 2), pp. 159–179.

26 Further examples for this early phase are »Türkei – Heimat von Menschen in unserer Stadt« and »Türkische Mitbürger in Hamburg« (both Hamburg, 1976); »morgens Deutschland, abends Türkei«

Another phase of historical exhibitions on migration history started in the late 1990s. In particular the exhibition »Fremde Heimat« (»Being Home Abroad«), organised by the Ruhrlandmuseum in Essen and by the immigrant association DOMiT in Cologne can be seen as a landmark for numerous reasons[27]. First, the exhibition and the catalogue were bilingual, in German and Turkish. Second, a migrant organisation cooperated on equal footing with an established cultural institution. Third, the visitors of the exhibition were around 30 percent immigrants, so that a new audience was reached. This success motivated further exhibitions on migration history[28].

Beyond these temporary projects there have been plans for the establishment of a migration museum for more than 20 years. A first concept for a »Museum for the History and Culture of ›Guestworkers‹« was developed in Bochum in 1980, proposed by an employee of the Kemnade International[29]. The museum was intended to develop educational perspectives to overcome the ignorance about reasons for labour migration and its history. It was not only envisioned as a classical museum that collects, preserves and displays objects or organises exhibitions on migration history and everyday immigrant life; it was also meant to become a centre for migrant intellectuals and their cultural life, activities and products[30].

Since this first proposal for a museum the idea has been launched again by various institutions[31]. Currently it is mainly the »Verein für ein Migrationsmuseum« in Cologne and the Berlin based NGO Network Migration in Europe (<www.network-migration.org>) that lobby for a migration museum in Germany, be the institution national or European in its scope. However, one can also find an overlap with various other projects. For instance, there are two initiatives in Hamburg and Bremen which invest in permanently displaying the history of *emigration*. The initiative in Hamburg is in its planning stage whereas the »Deutsche Auswandererhaus« (German House of Emigration) has already been opened in Bremerhaven in summer 2005 (<http://www.dah-bremerhaven.de>). Both initiatives discovered the importance of immigration and intend to include the topic into their exhibitions. The sudden and recent emergence of several new initiatives for migration museums indicates the change of public opinion with regard to migration, its history and its commemoration.

(Kunstamt Berlin-Kreuzberg, 1981); »Der Weg – Jugoslawische Frauen in Berlin« (organised by female migrants in Berlin) and »Griechen und Deutsche – Bilder von Anderen« (both launched in the early 1980s).

27 Aytaç Eryilmaz, Mathilde Jamin (eds), Fremde Heimat. Eine Geschichte der Einwanderung aus der Türkei, Essen 1998.

28 Examples are Referat Stadtgeschichte der Landeshauptstadt München (ed.), Für 50 Mark einen Italiener, München 2000; Kreuzbergmuseum (ed.), »Wir waren die Ersten ...,« Berlin 2000; DOMiT (ed.), 40 Jahre Fremde Heimat, Cologne 2001; Landeszentrale für Politische Bildung Niedersachsen (ed.), Hiergeblieben, Hannover 2002.

29 The Kemnade International was a cultural festival that started in the 1970s. Its focus was immigrant art and the challenges for art in an immigration society.

30 See Aytaç Eryilmaz, Deutschland braucht ein Migrationsmuseum. Plädoyer für einen Paradigmenwechsel in der Kulturpolitik, in: Motte, Ohliger, Geschichte und Gedächtnis in der Einwanderungsgesellschaft (see note 2), pp. 305–319.

31 The former »Bücherei des Deutschen Ostens« in Herne was re-organised as Martin-Opitz-Bibliothek in the late 1980s. Within this process a concept for an immigration museum was developed.

VII. ANALYSING A CINEASTIC APPROACH: THE MOVIE SOLINO AS »LIEUX DE MÉMOIRE«

The cinema has recently rediscovered the topic migration. After early beginnings with Rainer Werner Fassbinder's »Angst essen Seele auf« or »40qm Deutschland« immigration got new attention as film subject with the movie »Solino« in 2002[32]. Films can become *lieux de mémoire*, in which history is focussed, collective identities are formed and fostered[33].

Solino was released in German movie theatres in November 2002. One year later more than 600,000 people had visited the film of the Hamburg film director Fatih Akin. Solino could have had good chances of becoming what the PR section of the production company and many articles in the press declared: *the* »immigration epic«, *the* »film of labour migration history«[34], a »heart warming ›guestworkers‹ story«[35], a film about »an Italian family of labour migrants«[36] or an »authentic history of an immigrant family«[37], a film, that illustrates the history of migration to the Federal Republic, which catches the audience's attention with »unique sets of historical pictures«[38]. Critics wrote that it served »as document for the 1960s«[39]. Solino was said to be »a wonderfully exact part of immigration history. It put a piece of untold German history on the screen«[40]; it was staged as a »huge saga of an (immigrant) family«[41]. The director Fatih Akin stressed in several interviews, he had reproduced the perspective of the »guestworkers« in the format 1:1. He claimed to not having made the film from a German perspective. Akin pointed to Fassbinder as a negative counter example[42]: »I wanted to create a monument for the whole first generation of ›guestworkers‹«[43]. The film director and the author of the script wanted a high quality piece of art to become an

32 An overview about migration and film is provided by Deniz GÖKTÜRK, Migration und Kino – Subnationale Mitleidskultur oder transnationale Rollenspiele?, in: Carmine CHIELLINO (ed.), Interkulturelle Literatur in Deutschland. Ein Handbuch, Stuttgart 2000, pp. 329–347.

33 In the German context the epic »Heimat« by Edgar Reitz should be taken into comparison. It started a critical re-appraisal of the term »Heimat«. In terms of publicly commemorating the Holocaust the American soap opera »Holocaust« (1978) and »Schindler's List« (1993) played an important role.

34 See *Hamburger Abendblatt*, 24 November 2003.

35 This was a statement of the interviewer of the Bayerischer Rundfunks in an interview with movie director Fatih Akin, see Fatih Akin über seine Art Filme zu machen, <http://www.br-online.de/unterhaltung/kino/filme/200211/101/>.

36 See NDR Special: Solino – Der neue Film von Fatih Akin, <http://www.ndr.de/ndr/special/ filmfest_hamburg2002/solino.html>.

37 WestART Magazin, 31 October 2002, WDR TV.

38 <http://www.filmstarts.de>, the film and movie magazine in the Internet.

39 Film critique in »outnow«, <http://www.outnow.ch>.

40 Solino, see <http://www.hochschulfilmclub.de/cgi-bin/movie_db.pl/filme/1046891859.html>.

41 NDR Online, film review »Solino«.

42 *Die Zeit*, Kulturbrief vom 25. Oktober bis zum 3. November 2002, Achim FEHRENBACH (Gesprächsführung), Der Regisseur Fatih Akin über seinen neuen Film »Solino«, <http://www.zeit.de/2002/44/Kultur/kulturbrief_25102002.html>.

43 See an interview with Fatih Akin, Votivkino, film description, <http://www.votivkino.at/textlang/~438soli.htm>.

omnipresent place for commemoration. However, to label »Solino as a film about the first pizzeria in the Ruhr area is maybe a smart marketing strategy, but it is misleading«[44]. The movie could have become a central *lieu de mémoire* for German post-war migration history, similar to the TV series »Roots« for African-Americans in the USA in the 1970s[45]. But the movie did not manage to do so.

The film tells the story of the family Amato, which came from the small southern Italian village Solino to Duisburg in the 1960s. There they open the first pizzeria in Germany. The family story turns mainly around the conflictual relation of the two brothers Gigi and Giancarlo. It is told from the 1960s to the 1980s. The family falls apart. Gigi and his mother Rosa return to Italy. The father Romano keeps the pizzeria with his German girl friend. Gigi makes under false pretences a career as a film director. Thus, he fulfills the dream his brother Giancarlo had dreamt of for himself. The film script of the renowned author Ruth Toma is based upon the true story of her husband. Her parents-in-law had opened a pizzeria in the city Oberhausen in the 1960s. Thus both, the film maker Fatik Akin, a child of Turkish labour immigrants, and the author of the script are biographically involved in the story of the film.

The criticism of the film starts with its subtitle and the main plot. The film was advertised and released under the title: »Solino: Brothers are always closest friends ... and bitter rivals«. The title was not: »Solino: An immigration story«. The film distributor probably made a conscious and market oriented decision when releasing the film as »a tragic-comic family portrait and the empathic story of two rivalling brothers«. The potential for an immigrant epic is hidden under the brotherly conflict, the love stories, the dreams of home and the cineastic reminiscents of Italian neo-realism. The German daily *die tageszeitung* characterised it correctly when writing: »Fatih Akin once started out to bring an immigrant perspective into German cinema. In Solino not much remains of it: a little bit yearning for Italy, a little bit Ruhr epic, a little bit of a rivalry between brothers ...«[46].

The film critic of the national daily *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, Andreas Kilb first stated: »And again it looks as if a spell has been released, as if a part of German reality, in which we live, has finally made its way into the movie theatres«. Then his hard and devastating criticism followed: »It is a story of arrival and departure, a story about being in-between two worlds, two languages, two kinds of skies. That is the way it seems. Or it could have been like this. It could have been like this if Fatih Akin and Ruth Thoma had felt the desire to present us something else than a nice evening among brothers«[47]. Kilb criticised that the historical substance had evaporated in the movie. An illustration for this loss of substance is to overlook the world of labour. This part of life was essential for millions of labour migrants. It shaped their existence in Germany. The world of industry – in the case of the father in the movie it was a coal mine

44 Film critique at <http://www.programmkino.de>.

45 The West German movie theater of the 1950s partly played a similar role for refugees and expellees. However, these films have not become long term *lieux de mémoire*. They only had a timely limited impact. See Robert MOELLER, War Stories. The Search for a Usable Past in the Federal Republic of Germany, Berkeley 2001.

46 *die tageszeitung*, 7 November 2002.

47 Andreas KILB, Vorsicht, frisch gestrichen. Der Gastarbeiter-Film »Solino«, in: <http://faz.net>.

– are left out. These places of hard labour, of repression, but also solidarity among colleagues are not shown. Only in two very short sequences the audience sees the father in the coal mine. For Akin these allusions have to suffice to represent a whole orbit of work experiences. The author of the script Ruth Toma criticised herself that scenes of everyday life were sacrificed during the final cut. Places beyond pizza and pasta such as the confrontation of the children with the German school system and the first job of the father in the mines were removed[48]. This is also true for the originally longer section about the emigration and the reasons for it. Those scenes about places that became decisive for the first generation of immigrants were replaced by other narratives. Instead of taking the story of immigration seriously it was amputated. Instead of realizing the claim to create a visual monument for the first generation of immigrants, it focuses on the story of the two brothers, who belong to the second generation.

And yet, despite all criticism Solino drew huge attention with its stories, pictures and the atmosphere it generated. The reactions from among the audience were overwhelmingly positive. And even the shortened version of the immigration story was mostly received positively. In particular visitors who came from immigrant families commented positively upon it in the virtual guest book. The entries show that the film managed to create an identity among immigrants that transcends individual immigrant groups. Some comments stated that the film went beyond the specific history of Italian labour migrants. It condensed their history into a paradigmatic story which served as identification for other groups. »I am Turkish, I found the film overwhelming. I immediately went to see it together with my father and recommended it to others«. Here Fatih Akin's view is confirmed: »It does not matter if an immigrant comes from Anatolia or Apulia« (entry in the guestbook[49], 16 November 2002). However, one could argue that Fatih Akin only superficially touched upon the first wave of immigration of »guestworkers«[50]. Spectators from immigrant families watched »Solino« as representation of their family history and were grateful for it. Guido Messer's statement about his sculpture, that immigrants appreciate the fact to be put in the centre at all, also holds true for the movie and the reactions it generated. This positive appreciation of the film was only challenged by a few critical voices. One comment of a »daughter of an immigrant from Southern Italy« read: »To be honest, I was not only bored to death, but I was angry about Solino. [...] The film is nothing but a disappointment! [...] It does not reconstruct any of our experiences. Hardly anything of what we really lived through is shown. [...] It would have been more honest, to tell the story of two rivalling brothers and leave Italy and the ›guestworkers‹ issue out of it. [...] Emigration, living abroad and feelings of belonging are not a topic for him [Fatih Akin].« (Entry in Internet guestbook, 14 November 2002.)

48 This is a statement of Ruth Toma who wrote the film script, see Verlag der Autoren, Programmheft No. 2, 2002, pp. 3–7, here p. 5.

49 <http://www.solino-derfilm.de>.

50 *die tageszeitung*, 7 November 2002. The WDR magazine westART interpreted this perspective more positively: »In Solino the milieu of the ›guestworkers‹ just serves as a key for people with a similar socialisation«. See westART – magazine, 31 October 2002.

One criticism read that »watching the movie made the spectator realise that the chapter ›guestworkers‹ migration has not yet been part of German movies«[51]. Unfortunately this statement still holds true, even after Solino. The topic that was targeted perfectly by the film makers Fatih Akin or Yüksel Yavuz in their documentaries, still waits for a convincing realisation in a movie[52]. The cinematic, epic monument for the history of labour migration is still lacking in Germany[53].

VIII. CONCLUSION

Two recent intellectual debates are important for the topic this article deals with: on the one hand it is the role of historical memory, on the other it is the controversy about immigration and integration. It is striking that the two discourses have rarely been brought together in Germany, though they are central to the definition of what historical and contemporary German identity is. The topics remain largely detached from each other. This is the more surprising as both discourses have a similar leitmotif. They refer to the question of membership within a nation state and its public sphere. In the discourse about memory history and historical narratives in the broadest sense play a key role. In the discourse about immigration and integration the historical dimension remains vague. The immigration society does not yet constitute itself as a community of shared narratives *(Erinnerungs- und Erzählgemeinschaft)*. It does not share a common heritage or common traditions. The native born population and the immigrant population (and its children) live in separate worlds of commemoration. They do not own a shared memory. Their memories are divided. One aspect of this divided history is, that the two groups do not inhabit common historical-symbolic spaces. This symbolic segregation is visible at historical anniversaries as well as at classical sites of historical commemoration, interpretation and representation such as monuments, street names, museums or more modern *lieux de mémoire* such as films, movies and other electronic media.

As a consequence, participation of immigrants in discourses about history and memory and thus their recognition are not very well anchored. They are often reduced to a narrow understanding of integration, which aims at economic and social, partly also at political rights and participation. Within this utilitarian framework questions of economics, of social success or failure and more recently of linguistic assimilation prevail. Historical-symbolic recognition, however, is an important part of fully exercised citizenship rights and thus a precondition for political, social and cultural participation. This recognition is also important for the creation of an emotionally

51 Verlag der Autoren, Programmheft No. 2, 2002, p. 7.

52 Fatih Akin, Wir haben vergessen zurückzukehren (2000); Yüksel Yavuz, Mein Vater der Gastarbeiter (1994).

53 German TV recently also discovered immigration history as a subject for documentaries and fiction. The most important example is the prize winning film »Zeit der Wünsche« (Time of Wishes) which was shown on German TV in January 2005 at prime time. The film won the prestigious Adolf Grimme prize. It told the story of Turkish labour immigrants since the 1960s.

grounded membership in society. In practice it often remains an empty placeholder. The key areas of culture and history are not yet mirrored in the main controversies about establishing and furnishing Germany's immigration society. What might be the reasons for this? A rather banal answer, though not unimportant, points to a different access for native born Germans and immigrants to cultural resources. These resources are often denied to immigrants within the struggle for scarce goods. Often migrants do not succeed in gaining access since they are not part of networks and decision making processes. Sometimes they also lack their own elite that can demand these rights by way of handling established power structures.

A deeper reason is related to the historical concept of culture and nation in Germany (and Central Europe), i.e. what is eligible for recognition within the interrelation of nation and culture. These two concepts were for a long time forged together in the term *Kulturnation* (cultural nation). And this interrelation was legitimised by politics and science. This is one reason why cultural reform and opening up the definition of culture is often seen as a danger and threat. The challenge for society, politics, the public in general, but also for historiography and public history is to fill the gap of history and culture that can be discerned in the migration debate. The first attempts are visible: future projects for historical exhibitions and scholarship itself already point into this direction[54]. If culture, history and education could be centrally located *within* this debate, it would be a contribution for building the basis of a future integrated society. History and historically defined membership would then provide multiple perspectives. These perspectives would stretch from integration of immigrants into a model of constitutional patriotism *(Verfassungspatriotismus)* over individual or subcultural engagement with historical knowledge to the subversive potential for resistance that history can provide. Such a multi-layered view and interpretation of the common history is only in a nascent state. If such a perspective found its way into practices of memory in Germany, it would allow drawing the above mentioned social character of the »stranger as man without history« differently. The stranger could then become a person who does not only have his or her own history, but also somebody, whose history is worth being integrated and shared in the collective master narrative and the emerging memory of a country of immigration.

54 For conceptional efforts to overcome nationally centered views of history see Jürgen OSTERHAMMEL, Geschichtswissenschaft jenseits des Nationalstaats. Studien zu Beziehungsgeschichte und Zivilisationsvergleich, Göttingen 2001; Sebastian CONRAD, Doppelte Marginalisierung. Plädoyer für eine transnationale Perspektive auf die deutsche Geschichte, in: Geschichte und Gesellschaft 28 (2002) pp. 145–169. Hanna SCHISSLER, Yasemin Nuhoğlu SOYSAL, Introduction: Teaching beyond the National Narrative, in: ID. (eds), The Nation, Europe and the World. Textbooks and Curricula in Transition, New York, Oxford 2005, pp. 1–9. For a historical narrative of migration history in the European context see Klaus J. BADE, Europa in Bewegung. Migration vom späten 18. Jahrhundert bis zur Gegenwart, Munich 2000. For a global perspective throughout ten centuries see Dirk HOERDER, Cultures in Contact. World Migrations in the Second Millennium, Durham, London 2002. For France see Gérard NOIRIEL, Le creuset français. Histoire de l'immigration, XIX^{e}–XX^{e} siècles, Paris 1988. For individual European countries the series »Migrance« run by the Parisian NGO Génériques is also useful; it has issues on Belgium, Germany, Great Britain, Luxemburg and Spain (<http://www.generiques.org/migrance.html>).

WLADIMIR FISCHER

An Innovative Historiographic Strategy Representing Migrants from Southeastern Europe in Vienna

There is a paradox in Vienna's historical image. On the one hand, Vienna appears to be a multicultural city in the memory stored in mainstream discourses and in historical knowledge production. On the other hand, migrants by tradition do not figure as autonomous protagonists in historical accounts of Vienna. Rather, they are only mentioned on the occasion of their arrival to certain city quarters – what remains are Jewish, Bohemian, Hungarian, etc. ›cultural influences‹ in Viennese slang and cuisine[1].

This article aims to write an open history of one of the smaller historical migrant groups in the period around 1900. It is a group that might at that time not even have existed as an »imagined community«: the migrants from the regions that used to be 20th century Yugoslavia. One might ask why the topic is defined by a territory that did not politically exist in the period in question. The answer lies in the strategy of my research: the potential readers of this history do live now. They are (not exclusively but also) migrants from the countries that used to be Yugoslavia who have come to Vienna in the last 40 to 50 years. Today these migrants make up ten percent of Vienna's population. Thus, they are the city's largest migrant group. However, these migrants are virtually invisible in the public sphere and their voices are very weak in political, social and cultural discourses. This is where history comes in. Writing history has proved to be a reliable tool in raising voices of underrepresented groups. However, in constructing such historical communities, they must at the same time be *de*constructed in order to counteract hegemonic readings. Such research strategies will be described in more detail below after a review of the already existing literature.

I. MIGRANTS IN VIENNA'S HISTORIOGRAPHY

Migrants came to Vienna from all parts of the Monarchy. Around 1900 many more of them were internal migrants than would be the case today. This was due to the fact that Bohemia, Moravia, Carniola, Galicia, Bukovina and gradually also Bosnia and Hercegovina belonged to Austria. While migrants from Hungary, including Croatia, Dalmatia, Istria and present-day Slovakia and Burgenland, had a different status (especially

1 This article is based on research conducted in the framework of the project »Centers and Peripheries. Cultures and Power Relations in Austria-Hungary 1867–1918« (P16511), funded by the Austrian Research Foundation FWF.

men who had to straighten out their military duties with the Hungarian government), they could usually settle easily across this border. What was more important for migrants of the period was *Heimatrecht*, a law, which regulated that any person had a right to dwell only in his or her community of birth. If a person became undesirable in another community, s/he could be ›pushed out‹ (*abgeschoben*) by this community to the community of birth. *Heimatrecht* could be married or inherited in patrilinear logic. This meant that a Viennese women who married a Bohemian could find herself ›pushed out‹ to Bohemia for instance if her husband required public welfare. It also meant that a child born in Lemberg/L'viv could have its *Heimatrecht* for instance in Sarajevo or Graz.

How is the history remembered? While Czech migrants' history and their representation in general Viennese historiography are already in a poor state, migrants other than the Czechs (and some segments of Jewish migration) are usually completely nonexistent in general historical accounts. In the case of migrants from the countries of the former Yugoslavia, there is a double lack of representation: they have equally seldom been treated in the history of Vienna as they are prominently absent from contemporary mainstream discourses and spaces. Three sentences on Yugoslav, Turkish, African and Asian immigrants in the most recent »History of Vienna« is relatively much coverage and a notable progress in comparison to older histories, which completely ignored immigrants[2].

Taking into account that migrants from the Southeast were a minority among their kind before World War II it is understandable that they have not found their way into general history accounts of that period. It is certainly not when contemporary history is in question. The exclusion from history means for contemporary migrants that they are virtually cut-off from identifications with their city of residence, which are not directly tied to the present – and this is true, unfortunately, even though there are multiple links to the past.

This part of the article describes the available literature, which represents, all due criticism notwithstanding, the first step towards a comprehensive yet diverse history of migrations from Southeastern Europe to Vienna and back. The literature can be roughly divided into two groups. One part deals with labour migrants who arrived at the beginning of the 1960s and who made up the basis for the present population of about 100,000 citizens of a formerly Yugoslav state. The other body of literature deals with migrants from these regions who lived in Vienna before World War II, and is driven by ›identity politics‹. The former studies can accurately be described as mainly sociological, economic and political ones.

Descriptions of the earlier history of migrants from the area of the former Yugoslavia firstly try to increase the importance of these migrants by pointing out famous biographies and connections to prestigious already established figures and events in

2 Peter Csendes, Geschichte Wiens, Vienna ²1990 (Geschichte der österreichischen Bundesländer), p. 176; In Austrian history Vocelka acknowledges the importance of migrants, while Bruckmüller dedicates the ›guest workers‹ (sic) too few sentences for a social history. Karl Vocelka, Geschichte Österreichs. Kultur, Gesellschaft, Politik, Graz, Vienna, Cologne 2000; Ernst Bruckmüller, Sozialgeschichte Österreichs, Vienna, Munich 2001, p. 377.

mainstream Viennese history. Secondly, most of these accounts are ethnically exclusive or separate. This is because usually such histories are instrumental in facilitating one or another form of ›identity politics‹, which have been mainly nationalist and elitist. It does not come as a surprise then that women and Jews do not play significant roles in such histories, although many Southeastern migrants were female and/or Jewish.

The most outstanding contribution in this framework is an impressive coffee table book on »The Serbs in Vienna« by Dejan Medaković, which features famous writers, scholars, officers, merchants, and clergy-men connecting ›the Serbs‹ even to the defence against the Ottoman siege. The strategy of the narrative is clearly to write yet another part of a glorious Serbian history in the context of the national histories of the ›Western states‹. The Croatian counterpart is more humble, a catalogue accompanying an exhibition »On the Traces of the Croats in Austria«, but it applies the same strategy of linking ethnic history to heroic general history. Bosnians, who could boast a military regiment stationed in Vienna, have so far not made their way to the bookshelves except for the publications by Smail Balić[3].

Hitherto sociologists, political scientists, human geographers and economists have been the actual authors of contemporary history of migrants from the countries of the Former Yugoslavia. Historians have kept in the background. There are excellent studies on the socio-spatial segregation of Yugoslav labour migrants in Vienna, their economic situation, their role in Austrian labour market policy, the situation of Yugoslav women, perspectives of political representation and citizenship, and much more. Maybe labour migrants are the most intensely researched segment of the population whatsoever[4].

The drawback of the socio-political literature for students of migrants' history is however, that the way migrants themselves conceive of their history has been ignored, with the exception of Ljubomir Bratić's contributions[5]. An important step in the ongoing reappraisal of the labour migrants' contemporary history was the exhibition »Gastarbajteri«, shown last year in the Wien Museum. The concept of this exhibition was to consciously avoid the worn-out and hegemonic argument of the ›valuable contributions of the strangers‹ to Viennese culture and economy. Instead the exhibition highlighted the legal, political, economic and cultural situation of modern labour migrants, based on personal individual memories, photos and documents. This included

3 Dejan Medaković, Srbi u Beću, Novi Sad 1998; Auf den Spuren der Kroaten in Österreich: Katalog zur Ausstellung 1996/97. Tragovima Hrvata u Austriji, ed. Marijan Brajinović, Vienna 1996; Smail Balić, Das unbekannte Bosnien. Europas Brücke zur islamischen Welt, Cologne, Weimar, Vienna 1991 (Veröffentlichungen zur Realgeschichte, 23).

4 Elisabeth Lichtenberger, Die Wohnverhältnisse der jugoslawischen Arbeitnehmer in Wien (Univ.-Dipl.-Arb. Universität Wien 1977); Id., Gastarbeiter. Leben in zwei Gesellschaften, Wien 1984; Rainer Bauböck, Demographische und soziale Struktur der jugoslawischen und türkischen Wohnbevölkerung in Österreich, in: Hannes Wimmer (ed.), Ausländische Arbeitskräfte in Österreich, Frankfurt a. M., New York 1986, pp. 181–240; Helga Matuschek, Ausländerpolitik in Österreich 1962–1985. Der Kampf um und gegen die ausländische Arbeitskraft, in: Journal für Sozialforschung 2 (1985) pp. 159–198.

5 Ljubomir Bratić, Soziopolitische Netzwerke der MigrantInnen aus der ehemaligen Sozialistischen Föderativen Republik Jugoslawien in Österreich, in: Heinz Fassmann, Irene Stacher (eds), Österreichischer Migrations- und Integrationsbericht. Demographische Entwicklungen – sozioökonomische Strukturen – rechtliche Rahmenbedingungen, Klagenfurt/Celovec 2003.

topics such as the self-organisation of migrants and remigration as well as trans-national links of migrants[6].

II. STRATEGIES

In this complicated and partly hostile situation, it is the goal of my research to negotiate migrant historical presences to public spaces, such as academic discourses, education, media, exhibitions, etc. New research should make migrant memories part of mainstream history and general memory, making it unavoidable in Austrian as part of European histories. The focus is currently on the time period around 1900. Investigations into the past forty years of labour migration and exile are in preparation[7].

Research on the so-called ›fin de siècle‹ or ›Ära Lueger‹ has confirmed the assumption that Balkan migrants were notably different from today's, both in numerical and social terms. However, it is the conscious strategy of this research to describe lives of such migrants in this crucial historical period, in order to provide present-day migrants with the opportunity to connect to migrant ›predecessors‹ from similar regions. This is not a strategy to voluntarily construct an essential continuity, but, on the contrary, to carve out the discontinuities between (and among) both migrations. Thus contemplation on the diversity of life experiences and belongings in time and space is fostered. Older attempts at writing migration history in this city wanted to reflect today's migrants in the mirror of (ethnically) different migrants in the past[8]. Following this logic present-day Turkish or Chinese migrants should be able to recognise themselves in the mirror of past Czech etc. migrants. As a variation of this principle, research into ›ex-Yugoslav‹ migrants' history compares e.g. Serbian migrants of today with fin-de-siècle Serbian migrants, which brings to light the above mentioned discontinuities and differences. Self-conceptions and conceptions of the Other are thus bleeding into each other as in the motto »we are strangers to ourselves«.

The proposed history of migrants should offer all sorts of present-day migrants the possibility to find links to their own lives. Therefore, this history will not be limited to certain groups of persons, but will encompass as many different social, professional, political, religious, regional, cultural, and age positions as possible. No strategies of self-identification should be excluded.

A basic principle of my research strategy is that connections, which existed (and that can be documented) should not be cut off for the sake of a clear-cut picture but should instead be kept in sight in order to show the interconnectedness of past reality. There-

6 Hakan Gürses, Cornelia Kogoj, Sylvia Mattl (eds), Gastarbajteri. 40 Jahre Arbeitsmigration, Vienna 2004.

7 Cf. Wladimir Fischer, Migrant Voices in Vienna's Contemporary History, in: Cynthia Brown, Richard G. Rodger (eds), Constructing Urban Memories: The Role of Oral Testimony, Aldershot [in print] (Historical Urban Studies).

8 Hildegard Pruckner, Waltraud Weisch (eds), Schmelztiegel Wien einst und jetzt. Didaktisches Beiheft, Vienna, Cologne 1990.

fore, the basic model of historical description is a network-model or a rhizomatic one instead of a systematic hierarchic model. This means to follow traces where they lead to, and to stop following them only when the number of links decreases significantly. Admittedly, with this method, one can easily be distracted from central to peripheral phenomena, but the conscious strategy of this history is exactly to allow for such peripherality and ›untypical‹ cases.

Both individual and communal perspectives will be described in this history. One important aim is to follow individual persons' traces in the archives, to describe their family relations, to reconstruct their biographies and to revisit the spaces they inhabited, the impressions they made on the scribes of the records. Another goal is to construct from the links of these individual persons networks with communal character: family bonds, social clusters, cultural constellations, houses, clubs, gangs, etc. These should be complemented with contemporary concepts of such communities as expressed in declarations, statutes, periodicals etc.

In both individual and communal contexts it is important to consider periodisations that might have made sense for migrants. These might be different for different migrants, but still there should have been plausible turning points for wider groups. For instance, the legal framework of *Heimatrecht*, which underwent important transformations in the late 19th century, should have had an impact on migrants' lives, as well as on the policies and rhetoric of the city and on the national government(s), for example concerning religious minorities. Such legal circumstances, of course, will have affected Balkan migrants in different ways according to their religious affiliations and also to many other factors.

It is not the aim of this migrants' history to construct an imaginary community of the past. If there were structures, strings of events, series of archival entries, this should not serve to petrify the fluidity of migrant presences. Consequently, my study does not narrate migration as a story whose closure should be successful settlement but rather treats re-migrations of different types as constitutive phenomena of migrants' history.

One drawback of migrants' histories is that they tend to be classified as specialised histories, and therefore can only exist in small niches of mainstream historiography. Therefore a history of (Balkan) migrants in Vienna should be as diverse as other histories, including aspects not only of a political, cultural and social history but also of a history of ideas, of criminality, a gender history, urban history, and other ›hyphenated‹ histories. In other words, this strategy provides several entries to other historiographies, which lead not only via political and/or cultural histories. If diverse perspectives on and aspects of history are present in this concept, it should be easier to argue that migrants' history is a part of general history in many different fields.

It is the explicit intention of my research to subvert hegemonic conceptions of migration history. Nationalist, functionalist and elitist histories are already available and I do not want to add yet another contribution to these projects. Although it is of course possible to extract from the projected historiographic work exploitable information in such a way of thinking, the close links to histories that are deemed undesirable in such discourses (poverty and crime for instance) should help boycott these readings.

Instead of erecting a monument, my work is designed to offer locatable links to the past. This means to trace personal biographies, legal contexts, images, social positions, and interactions of persons and authorities, and to connect these both between each other and to actual places in the cityscape.

III. ›BALKAN MIGRANTS‹ AROUND 1900 MATERIAL, METHODS, RESULTS

The archival situation is not favourable to migrants' history, especially not to the history of labour migration. Migrants of the ›lower classes‹ left their traces unwillingly, in most cases, with the authorities which tried to control them. Only those migrants who decided to stay in the city and/or were wealthy enough to bestow their heirs with money, created a ›track‹ of documents which we can follow in the archives. Therefore, this history is more similar to an archaeology of migration than to a systematic, let alone quantitative history. Rather we have to study single findings, which have luckily come upon us, very intensely in order to think about the lives of migrants. Documents by migrants themselves turn up rather as serendipity.

Generally, it is more difficult to find non-Orthodox persons, because their birth certificates etc. are scattered over several hundreds of Catholic churches and Synagogues, which used to serve as registry offices as well. As in most archives of the world, more mobile and less wealthy migrants are harder to find. For the case of migrants from the Southeast it means that an overrepresentation of middle class orthodox persons is to be expected. Methods to counteract that research dynamic will be discussed below.

A ›representative‹ picture of the migrants from the countries, which used to be Yugoslavia for a couple of decades, is neither a realistic goal nor is it desirable. What I am more interested in is to show the scope of the diversity that was present among these migrants. In describing this, of course it is helpful to provide information on approximate numbers of such migrants, their social, regional, religious, age, and gender composition and some turning points for their presence in the city and for the quality of this presence. This information, however, I am treating with care and I am presenting it as reported from several sources, inconclusive as it is. What I would like to avoid is constructing yet another image of manageable clear-cut population segments. It is however safe to propose some theses based on material collected in the archives, stored in a relational person-document database with over 1,500 personal data entries:

- The entire number of migrants from a territory, which used to be part of a Yugoslav republic, was relatively small compared to Czech migrants.
- Among these migrants there was a relatively small group of orthodox-oriental migrants, mainly Serbs from Southern Hungary, Croatia and Dalmatia; in social terms these can be characterised as middle class.
- Amid ›orthodox-oriental‹ migrants again two larger social groups can be identified, i.e. merchants (especially livestock dealers) and craftsmen (mainly cobblers, tailors and hairdressers).

- Two special groups were made up by Serbian citizens and Czechs (Austrian citizens) of the ›orthodox-oriental‹ denomination.
- Only a few members of these groups were maidservants or unskilled labourers.
- Catholic migrants originated mainly from Carniola, Dalmatia and Istria (today Slovenia and Croatia).
- They were more diverse in social terms, because they were either career migrants (especially civil servants) but also unskilled labourers.
- Among most listed groups were also Jews.
- The same goes for German-speaking migrants, especially from Carniola, but also from Dalmatia, Istria and Hungary, who were often civil servants or spouses.

In order to make more sense of the material I proceed from data such as the Serbian Orthodox church books and combine these prosopographic data with information from other sources such as work-books, testaments, guilds' administration, social welfare institutions, etc. I am deciding which information to include not from an a priori typology of ethnic communities or similar a priori assumptions but by the links and connections that are revealed by the sources. Thus, for example, although taking a person of the Orthodox faith as a starting point because of his or her ethnic background, links to persons of other backgrounds will not be faded out (for the sake of thematic consistency) but included together with these persons. Via these links Czechs and Jews and ›Germans‹, etc. come into focus as well. What is more, instead of taking these links as indicators of ›contacts of communities‹, i.e. instead of transferring interpersonal contacts to a level of simplistic anthropomorphism, I am treating such links as vertical connections across certain power lines such as ethnicity, religion and gender. The strategy of looking for differences instead of regularities permits to show a whole bandwidth of diverse social positions, in which migrants from different regions found themselves, in combination with different frameworks such as laws, authorities' practices, environmental influences, ideologies, passions and more. This approach reveals historical reality, which would remain invisible with other methods. For instance, such abstract phenomena as inter-group marriage and conversion can be shown as choices of individual people. On this level we can see that there were, against the mainstream, also people who converted from Catholicism to Orthodoxy, among them even men, such as cavalry officer Johann Nepomuk Sturm who married Almeria Enescu, and even changed his first names to Wladimir when he took on the new confession. Obviously, class and status played a role here, which also becomes apparent considering that the cavalryman's conversion was testified by wholesaler Theodor Ostoits. This was in contrast to cases such as Demeter Mišković's and Maria Hofstädter's who had an illegitimate son. He had been baptised catholic like his mother but converted to his father's faith at the age of 17. There is more, as the low-level career migration, which had many different faces. Slovenian policemen from Carniola for instance were concentrated in one building in Vienna's third district, while other officials such as postal workers and financial administrators from similar regions were dispersed in several quarters, some of whom arrived without family. Others, like one of the few orthodox officials, high ranking Demeter Petrovits from Pancsova, could move to Vienna because they already had a network reaching to the capital, as in this case, through godfathering baby Paul Gruić, son of a railway official.

Other notable people we can encounter in the archival material are as diverse as Stana Radunov, an unmarried Orthodox mother from Dalmatia working as a maid; Rosalia Petkovits, a Croatian cook, who lived in her employers' apartment; Nikolaus Nešković, a Serbian waiter who died of tuberculosis; the Ostojić', a Serbian Vojvodinian family, which erected a little empire based on pig trade and paper bag production. There are networks of Serbian tailors who lived in a surprising symbiosis with orthodox Czech colleagues, based on the shared denomination, Croatian officers successful in the Military Academy but also a Croatian cadet, who socialised with so-called *Plattenbrüdern*, members of Vienna's ›dangerous classes‹, and who was sacked from the Infantry School because of sexual and violent breaches of discipline. There is the Orthodox parish priest Eugen Kozak who spent his old days as a singer in a Bukovinian prison; Maria Redthammer, a Bavarian actress, divorced daughter of an unmarried woman, who converted to the Orthodox faith; Jacob and Maria Böhm, a Jewish/Atheist couple who let their child be baptised ›orthodox-oriental‹; organised Serbian barbers and hairdressers like Tima and Amalia Milkov; officers' servants such as Peter Matkovic, and many students, a group from which of course partly emerged a row of ›notable‹ Slovenian, Croatian, and Serbian men and women, among them musicians, officers, writers, scholars, and so forth, again with very diverse biographies. Instances of the lives of these people are locatable in hospitals, barracks, homes of employers, workshops, apartments, apartment houses, churches, market places and of course in the offices of the authorities, in courtrooms and prisons ... and cemeteries.

MYRIAM CHERTI

Reconstructing the History of Moroccan Migration to the UK: An Oral History Approach

I. INTRODUCTION

Rarely does one hear of the presence of Moroccans in the UK, yet one has just to walk down Golborne Rd in London, commonly known as ›Little Morocco‹, to see Moroccan-owned cafes, restaurants, grocery stores, mosques, supplementary schools, and several community organisations, that all attest to a thriving Moroccan community. Moroccan migration to Western Europe, in general, has been the subject of much research, especially in France and the Netherlands, which represent the first and the second countries of destination for Moroccans. However, very little academic research has been done on Moroccan migration to the UK, even though the main waves of migration to the UK, France, and the Netherlands started in roughly the same period, that is, during the early 1960s and into the 1970s. The purpose of this paper, therefore, is to shed some light on this lost migration history and to discuss how oral history can be used as a method in its reconstruction. I argue that an oral history approach is valuable not only in capturing the living memory of the first generation Moroccan migrants and in highlighting their respective personal experiences, but also in revealing aspects of the migrants' lives that could not have been depicted through other research methods.

II. THEORETICAL DEBATES ABOUT THE RELEVANCE OF ORAL HISTORY

Oral history has been variously defined, and the name has been used to describe a number of different activities. For the purpose of this paper, oral history will be defined as information transmitted orally, in a personal exchange, of a kind likely to be of historical or long-term value[1]. Oral history is used here as a method to challenge the top-down approach of having researchers speaking on behalf of the community. Oral testimonies are vivid, personal, and direct and their use is an acknowledgement that individual people's perceptions are equally valuable to other, more traditionally accepted methods used in gaining understanding of their societies and their priorities.

1 Anthony SELDON, Joanna PAPPWORTH, By Word of Mouth, Elite Oral History, Cambridge 1983.

Not only this, but oral history, as it will be discussed in the case of Moroccan migration to the UK, can provide completely new information about whole areas of our past which is unavailable from documentary evidence in written sources.

As Alessandro Portelli[2] argues, oral and written sources are not mutually exclusive. They have common as well as autonomous characteristics, and specific functions, which only either one can fill (or which one set of sources fills better than the other). Therefore, they require different specific interpretative instruments. But the undervaluing and the overvaluing of oral sources ends up by cancelling out specific qualities, turning these sources either into mere support for traditional written sources, or into an illusory cure for all ills. The first thing that makes oral history unique, therefore, is that it tells us less about *events* than about their *meaning*. This does not imply however that oral history has no factual validity. Interviews often reveal unknown events or unknown aspects of known events; they always cast new light on unexplored areas of the daily life of the non-hegemonic classes[3].

Oral sources are credible with a *different* type of credibility. The importance of oral testimony may reside not in its adherence to facts, but rather in its departure from them, as imagination, symbolism, and desire emerge. Therefore, there are no ›false‹ oral sources. Once we have checked their factual credibility with all the established criteria of philological criticism and factual verification which are required by all types of sources anyway, the diversity of oral history consists in the fact that ›wrong‹ statements are still psychologically ›true‹ and that this truth may be equally as important as factually reliable accounts. However, having said that, this does not mean that we accept the dominant prejudice, which sees written documents holding the monopoly on factual credibility. Very often written documents are only the uncontrolled transmission of unidentified oral sources. Yet, many historians who turn up their noses at oral sources accept these legal transcripts with no questions asked[4].

Referring back to the case under study, and in the words of Ghada Karmi[5] »The Moroccan community in Britain represents a fascinating subject for study yet, not so easy was the task of studying Moroccans in London, and previous workers had abandoned the attempt. They were reported to be an inward looking, isolated and suspicious community, fearful of authority and largely inaccessible«. It is therefore through an oral history approach, interviews with more than 40 first generation men and women living in London that I will attempt in this paper, to reconstruct part of this recent history that remains to this day unavailable in written sources. Choosing oral history as a method to fill in this historical gap, serves at least two purposes: first, collecting interviews and individual memories that could be gone forever as the first generation is slowly fading away; and second, restoring a sense of self-worth to older people who often feel their lives are of no interest, and who feel marginalised and excluded by both the host society and their country of origin.

2 Alessandro PORTELLI, What makes oral history different, in: Robert PERKS, Alistair THOMSON (eds), the Oral History Reader, London 1998, pp. 64–74.

3 Ibid.

4 Ibid.

5 Ghada KARMI, The Health Status and Health Beliefs of Two London Migrant Communities, in: International Migration Vol. 29, No 1, March 1991, pp. 5–10.

A thematic montage of extracts is used here, where several interview extracts are used representing the various phases of Moroccan migration from: motivations to migrate, to settlement itself, and then the challenges of integration. Building this multi-dimensional picture by using typical life histories allows the stories to be used more effectively in constructing a broader historical interpretation. The reconstructive mode of analysis is adopted here instead of a narrative approach simply because it remains closer to the most characteristic method in published oral history. As Paul Thompson[6] explains, it also remains close to the ›ethnosociological‹ approach for which Daniel Bertaux argues in his »Les Recits de vie«. The objective is to use life-story interviews to reconstruct in detail how social context or elements work and change in this case of a specific migrant community. The ethnosociologist seeks to understand these contexts in terms of testimonies of day-to-day practice and knowledge, and so on, gathered through reflective accounts of practical lived experiences[7]. This clearly echoes the aims of many social historians using oral evidence. It is therefore not surprising that there is much in common between such social historical and sociological forms of analysis.

III. THE ›BLINDINGLY VISIBLE‹ MOROCCAN COMMUNITY IN THE UK

Before discussing the more recent Moroccan migration to the UK, it is worth mentioning that the roots of this exodus go back to the 19th century. According to Fred Haliday[8] the first Moroccans who came were merchants trading in silverware and textiles from Fes. At some point in the nineteenth century, as English cotton goods entered Morocco via Gibraltar and Tangier, Fasi merchants began to settle in large urban centres such as London, Liverpool, and Manchester in England, and Cardiff in Wales.

In the 1960s a more significant migration started, where Moroccan workers came to the UK after being hired by Spanish patronage so as to work in the service industries such as hotels and small businesses that started to prosper in the climate of economic growth during this period.

Based on my interviews, Moroccan migration to the UK in the 20th Century can be categorised into four phases:

- The first wave, which is the most significant one, started in the 1960s and was characterised by the emigration of unskilled labourers who originated mostly from the northern part of Morocco, more specifically Jbala region (Khmiss Sahel, Beni Garfet, Beni Arouss), Larache, Tetouan, Tangiers and the surrounding areas, with a smaller community from Meknes.
- Family reunification followed from the early 1970s onwards; this was the second phase.

6 Paul Thompson, The Voice of the Past: Oral History, Oxford 2000.
7 Daniel Bertaux, Les Recits de vie: Perspective ethnosociologique, Paris 1997.
8 Fred Haliday, The Millet of Manchester: Arab Merchant and Cotton Trade, in: British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies Vol. 19, No. 2 (1992) pp. 159–176.

- The third wave started in the 1980s, with young semi-skilled professionals and entrepreneurs, mostly from Casablanca.
- The fourth wave started in the early 1990s with the emigration of highly skilled Moroccan professionals both from Morocco itself and France. A large majority of these most recent immigrants currently work in the finance sector in London.

An exact estimate of the real size of the Moroccan community at present living in Britain is not available, mainly because British government census data does not include a question of nationality; therefore, one has to rely on the census table which gives the number of UK residents by their place of birth. Another shortcoming of the census data relates to the fact that it is impossible to reach an estimate of the number of UK born Moroccans, because second and third generation migrants who are born in the UK do not appear in the census as they are grouped under ›born in the UK‹. Because of this, researchers are faced with a real challenge in reaching a conclusive picture regarding the number of Moroccans and their geographical distribution in Britain. The Economist published an article on the Arab communities of Britain in 1988 in which the number of Moroccans was estimated to be 50,000[9].

The inadequacy of the national census, coupled with the scattered statistics of other government departments and the guesswork of the migrant's voluntary organisations, only help us to point out that the Arab community in general, and the Moroccan community in Britain in particular, remain veiled as far as policy makers are concerned. In fact, their invisibility could well be interpreted as a significant indicator of an underlying problem facing the majority of Arab migrant workers. Lack of visibility at this level means lack of recognition of the group's presence and an absence of commitment to its interests, grievances and problems[10]. However, this statistical invisibility cannot hide the reality of established migrant communities in this country.

IV. MOTIVATIONS FOR MIGRATION TO THE UK

Similar to other migrations to Western Europe in the late 1960s, Moroccan migration to Britain was mainly a labour migration, influenced by the traditional push and pull factors (i.e. high rates of unemployment in the home country, better job opportunities in the host country). The majority of Moroccans in this first migration phase were recruited to fill job vacancies in the British labour market, mainly in hotel and catering businesses, and to some extent the National Health Service. In other words, it was mainly for economic reasons and the attraction of ›Eldorado‹ that convinced a number of Moroccans to come to Britain, as the following quote from Hajj Mohammed illustrates:

9 Al-Rasheed Madawi, Invisible and divided communities: Arabs in Britain, in: Riad al Rayess (ed.), Arab Communities in Britain, London 1991, pp. 1–13.

10 Ibid.

I was born in Larache. I came to London in the 70s, like everybody else attracted by the idea of London and Great Britain as the ›Eldorado‹. The big illusion in a way! When I was in Larache, I heard from friends about some recruiting agencies that were looking for people to go and work in the catering sector (...) so I went ahead and wrote to one those recruiting agencies. (Hajj Mohammed, January 2004)

As opposed to many other European countries, one of the main specificities of the Moroccan migration in the UK is the large number of women who came as independent migrants in the early 1970s. The following quote from Hajja Zohra, in her early 70s now, who was one of these independent female migrants, testifies:

I arrived in England 35 years ago. At that time there were many people from my home town Larache, who were contracted to work in England. I didn't have any children and my husband had died, so I decided to go. I was told that England is a prosperous country (...) There were a lot of women who came on their own like me in the early 70s. They looked for jobs, and then brought their husbands over. While those who came here single, they got married here. They were from different parts of Morocco but mostly the north of Morocco: Tangiers, Lakssar Lakbir, Larache. (Hajja Zohra, April 2004)

This reflects an earlier feminisation of migration as opposed to what is commonly believed to have happened only through the channel of family reunification. Furthermore, unlike the Moroccan women immigrants elsewhere in Europe, Moroccan women in the UK play a major role in the economic life of the family. In many cases, they came first with work permits, and later had their spouses and children join them. As this Community Development Worker in London states, »This community is not a typical example of a patriarchal community. It was the women that carried all the burden of the family, the majority of them were breadwinners; yet this is rarely acknowledged«.

The increasingly restrictive immigration rules set in motion by the early 1970s encouraged many to bring their families over from Morocco, thus transforming what was originally a temporary migration in search of a livelihood into longer-term settlement. As with many immigrants' wives, Fatima had to join her husband, who came much earlier before her, in 1970.

I was born in Larache, I grew up there until the age of 17, then I got married and came over to England. I joined him in 1983 (...) Of course it was fine with me to come here (...) Anyway we are all supposed to follow our husbands isn't it? While I was with my parents I couldn't go anywhere, so I was quite eager to leave the country and discover new places. (Fatima, December 2003)

Family reunion is often portrayed in migration literature as if women have no other choice but to join their partners in a ›passive‹ manner, as it was reinstated by Fatima's testimony; where she implicitly alludes to the fact that women do not have any decision to make in terms of emigrating to join their husbands. However, through some of my interviews other female migrants stated the opposite. In fact, it was clear that some were quite particular in choosing their future partners, hence deciding about their future country of destination.

V. IMMIGRATION CHANNELS AND ARRIVAL

Moroccan migration to the UK as opposed to France, the Netherlands or Belgium has not been ›structured‹ through bilateral agreements. Instead it was shaped mainly by social networks of friends and relatives. One often hears members of the Moroccan community say: »We did not get the support of the Moroccan government as it's the case for other Moroccan communities in Europe, we are a ›self-made‹ community (...) unfortunately, we are also the forgotten one!«

Hajj Mohammed's experience illustrates how he has managed to ›make‹ it to England:

At that time, the person who wanted to immigrate to England had first to buy an address of a recruiting agency, and then go to Melilla to pay a small fee so that a work contract was sent to him (...) I contacted Castano and Guilbert, recruiting agencies, both based in London and asked them to send me a work contract. I had to then pay a small fee to get my contract. The challenge at the time was how to pay for the fee. I had to go to Melilla ›illegally‹ [without a passport] to pay for that fee. I waited until it was dark to get there, and then till it was dark to leave again. (Hajj Mohammed, January 2004)

Coming to Britain for most of my interviewees was not simply a trip to a new country but was a fresh start for many; it was evoked as a vivid recollection, where often the exact date and even the time of their arrival were given. Similarly, their first impression was also recalled with a lot of emotion:

My first memories of London were that of a cold and a dark place. I remember when I got to Victoria Station I wanted to get a drink to warm up so I asked for a tea. When I was served, only then did I realise that I was in England as it wasn't the mint tea I was used to back home! (Hajj Mohammed, January 2004)

My first memory of England is of extreme loneliness. My father and mother-in-law, as well as my husband, were all working, and since I didn't speak any English and I was new to the country I stayed most of the time at home. (Fatima, December 2003)

The first and most important challenge that Moroccans were faced with once they arrived in the UK, was the language barrier. However, since the majority originated from the north of Morocco, which was a Spanish colony (and part of it still is), most of them were already quite fluent in Spanish, which helped a few of them communicate in their work place. Their fluency in Spanish influenced, to some extent, the choice of jobs of a few of them, as was the case for Hajja Zohra who, after spending more than 35 years in the UK, still speaks very little English. The only way she managed was through having Spanish employers all the time.

I was about 32 years old when I first came to England. I didn't speak any English, in fact I still speak very little English now, but I always managed to get jobs where there were Spanish speakers, and since I'm fluent in Spanish I never had any problems communicating with them. I learned Spanish in Morocco, since they were living with us and they also learnt a bit of Arabic from us. (Hajja Zohra, April 2004)

VI. MAKING A NEW LIFE IN THE UK

Arriving in London with no spoken English, most Moroccans have sought to retain a lifestyle consistent with Moroccan Muslim customs. The great majority, who originate from the north of Morocco, have ended up living in an equally specific part of London, in close proximity to each other in the area of Golborne Rd in North Kensington which is commonly known now as ›Little Morocco‹. According to the 1998 Index of Local Deprivation, Golborne[11] ranks 78th out of the 8616 wards in England with an index of 14.04, placing it among the one percent of most deprived wards nationally. It is no surprise, therefore, to hear such a statement from Hajja Zohra:

When I first came to London, I knew that there were very few Moroccans, but not as many as now. Portobello was empty at the time, now they call it *Colleto*, which is a slum area in Larache. (Hajja Zohra, April 2004)

The community's strength is often described in its self containment, its mutual support networks and its ability to face up to its difficulties of displacement and migration. However, this tendency for the community is becoming ›inward looking‹ has been described by Omar, a Community Development Worker, as a necessity rather than a self conscious decision. He explains that:

If these people chose to remain in close knit communities, I understand it; I don't support it because it's bad for the community. But at the end of the day I don't blame them because they have been forced to do that. These communities are not necessarily comfortable within themselves, but it's just that if you are in dire straights people are willing to help. Because, if you are having problems and you go to the local government to seek help, no one wants to know (...) Sometimes we find the community divided because of stupid issues, but generally it provides that safety net, the help and the support, even sometimes financial support, so people don't have to go to banks to get money to set up businesses. (Omar, May 2004)

Moroccans had to struggle hard to establish their own religious and social facilities, mosque, Koranic and Arabic classes for the younger generation[12]. In London alone there are more than 15 Moroccan community organisations catering for the needs of their local communities by providing advice and support in accessing services, especially to the first generation that still remains relatively isolated because of the language barrier and lack of knowledge of how the system works. There are also several supplementary schools across London, providing support classes for the younger members of the community, second and third generation.

The community's main weaknesses however are related to its relatively low educational and skill levels. This has served further to relegate Moroccans to the margins of British mainstream society, a position from which they find it difficult to move. The Moroccans living in the UK, especially in London, are amongst the most isolated

11 MORI Social Research, This is Golborne: A profile of Golborne ward, January 2000.

12 Jerome Borkwood, From Kensal Village to Golborne Road: Tales of the Inner City, Kensington & Chelsea Community History Group 2002.

people in the capital. The most obvious factor that has contributed to this isolation in comparison with other ethnic minority groups is the fact that the significant minority groups in England have come from countries which were originally colonies within the British Empire. This meant that the combined language and culture barrier was partly waived, and most importantly they had already experienced the nature of British administrative practice in their own countries. In the case of Moroccans there has been no such common ground. Their experience of Britain has, in short, been very different from that in France, Belgium or Spain where there was, at least, some common language as well as a frequent familiarity with the way in which the system works. The result has been that, for a large number of Moroccans, especially those who came in the 1970s, there has been no instinctive, almost unconscious understanding of the way in which British administration works. Conversely, most local authority representatives have lacked any real comprehension of the nature, background, culture or needs of the people they have been trying to help. This has been so even when – as has often been the case – they have been anxious to deal effectively with their problems.

VII. TRANSNATIONAL LIVES AND LOCAL IDENTITIES

The first generation Moroccans, which has very limited knowledge of English, as it is often the case for many migrant communities, live on the long-dream of returning ›home‹ and spending the rest of their days there. They have worked hard to raise their families in the UK, and even the rest of their extended families at home. They have often lived in deprivation to be able to save enough money to build a house in Morocco for their later years; unfortunately this dream of return rarely touches the shore.

We feel that we are just struggling to survive here or there, but in the end we are everywhere! The community is floating, both the young and the old (...) with our community we always think that we are not staying here and we hold on to that dream of going home for good one day (...) but things are changing back home too, and the truth is that we won't fit in there either, so we remain stuck in time (...) waiting. (Hassan, December 2003)

This last quote from Hassan summarises many of the key elements of the dilemma lived by many members of the Moroccan community living in London. This cherished ›dream of return‹ often remains as such and rarely translates into reality. Over the years, Moroccans have become deeply rooted in their local communities in the UK and have developed a stronger sense of belonging compared to when they first came. In fact, improved means of communication and transport combined with the growth of the Moroccan community in the area where they live have played an essential role in nurturing those feelings of a dual sense of belonging.

To be honest, now life has become *equal* because now with all the mosques in the area for me it has become just the same (...) I don't feel any difference as before when I first came here (...) To be honest I want both, Morocco is my home country but here I have my kids and family, I've

developed my roots here (...) I can't leave my family and live on my own in Morocco. I've lived here for 33 years. (Hajj Mohammed, January 2004)

Finding a compromise in an attempt to reconcile between these dual senses of belonging of the first generation Moroccans led to the creation of a new transnational life cycle. Contrary to the usual yearly two months family summer holidays in Morocco, some retired couples now prefer to go in turns. The women would go with their children and grandchildren during the two months holidays and men would stay in London looking after the house, so that when their families are back in September it is the men's turn to go back.

VIII. CONCLUSION

A key question when using oral history in a community context is to what extent can individual migrants' memories be combined to represent a collective memory of a whole community. I would argue that interviewees are selected, not because they present some abstract statistical norm, but because they typify historical processes. Thus the questions to be asked constrain the historian's concept of historical process (i.e. on his conception of history) and the relevance of the information gathered to that particular process. In other words, the real issues here are historiographical, not statistical.

It is for this particular reason that while reconstructing the history of recent Moroccan migration to the UK, I have chosen a reconstructive mode of analysis instead of a narrative approach. The structuring of data from one fairly homogenous group of views is instructive on two levels. It shows that this small sample of interviewees displays impressive congruence with wider historical trends, even when the interviews are divided under different categories. Second, the structured evidence reveals stratified distinctions in behaviour and attitudes, which are not necessarily apparent from pursuing the qualitative evidence of individual interviews. Therefore, structuring the evidence in such a way, not only provided some grounds for generalising evidence in the interviews, but actually contributed to a more accurate appreciation of its meaning and to a reshaping of the interpretation drawn from it. In this case under study, a great deal of basic historical reconstruction was necessary because of a lack of satisfactory documentary evidence on even such basic information. When there is no written evidence, oral history plays a crucial role in historical reconstruction as it has been the case here for Moroccan migrants to the UK or could be the case for any other ›invisible‹ groups or communities.

In short, oral accounts from those who experienced a specific situation provide unsurpassed and irreplaceable evidence for actual behaviour. I am also convinced that there are enormous advantages that can be gained if these accounts are as fully biographical as is practicable. For instance, the case of the independent female migrants represents fascinating data on a hidden process of feminisation of migration that started much earlier than is commonly believed.

Finally, and in the words of Paul Thompson[13], oral history simply makes history »more democratic« by introducing new evidence from the underside; by shifting the focus and opening new areas of inquiry; by challenging some of the assumptions and accepted judgements of historians; by bringing recognition to substantial groups of people who had been ignored. Oral history is a history built around people. It thrusts life into history itself and it widens its scope. It allows heroes not just from the leaders, but also from the unknown majority of the people. It brings history into, and out of, the community. It makes for contact – and hence understanding – between social classes, and between generations. And to individual historians and others, with shared meanings, it can give a sense of belonging to places or in time. In short, it makes for fuller human beings. Equally, oral history offers a challenge to the accepted myth of history, to the authoritarian judgement inherent in its tradition. It provides a means for a radical transformation of the social meaning of history.

13 THOMPSON, The Voice of the Past (see note 6).

SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY

ABRAM, Ruth J., Harnessing the Power of History, in: Richard SANDELL (ed.), Museums, Society, Inequality, London, New York 2002, pp. 125–141.

–, Using the Past to Shape the Future. New Concepts for a Historic Site, in: Museum International 1 (2001) pp. 4–9.

ANDERSON, Benedict, Imagined Communities. Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism, London ²1998.

ANTHIAS, Floya, The Concept of »Social Division« and Theorising Social Stratification: Looking at Ethnicity and Class, in: Sociology 35 (2001) pp. 835–854.

APPADURAI, Arjun, Modernity at Large. Cultural Dimensions of Globalization, Minneapolis, London 1997.

ASSMANN, Aleida, Im Zwischenraum zwischen Geschichte und Gedächtnis: Bemerkungen zu Pierre Noras »Lieux de mémoire«, in: Etienne FRANÇOIS (ed.), Lieux de mémoire, Erinnerungsorte. D'un modèle français à un projet allemand, Berlin 1996, pp. 19–27.

–, FRIESE, Heidrun (eds), Identitäten, Frankfurt a. M. 1998.

ASSMANN, Jan, Das kulturelle Gedächtnis. Schrift, Erinnerung und politische Identität in frühen Hochkulturen, Munich 2002.

Auf den Spuren der Kroaten in Österreich: Katalog zur Ausstellung 1996/97. Tragovima Hrvata u Austriji, ed. Marijan BRAJINOVIĆ, Vienna 1996.

AVIZIENIS, Jura, Mediated and Unmediated Access to the Past: Assessing the Memoir as Literary Genre, in: Journal of Baltic Studies 36 (Spring 2005) pp. 39–50.

BADE, Klaus J., Migration in European History, Malden, Oxford 2003 (The Making of Europe).

BAL, Mieke, Double Exposures. The Subject of Cultural Analysis, New York 1996.

BAUR, Joachim, Standpunkte und Standorte. »Points of Departure« in drei New Yorker Immigrationsmuseen, in: Henrike HAMPE (ed.), Migration und Museum. Neue Ansätze in der Museumspraxis. 16. Tagung der Arbeitsgruppe für Sachkulturforschung und Museum in der Deutschen Gesellschaft für Volkskunde, Münster 2005, pp. 71–82.

BENKE, Gertraud, WODAK, Ruth, Remembering and Forgetting: The Discursive Construction of Generational Memories, in: Mirjana N. DEDAIC, Daniel N. NELSON (eds), At War with Words, Berlin 2003, pp. 215–244.

BENNETT, Tony, The Birth of the Museum. History, Theory, Politics, London, New York 1995.

BERTAUX, Daniel, Les Recits de vie: Perspective ethnosociologique, Paris 1997.

BISCHOFF, Volker, MANIA, Marino, Melting Pot-Mythen als Szenarien amerikanischer Identität zur Zeit der New Immigration, in: Bernhard GIESEN (ed.), Nationale und kulturelle Identität. Studien zur Entwicklung des kollektiven Bewußtseins in der Neuzeit, Frankfurt a. M. 1991, pp. 513–536.

BLANC-CHALÉARD, Marie-Claude, DOUKI, Caroline, DYONET, Nicole, MILLIOT, Vincent (eds), Police et migrants. France, 1667–1939, Rennes 2001.

BLUMBERG, Barbara, Celebrating the Immigrant. An Administrative History of the Statue of Liberty National Monument 1952–1982, New York 1985.

BOBKOVÁ, Lenka (ed.), Exulanti z Prahy a severozápadních Čech v Pirně v letech 1621–1639 [Exiles from Prague and North Western Bohemia in Pirna 1621–1639], Prague 1999.

BOHN, Cornelia, HAHN, Alois, Patterns of Inclusion and Exclusion: Property, Nation and Religion, in: Soziale Systeme 8 (2002) pp. 8–26.

Böke, Karin, Flüchtlinge und Vertriebene zwischen dem Recht auf die alte Heimat und der Eingliederung in die neue Heimat. Leitvokabeln der Flüchtlingspolitik, in: Id., Frank Liedtke, Martin Wengler (eds), Politische Leitvokabeln in der Adenauer-Ära, Berlin 1996, pp. 127–206.

Borkwood, Jerome, From Kensal Village to Golborne Road: Tales of the Inner City, Kensington & Chelsea Community History Group 2002.

Brooks, Kenneth G., The Re-Establishment of Displaced Persons, in: When Hostilities Cease, London 1944 (Papers on Relief and Reconstruction Prepared For the Fabian Society), pp. 99–123.

Brubaker, Rogers, Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany, Cambridge 1992.

–, Cooper, Frederick, Beyond »Identity«, in: Theory and Society 29 (2000) pp. 1–47.

Budrytė, Dovilė, Taming Nationalism? Political Community Building in Post-Soviet Baltic States, Aldershot 2005.

–, Ethnic Restructuring and Its Aftermath in the Baltic States, in: Rainer Münz, Rainer Ohliger (eds), Diasporas and Ethnic Migrants: Germany, Israel and Post-Soviet Successor States in Comparative Perspective, London 2003, pp. 206–210.

–, Coming to Terms with the Past: Memories of Displacement and Resistance in the Baltic States, in: Kenneth Christie, Robert Cribb (eds), Historical Injustice and Democratic Transition in Eastern Asia and Northern Europe, London 2002, pp. 118–138.

Bungert, Heike, »Feast of Fools«: German-American Carnival as a Medium of Identity Formation, 1854–1914, in: Amerikastudien 48.3 (2003) pp. 325–344.

–, From Celebrating the Old to Celebrating the New: The Formation of a German-American Identity, 1859–1914, in: Udo Hebel (ed.), Sites of Memory in American Literature and Cultures, Heidelberg 2003, pp. 193–212.

Chickering, Roger, We Men who Feel Most German: a Cultural Study of the Pan-German League, 1886–1914, Boston 1984.

Cohen, Daniel, Naissance d'une nation: les personnes déplacées de l'après-guerre 1945–1951, in: Genèses 38 (2000) pp. 56–78.

Desforges, Luke, Maddern, Joanne, Front Doors to Freedom, Portal to the Past. History at the Ellis Island Immigration Museum, New York, in: Social and Cultural Geography 3 (2004) pp. 437–457.

Dewitte, Philippe, Un centre d'histoire de l'immigration: Pourquoi et comment?, in: Homme et Migration Jan.–Feb. (2004) pp. 6–15.

Diner, Dan, Restitution and Memory. The Holocaust in European Political Cultures, in: New German Critique 90 (2003) pp. 36–44.

–, Elemente des Subjektwerdung: Jüdische DPs in historischem Kontext, in: Jahrbuch zur Geschichte und Wirkung des Holocaust (1997) pp. 229–248.

Elliott, Mark R., Pawns of Yalta. Soviet Refugees and America's Role in their Repatriation, Urbana 1982.

Emerson, Herbert, Postwar Problems of Refugees, in: Foreign Affairs 21 (1943) pp. 211–218.

Eryilmaz, Aytaç, Deutschland braucht ein Migrationsmuseum. Plädoyer für einen Paradigmenwechsel in der Kulturpolitik, in: Jan Motte, Rainer Ohliger (eds), Geschichte und Gedächtnis in der Einwanderungsgesellschaft. Migration zwischen historischer Rekonstruktion und Erinnerungspolitik, Essen 2004, pp. 305–319.

Espagne, Michel, Bordeaux-Baltique. La présence culturelle allemande à Bordeaux aux XVIII^{e} et XIX^{e} siècles, Bordeaux 1991.

Fahrmeir, Andreas, Citizens and Aliens: Foreigners and the Law in Britain and the German States 1789–1870, New York, Oxford 2000.

François, Etienne, Schulze, Hagen (eds), Deutsche Erinnerungsorte, Munich 2001.

Gantet, Claire, La mémoire, objet et sujet d'histoire. Enquête sur l'historicité et sur l'écriture de l'histoire, in: Francia 28/2 (2001) pp. 109–128.

Giesen, Bernhard (ed.), Nationale und kulturelle Identität. Studien zur Entwicklung des kollektiven Bewußtseins in der Neuzeit, Frankfurt a. M. 1991.

Gosewinkel, Dieter, »Einbürgern und ausschließen«. Die Nationalisierung der Staatsangehörigkeit vom Deutschen Bund bis zur Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Göttingen 2001 (Kritische Studien zur Geschichtswissenschaft, 150).

Grossmann, Atina, Victims, Villains, and Survivors: Gendered Perceptions and Self-Perceptions of Jewish Displaced persons in Occupied Post-War Germany, in: Journal of the History of Sexuality 11 (2002) pp. 291–318.

–, Trauma, Memory and Motherhood: Germans and Jewish Displaced Persons in Post-War Germany, 1945–1949 in: Archiv für Sozialgeschichte 38 (1998) pp. 215–239.

HAHN, Eva, HAHN, Hans-Henning, Flucht und Vertreibung, in: Etienne FRANÇOIS, Hagen SCHULZE (eds), Deutsche Erinnerungsorte I, Munich 2001, pp. 335–351.

HANDLER, Richard, GABLE, Eric, The New History in an Old Museum. Creating the Past at Colonial Williamsburg, Durham 1997.

HARZIG, Christiane, Einwanderung und Politik. Historische Erinnerung und Politische Kultur als Gestaltungsressourcen in den Niederlanden, Schweden und Kanada, Göttingen 2004 (Transkulturelle Perspektiven, 1).

–, JUTEAU, Danielle, SCHMITT, Irina (eds), The Social Construction of Diversity: Recasting the Master Narrative of Industrial Nations, New York 2003.

–, HOERDER, Dirk, SHUBERT, Adrian (eds), The Historical Practice of Diversity: Transcultural Interactions from the Early Modern Mediterranean to the Postcolonial World, New York 2003.

–, HOERDER, Dirk, SHUBERT, Adrian (eds), Negotiating Nations: Exclusions, Networks, Inclusions, Histoire sociale – Social History 34 (2000).

HERBERT, Ulrich (ed.), Arbeit, Volkstum, Weltanschauung. Über Fremde und Deutsche im 20. Jahrhundert, Frankfurt a. M. 1995.

HERZOG, Tamar, Defining nations. Immigrants and citizens in early modern Spain and Spanish America, New Haven, London 2003.

HIGHAM, John, Immigration and American Mythology, in: ID., Hanging Together. Unity and Diversity in American Culture (ed. by Carl J. GUARNERI), New Haven, London 2001, pp. 101–109.

HILTON, Laura, Prisoners of Peace: Rebuilding Community, Identity and Nationality in Displaced Persons Camps in Germany, 1945–52, Ph.D. Dissertation, Ohio State University 2001.

HOERDER, Dirk, Cultures in Contact. World Migration in the Second Millennium, Durham 2002 (Comparative and international working-class history).

HOLLINGER, David A., Postethnic America, New York 1995.

JAMIN, Mathilde, Migrationsgeschichte im Museum. Erinnerungsorte von Arbeitsmigranten – kein Ort der Erinnerung?, in: Jan MOTTE, Rainer OHLIGER (eds), Geschichte und Gedächtnis in der Einwanderungsgesellschaft. Migration zwischen historischer Rekonstruktion und Erinnerungspolitik, Essen 2004, pp. 145–157.

JENKINS, Richard, Rethinking Ethnicity. Arguments and Explorations, London, New Delhi 1997.

JONAS, Susan (ed.), Ellis Island: Echoes from a Nation's Past. The Celebration of the Gateway to America, New York 1989.

KIRSHENBLATT-GIMBLETT, Barbara, Destination Culture. Tourism, Museums, and Heritage, Berkeley, London 1998.

KIRSS, Tiina, KORESAAR, Ene, LAURISTIN, Marju, She Who Remembers Survives: Interpreting Estonian Women's Post-Soviet Life Stories, Tartu 2004.

KÖNIG, Mareike (ed.), Deutsche Handwerker, Arbeiter und Dienstmädchen in Paris. Eine vergessene Migration im 19. Jahrhundert, München 2003 (Pariser Historische Studien, 66).

KÖNIGSEDER, Angelika, WETZEL, Juliane, Waiting for Hope: Jewish Displaced Persons in Post-War Germany, Evanston 2001.

KULISCHER, Eugen, Europe on the Move. War and Population Changes 1917–1947, New York 1948.

KULYK, Volodymyr, The Role of Discourse in the Construction of an Émigré Community: Ukrainian Displaced Persons in Germany and Austria after the Second World War, in: Rainer OHLIGER, Karen SCHÖNWÄLDER, Triadafilos TRIADAFILOPOULOS (eds), European Encounters: Migrants, Migration and European Societies since 1945, Aldershot 2003, pp. 213–237.

KYMLICKA, Will, Multicultural Citizenship. A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights, Oxford 1995.

LAGROU, Pieter, The Legacy of Occupation: Patriotic Memory and National Recovery in Western Europe 1945–1965, Cambridge 2000.

LEQUIN, Yves, La Mosaïque France, Histoire des étrangers et de l'immigration en France, Paris 1988.

LICHTENBERGER, Elisabeth, Gastarbeiter. Leben in zwei Gesellschaften, Wien 1984.

Lower East Side Tenement Museum, A Tenement Story. The History of 97 Orchard Street and the Lower East Side Tenement Museum, New York 2004.

LUCASSEN, Leo, The Threat: The Integration of Old and New Migrants in Western Europe since 1850, Urbana 2004.

LUCIUK, Lubomyr Y., Searching For Place. Ukrainian Displaced Persons, Canada, and the Migration of Memory, Toronto 2000.

MACDONALD, Sharon, FYFE, Gordon (eds), Theorising Museums: Representing Identity and Diversity in a Changing World, Oxford 1996.

MADAWI, Al Rasheed, Invisible and Divided Communities: Arabs in Britain, in: Arab Communities in Britain, London 1991.
MANKOWITZ, Zeev, Life Between Memory and Hope. The Survivors of the Holocaust in Occupied Germany, Cambridge 2002 (Studies in the Social and Cultural History of Modern Warfare).
MOCH, Leslie Page, Moving Europeans. Migration in Western Europe since 1650, Bloomington 2003 (Interdisciplinary Studies in History).
MOELLER, Robert G., War Stories: The Search for a Usable Past in the Federal Republic of Germany, Berkeley 2001.
MORAR-VULCU, Călin, Construcţia identităţilor politice în discursul oficial din România, 1948–1965 (Constructing Political Identities in the Official Discourse in Romania, 1948–1965), Cluj-Napoca 2005.
MOTTE, Jan, OHLIGER, Rainer, (eds), Geschichte und Gedächtnis in der Einwanderungsgesellschaft. Migration zwischen historischer Rekonstruktion und Erinnerungspolitik, Essen 2004.
MÜNZ, Rainer, OHLIGER, Rainer (eds), Diasporas and Ethnic Migrants: Germany, Israel and Post-Soviet Successor States in Comparative Perspective, London 2003.
–, Auslandsdeutsche, in: Etienne FRANÇOIS, Hagen SCHULZE (eds), Deutsche Erinnerungsorte I, Munich 2001, pp. 370–388.
NIETHAMMER, Lutz, Kollektive Identität. Heimliche Quellen einer unheimlichen Konjunktur, Reinbek 2000.
NOIRIEL, Gérard, État, nation et immigration. Vers une histoire du pouvoir, Paris 2001.
–, La Tyrannie du national. Le droit d'asile en Europe 1793–1993, Paris 1991.
–, Le creuset français. Histoire de l'immigration, XIX^{e}–XX^{e} siècles, Paris 1988.
OFER, Dalia, The Strength of Remembrance: Commemorating the Holocaust During the First Decade of the State of Israel, Jewish Social Studies 6-2 (2000) pp. 24–55.
ONKEN, Eva-Clarita, The Legacy of Parents and Grandparents: How Do Young People in Central and Eastern Europe Reflect on the Communist Past?, in: Martin ROBERTS (ed.), After the Wall: History Teaching in Europe since 1989, Hamburg 2004, pp. 239–248.
REEVES, Pamela, Ellis Island. Gateway to the American Dream. New York 1991.
REISIGL, Martin, WODAK, Ruth, Discourse and Discrimination. Rhetorics of Racism and Antisemitism, London, New York 2001.
ROSEN-PREST, Viviane, L'historiographie des Huguenots en Prusse au temps des Lumières. Entre mémoire, histoire et légende: Jean Pierre Erman et Pierre Chrétien Frédéric Reclam, Mémoires pour servir à l'histoire des Réfugiés françois dans les États du Roi (1782–1799), Paris 2002 (Vie des Huguenots, 23).
SAHLINS, Peter, Unnaturally French: Foreign Citizens in the Old Regime and After, Ithaca 2004.
SAYAD, Abdelmalek, La double absence. Des illusions de l'émigré aux souffrances de l'immigré, Paris 1999.
SCHLESINGER, Arthur, The Disuniting of America, New York 1992.
SCHOLZE, Jana, Medium Ausstellung. Lektüren musealer Gestaltung in Oxford, Leipzig, Amsterdam und Berlin, Bielefeld 2004.
SHAIN, Yossi, The Frontier of Loyalty. Political Exiles in the Age of Nation-State, Middletown 1989.
SHAPIRO, Mary J., Gateway to Liberty. The Story of the Statue of Liberty and Ellis Island. New York 1986.
SHILS, Edward A., Social and Psychological Aspects of Displacement and Repatriation, in: Journal of Social Issues 2-3 (1946) pp. 3–18.
SMITH, Judith, Exhibition Review: Celebrating Immigration History at Ellis Island, in: American Quarterly 1 (1992) pp. 82–100.
SMITH, Neil, The New Urban Frontier. Gentrification and the Revanchist City, London, New York 1996.
SOLONARI, Vladimir, Narrative, Identity, State: History Teaching in Moldova, in: East European Politics and Societies 2 (2002) pp. 415–446.
TAYLOR, Charles, Multiculturalism: Examining the Politics of Recognition, ed. and introduced by Amy GUTMANN, Princeton 1994.
TCHEN, John Kuo Wei, Creating a Dialogic Museum. The Chinatown History Museum Experiment, in: Ivan KARP et al. (eds) Museums and Communities. The Politics of Public Culture, Washington, London 1992, pp. 285–326.
TORPEY, John, The Invention of the Passport. Surveillance, Citizenship and the State, Cambridge 2000.
VERDERY, Katherine, National Ideology Under Socialism. Identity and Cultural Politics in Ceauşescu's Romania, Berkley 1991.
VERNANT, Jacques, The Refugee in the Post-War World, New Haven 1953.
WAGNER, Patrick, Displaced Persons in Hamburg. Stationen einer halbherzigen Integration, 1945 bis 1948, Hamburg 1997.

Wallace, Michael, Mickey Mouse History and Other Essays on American Memory, Philadelphia 1996, pp. 55–73.

Weil, Patrick, Qu'est-ce qu'un Français? Histoire de la nationalité française depuis la Révolution, Paris 2002.

Wells, Charlotte C., Law and Citizenship in Early Modern France, Baltimore, London 1995.

Welz, Gisela, Inszenierungen kultureller Vielfalt, Frankfurt a. M., New York, Berlin 1996.

Wieviorka, Annette, Déportation et génocide. Entre la mémoire et l'oubli, Paris 1992.

Windler, Christian, Plurale Identitäten: Französische Staatsangehörigkeit in mediterranen Diasporasituationen, in: Saeculum 55 (2004) pp. 97–131.

Wodak, Ruth, de Cillia, Rudolf, Reisigl, Martin, Liebhart, Karin, The Discursive Construction of National Identity, Edinburgh 1999.

Wyman, Mark, DPs: Europe's Displaced Persons 1945–1951, Ithaca 1998.

–, On the Trail of the Displaced Persons: Sources, Problems, Dangers, Opportunities, in: Spectrum (Immigration History Research Center, University of Minnesota) 6 (1994) pp. 19–25.

Zika, Charles, Memory and Commemoration in Recent English-Language Historiography and Discourse, in: Paul Münch (ed.), Jubiläum, Jubiläum ... Zur Geschichte öffentlicher und privater Erinnerung, Essen 2005, pp. 241–257.

LIST OF CONTRIBUTORS

Joachim BAUR is a PhD candidate at the Department of Cultural Anthropology at the University of Tübingen, Germany (joachim.baur@gmx.net).

Dovilė BUDRYTĖ is an Associate Professor of International Studies at Brenau University in Gainesville, Georgia, USA (dbudryte@brenau.edu).

Myriam CHERTI is a PhD candidate at the Sussex Centre for Migration Research, University of Sussex, Great-Britain (Myriam.cherti@mrcf.org.uk or mcherti@hotmail.com).

G. Daniel COHEN is an Assistant Professor of Modern European History at Rice University in Houston, Texas, USA (gdcohen@rice.edu).

Wladimir FISCHER is a Research Associate at the University of Vienna, Austria (wladimir.fischer@univie.ac.at).

Dirk HOERDER is a Professor at the University of Bremen and University of Paris 8 – Saint-Denis and teaches North American social history and history of migrations (hoerder@uni-bremen.de).

Mareike KÖNIG is a Research Fellow at the German Historical Institute Paris and teaches at the École pratique des hautes études in Paris (mkoenig@dhi-paris.fr).

Jan MOTTE is an historian by training and staff member of the unit for »EU and international Affairs« at the Ministry for Intergenerational Affairs, Family, Women and Integration North Rhine – Westphalia, in Düsseldorf/Germany (jan.motte@mgffi.nrw.de).

Rainer OHLIGER is a board member of the Network Migration in Europe (rainer.ohliger@web.de).

Alexander SCHUNKA is an Assistant at the Chair of early modern history, University of Stuttgart, Germany (Alexander.Schunka@po.hi.uni-stuttgart.de).

Hanna SONKAJÄRVI is a PhD candidate at the Department of History and Civilization at the European University Institute in Florence, Italy (Hanna.Sonkajarvi@iue.it).

Lavinia STAN is a PhD candidate in International Relations at Babeş-Bolyai University, Cluj-Napoca, Romania (slavinia@msn.com).

Pierre DE TRÉGOMAIN is a PhD candidate at the Department of German studies at the University of Sorbonne nouvelle Paris 3 (pierre.detregomain@libertysurf.fr).

Klaus WEBER is a Research Fellow at the Rothschild Archive (London) and Honorary Research Fellow at the History Department of Royal Holloway, University of London (klaus.weber@rothschild.co.uk).